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Abstract 
Why do some Muslim nations confront more radical religious mobilization, but 
not others? This study provides insights into the answer to this question through 
focused analysis of the Malaysian case. In contrast to some other nations with 
active radical Islamist movements, Malaysia is characterized by weak religious 
activism of both the radical and liberal varieties. This study explains this relative 
tranquility by focusing on the particular quality of state intervention in Islamic 
affairs: the process of institutionalization of religious bureaucratic authority 
structures within the state. The study argues that the key to understanding 
outcomes in Malaysia in a comparative context lies in the extent to which Islamic 
institutions are institutionalized in the state as well as in how institutionalization 
takes place. 
Malaysia, one of the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, offers an 
intriguing case for debates about religious political mobilization and state-religion 
relations. In Malaysia, the process of state intervention in Islamic affairs was 
carried out via a strategy that contrasted starkly with that used by many other 
Muslim nations. The government dominated by the Malay-Muslim party UMNO 
expanded bureaucracies to carry out religious functions such as administration of 
Syariah and the running of religious schools along Weberian lines. It has managed 
to control and channel religious political mobilization by incorporating many 
theologically-trained Muslims into the state bureaucracy. 
v 
This study asks why and how the institutionalization of the religious 
bureaucracy took place in the manner it did, and what the effects on the 
mobilizational capacities of oppositional religious movements were. Conventional 
wisdom claims that state intervention in Islamic affairs occurs in response to 
growing external pressures from societal actors, especially the Islamist opposition 
in the context of growing Islamic consciousness among the Muslim urban 
middle-class. My study takes this society-centric argument to another level by 
highlighting another critically important force: state actors. The study focuses on 
strategic interactions among Muslim politicians within the ruling party and argues 
that they are motivated not only by their need to combat the Islamist opposition 
but also compelled to cultivate patronage networks in order to rise within their 
own party. Such incentives-against the backdrop of intense intra-party 
competition-shaped the way in which the state intervened in Islamic affairs. I 
also argue that the manner in which the government incorporated religious 
authorities-ulama-into the state bureaucracy has correlates strongly with a 
state's capacity to control various religious activities, including radical 
ones-both in ideological and organizational terms. 
The study makes some comparisons between Malaysia and other Muslim 
nations (especially its neighbor Indonesia) to suggest that the mode of state 
co-optation of religious authorities is a crucial factor to explain the state capacity 
to regulate oppositional Islamist mobilization in general, and religious radicalism 
in particular. Concurrently, this study also contends that the institutional exclusion 
of religious authorities from the corridors of state power often has the opposite 
consequence: persistent radical religious mobilization at the societal level. The 
Malaysian case confirms that when religious authorities become part of a more or 
Vl 
less Weberian state bureaucracy, radical religious elements tend to be tempered. 
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CHAPTERl: 
INTRODUCTION 
Actually Malaysia is already an Islamic country. The State religion is Islam and 
Muslims can practice their religion and apply the Syariah laws as family laws. 
All the religious needs of Muslims are provided by the government. 
-Mahathir Mohamad.1 
A faith community whose proud boast was long that it placed no intermediaries 
between the Almighty and the individual and therefore no Pope now runs the 
risk, thanks to this new Malaysian practice and its proliferation of state 
religious authorities, of having more popes at any one time than the Catholic 
church has had throughout the history of Rome and Avignon! 
-Norani Othman, a founding member of Sisters in Islam.2 
There has long been great interest in the relationship between · state and 
religion-especially the state's mobilization of religion to strengthen legitimacy, to 
promote nationalist causes and to justify war. In Western political thought, the 
development of more rational and efficient state institutions has been correlated with the 
secularization of the state, and the separation between state and church in particular. In 
many parts of the world, however, religion continues to be closely entwined with the 
state. Since September 11 2001, the issue of the proper relationship between state and 
religion has received renewed attention in the context of political Islam. Religious 
1 Speech entitled 'The role oflslam in the Modem State,' New York, USA, 3 February 2002, downloaded 
from http://www.smpke.jpm.my/WebNotesApp/PMMAIN.nsf/ (accessed on 9 March 2002). 
2 Norani Othman (1998: 20). 
mobilization and the, proliferation of extremist types of religious movements in the 
Muslim world, in particular, have been of great international concern. 
Scholars and policymakers alike are particularly concerned with how to prevent these 
religious movements from engaging in violence. The focus of attention is on the 
theologically trained Islamic scholars or authorities, who are called ulama. These 
individuals are seen by many Western observers as sources of radical religious 
mobilization, political agitation, and violence in Muslim societies. 
Two analytical perspectives prevail in the current debate on radical religious 
mobilization in Muslim nations. The first claims that Islamic culture plays a central role 
in spurring radicalism. This 'culturalist' view suggests ·that Islamic culture is 
characterized by intolerance and is responsible for the problem of religious 
radicalization. 3 This view echoes the culturalist assumption, advanced by scholars such 
as Samuel Huntington, that Islam is not compatible with the Western model of liberal 
democracy (Huntington 1984, 1993).4 
A second explanatory paradigm focuses on Islamic doctrinal precepts-that is, the 
teachings contained in the Qur'an and Hadith (the sayings and the deeds of the Prophet). 
This view suggests that some of these teachings facilitate radical political ideas that help 
mobilize social discontent. The prime example is the idea of jihad (holy war), which is 
sometimes narrowly interpreted as a war conducted by Muslims against non-believers. 
This view also holds that Islamic teachings that repudiate the separation between state 
and religion help foster radical Islamic movements in Muslim societies today. 
These perspectives are similar in one key respect. Both assume that all Muslim 
societies are alike and reinforce a 'static' and 'uniform' view about religion and Muslim 
3 About this culturalist claim, see, for example, Roy (1994: 7-12) 
4 The perspective that 'something is wrong with Islamic culture', however, has been contested by other 
scholars who take an equally culturalist position to suggest that Islam can actually promote the emergence 
of civil and democratic culture and institutions. The case of Indonesia, for example, has been put forward 
by Hefner (2000). 
2 
societies. Such monolithic views about Muslim societies lead to a conclusion that is 
problematic. This conclusion is that one solution to the problem ofreligious mobilization 
is to modernize culture and institutions by replacing existing institutions with Western 
liberal democratic institutions. In particular, proponents of these paradigms conclude that 
the separation between state and church is crucial. 
But if the separation of church and state is really the answer, then why is it that some 
Muslim countries have managed to contain the proliferation of radical Islamic 
movements better than others by incorporating rather than excluding Islamic elements 
from tlie state apparatus? I use the term 'radical' to refer broadly to Islamist5 groups that 
adopt a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and Hadith and are uncompromising not only 
in terms of ideological orientation but also behavior, objectives, and tactics. Radicals call 
for the full implementation of Syariah and are reluctant to acknowledge the legitimacy of 
governments that fall short of their goals (Roy 1994: 41-42). Under this definition, some 
reject accommodation with the state system and insist on the necessity of violent mass 
mobilization both in theory and in practice. Others are only uncompromising in terms of 
ideological orientation, and do not always advocate violence as a means of achieving 
their goal. 
The relations between state and religion have been hotly debated as well-organized 
Islamist parties have managed to mobilize a broad spectrum of popular allegiance in some 
Muslim nations in recent years. In non-Muslim nations, too, a growing number of 
5 This study inclusively uses the term 'Islamic' to characterize actors that emphasize Islamic identities 
and/or endorse Islamic doctrines unless otherwise specified. Some Islamic organizations are led by 
theologically trained ulama to uphold traditional interpretation and enforcement of Syariah, but this is not 
always the case. Others broadly identify Islamic values and principles and are more concerned with the 
welfare needs of Muslims and exhibit little interest in political activism. 'Islamist' is used more narrowly to 
distinguish groups, parties, and individuals that see in Islam a guiding political doctrine that justifies and 
motivates collective action on behalf of that doctrine. Islamist groups are usually led by university-educated 
Muslim intellectuals, and the leadership of theologically trained ulama is insignificant. Muslim 
Brotherhoods in the Middle-East are a prime example of this type. It has to be admitted, however, that strict 
categorization of various strands of Islamic groups is not straightforward, as they sometimes change their 
doctrinal positions according to political conditions. For basic information about the concepts oflslamism, 
see, for example, Roy (1994: chaps.1-2). 
3 
immigrant Muslim populations have raised questions about the state role in 
administration of religious matters (Kepel 1997). Moreover, state exclusion of Islamist 
movements and leaders from the formal political system appears to have brought about a 
costly, rather than positive, outcome; it has helped fud religious radicalism and at times 
violence (Hafez 2003). If state exclusion is not always the answer in controlling 
proliferation of radical religious movements, the key question is how to include religious 
elements into a state system. 
The case of Malaysia, one of the Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, poses 
particularly tough questions for those who espouse the views I noted earlier. 6 In the 
1970s, just like many other Muslim nations, Malaysia experienced an upsurge oflslamist 
movements. Yet, radical and violent types of Islamist mobilization proved largely 
ineffective and were readily curtailed both ideologically and organizationally. Moreover, 
the government led by the Muslim-based UMNO (United Malays National Organization) 
managed to promote a moderate-and standardized-type of Islam, while actively 
incorporating religious authorities into the state. 
Malaysia also stands out among Muslim nations in respect to 'quiescence': the lack of 
vibrant Islamic doctrinal debates and near absence of liberal and plural Islamic 
activism-a growing trend in some other parts of the Muslim world (e.g., Eickelman and 
Anderson 1999, 2003; Esposito and Voll 2001). This is a puzzling outcome if we take into 
account Malaysia's comparatively high level of socio-economic development. It is also 
worth noting that some other Muslim governments are more repressive and violent than 
the Malaysian government (Diamond, Plattner, and Bromberg 2003: introduction). What 
is the source of Malaysia's demobilized Islamic activism? 
6 Malaysia is a multi-ethnic nation comprising three major ethnic groups, Malay, Chinese, and Indian. 
Malay and other indigenous groups comprise approximately 58 percent, Chinese 24 percent, Indian 8 
percent and others 10 percent. Malays are virtually all Muslim; some Indians and a very small proportion of 
Chinese are Muslim. 
4 
This study argues that the institutionalization of religious bureaucratic authority 
structures-the particular quality of·state co-optation of religious authorities-strongly 
correlates to the conspicuous weakness of religious mobilization. I employ the concept, 
institutionalization, when government organizations take on Weber's meritocratic, 
rational-legal authority structures to manage religious affairs, and these bureaucratic 
procedures and precepts, in Huntington's terms, 'acquire value and stability' (Huntington 
1968: 12). This is opposed to another type of state organization characterized by 
personalistic relations and ascriptive norms and practices, a type Weber called 
'patrimonial.' 
Malaysia is an important example of political stability and moderate Islam. It offers a 
case where the government has managed to control and channel religious political 
mobilization by incorporating a 'church-like' 7 religious bureaucracy within the state. 
Malaysia's Muslim-led federal government launched an Islamization policy in the early 
1980s. This led to unprecedented federal encroachment on Islamic affairs-an area that 
constitutionally falls under the jurisdiction of individual States of the Malaysian 
federation. 8 As a result, that part of the federal bureaucracy that sponsors and regulates 
Islamic affairs (e.g., Syariah laws, religious education) was dramatically expanded, 
although State governments retained many powers. 
By focusing on the Malaysian case, the study asks why and how the institutionalization 
of state religious bureaucracy took place in the particular manner that it did, and what the 
effects of the institutionalization on the mobilizational capacities of oppositional religious 
movements were. Conventional wisdom asserts that state intervention in religious affairs 
occurs in response to growing external pressures from societal actors. The most 
7 The Sunni Islamic tradition conventionally does not recognize the bureaucratized clerical order in which 
ulama have power. 'Church' here is broadly identified as a formal hierarchical clerical body. 
8 This study uses 'State' (with capital letter) to refer to a state government in the Federal system, while 
'state' refers to a set of national bureaucratic authority structures in a conceptual sense (e.g., state-society 
relations). 
5 
formidable pressure is in the form of an electoral threat from the rising influence of 
oppositional Islamic parties among the growing Muslim urban middle-class which is 
becoming increasingly self-consciously Islamic. My study, however, complements this 
society-centric argument by highlighting another important force: state actors. The study 
focuses on strategic interactions among Muslim politicians within the governing party 
and argues that they are motivated not only by their need to combat the Islamic opposition 
but also compelled to cultivate patronage networks in order to rise within their own party. 
Such incentives-shaped in the context of intense intra-party competition-affected the 
way in which the state intervened in religious affairs. The study also contends that the 
manner in which the government incorporates religious authorities-u/ama-into the 
formal state structure strongly correlates with a state's capacity to· control various 
religious movements, including radical ones-both in ideological and organizational 
terms. 
In other words, a close relationship between state and religion may not necessarily be a 
bad thing for a state confronted by religious extremism. The key issue, however, is not 
simply whether or not there is state intervention, but how the state intervenes and 
incorporates religious authorities into government organizations. 
Unlike the contemporary Western world, state intervention in religion is nothing 
extraordinary in the Muslim world; most governments intervene in religious institutions 
and seek to co-opt religious authorities.9 This is not particularly surprising given the fact 
that religious authorities (ulama) potentially exert enormous political influence and can 
pose a grave threat to the dominance and legitimacy of both secular and religious ruling 
elites. Despite this threat commonly felt by elites in many Muslim nations, however, the 
mode of state intervention in religious institutions-and the relationship between state 
and religious authorities-varies greatly across place and time. Some Muslim 
9 In Asia, state intervention in religious affairs is common not only in Muslim but also non-Muslim nations. 
6 
governments depict political Islam and Islamist movements as threats to national security 
and seek to maintain the relatively secular character of the state by suppressing and 
excluding religious organizations and actors from the corridors of formal state power 
(e.g., Algeria, Turkey, Indonesia). 10 Others, on the other hand, adopt a pro-Islam position 
by granting official recognition to Islam and imbuing the state with a more Islamic 
character. These governments give ulama considerable authority and power within 
government institutions to implement 'orthodox' Islamic doctrines (e.g., Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Egypt, Malaysia). 
In Malaysia, state intervention in religious affairs took on a special character through a 
strategy that contrasted starkly with those used in many other Muslim nations. Malaysia 
maintained relatively secular government institutions but at the same time expanded the 
religious bureaucracy along Weberian lines to perform religious functions such as 
administration of Syariah. In the process, the government incorporated a number of 
religious-educated Muslims into the state bureaucracy and provided them with stable 
long-term career prospects as well as some authority and power. These Muslims may 
have been marginalized and dislocated under a rapidly modernizing regime and have 
become potential sources of discontent against the government. By incorporating them 
into the tightly defined state organizations, the governing politicians have attained 
'infrastructural power' not only to limit effectively sources of oppositional mobilization 
but also to prevent religious authorities from gaining too much power within the ruling 
party and the government dominated by it. 
Comparison between Malaysia and other cases (especially its neighbor Indonesia) 
informs us that the mode of state co-optation of religious authorities helps to explain the 
Thailand and Singapore are examples. 
10 It has to be acknowledged that there is a significant variation across regimes/governments within single 
countries or even within single regimes. For example, the Suharto regime in Indonesia initially regarded 
political Islam as a threat and only began to adopt a more-pro Islam position at the end of the 1980s. In 
Turkey, secular-oriented governments were swept from power by the Islarnist Justice and Development 
Party which won an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections in 2002. 
7 
state's capacity to control oppositional religious mobilization in general, and religious 
radicalism in particular. In Indonesia, the government's involvement in Islamic affairs has 
been relatively limited, leaving many religious functions to private actors. And, most 
significantly, its intervention takes a patrimonial character. President Suharto, for 
example, endorsed the formation of extra-governmental organizations which, among 
other activities, channeled public resources to particular private group interests. 
Moreover, the state religious agency, the Department of Religious Affairs, was largely 
staffed by rival societal religious groups competing for public spoils. Unlike equivalent 
agencies in Malaysia, this department was a poor instrument for the coherent regulation 
of religious activities at the societal level. 
Conversely, this study also asserts that the institutional exclusion of religious 
authorities from the corridors of state power often has an opposite and destructive 
consequence: persistent radical religious mobilization in society. Furthermore, the 
Malaysian case suggests that when religious authorities become part of the tightly 
organized state bureaucracy, radical religious elements tend to be tempered. 
The rest of the present chapter proceeds as follows. The following section discusses 
debates about religious mobilization and state-religion relations in Muslim nations and 
the approaches of prior studies that emphasize societal actors. This is followed by 
discussion of my approach. The focus is on the state and the quality of state intervention 
in Islamic affairs. I elaborate my central questions and key concepts, contending 
arguments and their problems, and my arguments. The final section introduces 
comparative cases to assess my propositions. 
8 
States, Social Forces, and Religious Mobilization 
The function of religious authorities in politics has always been a contentious question in 
the modern world and has motivated significant scholarly debates (e.g., Casanova 1994). 
In many parts of the world both governments and social forces have expressed their 
political aspirations and interests in religious terms. Governments have sought religious 
endorsement while oppositionists have mobilized religious support to displace or 
influence existing governments. 11 
Secular ruling elites, that is, political leaders whose authority is not derived primarily 
from religious identity and theological training, have also attempted to utilize the 
mobilizational power ofreligion to extend their authority and to foster popular allegiance 
to their rule. For secular ruling elites, a central concern is how to keep religious 
movements peaceful and how to preempt these movements so that they cannot mobilize 
social discontent against them. In other words, how to hold church or clerical authorities 
at bay poses a major challenge. 
Despite the global significance of religious forces in politics, no other religion has 
attracted as much attention as Islam among scholars and policymakers alike in recent 
decades. In the global context of the War Against Terror and American efforts to construct 
democracy in Muslim nations, the issue of the proper relationship between state and 
religious authorities has received renewed attention; to what extent should the state 
intervene in religious affairs? Is religion none of the state's business and should it be left 
exclusively to the religious authorities? Should religious authorities be incorporated 
into-or excluded from-government organizations? 
11 See, for example, for Catholic Latin America, Levine (1981; 1986) and Levine and Mainwaring (1989), 
for the Catholic Philippines, Casper (1995) and Youngblood (1990), for Buddhist Southeast Asia, Ishii 
(1986), Keyes (1971; 1987), Matthews (1993), Mendelson (1975) and Smith (1978), and for Hindu/Muslim 
India, van der Veer (1994). 
9 
Contention derives from diverging positions with regard to the proper relationship 
between state and religion, and the political role of clerical authorities. These questions 
have been very divisive not only between Muslim and non-Muslim communities but also 
within the Muslim community. In the Western world, the secularist principle that state 
and church should be separate is generally a received wisdom. In other words, the state 
should not run religious affairs and such matters should exclusively, or at least largely, be 
left to the church and professional clergy. 12 
In contrast, the issue of the relationship between state and religious authorities remains 
unsettled across the Muslim world (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996: especially chap.3; 
Piscatori 1983). A traditional interpretation of Islamic precepts denounces the division 
between state and religion, allowing the former a much larger-and legitimate-role in 
governing religious matters. Overall, the 'no separation' principle is widely 
acknowledged within Muslim nations and among Islamic scholars in particular (e.g., Roy 
1994: especially 12-13). This doctrinal sanction allows ulama and Islamists wide scope 
for claiming state power-and urging state implementation of religious doctrines, 
especially Syariah (Islamic law). Thus, even in Muslim nations such as Indonesia and 
Turkey, issues related to the extent to which the state should be involved in religious 
affairs remain unresolved and contentious politically. The question remains to be a source 
. of dispute even after Islamists are allowed to participate in contests for state office. 
Thus, state-religion relations in Muslim nations vary significantly and are not as simple 
as conventionally depicted by some Western observers. Some Muslim-dominant 
countries such as Turkey and Indonesia chose to adopt 'secular' principles in the course 
of modem nation-state building, and rejected Islam as the ideological and institutional 
foundation of the state. Even when a country decided to incorporate Islam as the official 
religion such as in Malaysia, Algeria, and Pakistan, this conclusion did not make its 
12 Recent debates about state-church relations in the United States and other parts of the Western world, 
10 
government 'Islamic.' Two points should be noted. First, there is· no clear relation 
between the official (constitutional} position of the religion and the attributes of state 
religious administration. There are a number of so-called 'Islamic states,' but those states 
differ in terms of the mode and level of state involvement in religious affairs. The position 
of religious authorities-ulama-in these states is not predetermined either; the extent to 
which they are allowed real decision-making power is contingent on the particular 
political context. For example, Pakistan was born as an 'Islamic' state, but the executive 
has always been in the hands of Western-educated secular elites or military officers. The 
role of religious authorities in government institutions has been limited. 
Second, state leaders are equipped with a range of political and institutional 
instruments to engage in Islamic affairs without altering the entire original constitutional 
framework. In other words, the state can intervene in religious affairs regardless of its 
official rubric as Islamic or secular and regime type. Thus, a proper analytical framework 
is needed to better understand the actual relationship between state and religious 
authorities. This study intends to partially fill this analytical gap by advancing the concept 
of institutionalization of religious bureaucratic authority structures. 
Religious Actors and Political Mobilization 
The state's efforts to accommodate religious authorities are primarily due to a political 
reality that confronts many Muslim rulers: religious authorities-ulama--can pose an 
enormous thre~t to the political legitimacy and authority of secular Muslim ruling elites. 
Most Muslim-dominant governments intervene in religious institutions to preempt 
religious authorities from becoming a source of oppositional mobilization or violence 
within the Muslim community. Moreover, ulama are not the sole Islamic opposition to the 
government. Islamist groups led by non-theologically trained Muslim intellectuals such 
however, seem to suggest that such 'secularist' assumptions have been increasingly questioned. 
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as the Muslim Brotherhood have become influential and popular in many parts of the 
Muslim world. Compared with traditional ulama, these groups tend to adopt a variety of 
modem tactics and vigorous interpretational skills to expand their influence and can also 
pose a serious threat to secular elites in the government. When a government confronts an 
Islamist opposition, ruling elites need to rely on the cooperation of ulama to rebut the 
Islamists on doctrinal grounds. 
Across the Muslim world, Islamic institutions such as traditionai religious schools 
(madrasah, pondok) and mosques have customarily offered an important site for political 
mobilization (Wiktorowicz 2004). Ulama who run these institutions have been a source 
of moral and political leadership. In Muslim Southeast Asia, these Islamic institutions 
also acted as significant ideological and organizational vehicles to mobilize popular 
support for anti-colonial and nationalist causes and to express political and 
socio-economic concems. 13 
Rulers have also recognized the value and power of these Islamic institutions since the 
advent oflslam in the Malay archipelago. In the pre-colonial Malay world, Malay rulers 
readily accommodated Islam to promote their ideological and political causes and to 
reinforce political legitimacy (Milner 1981). After the onset of colonial rule, the British 
policy of co-opting Muslim rulers (or Sultans), coupled with their accommodative policy 
towards Islam, helped reinforce and centralize the official position oflslam. The colonial 
regime helped build state institutions to administer Islamic courts, Islamic schools and 
other religion-based social functions (Roff 1974, 1998; Yegar 1979). As discussed in 
chapter 2, Muslim rulers' handling ofreligious affairs in colonial Malaysia (then known 
as British Malaya) differed from the Dutch colonial regime's dealings with religious 
authorities in Indonesia (then known as the Netherlands East Indies). The Dutch remained 
13 For a general overview ofreligious-based anti-colonial a~d nationalist movements, see Ileto (1999). On 
specifically Islamic movements in Southeast Asia in the more recent period, see Hefner and Horvatich 
(1997). 
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alert to Islam as a source of political agitation and unrest, and adopted a cautious 
approach that excluded Islamic movements and activities from formal involvement in 
government. Despite the colonial government's vigilance towards political activism, a 
number oflslamic social-welfare movements such as the modernist Muhammadiyah, the 
nationalist Sarekat Islam and the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) emerged and 
expanded under Dutch rule (e.g., Benda 1957). 
After the global rise oflslamic reformist movements in the 1970s, the challenge faced 
by ruling elites in dealing with religious forces grew greater. A wide spectrum oflslamic 
movements and associations mushroomed in Muslim societies. Some were explicitly 
political in objective and approach; while some demanded political liberalization, others 
called for the establishment of an 'Islamic state.' Islam offered an ideological and 
organizational channel and moral leadership to mobilize resistance against government 
authorities. Other movements were only implicitly political and more committed to the 
socio-economic welfare of their ·adherents; they advocated the interests of the 
underprivileged groups and initiated a wide range of educational and welfare programs. 
Muslim communities in Southeast Asia similarly lived through the rise of Islamic 
reformist movements against the backdrop of rapid socio-economic transformation- and 
the rise of Muslim urban middle-classes which became more Islamic in their devotion 
and life-style (e.g., Barton 1994; Effendy 2003; Federspiel 1998; Ramage 1995). Hefuer 
(1993; 1997; 2000), for example, depicted the Indonesian situation this way: although a 
handful of uncompromising Isla.mist movements strove for the establishment of an 
Islamic state, 'political Islam' 14 was largely neutralized under Suharto's authoritarian 
regime and moderate Muslims generally sought to develop new Islamic initiatives, 
especially in the field of education, the economy, and social welfare in the 1980s. 
14 
'Political Islam' refers to Islamic activism that emphasizes involvement in party politics and other 
political activities. 
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Flourishing Islamic activism-termed 'cultural Islam' 15-Hefner argues, arose primarily 
from rising bourgeois aspirations and 'the most spectacular evidence of cultural Islam's 
advance was visible' in the booming metropolitan regions of Indonesia (Hefner 1997: 
90).16 
Malaysia's Islamic movements exhibited similar characteristics, and were also 
associated with rapid socio-economic transformation and the emergence of urban 
middle-class Muslims. 17 The active involvement of youth organizations and university 
students in dakwah (Islamic missionary) and other religious activities was a distinctive 
feature of the Islamic reformist movements (Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Chik 1992; 
Nagata 1980; Zainah Anwar 1987). The most prominent among these non-governmental 
Islamic movements was ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, Muslim Youth 
Movement of Malaysia) led by Anwar Ibrahim, the most prominent and charismatic 
Islamic-oriented politician who was later inducted into UMNO by then Prime Minister 
Mahathir in 1982. 18 Despite its efforts to promote dakwah activities among a wider 
spectrum of Muslims, both in urban and rural areas, ABIM's influence was more or less 
restricted to students and the better-educated urban middle-class. ABIM found relatively 
little acceptance in rural areas primarily because many, although by no means all, of its 
leaders were secular educated, in contrast to the ulama (Nagata 1980: 423-28; Zainah 
Anwar 1987: 42). 19 
15 Muslim intellectuals and scholars use the terms 'cultural Islam' or 'civil Islam,' to refer to Islamic activity 
that serves as a source of ethical and cultural guidance. 
16 Universities were at the forefront ofthis trend. By the early 1980s, campus-wide devotional movements 
were spawned at virtually every major university. In order to Islamize secular universities students adopted 
relaxed forms of dress, amusement, and interaction, while encouraging strict adherence to Muslim 
devotional acts, including the daily prayers, the fast, and payment of alms (zakat) to the poor (Hefuer 1993: 
12-13). 
17 Some scholars emphasize the role of ethnic identity to account for strong religious assertion among 
Malays (Russin Mutalib 1990; Shamsul A.B. 1994, 1997). 
18 ABIM was formed in August 197L Only 153 attended its inaugural meeting, but by the late 1970s, its 
membership was estimated to have mushroomed to around 35,000 (Nagata 1980: 423-28). Anwar later 
became Deputy Prime Minister. 
19 Others dispute this characterization. J omo and Ahmed Shabery, for example, note that 'in rural areas, 
ABIM was received as the champion of the umma (Muslim community), addressing itself to social as well 
as religious issues.' ABIM's pragmatic and this-worldly approach, in fact, stirred a great deal of sympathy 
and support among the Muslim populace (Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Chik 1992: 853). 
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Muslim ruling elites could not simply ignore the rise of religious activism in society. 
For them, how to deal with these pressures from Muslim communities ultimately boiled 
down to the question of political legitimacy (Alagappa 1995: 39-41). A failure to deal 
skillfully with this challenge could both cause an upsurge in anti-government sentiment 
in one community or another, and jeopardize political legitimacy. 
It is important to note, however, that the reaction of Muslim governments to this global 
trend differed significantly across nations. Some governments defended essentially the 
'secular' characters of the state apparatus at the risk of sacrificing some authority within 
increasingly self-consciously Islamic Muslim constituencies. They avoided any obvious 
involvement in the running ofreligious affairs. Some national leaders perceived Islamist 
groups as threats to their hegemonic position in the Muslim community and suppressed 
them by exploiting security means. 
Other governments, in contrast, pursued a policy of Islamization and funded various 
religious socio-economic activities (such as Islamic education) to win the hearts and 
minds of Muslims. Government leaders undertook greater state involvement in religious 
affairs in order to preempt the capture of the state by conservative ulama or Islamists. The 
seizure of state power by a class of ulama in Iran in 1979 sent a blunt reminder to other 
modernizing Muslim leaders that too much modernization and secularization would put 
their political future at risk. Confronted with similar pressures, why did some 
governments choose to actively incorporate Islamic elements into state institutions while 
others did not? 
Where is the State? 
What is often dismissed and less explored in the debate related to religious mobilization 
in general, and Islamic political activism in particular, is the function of the state. 
Dominant society-centric views about religious mobilization have made the role of states 
15 
secondary. In this approach, the state is generally regarded as a passive actor, merely 
responding to social pressures. In other words, social pressures are the key determinant of 
policy change as if state interests are not present or relevant. In any event, according to 
this view, state choices are primarily contingent on social interests. 
The Islamization policy launched by the Mahathir administration in the early 1980s 
was generally seen from this perspective; its drastic policy change was the government's 
(and UMNO's) response to its chief constituency, the Malay-Muslim community (Russin 
Mutalib 1993: 29-33; Milne and Mauzy 1999: 80-89).20 The government's support for 
religious related activities such as dakwah was conventionally seen from a perspective of 
partisan politics as a result of electoral competition between the two Muslim-based 
political parties, UMNO and PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia).21 
Some studies acknowledge the government's accommodative approach to Islam. But 
when they do, they tend simply to emphasize the preferences of individual politicians. In 
particular, these studies focus on the role played by former Prime Minister Mahathir and 
his former deputy, Anwar, and portray the government's policy as a product of their ideas 
and beliefs (e.g., Milne and Mauzy 1999: 84-88). Other studies are more suspicious and 
even cynical about the government's 'pro-Islam' initiatives; they dismiss these initiatives 
as merely 'cosmetic' or a 'political trick' (e.g., Nagata 1980: 430). Here, too, a key factor 
driving the government's accommodation of !Slam is UMNO's concern about the rising 
influence of the Islamist party PAS in the Muslim constituency. Echoing this position is 
discourse analysis that focuses on the various parties' engagement in 'rhetorical 
competition;' This analysis especially highlights an ideological conflict between UMNO 
and PAS over 'Who is more Islamic than the other' and 'Whose interpretation and 
20 Some studies are subtly more appreciative of the role of the government (or the ruling party) in Islamic 
resurgence. See, for instance (Chandra Muzaffar 1987: 5-6). 
21 Most commentary and analyses on political Islam in Malaysia emphasize and rephrase this point. See, for 
example, Chandra Muzaffar (1987: chap.7); Farish Noor, 'Sharia Gambit in Malaysia,' FEER, 8 January 
2004, and Liow (2003). 
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practices of Islam are more correct than the other.' (e.g., Farish A. Noor 2004). Other 
studies are even more negative about the government's approach to Islam, emphasizing 
the latter's repressive strategy to manage the impact of Islamic activism (Barraclough 
1983). 
This study does not by any means suggest that these society-centric accounts are 
invalid; they, indeed, made an important contribution to better understanding Islamic and 
political mobilization in Malaysia. The study acknowledges the role of societal pressures, 
and the rising influence of the Islamic opposition in particular, that aroused enormous 
concern among the governing elites in the first place. Moreover, the study does not 
entirely write off the function of ideologies. As I argue elsewhere, Mahathir's ideas on 
progressive Islam, and his pledge and initiatives to promote it, helped to mobilize a large 
segment of the Muslim community for national development efforts (Hamayotsu 2002). 
The study queries whether the behavior and choices of the state can only be understood 
in terms of response and suppression. My central contention is that social pressures alone 
cannot fully explain the particular way in which the Malaysian government intervened in 
Islamic affairs. Exclusive emphasis on the ideas of individual leaders, rhetorical 
discourses between two contending political parties, or the government's repressive 
capacities fails to capture the significant institutional and political dynamics taking place 
within the state. 
This study highlights intra-state interactions as well as those between state and society 
actors. The Malaysian government adopted an Islamization policy and actively 
intervened in a range ofreligious affairs including Islamic courts and religious education. 
Most significantly, the state developed bureaucratic structures to sponsor and regulate 
these religious matters. We have witnessed state attempts to co-opt religious authority 
structures in many countries and under various regimes (e.g., Moustafa 2000; Nasr 2000; 
Piscatori 1983: various chapters; Zaman 2002; Zeghal 1999). Yet, the degree and method 
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of co-optation varies significantly from one case to another. Why was the Malaysian 
government's Islamization policy implemented in the particular way that it was? Who has 
benefited and who has lost from the process? Intra-state political dynamics and 
institutional change, I argue, have a significant long-term impact on the state's 
relationship with social actors as well as on choices and behavior of societal actors. 
Malaysia: A Case of What? 
This study investigates one particular mode of state intervention in religious 
affairs-institutionalization of the religious bureaucracy in Malaysia. Among Muslim 
nations, Malaysia's political stability, economic development, and most importantly, 
moderate Islam, is notable. Unlike many other Muslim nations, the country under a 
Muslim-based government managed to promote a moderate type of Islam, while 
achieving remarkable economic development with equity and stability (Kuhonta 2003). 
Inter-religious and ethnic conflict has been relatively restrained despite the devastating 
racial riots in 1969. In the wake of the War Against Terror, the Malaysian government, 
unlike its neighbor Indonesia and other Muslim nations, exhibited a comparatively strong 
capacity to control extreme and radical types of Islam. Although PAS, the influential 
conservative Islamic opposition party led by ulama, has ruled Muslim-majority States, 
Kelantan and Terengganu, its influence continues to be mainly limited to rural areas.22 In 
this respect, it is not even close to the Islamist Justice and Development Party in Turkey, 
which won convincingly in parliamentary elections. My study claims that the mode of 
state intervention in religious affairs-institutionalization of the 'church-like' religious 
bureaucracy- provides one explanation of the limited significance of radical Islam in 
Malaysia. 
In Malaysia, the federal government launched an Islamization policy in the early 
22 PAS has ruled Kelantan between 1957 and 1974 and since 1990, and Terengganu between 1999 and 
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1980s. This has brought about increasing federal intervention in Islamic affairs which had 
previously been mainly under the jurisdiction of the State governments. Most 
importantly, the government's intervention strategy took a particular form: the expansion 
of the bureaucracy to administer a range of religious matters such as the Syariah judiciary 
and Islamic education along the lines of Weber's familiar meritocratic, rational-legal 
bureaucratic authority. In other words, religious officials were recruited into the tightly 
organized public service based on merit, and were remunerated by salaries-as opposed 
to what Weber called 'patrimonial' recruitment based on personal favors or organizational 
affiliation. As a result, these officials become dependent on the state-and secular 
Muslim politicians who dominate it-for their authority, career prospects as well as 
material benefits. 
The state as a result took over a number of traditional 'church' functions; the running of 
Islamic schools, implementing Islamic laws, and organizing Islamic welfare programs. 
This institutionalization equipped the Muslim governing elites with bureaucratic 
machinery to sponsor and regulate religious affairs relatively effectively. This was in 
contrast with other Muslim governments, such as those of Indonesia and Turkey, which 
have tended to leave many of these functions to private religious organizations. By 
incorporating religious authorities into the tightly defined state bureaucracy, moreover, 
the Malaysian federal government has gained enhanced authority and legitimacy to 
define and enforce 'correct' Islamic doctrines and thus limit the influence of oppositional 
religious political mobilization. The government's control over the religious activities of 
Muslims has grown tighter both ideologically and organizationally. 
What is distinctive about the Malaysian case is that while the state has become more 
involved in religion, this has not been accompanied by religious radicalization. In this 
respect, the Malaysian experience has been different to that of Pakistan. In Pakistan, 
2004. 
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heavy state involvement in Islamic affairs, such as sponsoring of madrasah schools, 
facilitated radical religious mobilization, and sectarian violence (Nasr 2000). In 
Indonesia, too, state intervention in Islamic affairs proved rather negative; Suharto' 
policies to sponsor some sections of the Muslim community facilitated religious tension 
between Muslim and non-Muslim communities as well as within the Muslim community, 
and contributed to religious radicalization (Hefner 1999; 2000: chap.7; Sidel 1998, 2003). 
Moreover, state co-optation of ulama did not lead to public repudiation of the state 
religious officials, in contrast to some other countries, despite the Islamic opposition's 
constant disparagement and accusations. The state religious officials commanded 
considerable authority and esteem within the Muslim community to help enforcing 
government policies effectively. Why did the Malaysian government's co-optation of 
religious authorities develop the way it did? 
Bringing the State Back In: Institutionalization of the Religious 
Bureaucracy 
There is no standard method to measure the level of state intervention in religious affairs. 
The portrayal and interpretation of state intervention in Islam tends be fuzzy in existing 
studies. Commentary on political Islam in Malaysia, for example, tends to bracket 
together the government's Islamization campaign and its sponsoring of Islamic-labeled 
organizations and companies into a kind of package. Such a trend is regarded as 
'Islamization of the state,' but little effort is made to establish a method to measure the 
degree or qualitative nature of state intervention in religion. The government's support for 
the establishment of the Islamic Bank, the Islamic University, and other religious-based 
socio-economic institutions, for example, has been a key indicator of the Islamization 
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trend of the Malaysian government (e.g., Russin Mutalib 1993: 29-33). 
To assess the level of state intervention in this way is problematic; it may give us an 
impressionistic observation of some action taken by the government that is related to 
Islam, but leaves us unsure of what aspect of Islamization is seen as the critical 
explanatory link to outcomes. And, how are we to distinguish between simple policy 
changes at the margins and institutionalization, which suggests a more deeply lasting 
change? This analytical ambiguity makes comparative analysis difficult, both across 
place and time. 
The concept of state co-optation oflslamic movements, another model used to indicate 
state intervention, can also be too broad and problematic for understanding adequately the 
type and effects of state intervention in religion. For example, military regimes in 
Indonesia and Pakistan adopted co-optation strategies to neutralize oppositional Islamic 
movements. But their strategy was different from the Malaysian government's 
co-optation. In Indonesia, for example, the former Suharto regime put greater emphasis 
on creating extra-governmental organizations (filled by the president's own loyalists) to 
sponsor Islamic activities and to co-opt some segments of the Islamic community. This 
strategy allowed state religious agencies and regulations to be largely captured by 
particular Muslim interests. Favoritism and corruption in the state's operation ofreligious 
affairs-and its allocation of public funds for religious activities-under this patrimonial 
regime had the effect of making the state religious officials opportunistic and unfit to 
carry out designated tasks to fulfill public needs. Moreover, Indonesia's patrimonial state 
encouraged rival religious organizations to compete for access to spoils derived from 
public office. Thus, in the authoritarian past, this particular mode of state 
intervention-together with repressive security tools-succeeded in dividing political 
Islam and prevented the emergence of a united political challenge to the governing elites, 
but, in the long run, as some scholars argue, facilitated sectarian tendencies, radical 
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Islamist mobilization, and at times violence (Hefner 1999; 2000: chap.7; Sidel 1998, 
2003).23 
This study draws on the literature on the state to distinguish the type of state 
intervention in religion. My approach employs Weber's model of bureaucratic authority 
structures-together with Huntington's institutionalization-to advance our 
understanding of institutionalization of state religious bureaucratic authority structures as 
a key analytical variable. The distinction of this model is its ability to identify not merely 
the quantitative but also one aspect of the qualitative dimensions of institutional change. 
How state bureaucracies are organized and the effects of state organizations on 
political and socio-economic changes have been of broad theoretical concern for many 
political and social scientists. Students of political economy, for example, emphasize the 
significance of state institutions, and the characteristics of bureaucracies in particular, in 
accounting for economic growth (e.g., Evans and Rauch 1999; Rueschemeyer and Evans 
1985). These studies draw upon Weber's model to assess the level of state 'strength' and 
to determine whether state institutions are insulated (and therefore autonomous) from 
particularistic societal and personal interests.24 Echoing this position, some argue that the 
way state organizations are institutionalized determines the boundary between the state 
and other non-state actors, a boundary influencing the quality of state intervention and 
regulation (Hamilton-Hart 2002: 16). 
For those studies, institutionalization is an explanatory variable (independent variable). 
In the present study, institutionalization is primarily an outcome (dependent variable), 
and my first inquiry is to explore the causes of institutionalization. Exploration of the 
effects of institutionalization of the state religious bureaucracy on religious mobilization 
is my second inquiry. The specification of institutionalization-the extent to which the 
23 For a similar claim in the context of Pakistan, see Nasr (2000). 
24 For an insightful political-economy account focused on Southeast Asia and emphasizing this analytical 
perspective, see Hutchcroft's study on banking in the Philippines (Hutchcroft 1998). 
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state religious bureaucracies have developed to acqmre Weberian rational-legal 
meritocratic characteristics-goes some way to understanding the type of state 
intervention in religious affairs. The distinction of this analytical model is its ability to 
specify the state strategy of co-optation; it answers how theologically trained Muslim 
leaders and teachers are co-opted into the state or remain in the public milieu. It allows us 
to differentiate the bureaucratic mode of state co-optation (i.e., Malaysia) from the 
patrimonial one (i.e., Indonesia). The argument that follows is that the attributes of state 
organizations (especially state bureaucracies to administer religious affairs) is a 
significant variable affecting the state's capacity to control religious mobilization among 
non-state actors and oppositional religious mobilization in particular. 
Dimensions of Institutionalization 
Our first step is to establish a conceptual parameter to assess the level of 
institutionalization of state bureaucracies tasked with regulating religious affairs. My 
approach draws upon Weber's model of bureaucratic authority structures to emphasize 
the quality of state organizations and procedures. Well-institutionalized states match 
Weber's rational-legal bureaucratic organizations: government organizations are run 
according to meritocratic, rule-based precepts as opposed to patrimonial principles (Roth 
and Wittich 1978: 956-105). They are organizationally coherent, autonomous, complex 
and adaptable (Huntington 1968: 8-24). 
This analytical approach equips us to address not only the quantity but also quality 
dimension of institutional change. Evaluation of the quantity of state intervention in 
Islamic affairs tells us about 'how much' the state has become concerned with financing 
and regulating religious affairs. Assessment of the quantitative dimension alone, 
however, does not inform us much about the attributes of state-sponsored religious 
organizations and the quality of state intervention. This distinction matters because our 
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central question is whether the state intervention in Islam brings about societal-religious 
penetration/capture of the state on one hand or state rule on the other, and within the 
category of state rule, whether that rule is carried out by a Weberian bureaucracy. Ruling 
elites may create new bureaucracies to regulate religious affairs, but the organizations 
may be corrupt or staffed by loyalists unqualified to carry out official duties in ways that 
meet public interests. A likely consequence is that administration ofreligious affairs will 
be ineffective; and that particular political groups or individuals may hijack and use 
offices to benefit their personal interests. This was precisely the experience in Indonesia 
and Pakistan. 
In Indonesia, despite its official 'secular-nationalist' principle, the Department of 
Religious Affairs was created at independence initially to meet the expectations of the 
modernist segment of the Muslim community (Boland 1982: 105-12). The size of the 
department grew larger-the largest at one time among all the ministries-despite its 
limited jurisdiction (Emmerson 1978). However, the size of the agency was one thing; the 
quality of its rule was quite another. Rival Islamic groups competed to control the 
department's vast bureaucracy; identification of the department's interests with those of a 
particular religious group was blatant and embezzlement of public religious funds and 
misuse of public offices was not uncommon. The state expansion was apparently a result 
of pressure to serve the patronage interests of particular religious groups.25 
Weber's model of rational-legal bureaucracy addresses this quality question. 
According to Weber's model of bureaucratic authority structures, government 
organizations function in fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are generally 
ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations. The regular activities 
25 Emmerson gives an astute observation of the size and quality of the religious bureaucracy in the 1970s. 
He wrote: 'Because of the breadth oflslamic law and the sheer scope of human activity the new department 
was supposed to regulate, and because of Islamic organizations, especially the Muslim Teachers' party 
(Nahdatul Ulama or NU), controlled it and used it as a place to employ the political faithful, the Ministry of 
Religion increased rapidly in size (emphasis added)' (Emmerson 1978: 87). 
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required for the purposes of these organizations are distributed in a fixed way as official 
duties. Methodical provision is made for the regular fulfillment of these duties. Moreover, 
the authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is 
distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules; employment of officials is 
primarily based on established qualifications to serve the office. In a 
well-institutionalized government organization, these rule-based, meritocratic principles 
comprise 'bureaucratic authority' -as opposed to ascriptive and arbitrary precepts that 
characterize 'patrimonial authority'. Further, the characteristics described above form a 
source oflegitimacy (Gerth and Mills 1948: 196-98). 
Huntington's institutionalization is helpful to measure the extent to which particular 
organizational rules and procedures 'acquire value and stability'. Well-institutionalized 
organizations and procedures display four essential characteristics: adaptability; 
complexity; autonomy; and coherence (Huntington 1968: 8-24). Coherence and 
autonomy, closely linked together, are particularly important in well-institutionalized 
disciplined state organizations; autonomy becomes a means to coherence, enabling the 
organization to develop esprit de corps, unity, discipline, and distinctive identity. 
Well-institutionalized state organizations exist independently of the interests of other 
particular social groupings and defend clearly defined public interests. 
Vanguards of the Weberian Bureaucracy: The Mechanism of Recruitment and 
Qualifications of State Religious Officialdom 
Making rules and procedures alone is not sufficient to build well-institutionalized 
government organizations. A patrimonial state such as Suharto's Indonesia also has legal 
rules. To ensure that the organizations function according to formal rules and norms 
effectively, offices need to be staffed by adequately qualified officials to carry out 
designated duties. First and foremost, in Weberian organizations, employment of officials 
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is based on merit; that is, the possession of technical knowledge and adequate 
qualifications-rather than personal association with particular individuals or social 
groups. Government office is the prime source of employment for office-holders and is 
remunerated by fixed salary according to their function. The presence of such officials 
assures predictable and reliable implementation of state policies. 
The degree to which the organizations are equipped with a standardized meritocratic 
(qualification-oriented) system of recruitment and offer predictable and rewarding 
long-term career courses are variables particularly underscored in this study. In other 
words, my special concern is whether state office secures solid long-term career prospects 
for theologically trained ulama. This in tum affects their loyalty to state office and 
inhibits opportunistic and biased behaviors among these officials. 
Malaysia: Empirical Issues 
The organizational expansion of religious bureaucracies in Malaysia has gone some way 
to approximating the type of institutionalization described above. To operationalize these 
concepts empirically in the Malaysian case, the focus will be on jurisdiction over Islam. 
In Malaysia, Islam constitutionally falls under the jurisdiction of the sultans formally 
heading the governments in the individual States, and thus we have to consider the 
relations between the federal and State governments. In theory, State governments 
individually could have developed institutionalized religious bureaucracies to expand 
state jurisdiction over private religious organizations and activities. But, in practice, State 
governments lacked financial, technical and political resources under the country's 
generally highly-centralized political system. The administration of Islamic affairs at the 
State level had long been left largely unattended, irregular, and weak. It is partly due to 
this administrative irregularity (that caused a number of problems) that the federal 
government decided to intervene in the administration of religious affairs. Moreover, it 
26 
was only after the federal government got involved that state involvement in religious 
affairs increased sharply. The federal government has not only expanded but also 
centralized authority over Islamic affairs. In practice, therefore, the higher level of 
institutionalization matches the greater degree of 'nationalization' of the religious 
authorities in the sense that rules and procedures set by the federal government are 
enforceable nationwide. 
Varying Degrees of Institutionalization 
The chapters that follow show that the formation of institutionalized state authority 
structures governing Islamic affairs has a significant effect on mobilizational capacities 
of Islamic movements in society. To this end, this study employs inter-sectional 
comparative analysis. In the Malaysian case, three policy areas exhibit striking variation 
in the level of state intervention and institutionalization when they are measured across 
the institutionalization dimension outlined above. The three issue areas I examine are: (1) 
Syariah judiciary (Islamic courts, laws and judges); (2) education (Islamic s.chools and 
teachers); and (3) zakat (Islamic tax for welfare purposes) (see Table 1.1). 
The Syariah judiciary experienced the highest level of institutionalization on all 
accounts. The jurisdiction of the Syariah (Islamic) courts and legal apparatus expanded 
with enhanced independence and authority. The Federal Constitution was amended in 
1988 to give more jurisdictional leverage and autonomy to the Syariah courts and Islamic 
laws vis-a-vis their civil counterparts. Each State also passed legislation pertaining to the 
administration of the Syariah laws and courts under the auspices of the federal religious 
authorities to make the administration of Syariah courts and enforcement of Islamic laws 
more coherent and definite. Moreover, the Syariah judicial apparatus was separated from 
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Table 1.1: Cross-sectional Variation in the Level of State Institutionalization in 
Malaysia 
~ Judiciary (Syariah) Education Zakat High Medium Low s 
*A 1998 
constitutional 
Constitutional amendment gave 
Syariah courts and 
judges greater 
authority and 
autonomy 
*New Islamic *The 
administrative and Administration of 
Legislative procedural laws and Islamic Schools Act 
tightened (State-level) 
enforcement 
* The establishment * The formation of * The formation of a 
of the Federal the Advisory corporate body to 
Administrative/ Department of Council for the collect zakat 
policy Syariah Courts Coordination of contributions in 
(JKSM) Islamic Education some States 
* Standardized 
recruitment of 
Syariah judges: the 
Syariah Official 
Common-Use 
scheme 
* Ad-hoc nation-
Informal wide consortium for 
operational 
coordination 
the State religious authorities (the State religious departments and religious councils) in a 
physical, administrative, and financial sense. One of the most significant developments 
on the administrative front was the establishment in 1998 of the Federal Department of 
Syariah Courts (Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia or JKSM) under the Prime 
Minister's Office. This was the federal government's effort to standardize nationwide the 
administration of the Syariah machinery including Syariah judges. On agreeing to join 
this federal system, Syariah judges and officials previously employed by the individual 
State governments were placed under the Syariah official common-use scheme. 
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Moreover, qualifications for Syariah officials were standardized to give more coherence 
and integrity to a corps of Syariah officialdom. Although not all the States have yet joined 
the scheme for a variety of reasons, this federal mechanism is expected to help close 
inter-State gaps in the procedures and execution of the Syariah judicial machinery. 
Together, all these developments brought about a more coherent, autonomous and 
rule-abiding system of administration overseeing Syariah judicial affairs. 
In the educational sector, institutionalization remained at the intermediate level. The 
federal government's efforts to expand Islamic education within the formal national 
schooling system and to take over the administration of private religious schools and 
teachers were only partially successful. The federal government's maneuvers resulted in a 
number of administrative measures to expand federal control over religious educational 
institutions. For example, the federal government set up the Advisory Council for the 
Co-ordination of Islamic Education (Lembaga Penasihat Penyelarasan Pelajaran dan 
Pendidikan Agama Islam or LEPAI) at the federal level in 1983 in an effort to standardize 
Islamic teachings in all religious schools (except those run by the Ministry of Education). 
Within this framework, federal funds were channeled through the State religious 
departments to 'licensed' private religious schools. The funds, which financed teachers' 
salaries and renovation of facilities as well as purchase of teaching materials, provided a 
reward mechanism to woo the resource-poor private schools to comply with federal 
directives in terms of curriculum as well as qualifications of teachers. Despite such 
efforts, the absence of a central agency, a JKSM equivalent, impeded the emergence of a 
coherent and autonomous administrative mechanism supervising Islamic schools and 
teachers and securing efficient policy implementation nationwide. 
Finally, in the welfare (zakat) sector, federal intervention was almost zero, leaving the 
level of institutionalization lowest. Individual State religious authorities made some 
effort to make the collection and distribution of zakat more efficient and effective. For 
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example, some State governments set up a corporate body to develop a more advanced 
and effective system to collect zakat. However, those developments were essentially 
technical in nature, and federal involvement in this sector was close to nil; the federal 
proposal to centralize the zakat administration-creation of the central agency, Malaysian 
Zakat Management Board-has never materialized. Moreover, powerful UMNO 
politicians set up a private religious charity foundation while ignoring the official system 
of zakat. The concurrent development of an Islamic charity mechanism outside the formal 
bureaucratic structure-personally sponsored by influential UMNO politicians-helped 
further undermine the reputation and morale of the zakat institution and religious officials 
who run it. 
This variation in outcomes came into being under essentially the same conditions: the 
political system, ideological climate, socio-economic circumstances, and the same 
administration ofUMNO. Moreover, they were equally subject to the same constitutional 
constraint binding religious agencies: religious affairs fall under the jurisdiction of the 
sultan in each State (except in the Federal territories), an oft-cited factor that has held 
back federal intervention into Islamic affairs. 
Islamic doctrinal precepts, too, do not appear to have much to say about this particular 
pattern of institutional change. From a religious (doctrinal) perspective, these issues all 
appear equally important. Syariah, in principle, binds all aspects of Muslim life. 
Enforcement of Syariah is almost always a chief objective of Islamist groups across the 
globe. Islamic education is equally important; it serves as a means to propagate religious 
teachings, and Islamic scholars and teachers provide a base of religious and political 
leadership. Finally, zakat is one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith, and a vital source 
for charity, a deed most cherished in the Islamic teaching. Moreover, zakat funds, 
together with other religious funds, are an important financial source for Islamic 
activities. If religious doctrine is the key factor, we could have expected that state 
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expansion should be much the same across sectors. But this was not the case. Why was 
there more state intervention in one sector and less in others? 
The greater state intervention in Islamic affairs has led to an expanded religious 
presence within the state bureaucracy. Seen through an institutionalization lens, however, 
the study finds that the trend of Islamization of the state is not a process that evenly 
affects the entire state apparatus. Neither does the process of institutionalization of 
religious bureaucratic authority occur evenly across the entire state structure. This gap is 
significant for understanding factors shaping the institutional change of religious 
authority structures and political consequences of this change. The prime goal of this 
study is to explain this inter-sectional variation in institutionalization by identifying a key 
factor that determined the way in which the Malaysian government was involved in 
religious affairs and its Islamization policy was implemented. 
Contending Explanations: Why State Intervention? 
External Pressures from Societal Actors 
What facilitates state formation in general and institutionalization of state organizations 
in particular has long motivated intense debates among political and social scientists (e.g., 
Ertman 1997; Markoff 1975; Tilly 1975, 1990; Zucker 1987). By and large, theories on 
this question are categorized into two explanatory paradigms: one focused on external 
factors and the other on internal factors. 
A number of scholars of Malaysian politics echo the first paradigm by emphasizing the 
role of external pressures from societal actors in explaining greater state intervention in 
religious affairs. This social-pressure view portrays a secular-oriented government in 
Muslim countries as facing an external Islamic threat, that is, the rising influence of 
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oppositional Islamic parties among the increasingly self-consciously Islamic-oriented 
Muslim community. In the Malaysian case, most studies attribute the federal 
government's Islamization initiatives to electoral rivalry between UMNO and its 
archrival, the ulama-led Islamic party, PAS (e.g., Farish A. Noor 2003a; Russin Mutalib 
1990: chap.4; Liow 2003). These studies argue that PAS's Islamic credentials and 
agendas have threatened UMNO's electoral dominance in the Muslim community, as 
Muslims grew far more conscious of their religious identity and Islamic issues in the 
Muslim world. 
UMNO's concern with PAS's electoral threat in the context of strengthening Islamic 
consciousness dates from the late 1970s at a time when the prominent NGO, ABIM, was 
building close ties with PAS.26 Given the popularity and mobilizational capacities of 
ABIM among the Muslim youth, UMNO leaders were alerted to the potential electoral 
consequences of a pact between the two (Jomo and Ahmed Shabery Cheek 1988: 849-51; 
Nair 1997: 28-33). Despite its official political neutrality, the top ABIM leaders at that 
time supported PAS politically and helped strengthen the party organizationally when 
PAS's leadership was undergoing an intense leadership crisis and factional struggles. In 
the 1978 general elections, for example, ABIM launched a nationwide campaign to 
support PAS and three top ABIM leaders contested in the general elections on the PAS 
ticket. Moreover, PAS's growing confidence in ABIM through these campaigns allowed 
some of the ABIM leaders to hold important posts in the party (Jomo and Ahmed Shabery 
Cheek 1988: 850-51). Until the early 1980s, when Anwar joined UMNO, 'ABIM and 
PAS were seen to have had a mutually supportive relationship in their opposition to 
UMNO and certain government policies, and in their Islamic cause' (Zainah Anwar 1987: 
41). 
The PAS threat was reinforced further after PAS. gained control of the State 
26 Of course, UMNO had also been concerned with the PAS threat earlier-but not in the context of 
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government of Kelantan in 1990.27 Since then, PAS has kept UMNO leaders on the 
defensive in a number of ways. PAS promised to establish an Islamic state and to enforce 
a wider range of Syariah laws than the current 'un-Islamic' regime under UMNO. The 
prime example of this was its proposal to implement hudud (Islamic criminal code) in 
Kelantan.28 At the ideological level, PAS openly accused UMNO of being 'too secular' 
and claimed that an 'infidel' party should have no right and legitimacy to rule Muslims. 
Another hypothesis also emphasizes social pressures, especially the influence of the 
growing Muslim component of the urban middle-class. This view suggests that demands 
from the better educated and self-consciously Islamic-oriented younger generation 
among urban middle-class Malays that the government improve the operation of Syariah 
courts and religious schools was the key factor. Such Malays called for Islamic policies 
even through they were not necessarily supporters of PAS. For example, meeting such 
demands in the education sector would require the government to develop a systematic 
institutional framework to provide adequate religious teaching materials as well as 
qualified religious teachers. Moreover, the politically conscious middle-class Muslims 
also called for eradication of irregular and corrupt practices in administration of religious 
funds. According to this view, the ruling party's responsiveness to such middle-class 
interests resulted in greater federal intervention in religious institutions that had 
previously been neglected under the State governments. 
A focus on social pressures-either class based or party mediated-helps one 
understand why the secular Muslim ruling elites have chosen to adopt an Islamization 
policy.in the first place. There is no doubt that UMNO leaders felt uneasy about the threat 
emanating from PAS's Islamic agendas and realized the need to counter them with Islam. 
Yet, these explanations are not entirely persuasive on at least two grounds. First, these 
growing Islamic awareness in society. 
27 PAS also won the State government ofTerengganu in 1999, but lost it to UMNO again in 2004. 
28 For a detailed discussion about the controversy related to this proposal, see chapter 4. 
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explanations of state intervention cannot explain variation in outcomes. The pressure 
from the Islamic opposition party was evident in all the sectors I examined, but the 
outcomes in the mode of state intervention were strikingly different. The social pressures 
to systematize the administrative mechanisms were also evident in all the sectors; but the 
level of institutionalization varied markedly across sectors. 
Second, pressures from PAS or the Muslim middle class were not necessarily focused 
on the areas that were eventually emphasized by the UMNO government. In the first 
place, one needs to note that although both parties, UMNO and PAS, took initiatives to 
include Islam in their respective platforms, UMNO's Islam and the policies it espoused 
were very different to PAS's version; UMNO leaders were committed to advocating a 
more 'modem' and 'moderate' type of Islam, whereas PAS leaders were devoted to the 
enforcement of a more 'conservative' and 'traditional' form and insisted broader and 
tighter application of Syariah. Moreover, some scholars even argue that PAS's 
Islam-both in ideological and policy terms-became more radical as a result of the 
party's electoral competition with UMNO (Farish A. Noor 2003a). In other words, the 
social pressure thesis does not fully answer the question of why UMNO was willing and 
able to make the state system more Islamic in some sectors but not in others. We are also 
left uncertain about why state intervention took place in the particular way it did. 
Culturalist Claim 
Another school of the literature emphasizes the role of what are broadly categorized as 
culture and ideology. This culturalist view suggests that cultural and ideological interests 
of Muslim politicians explain the government's greater commitment to involvement in 
Islamic affairs. They argue that Muslim politicians are primarily interested in promoting 
an Islamic ideology and the general interests of the ummah (Islamic community). 
Moreover, these politicians could have expected to reinforce their political legitimacy 
34 
within the Malay community by upholding Islamic values and symbols.29 
A doctrinalist approach asserts that Islamic doctrines and teachings, especially the 
Qur' an, dictate the political behavior of Muslims, especially ulama. The doctrinal 
position that repudiates the division between state and religion, for example, is said to 
facilitate the state's intervention in religious matters. But religious doctrine is not 
monolithic and in practice there is no single ultimate authority or a church-equivalent 
clerical order that dictates 'orthodoxy.' State as well as societal actors often have their 
own views on what constitutes 'true' Islam. 
My study, however, finds that these culturalist and doctrinalist claims are not 
empirically tenable. As suggested above, if these factors are the determinants, one would 
expect that the degree and the mode of state intervention should have been the same 
across all the sectors. For example, given the fact that the idea of charity is highly 
cherished in Islamic teaching, and increasingly affluent Muslims are more willing to 
contribute zakat, it is puzzling that the federal UMNO leaders were obviously hesitant to 
revamp the management of zakat. Cultural and doctrinal arguments also fail to explain 
the timing of Islamic institutionalization. 
The Malaysian case attests that political agents-shaped in a particular political and 
institutional context-acted to bring about a particular pattern of state-Islam relations. 
Most importantly, the particular character of the rise of religious bureaucratic authority 
structures detailed in this study runs counter to the claims espoused by the 
abovementioned perspectives. The study claims that the behavior and choices of ulama 
are not exclusively dictated by religious doctrines, but also shaped by other political and 
socio-economic interests. 
29 Studies that emphasize the role of ethnic identity in the trend oflslamization (e.g., Russin Mutalib 1990) 
attest this point. Russin, however, also warns that the government's excessive promotion of Islam could 
endanger Malaysia's inter-ethnic relations since the non-Malays perceive Islam as a Malay religion and 
Islamization as nothing more than an assertion of Malay identity (Russin Mutalib 1990: 162-64). 
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Incentive Structures of Muslim Ruling Politicians: 
A One-Party Dominant Regime and the Politics of Patronage 
To fill these theoretical gaps, the study focuses on the incentives and strategies of 
individual politicians within the state, and on the intra-party logic of political rivalry in 
particular, as an explanatory variable. My study does not dismiss entirely the role played 
by societal agents, however. It seeks to complement the society-centric explanation by 
shedding more light on another important force driving institutionalization of religion: 
state actors. The study shows that when state actors can advance their own interests by 
appealing to a particular societal interest, they will. 
This study's emphasis on strategic interactions among various political actors-and the 
incentive structures of those politicians to maximize political resources-does not mean 
to neglect the effect of structural and institutional factors. Quite the opposite, political and 
institutional contexts do matter. The study shows that the incentives of ruling politicians 
are significantly shaped within a particular institutional and political context. 30 In 
Malaysia, we have to take into account two particular political contexts. The first is the 
UMNO's predominance within the multi-ethnic ruling coalition government and the 
Malaysian polity in general. The second is the highly centralized party organization of the 
UMNO, and extremely competitive intra-party rivalry among party members from the 
local to the national level. 
The study draws special attention to the organizational structures of UMNO, its 
position within the multi-ethnic coalition, and its relations to various social interests at 
various levels. These are also placed against the wider backdrop of socio-economic 
30 The approach taken here builds on ideas found in Geddes (1994: 7-8). 
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transformation. I demonstrate that these organizational and political contexts 
significantly influence the incentives and strategies of the UMNO politicians. Such 
incentives affected the way in which the state intervened to further the institutionalization 
of religious authorities. And, the structure of these incentives varied across policy areas, 
leading to variation in outcomes. 
Under the one-party dominant political system, UMNO politicians have a strong 
incentive to maximize opportunities to cultivate a broad support base in order to rise 
within the party. The most important tool to this end is dispensation of patronage (Crouch 
1996: 36-43). It is this patronage-maximizing incentive that makes them especially 
responsive to particular social interests. To ascend within the highly-centralized party 
hierarchy and to finance the enormous expenses of contesting party elections, politicians 
sought to build close ties with corporate businesses-Muslim and non-Muslim alike. The 
UMNO politicians' traditional constituency, the Muslim community, no doubt remained 
important. However, rapid socio-economic changes and the widening class gap within the 
Muslim community (that somewhat corresponded with the urban-rural divide) meant that 
the Muslim politicians needed to be attentive to contradictory demands arising from these 
diverging classes. The rising Muslim urban middle-class, for example, tended to support 
a more liberal religious regime and was more concerned about the growing influence of a 
conservative type oflslam than were rural Muslim constituents. Moreover, economically 
powerful Chinese interests became far more important than ever before within UMNO 
itself as financiers of increasingly tense and expensive intra-party election campaigns. 
Importantly, the strategies Muslim politicians adopted to achieve their goals varied 
depending on their respective positions in the party hierarchy. For the federal-level 
leaders, their ties with wealthy corporate businesses, especially those owned by 
economically powerful Chinese, have become as important as their traditional Muslim 
constituencies, because those businesses financed the costly election campaigns that were 
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necessary for political rise and survival. These patronage-based political-business ties 
made them responsive to demands from corporate business and the Chinese community. 
Moreover, this convergence of interests between the federal-level politicians and the 
business and non-Muslim communities produced a particular aversion of radical and 
conservative Islamic elements among the federal-level politicians. Federal intervention in 
religious affairs was intended to limit the influence of these unfavorable Islamic elements 
that came not only from the Islamic opposition, but also within the party and the religious 
department. 
In contrast, for the State-level leaders, particularly those from Muslim-dominant rural 
States, their ties with traditional Muslim constituencies remain very important. Since 
religious leaders were politically very influential in the local Muslim community, the 
State prerogative over religious matters offered them valuable patronage opportunities to 
consolidate their support base. 
The federal-State divide among those Muslim leaders affected the strategies they 
adopted to achieve the same goal (i.e., expanding patronage-networks). Given the 
UMNO's highly centralized party hierarchy and decision-making power in the hands of 
the party President, it is conventionally believed that decisions made at the federal level 
are almost absolute and final. This was reinforced even further under Mahathir's 
'personalized' regime (Hwang 2003). Against this received wisdom abortt Malaysian 
politics, however, State-level politicians sometimes opposed and distorted the policies 
initiated by the federal government. As shown in the following chapters, this intra-party 
competition significantly affected the level of federal intervention and the 
institutionalization of the religious bureaucratic authority structures across sectors. 
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Institutionalization in Whose Interest? 
Institutionalization, State Capacities and State-Society Relations 
The relatively high level of institutionalization of Islamic governance m 
Malaysia-albeit with some inter-sectional variation-meant that an increasing number 
of better-qualified religious officials were incorporated into the government institutions. 
A range of official posts administering Syariah, including Mufti31 and hakim (Islamic 
judges), for example, was standardized as 'remunerated officials' and ranked within the 
clearly defined public service hierarchy. Religious matters were settled according to the 
rules and procedures sanctioned by the state religious authorities. The religious officials 
employed by the government-including Syariah court officials and religious 
teachers-are largely seen as the source of Islamic authority, ruling and teaching in the 
Muslim community at large. Although Islamic opposition leaders and sympathizers 
frequently questioned the authority and legitimacy of these officials, this did not lead to 
public repudiation of the government religious authorities. The institutionalization 
process, however, made these religious officials heavily dependent upon the state-and 
the Muslim politicians who dominate it in particular-not only for their career prospects 
and material benefits but also religious authority and legitimacy. 
One important effect of the process of institutionalization is that it equipped the 
Muslim governing politicians with an institutional foundation of religious authority to 
define 'correct' Islam and to regulate religious activities of Muslims. The 
institutionalization of the religious bureaucracy thus has the possibility of reinforcing 
state authority in the Muslim community at large. Given the likelihood that any policy 
31 The Mufti is the supreme authority in each State in respect to all matters concerning Syariah law. He is 
authorized to issue, modify, or revoke fatwa (authoritative Islamic decrees) on any unsettled or 
controversial question of Syariah law (See, for instance, Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemlah Joned 1995: 
52-53). 
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initiative benefits some actors-but not others, the institutionalization process can be 
contentious and thus highly political. What are the effects of this institutionalization 
process on the state's capacities to control oppositional religious mobilization, and who 
benefits from the process? 
My inquiry into the expansion of the state religious bureaucracy is located at the heart 
of state-society relations in Muslim societies: religious mobilization. I emphasized at the 
onset that religious institutions-especially religious leaders-have offered Muslims 
vital ideological and organizational channels to express their socio-economic and 
political interests and grievances. As Norton, a Middle-Eastern specialist, underscores, 
religious organizations and associations in Muslim societies play a very important role in 
the development of a civil society (Norton 1995, 1996, 1999).32 The mobilizing powers 
ofreligious movements usually depend upon the latter's essentially 'apolitical' nature and 
use of apolitical channels to reach out to the populace; for example, they organize Qur' an 
reading groups or render charity and welfare services to the needy. As Norton contends, 
Islamist movements have evinced 'a more profound understanding of the requisites of 
political mobilization than their adversaries and competitors. In point of fact, many of the 
Islamist movements have been acutely sensitive to the needs of their constituencies, 
providing reliable, efficient services to the urban lower class, and winning respect in the 
urban middle class by their integrity and relative incorruptibility' (Norton 1999: 33). It is 
this 'apolitical' socio-religious activism that makes religious movements popular and 
politically powerful (see also White 2002; Wickham 2002). Importantly, these strategies 
may be the only option under authoritarian regimes where the government is armed with 
abundant repressive powers and the legal means to suppress mass mobilization. 
It is also worth recalling the significance of religious ideas in mobilizing adherents for 
. 
32 An increasing number of studies on Islamic movements in the Middle East/North Africa (and Turkey) 
spotlight this dimension. See, for instance, White (2002) and Wickham (2002; 2004). Both studies explore 
the 'mobilizing' capacities-and the popular appeal--oflslamist movements against all odds. 
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political activism. As some scholars argue, new religious ideas and interpretations of the 
religious texts and doctrines are a driving force behind movements, enabling 
non-governmental actors to offer alternative visions of society and to challenge the 
legitimacy of ruling elites (e.g., Ileto 1979; Wickham 2002). 
These aspects of religious mobilization lead to a question about state's capacities to 
regulate religious political mobilization and propagation ofreligious ideas at the societal 
level. Conventional wisdom holds that strong state security apparatus determines the 
government's capacity to control religious mobilization. The Malaysian government's 
relatively strong capacities to limit the proliferation of radical Islamic mobilization are 
primarily explained by the security force factor-its strong police force (especially the 
Special Branch) and security laws (especially the Internal Security Act). Indeed, the 
Malaysian authorities heavily relied on security instruments to fight religious deviants 
and opponents. This study finds, however, that security instruments alone are not 
sufficient for the government leaders to deal with oppositional religious mobilization. I 
argue that security instruments may be effective to suppress oppositional religious 
movements in the short run, but are not sufficient to regulate them in the long terms.33 For 
instance, many Muslim-dominated governments (such as Pakistan, Egypt and Algeria) 
have been constantly afflicted with radical Islamist movements regardless of their 
security capacities (ICG Asia Report No.73 2004; ICG Middle East and North Africa 
Briefing 2004). In fact, as some scholars argue, the government's exclusive and 
suppressive measures tend to produce a reverse-and damaging-result: escalation of 
radicalism and at times violence (Hafez 2003, 2004). Moreover, as suggested above, 
many religious movements derive their mobilization power from new interpretations of 
religious ideas and apolitical socio-religious activities. The majority of them do not rely 
on violence or criminal activities, let alone terrorism, to _propagate their beliefs and carry 
33 Here, control of terrorist activities or Muslim groups generally referred to as terrorist (such as Al-Qaeda) 
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out socio-economic welfare activities. The government authorities increasingly realized 
that their heavy reliance on draconian security tools caused too much political cost to 
justify. The Malaysian gqvernment's dealing with radical religious movements attests 
that the governing elites need more than just a strong police force and security tools. 
This study posits that the institutionalization of state religious authority structures 
strongly correlates to state capacity to control oppositional religious movements 
including radical ones. A well institutionalized religious apparatus helps alleviate the 
dilemma of Muslim politicians confronted by religious radicalism. At least three effects 
of institutionalization deserve special attention. First, it equipped the Muslim ruling 
politicians with an institutional foundation ofreligious authority to define 'correct' Islam 
and to regulate religious deviation. They could use the religious bureaucracy to police and 
harass political opponents and, if necessary, ban them on doctrinal grounds whenever 
they become politically a threat to the dominance of Muslim ruling politicians. Whether 
they were genuinely deviant or not is not a central concern of politicians. The critical 
point is that the Muslim politicians armed themselves with a religious apparatus that 
could be utilized according to their political interests. 
Second, the institutionalization of the religious authority structures gave Muslim 
politicians the vital means to prevent religious officials from gaining too much power 
within the government. By becoming the part of the tightly defined state bureaucracy, and 
dependent on the state for their authority and material rewards, the religious officials had 
to adhere to the iron rules of obedience and acquiescence. As the following chapters 
show, however, securing compliance of the religious officials was not always easy for 
UMNO leaders. The different position between the two groups about how Islam should 
be interpreted and applied sometimes caused internal conflict. Institutionalization was 
one way to secure the compliance of the religious authorities. 
is not my concern. 
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Third and finally, institutionalization reduced a source of oppositional religious 
mobilization by making the state a major provider of job security and long-term career 
opportunities for religious-educated Muslims. The religious-educated youth in Muslim 
societies often found themselves victimized against the backdrop of the state's emphasis 
on modernization and the expansion of the modem sectors of the economy (Goldstone 
2002). Under an aggressively modernizing regime such as Malaysia's, they could have 
been socio-economically marginalized and dislocated. The ideology of Islamic justice 
could have given them an attractive channel to mobilize anti-government discontent 
among the unemployed and disadvantaged Muslim youth. The Malaysian government's 
Islamization policy not only funded traditional religious education (as other Muslim 
nations did), but also created recruitment mechanisms within the public sector to save 
'losers.' The distinctive character of institutionalization is crucial here; this particular 
mode of state co-optation of Islam assured that the state bureaucracy-state regulation 
and distribution of public resources-remained independent of, and was not hijacked by, 
societal Islamic groups to achieve their personal or group interests. 
Institutionalization of the Islamic Bureaucracy in Malaysia in 
Comparative Perspective 
Locating the process of institutionalization of the Islamic bureaucracy in Malaysia in a 
cross-national comparative perspective helps us to appreciate the key proposition of this 
study: the institutionalization of religion within the state restrains non-governmental 
Islam~c organizations and individuals from acting as viable autonomous/oppositional 
forces against government authorities. This consequently allows the government 
considerable scope to carry out Islamic-related programs and handle Islamic issues 
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according to its own interests. 
Differences revealed by comparison between Malaysia and its neighbor, Indonesia, 
support this claim. Confronted by the global wave of Islamic resurgence, the two 
governments adopted different approaches. In Indonesia, the government's largely 
'secular-nationalist' 'noninterventionist' approach left many religious functions including 
education to private actors? and kept state-sponsored Islamic institutions such as Islamic 
courts on the periphery of the state administrative structure. By and large, the role of the 
state in administration of religious affairs is comparatively small, leaving the level of 
state intervention minimal. 34 Moreover, the state's intervention in religious affairs is 
usually personalistic/patrimonial-a long way from the Weberian model oflegal-rational 
bureaucratic authority. The Department of Religious Affairs has been largely captured by 
societal religious groupings at various levels. The appointment of religious officials has 
generally been based on personal connections or organizational association. The same 
pattern is found in government-sponsored religious organizations such as MUI and 
ICMI. 35 Religious leaders appointed to these organizations retain considerable autonomy 
as they can exit from office relatively easily because such offices are not the prime 
sources of their employment and religious authority. The Department of Religious Affairs 
grew large-despite its limited jurisdiction over Islamic affairs-as societal religious 
groups gained access to its considerable public spoils. Organizational interests of the 
department were often identified with those of the particular societal religious group in 
control at any particular time, leaving it too weak to enforce state regulation over 
34 Indonesia's central religious agency, the Department of Religious Affairs, is not exclusively tasked to 
administer Islamic affairs; its administrative scope also covers other official religions. Moreover, the 
department's jurisdiction over Islamic affairs is very limited. 
35 Appointment of politically well-connected individuals to high offices in some of the state-sponsored 
Islamic organizations such as MUI (Maj/is Ulama Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Ulama) and ICMI 
(Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals) illustrates this. 
For the development and political significance of these organizations utilized for Suharto's co-optation 
project, see Porter (2002). 
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non-state actors independently. 36 On the other hand, a number of private religious 
organizations have retained considerable religious autonomy up till today, although their 
overt political activities were largely curtailed under the authoritarian Suharto regime. 
Various non-governmental organizations run their own schools, welfare and 
socio-economic programs (including zakat and hospitals), and retain authority to issue 
religious rulings including/atwa (Hooker 2003). These organizations include not only the 
prominent Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah but also many others, whether 
liberal, conservative or radical. In the post-authoritarian era, nmnerous non-governmental 
Islamic groups and individuals play a prominent role in national politics. Given their 
prominence, some may question the surprisingly small role played by the major Islamic 
organizations, especially NU, in the fall of Suharto in 1998. In this respect, a strong 
argument is advanced that this was largely due to the Suharto government's personalistic 
co-optation of elements of the organizations into the state system of religious 
administration (Kadir 2002).37 
This, again, supports my analytical position: the state's involvement in religion in itself 
is nothing extraordinary; the state intervenes in almost all Muslim nations. What we 
should pay more attention to is how they intervene. The state's personalistic/patrimonial 
intervention in Islamic affairs in Indonesia-regardless of regime type-and the low 
level of institutionalization of the state religious authority has left societal religious 
activities vigorous and diverse. 
In Malaysia, in contrast, relatively effective and strong state capacities to regulate 
Islamic affairs made the working environment of private religious groups highly 
restricted. For instance, they are, in theory, required to obtain a license from the 
36 NU controlled the Department until 1971 and Muhammadiyah took over the domination henceforth. 
37 A case study of NU under Suharto by Sidney Jones (1984) makes a similar case in this regard. She points 
out that the government's increasing role in Islamic affairs brings increasing pressure to bear on 
non-governmental Muslim organizations; it weakens them institutionally, coerces their members into 
becoming inactive, or strengthens accommodationist elements within them. This line of argument is also 
advanced by Feillard (1997). 
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government to run their private schools; otherwise, they confront harassment by state 
religious authorities. In the worst case, they are suspected as 'deviants' and 'extremists' 
and if seen as a political threat to the government, forced by the religious authorities to 
terminate their activities. Some of them may enjoy a limited following at the grass-roots 
level, but their authority is comparatively weak. In short, the state-sanctioned religious 
apparatus highly regulates the Islamic market. 'Deviation' from the state-sanctioned 
religious rulings and teachings can be a serious offence in Malaysia's Muslim 
community. 
The study asserts that this 'undemocratic' religious regime accounts for the relative 
weakness of private religious movements and activism-whether radical or liberal-in 
Malaysia. Political Islam in Malaysia can largely be reduced to an electoral competition 
between the two Muslim parties, UMNO and PAS, a competition that increasingly centers 
on 'who is more Islamic.' It is generally considered that PAS's influence in the Muslim 
community and in Malaysian politics is in large part based on the party leaders' Islamic 
credentials and authority. Yet, PAS is after all a political party (and was born as such), and 
not purely a private religious organization. 38 It is nothing like Indonesia's NU or 
Muhammadiyah in terms of the scope and the scale of its religious activities. Besides 
PAS, there are few alternative mass-based religious movements such as ABIM (Angkatan 
Belia Islam Malaysia, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement) but their influence is rather 
limited. Moreover, unlike in Indonesia, non-theologically trained Muslim individuals and 
intellectuals in Malaysia have been allowed only little space and scope to express their 
religious views or speak out in the name of Islam. When they speak, they can be 
threatened with legal action by state religious authorities who accuse them of having no 
proper religious qualifications to do so.39 
38 For the birth and the evolution of PAS in an earlier period, see Funston (1976). 
39 The Ulama Council, for instance, called for the arrest and imprisonment of several individuals for their 
propagation of reform within Islam. The individuals included Farish Noor, a Western-educated Muslim 
academic, and ZainahAnwar, a Western-educated leader of the progressive Muslim women's group, Sisters 
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The fundamental issue here pertains to the place of religious authorities: who has the 
right to speak authoritatively about religious doctrines, and who is qualified to interpret 
them? Who has the ultimate authority to authorize such religious qualification? Scholars 
studying other regions have grappled with these questions. In Egypt, for example, the 
Islamist groups' successful appropriation of the authority to interpret sacred 
texts-authority formally monopolized by state appointed ulama-paved the way for 
popular acceptance of their religious message (Wickham 2004: 239). This case suggests 
that the possession ofreligious authority and interpretational skills is a crucial quality for 
successful religious movements. As I emphasized earlier, the function of 
religious-educated clerical actors has not simply been limited to religious service; they 
have also been a vital political force. The level and the mode of their involvement in 
political activism, however, vary considerably across place and time. This variation, 
ultimately, is not determined by religious doctrinal differences. Nor is it exclusively 
determined by the security capacities of the state. Other political and institutional forces 
must be at work. More specifically, this study contends that the institutionalization of 
religious authorities within the state can have an important impact on the way in which 
religious authority structures are formulated and how clerical actors can be i.nvolved in 
political activism and influence political mobilization. 
Organization of this Study 
This study is divided into nine chapters. This chapter has presented the central questions, 
a summary of the argument, as well as the theoretical framework of this study. The second 
chapter briefly overviews colonial legacies of organization of state Islam. It shows that 
in Islam. 
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the institutional foundation of religious bureaucratic authority structures was laid under 
the British colonial regime. This organizational formula equipped the state with the 
embryonic means to intervene in religious activities of Muslims in the way it has in 
post-independent Malaysia. The third chapter introduces the incentive structures of the 
Muslim ruling politicians that explain the varying levels of state institutionalization of 
religious bureaucratic authority structures. It shows how one-party dominance and the 
highly centralized, and competitive, party organization has shaped incentives, and 
strategies of individual ruling-party politicians to build patronage channels to achieve 
political ascendancy within the party. These incentive structures have left these 
politicians amenable to particular social interests according to their place in the ruling 
party. The fourth through to sixth chapters give an account of how the incentive structures 
of the Muslim politicians have brought about different outcomes m state 
institutionalization in three sectors respectively. Against received wisdom, the state 
intervened in these sectors-Syariah judiciary, Islamic education, and the welfare-based 
tax system (zakat)-very differently, and different types of state structures regulating 
respective issue areas have emerged. The seventh chapter examines the rise of two federal 
Islamic agencies that grew prominent under the Mahathir administration to inquire into 
the relations between ruling politicians and Islamic bureaucrats within the federal 
government. It assesses how their corps of officialdom was recruited and organized, and 
whether the expansion and greater presence of the federal organizations benefited a group 
of theological trained Islamic elites-the ulama. The eighth chapter inquires into the 
effects of institutionalization on the state's capacities to regulate 
oppositional/autonomous religious political mobilization at the societal level. It suggests 
that Malaysia's relatively high level of state institutionalization of religious bureaucratic 
authority structures-despite some inter-sectional variation-has a strong correlation 
with the weak mobilizational capacities of religious movements. The process of state 
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institutionalization has equipped the state-and the Muslim politicians who dominate 
it-with the infrastructural power and religious authority to define Islamic 'orthodoxy' 
and control 'unorthodox' variants at relatively low cost. Comparison between Malaysia 
and Indonesia is brought in to confirm this theoretical point. The final chapter concludes 
the thesis by summarizing the argument and suggesting implications for comparative 
analysis as well as policy making. 
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CHAPTER 2 
State Institutionalization of the Islamic Bureaucratic Authority 
Structures: 
The Origin of Institutionalized Religion 
This study focuses on the strategic interactions of Muslim politicians in the ruling party 
in explaining state institutionalization of the Islamic bureaucratic authority structures in 
the context of Islamic resurgence. Where did Malaysia's state religious bureaucratic 
authority come from in the first place? The question of why the UMNO politicians 
adopted the particular mode of state intervention in religious affairs-state 
institutionalization-in the face of the religious resurgence cannot be fully understood 
without taking into account the institutional foundation of the state religious authorities. 
This chapter traces colonial legacies of state involvement in Islamic affairs under the 
British colonial regime (1874-1957)~ 
The' concept of state institutionalization of religion is not entirely new in 
contemporary Malaysia. The institutional foundation of religious authority structures 
was first introduced to the country in the early twentieth century when it was still under 
the British colonial regime. The process of organizing and centralizing Islam was slow 
and uneven. But organizations administering various aspects of the Muslim faith were 
organized and centralized under Malay rulers or sultans in the individual States. The 
local rulers were formally installed as the guardians of the 'state religion,' and supported 
by the newly emergent bureaucratic authorities governing Islamic affairs. This 
institutional formula within the formal state bureaucratic structure came to significantly 
influence the organization and mobilization of Islamic movements at the societal level 
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thereafter. More detailed discussion of the historical background of institutional 
evolution in individual sectors is introduced in the later chapters. This chapter maps out 
a general overview oflslarnic bureaucratic structures under the British colonial regime. 
Institutionalized Religion in Historical Perspective: 
The Origin and the Significance of the State Religious Bureaucracy 
Co-optation of the Muslim Ruling Elites 
The expansion of British colonial rule, beginning in 1874 on the Malay peninsula, 
created an extensive territorial and political state, British Malaya, which together with 
the Straits Settlements, came under the direct control of the British government as 
strategically important trade and commercial entrepots. The integration process of these 
States into the British colonial administrative structure took three forms: the Federated 
Malay States (F.M.S.) composed of four States, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and 
Pahang; the Unfederated Malay States (U.M.S.), Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Terengganu, 
and Johor; and the Straits Settlements comprising Singapore, Penang and Malacca. The 
geographical divide was quite distinctive with all the Federated States except Pahang 
clustering on the west coast and the Unfederated States on the north and east, with the 
indigenous Malay population much larger in the latter (Allen 1968: 256-57). Since 1896, 
the Federated States were administered by an expanding British bureaucracy, centralized 
under the Federal Council, or the 'Conference of Rulers,' in the capital, Kuala Lumpur. 
The Unfederated States, on the other hand, were not immediately integrated into the 
Federation to form one political entity, while the Straits. Settlements remained separate 
(Roff 1994: 91-96). 
Despite this variation, British colonial policy in Malaya was commonly based upon a 
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mutually profitable alliance with the Malay ruling class, the rajas or sultans of the 
States and aristocratic elites. The British sought to co-opt them in governing the country, 
while 'protecting' the Malay peasantry from alien exploitation and allowing them to 
preserve their traditional way of life, with minimal adjustments to rapid social and 
economic change (Means 1969: 276). This arrangement was intended to preserve the 
traditional political-cum-social order within Malay society, enabling the individual 
sultans to maintain their position and prestige, or at least to do so in the eyes of 
commoner Malays in their own States. 
Given the backing of the colonial regime, the status of the Malay rulers was not 
merely maintained, but rather, strengthened within Malay society. Their customary, but 
previously infrequently exercised control over religion was carefully strengthened by 
the British (Cheah Boon Kheng 1988: 7). In practice, however, the sultans were 
deprived of much of their political power in decision making and assumed symbolic 
roles as figureheads under the supervision of British Residents, with the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements standing behind them as the final source of authority (Roff 1994: 
18). 
Given their supremacy over the Malay indigenous ruling elites, the British 
authorities' perceptions and intentions about Islam critically influenced the way in 
which British policy towards Islam took shape. In general, the British did not possess a 
sense of hostility towards Islam, in stark contrast to the vigilant attitude taken by the 
Dutch in the neighboring East Indies (Roff 1994: 67-71). These diverging attitudes were 
articulated in their respective policies towards Islam: the British policy on religious 
matters was much more liberal than that pursued by the Dutch (Yegar 1979: 109-17). 
Under the British regime, Islam was in fact encouraged. Pilgrimage to Mecca was 
promoted, as was the introduction of religious education in Malay schools (Yegar 1979: 
93). Attempting to avoid offending Muslim sensibilities, Christian missions were 
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forbidden from proselytizing among the Malays (Yegar 1979: 265). Once the British 
administration was consolidated, the construction of mosques throughout the peninsula 
was stepped up (Yegar 1979: 211). Furthermore, heavy British involvement in Islamic 
affairs shaped the particular way in which Islam was institutionalized and consolidated 
through legislative and administrative means (Yegar 1979: 265-66). 
On their part, the sultans appeared increasingly committed to Islamic administration 
and expressed a keen interest in introducing tighter control over religious affairs. 
Deprived of their real power in other areas, the sultans and the traditional Malay elite 
naturally turned to the only spheres now left to them: religion and Malay custom (Cheah 
Boon Kheng 1988: 7). The sultans' desire to prove their authority, thus, was translated 
into their zeal for reorganizing the Syariah court system and religious administration, 
together with codification of Syariah laws, which, in tum, equipped them with the 
means to control the religious life of their subjects. The British official, Hugh Clifford's 
report on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula in the 1890s suggested that gambling, 
cockfighting and 'kindred sinful sports' were 'prohibited to Muhammadans' (Milner 
1981: 59). State Mufti and Shaykah ul-Islam 1 issued fatwa (religious decrees) 
condemning new ideas as kafir (infidel) or Kaiani,2 and reformist leaders were refused 
permission to speak in some mosques (Roff 1994: 80). 
Islamic Reformist Movements under Colonial Rule 
The sultans' interest in spearheading Islamic administration was also intended to contain 
Islamic critics of the Malay ruling class, a force growing in the 1920s and collectively 
referred to as the Kaum Muda (Young Faction). 3 This newly emergent group 
incorporated reformist ideas as solutions to problems and contradictions brought about 
1 A title of honor given to jurists of more than usual standing. 
2 The term is used to imply heresy. 
3 For a detail discussion of the Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua controversy, see Milner (1994: 228-36) and Roff 
(1994: chap.3). 
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by colonial rule. They sought to return to the wisdom of the fundamental sources of 
Islam, the Qur'an and the Hadith (the sayings and the deeds of the Prophet), and to 
introduce elements of modem education into Muslim schooling. An equally distinctive 
character of the Kaum Muda was its attempt to re-think Islam in terms of the demands 
made by the contemporary situation, in order to participate in socio-economic change 
(Roff 1994: 76). By emphasizing the rule of Syariah (Islamic law) as the foundation of 
the umma (Muslim community), and the importance of ijtihad (interpretation), the 
reformists offered an alternative to, and thus threatened, the raja-centered traditional 
elites (Milner 1981: 58; TauficAbdullar 1993: 40).4 
The rising influence of the Kaum Muda provoked a reaction from the traditionalist 
religious community, the Kaum Tua (Old Faction). These traditionalists comprised 
much of the official religious establishment of the sultanates: kathi (Religious 
magistrate) and Mufti (Religious jurisconsult), and many rural ulama (Muslim 
theological scholars), allied with the traditional Malay ruling elites (Milner 1994: chap.6 
and chap.9; Roff 1994: chap.3). The reformist leaders' attack on the village ulama, from 
whom religious officialdom was mainly drawn, was especially severe. These traditional 
religious elites were castigated as 'hawkers of religion,' obstacles to progress, 
destroyers of the true faith and so on (Roff 1994). 
The reformist-traditionalist dichotomy in the religious sphere took on not only 
ideological but also political significance; it caused the growing friction between sultans 
and Islamic reformist critics in many parts of thy Malay world. Some sultans banned 
Islamic opponents of the traditional establishments from preaching in the mosques of 
their States, and they expelled members of reformist organizations from their territories. 
Others, who appreciated the importance of these Islamic developments, compromised 
4 Roff argues that the reformists' insistence upon the equality of all men before God, and upon a more 
individualistic ethic, in particular, may have been seen as having political implications subversive to the 
existing socio-political and religious order based on individual attachment and absolute loyalty to the 
sultans (1994: 79). 
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with the reformists. In some States, the sultans began to dismantle the ceremonial 
edifice of the kerajaan, which was considered un-Islamic (Milner 1981: 60). 5 It was 
evident that the Muslim ruler, the leader of the Islamic religion in his State, was forced 
to accommodate demands for the implementation of Syariah. Milner points out, 'in 
making such compromises, Malay rulers were perhaps trying to pre-empt the 
fundamentalist leaders' (Milner 1981: 60). Furthermore, many of these developments 
were pushed for by the Malay rulers' desire to emulate Western administrative systems, 
seen as 'modem,' in a field the Malays felt to be peculiarly their own (Roff 1994: 72). 
Despite the British principle of noninterf~rence in religious and customary affairs and 
the undoubtedly important effect on domestic politics caused by the rise of reformists, 
however, the British influence was profound in this area as well. On paper, the initial 
treaties with the Malay States excluded all matters of religion and Malay custom from 
British 'advice.' In practice, however, the British officials actively participated in 
institutional development of Syariah courts and laws, and other Islamic institutions 
(Yegar 1979: 92-93). 6 The reorganization of the Islamic legal system was part of an 
attempt by the British regime to modernize the state apparatus for maintaining law and 
order by introducing a unified and standardized legal system throughout Malaya of 
equal and universal application (Yegar 1979: 264). The British authorities' two major 
considerations accelerated further this 'modernization' process: first, to incorporate the 
religious system into the general framework of court administration; and second, to 
preserve the interests of the indigenous ruling elites and existing ulama and absorb them 
into the new political arrangement in order to obtain their support for changes and to 
neutralize anticipated objections (Yegar 1979: 145). With these co-optation 
considerations, the British administration actually organized Syariah courts, and the 
5 Kerajaan refers to the traditional pre-colonial form of government. In Terengganu and Kedah, titles 
which possessed both a worldly and a spiritual significance for Malays, were nearly all abolished. 
6 In the Federated States, British interference in Islamic affairs was much more direct than in the 
Unfederated States. 
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system of Syariah court administration. The British 'Islamization' policy consequently 
embraced a creation of, for the first time, a centralized administrative order and legal 
system for Islamic affairs in the individual States. 
The Judicial Sphere 
In the legal sphere, the British intervention in general, and the introduction of English 
law in particular, created the three systems of law (English, Islamic, and customary) that 
had to coexist and inevitably impinged upon one another. The supremacy of English law 
, 
in relation to the other two traditional systems of law that had existed, in embryonic 
ways, radically restricted the scale and scope of the application of the Syariah and 
customary laws.7 The British replaced much of the Syariah with modem ordinances, 
and limited the jurisdiction of Syariah to family laws mainly concerned with the 
questions of marriage, divorce and alimony (Milner 1981: 60; Yegar 1979: 126 and 
140-41). 
Despite the jurisdictional erosion of the Syariah laws, the gradual intrusion of the 
British in the legal sphere facilitated the formation of a more formal and organized 
judicial system of Syariah administration in a number of respects. First, British efforts 
to install legal clarity brought about a clearer distinction between religious and civil 
courts (Yegar 1979: 126). While shaping a modem system of courts, the British 
administration separated religious courts (Courts of kathi or Assistant kathi) from the 
rest of the legal apparatus (Yegar 1979: 152-53). Second, legal reforms resulted in the 
spread and strengthening of the Syariah at the expense of the customary law (Yegar 
1979: 140-42). An important consequence of this arrangement was that the position of 
7 Before the British came and introduced reforms, the administration of justice in Malaya was entirely in 
the hands of local chiefs. Justice was conducted according to the adat (custom) and the Syariah as 
understood and interpreted by the penghulus (local headmen) and chiefs, but without any organized 
system of courts. Syariah courts had not functioned earlier in any methodical fashion. For the traditional 
legal system, particularly the functions of the Syariah and the adat, see Yegar (1970: 119-44). 
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the sultans, who became both the political and the religious heads of the individual 
States, was elevated, further reinforcing the trend towards 'authoritarianism' (Yegar 
1979: 126). Third, alongside the written Constitution, Syariah laws in the form of 
modem legislation on religious matters were codified. Ancient forms of punishment 
were abrogated and steps were taken to codify consistent rules out of a heritage of 
mostly oral 'rules' of conduct. After the adoption of the Muhammadan Laws Enactment 
in 1904, all the States, to varying degrees, introduced a series of Islamic laws, with the 
enforcement of the religious regulations correspondingly tightened (Yegar 1979: 
193-94). 
The Educational Sphere 
The British administration also assisted and strengthened religious education.8 Initially, 
British officials introduced and advocated a purely secular form of education (English 
and Malay vernacular schools) for Malays. They found, however, that this approach had 
the adverse result of discouraging parents from sending their children to the government 
schools. In rural areas where the majority of Muslims lived, religious schools run by 
ulama or communities in mosques and suraus (prayer houses) or sekolah pondok, 
remained popular and continued to be important centers of education. Suspicion 
towards the government-sponsored secular schools among Muslims was one of the 
reasons why the government schools were so unattractive; their apathy towards secular 
education contrasted markedly with their interest in its religious counterpart. The 
growth of the government schools later was primarily attributed to the introduction of 
Islamic studies (Qur'anic education) to the curriculum of the Malay schools (Yegar 
1979: 241-44). The British were at first reluctant to sponsor Islamic education, but 
8 For an extensive discussion of religious education under the British administration, see Rosnani (1996: 
chap.2) and Yegar (1970: chap.7). 
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realized that it was necessary in order to promote modem schooling among the Muslim 
community. 
The sultans, on their part, expressed a keen interest in sponsoring Islamic education 
in their respective States. Since the tum of the twentieth century, under the auspices of 
the British, each State developed some form of administrative mechanism to assist and 
regulate the running of religious education. Here again, the influence of the British was 
profound; legislative measures were introduced to systematize and assist the 
administration of religious education including recruitment of teachers. In Kedah, for 
example, a compulsory school attendance law (Enactment No.10of1914) was passed. 
One important provision in the enactment was that Malay children enrolled in English, 
Arabic or Qur'anic schools 'recognized by the government' were exempt from 
attendance at Malay vernacular schools, subject to pnor perm1ss10n of the 
Superintendent of Education to enter such recognized schools. In Johor, similar 
legislation was introduced in 1915 to enforce compulsory attendance. Johor went even 
further by tightening a regulatory measure over religious schools. The Johor Offences 
by Muhammadans Enactment, 1935, provided that no Muslim could teach any religious 
doctrine (except in his own house and to members of his own family) unless he had the 
prior permission of the sultan in council. Similar legislation was also introduced in other 
States (Yegar 1979: 247-50). 
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, administrative structures for supervising religious 
education were further developed in all the States especially in the area of authorization 
and recruitment of teaching staff and supervision of teaching materials. State 
intervention in religious education was reinforced as a result. In Kedah, for instance, 
enactment No.14 of 1931 was passed to 'provide for the registration and control of 
Muhammadan Schools.' With this provision enforced, no one could teach religion 
without the written authority of the State council; a registrar for religious schools was 
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appointed by the president of the council; every school and religious teacher had to be 
registered; and the registrar and his inspectors could visit schools at any time, examine 
all teaching material and sequester anything found to contain 'unauthorized doctrine.' 
Moreover, a committee was authorized to supervise teaching of the Qur'an in Malay 
schools (Yegar 1979: 251). 
In addition, the British administration took steps to elevate the standard of religious 
teachers. Religious training colleges or high schools were established to train 'qualified 
teachers' to teach the Qur'an, among other topics. Annual examinations were also 
introduced in some States to grant higher grades to religious teachers. The colonial 
officials were constantly concerned that the standard of education was very low. For 
them, the 'ignorance' of the teachers (including religious teachers as well as kathi or 
Syariah officials) of religion was especially a source of irritation. All these 
'qualification' measures were meant to raise and standardize the quality of religious 
teachers. The British officials, however, lent assistance primarily to issues concerning 
management, leaving the religious aspects involving teaching and curriculum to the 
indigenous ruling elites (Yegar 1979: 254-58). 
The Zakat Sphere 
The basic organizational structures to manage religious funds including zakat were al~o 
laid down early in the British colonial period. In theory, zakat is the alms-tax, one of the 
five obligations of Islam, levied on different kinds of property and distributed to eight 
categories of recipient. How this is practiced in reality-by whom and for what 
purposes-however, diverges considerably across place and time. In colonial Malaya? 
zakat was traditionally limited to agricultural products and the fitrah (zakat at the end of 
the fasting month). The sultans entrusted the task of managing the religious funds to the 
religious councils or committees presided over, or commissioned by, the sultan himself. 
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The revenue was spent primarily on the building and upkeep of mosques and surau, the 
payment of mosque officials, and occasionally, the employment of religious teachers 
(Yegar 1979: 216-22). 
Zakat revenues allowed the religious councils, which had depended on often limited 
royal household financial resources, to become independent from the colonial 
administration, and its authority to control religious-related activities. An enactment was 
passed to authorize the sultan to appoint the treasurers and other assistant officers. 
Religious officials such as kathi and local dignitaries connected to the sultan were 
appointed to these posts at the discretion of the sultan. The arbitrary power of the 
sultans and the religious councils was enlarged as a result (Yegar 1979: 219-20). 
The Formation of Religions Councils: Institutionalized Religion under the Royal 
Household 
To deal with the Islamic operations that had been expanded and become more 
complicated, the general administrative structures of Islamic affairs were also developed 
in each State. Between the two World Wars, all the Malay Stat~s were equipped with 
central organizations, the religious councils, modeled on European administrative 
patterns, to handle questions of religion. The form and official title of the councils 
varied from one State to another, but they essentially retained similar functions. The 
tasks of the councils were all-encompassing, including almost anything related to 
Islamic matters: nomination of kathi and religious teachers, consideration of points of 
Islamic law and practices or appeals from lower religious courts, supervision of 
religious publications and dealing with religious legislation. The collection and 
management of zakat, as well as wakf (Islamic system of trusts and endowments) were 
also entrusted to the councils. Their 'official duties' meant that the councils under the 
royal household, in theory, were equipped with a great deal of prerogatives to regulate 
61 
religious life of Muslims in their respective States (Roff 1974; 1994: 73-74; Yegar 1979: 
chap.3). 
The Royal Household and Unqualified Officialdom 
The modem administrative reforms sponsored by the British created a whole new 
hierarchical 'ecclesiastic order,' comprising a corps of religious officialdom, a concept 
alien to the Muslim community in the pre-colonial period. The justices of Syariah courts 
were made salaried officers of the state, an innovation (Roff 1974: 114). Despite all 
these administrative developments hinting at a certain degree of institutionalization of 
the religious bureaucratic structures during the colonial period, however, the quality 
(type of institutionalization) of the state organizations governing religious affairs was 
dubious and not close to anything comparable with a rule-bound, disciplined, and 
systematic government organization envisaged by Weber. 
Based on the British model, a number of procedural enactments were passed to define 
the official responsibilities of the religious councils (Roff 1974). With the councils 
tightly placed under the jurisdiction of the sultans in the individual States, however, 
distinction between public and private spheres was not entirely clear. The sultans 
appointed the council members on a fixed salary at their discretion. The councils 
commonly comprised a majority of 'non-theologically trained members' drawn 
primarily from the royal household and traditional aristocratic class, in addition to the 
principal religious officers: the State Mufti, the Chief kathi, kathi, and assistant kathi, 
whose appointment was also a prerogative of the sultan (Roff 1994: 74). Given the 
ambiguous and arbitrary system of recruitment, the qualification of these officials was 
rather questionable; there was no standard system of recruitment and training. After all, 
the members of the councils were mainly people loyal to the sultans (Milner 1994: 
216-18). By making the councils dependent on themselves for their being, their 
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continued existence, and their revenues, the sultans greatly strengthened their positions 
(and their immediate advisors) (Roff 1974: 132-33). Moreover, the isolation of the corps 
of religious officers from the rest of the public service in the course of their evolution 
meant that they were separate from organizational and administrative development that 
other parts of the state bureaucracy experienced. 
While attempting to remain aloof from the administration of Islamic affairs, British 
officials' unhappiness about the incompetence of religious administration was obvious. 
One of high-ranking officers in Kelantan, for example, commented on the 'difficulties it 
[ Syariah court] had had in appointing and retaining hakim and kathi of ability.' He 
regarded the Syariah court as 'the last stronghold of the corruption and dishonesty 
formerly characteristic of the whole administration,' and added that 'there did not seem 
to be much prospect of improving [its] condition' (qtd. in Roff 1974: 113). Given the 
lower level of British intervention in the religious area, moreover, there were no 
grounds to expect that the regulations stipulated in the Syariah were put in force 
effectively. Indeed, Yegar writes, the judges displayed a tendency to ignore the new 
laws, preferring traditional customs and personal interests (Yegar 1979: 159-60). Roff 
reiterates the point by observing the Kelantan situation: 'in general there is no reasons 
to suppose that the details of the Syariah court regulations departed radically from past 
practice in Kelantan, and certainly no means of proving this' (Roff 1974: 114). In the 
zakat area, too, problems and complaints were rampant with regard to the competence 
of the councils in managing zakat. funds. In Kelantan, for example, there were many 
complaints about the sloppiness of the council in collection or remittance of zakat and 
fitrah, problems of handling and storing large sums of money, and hazards of theft and 
fire (Roff 1974: 146). The apparent lack of competence and discipline of the religious 
officials was in stark contrast with the newly emerging civil service, the Malay 
Administrative Service, dominated by the Western-educated Muslim aristocratic elites 
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and known for its competence, discipline, and integrity (Khasnor Johan 1984). 
The state-sponsored institutionalization of Islam under British rule, however, had 
very important consequences ideologically and politically. First, the centralization and 
bureaucratization of Islam under the sultans contributed to the focusing of religious as 
well as political authority on the traditional Muslim ruling elites who enhanced their 
paramount position in the Muslim community. This religious hierarchical order, 
governing in principle every aspect of Islamic affairs in the country, was put under the 
jurisdiction of the sultans of the individual States, while immediate responsibility was 
entrusted to the lay officials personally connected to them. In consequence, state 
authorities alongside the religious establishment came to exert enormous authority over 
Islamic activities and teaching at the societal level. For example, some Islamic groups 
were refused permission to speak in some mosques. Printing and publishing were also 
regulated (Roff 1994; 80). In this climate, the space for liberal religious discussion-let 
alone dissension-was largely curtailed (Cheah Boon Kheng 1988: 17). 
Second, the formation of the Islamic officialdom within the formal state structure 
helped co-opt a number of theologically trained Islamic leaders and teachers into the 
Western form of bureaucratized government structure. These religious leaders, as a 
result, found themselves heavily dependent on the state career-, material-, and 
--------
authority-wise. This corps of religious officials was 'officially' authorized to regulate 
religious affairs. The alliance of the traditional Malay rulers and aristocratic elites and 
the religious officials was seen as the supreme authority in the Muslim communities in 
the individual States-in both the religious and political senses. Religion and state were 
now so inextricably intertwined that the sultan's prerogative to regulate the religious 
lives of their subjects appeared unquestionable (Yegar 1979: 199). 
In sum, the institutionalization of Islam under British rule dramatically altered the 
nature of Islam in Malaysia. In pre-colonial period, Islam was the 'state religion,' but 
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only in a symbolic and nominal sense. The Malay royal courts, in effect, lacked the 
necessary resources, both politically and economically, to support or centralize Islamic 
institutions and activities (Milner 1994: 217; Roff 1994: 67; Yegar 1979: chap.3). In the 
legal sphere, Islamic jurisprudence influenced legal codes in some restricted areas. In 
practice, however, these laws seem to have been largely neglected in the settlement of 
disputes. There was no organized class of ulama, nor was there a central religious 
authority, such as a Mufti. Islam essentially remained local in nature. In general, senior 
kin, village elders, and local notables were responsible for the administration of 
religious law and other matters bearing on religion and custom (Means 1969: 269; 
Peletz 2002: 25-38). Peletz highlights this local nature of Islamic affairs in his 
assessment of the pre-colonial situation: 
Local leaders, headmen, and their superordinates were assisted in the 
management of Islamic (and other) affairs by village-level Islamic 
functionaries, especially since there were no district-level or other supra 
village-level organizations of ulama, nor any mufti capable of issuing 
opinions with the authority of law or anything approaching law-like status ... 
The village-level Islamic officials in question exercised a fair degree of 
autonomy and served various functions that were later assumed by kadi and 
other religious specialists (Peletz 2002: 30-31 ). 
It was under the British colonial regime that the concept of Islam as the official faith 
was introduced both in theory and in practice. The preservation and reinforcement of the 
traditional bases of authority and social organization implicit in the British policy were 
most pronounced in the realm of Islam. Coupled with greatly improved means of 
communication, and centralization of the administrative mechanisms and legislative 
sanctions now open to the alliance of the British and the Malay ruling elites, their 
political and economic will combined to produce an authoritarian form of religious 
administration much beyond anything previously known on the peninsula. It has to be 
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reiterated, however, that the level of state institutionalization of the administrative 
structures regulating Islamic affairs was on the whole quite moderate; the corps of 
Islamic officials lacked the capaGity to carry out a wide range of complex duties in a 
consistent and effective manner. There was not only uncertainty and irregularity in the 
administration of Islamic affairs at the State level, but also a great.deal of inter-State 
discrepancy. It was only after independence that these contradictions. and problems 
became overtly evident; the post-independence government that inherited the 
bureaucratized system of Islamic administration found that these problems increasingly 
constrained its capacities to deal with Islamic issues and activities. Demands for 
establishing an effective, consistent, and efficient government organization managing 
Islamic affairs grew strong only after the resurgence of Islam within the Muslim 
community in the 1970s. 
Indonesia iµ a Comparative Perspective: The 'Anti-Islam' Dutch Colonial Regime 
and the Minimal Level of State Institutionalization 
Comparison with the Indonesian experience with respect to institutional evolution of the 
state Islamic bureaucracy helps us to evaluate the significance of the Malaysian 
experience. A Muslim-majority neighbor, the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia after 
independence), had a contrasting experience with regard to administration and 
institutionalization of Islam despite the presence of important similar conditions. 
Overall, state intervention, and the institutionalization of bureaucratic structures 
overseeing Islamic affairs was kept minimal, leaving administration of religious affairs 
to non-state actors. Even when the state intervened in the relevant areas (e.g., Syariah 
judiciary), it did so in a very arbitrary and ambiguous manner. Moreover, from the early 
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twentieth century on various grassroots Islamic organizations expanded in scale and 
scope outside the formal state structure. Their concerns covered not only 'after-world' 
but also 'this-world' issues more broadly, concerning laws, education and social welfare 
of the ummah. The emergence of vibrant grass-roots Islamic movements such as the 
modernist Muhammadiyah contrasted starkly with the situation in British Malaya where 
independent religious activities (especially the reformist types) were actively opposed 
by the sultans and failed to attract a large number of Muslim followers. 9 
The contrasting developments in the two neighboring countries were a result of the 
colonial governments' approach towards Islam. In the Dutch colony, policy on Islam 
was not entirely consistent at all times, but essentially reflected official suspicion and in 
the early decades of colonial rule was based on the twin principles of religious neutrality 
and political vigilance. Policy was hardened as a result of the violent upsurge of 
political agitation (not only Islamic, but also communist and nationalist) in the 1920s 
(Benda 1958: chap.3). 
While the traditional authority centered on kiyayi and ulama was largely ignored in 
the formal state structure, the colonial government consolidated the superior position of 
the aristocratic elite, the priyayi, in local society by incorporating them into the state 
administrative machinery. Members of the highest echelon of the priyayi class were 
appointed as Bupati (Regents) in the newly demarcated administrative districts 
(Regencies) in return for their hereditary rights; the lower echelon became 'salaried 
officials' (Sutherland 1979: chap.1). They were given-and immensely benefited from 
-Dutch education and training, and 'became acquainted with Western administrative 
and, to a lesser extent, entrepreneurial skills, from which most graduates of Islamic 
schools were ipso facto excluded' (Benda 1958: 58). Moreover, the majority of them, 
9 Islam in Indonesia is divided into two streams-modernist and traditionalist. See Geertz (1960) for 
elaboration. The Indonesian modernists shared many of the views of the Kaum Muda in the Malay 
peninsula. 
67 
Benda wrote: 
adopted an attitude of disdainful arrogance vis-a-vis Islam which was quite 
clearly derived from, and very similar to, prevalent Western attitudes. The 
secular, modem state which they envisaged would have as little use for the 
santri and the ulama as for the adat and the priyayi. Both, in their eyes, 
represented intrinsically conservative elements doomed to extinction in the 
envisaged political evolution of their homelands (Benda 1958: 59). 10 
The colonial regime, thus, reinforced the irreconcilable division between the highly 
Westernized 'bureaucratic elite' sponsored by the Dutch on the one hand, and the 
religious elites excluded from the corridors of formal power on the other, a division 
unknown in Colonial Malaya. The 'exclusivist' attitude of the governing elites-both 
foreign and local alike-toward Islam in Indonesia contrasted starkly with Malaysian 
ruling elites' 'inclusive' approach. This 'exclusivist' attitude brought about the very low 
level of state institutionalization of the bureaucratic structure handling Islamic affairs, as 
shown briefly below. 
Islamic Courts 
In the judicial sector, Islamic courts established under the Dutch colonial regime were 
conferred with very limited jurisdiction and power. Unlike Malaysia where the position 
of Islamic laws was strengthened as against adat laws, in Indonesia the application of 
adat laws was revived to cover various aspects of personal law. The influence of Islamic 
law and courts diminished as a result (Noer 1978: 45). Moreover, the Dutch neglect of 
Islamic affairs meant that development of the Islamic court system was largely nominal, 
leaving the latter subject to arbitrary intervention by the aristocratic elites. The 
inevitable result was incompetence, nepotism and corruption among the Islamic court 
10 The term santri refers to the section of the Muslim community that received Islamic education and 
strictly follows Islamic teachings. 
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officialdom. 
Islamic courts were established for Java and Madura in 1882. They were headed by a 
penghulu (local headman) and had three to eight members. The members of the courts 
were not paid officials, while the Chairman received a salary as penghulu of the civil 
(secular) courts (Lev 1972: 13-14). They had other political functions at the local level 
and were not independent 'professional' judges in a modem sense. They had jurisdiction 
over family law such as marriage, divorce, and reconciliation and to a certain extent 
inheritance. However, decisions of Islamic courts could only be executed after the civil 
court had given its affirmation, allowing the latter to nullify decisions of the former. 
Moreover, unlike the Islamic courts in Malaysia, they did not handle matters of prayer, 
fasting, and zakat. Furthermore, a regulation promulgated by the Dutch authorities in 
193 7 further curtailed the jurisdiction of Islamic courts. The new regulation stripped the 
Islamic courts of their jurisdiction over inheritance and waqf disputes, and transferred 
these matters to the civil courts (Lev 1972: 19-21; Noer 1978: 42-43). 
In the areas outside Java and Madura, the insignificance of Islam in judicial affairs 
was even more prominent. Islamic legal matters were handled by sultanate courts or left 
to the Muslim community where there was no sultanate. Muslims living in areas not 
subject to sultanate rule, for example, conducted marriages themselves in accordance 
with Islamic principles (Noer 1978: 43). 
The colonial government's general neglect of Islamic affairs meant that only limited 
resources were invested in the development of the Islamic court apparatus, including its 
personnel. One important consequence was that the Islamic courts were run by 
'unqualified' officials, many of them being traditionalist ulama having little knowledge 
about, and no training in, law (Noer 1978: 45-46). Moreover, according to Lev, the 
penghulu, who presided over the Islamic courts, was essentially an appointee of the 
royal or local aristocratic authority; the latter might often select someone from his own 
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family for the job. Nearly everywhere, Lev wrote, 'the penghulu and other Islamic 
officials remained under the control of local government officials, who (other than 
Dutch officials) in Java were prijaji [priyayi] and elsewhere customary authorities with 
little interest in promoting Islam independent of their own influence' (Lev 1972: 13). It 
was evident that there was no concept of judicial independence or the separation of 
powers as far as Islamic courts were concerned. A prominent Dutch scholar, Snouck 
Hurgronje, stated in his criticism of the royal decree of 1882 that intended to reorganize 
Islamic courts: 
For the bupati (regents) as well as for village heads, Islamic officials were 
understood not as spiritual leaders but as beambten (officials) with what 
amounted to a fairly unspecialized but distinctly subordinate kind of 
responsibility. Nor were Islamic officials educated or trained in Islamic law, 
a kind of expertise that might also have lent them a measure of 
independence (qtd. in Lev 1972: 12). 
The condition of Islamic judges was hardly improved by the reorganization of Islamic 
courts in 1882, although it attempted to give the courts a measure of formal 
independence from aristocratic authority. The principle of non-interference with religion 
meant that the colonial government did not provide funds for educating religious judges 
or for paying them. The result was widespread corruption, leaving the religious courts 
'deeply vulnerable to the charge of venality' (Lev 1972: 13-14). Unsatisfied with the 
government's neglect of the Islamic courts, Islamic organizations such as 
Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama, and Sarekat Islam, urged the government to ensure 
that Islamic courts be staffed by properly trained judges. Far more significantly, Benda 
wrote, 'they had threatened to boycott the 'priests councils' and organized competing 
benches of their own, staffed by ulama with unquestioned expertise in Islamic law' 
(Benda 1958: 86). Furthermore, the poor quality of the Islamic judges exacerbated even 
further the unsympathetic attitude towards Islamic courts among law experts as well as 
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officials, both foreign and local alike. As independence approached, even the possibility 
of abolishing the Islamic courts was contemplated among the nationalist leaders who 
were to lead independent Indonesia (Noer 1978: 45-49). 
Islamic Education 
In the Islamic education sector, too, state intervention was very limited. The idea of 
incorporating Islamic religious schools in the state education system was acknowledged 
by the Dutch government in principle, but never realized in practice. Islamic education 
was customarily organized by Muslims themselves through private schools and training 
centers. These schools and centers-known as pesantren or madrasah-provided an 
important avenue for education for those Muslims who either could not afford, or were 
not willing, to send their children to the government-sponsored schools run by 
'infidels.' 11 The Islamic schools varied in scale and scope and had no formal 
connection with one another initially; each school was organized and managed by an 
independent kiyai or ulama. 
What was common and most distinctive about this traditional religious school system 
was the deeply personalized nature of school management and teaching that c~ntered on 
the personal authority of individual teachers, or kiyai. The traditional pesantren, for 
example, often declined or had to be closed down following the death of the kiyai 
concerned, especially when his successor was not able to match the deceased teacher in 
his knowledge (Noer 1973: 15, 75). Moreover, many pesantren in Java were 
interconnected through personal, and sometimes blood, relationships between kiyai. 
After more competent students finished their training, kiyai supported them to open new 
11 Those Indonesians who sent their. children to Dutch schools or to Malay/Javanese schools established 
by the Dutch government were often accused of leaving their children under the care of foreign hands to 
be converted to Christianity. This was in spite of the fact that many of the teachers were Indonesians 
(Muslims). It was also not uncommon that a kiyai or ulama issued a fatwa to prohibit Muslims to enter 
Dutch schools as haram (unlawful) (Noer 1973: 7-8). 
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schools. It was also not uncommon that these students became sons-in-law of kiyai to 
take over the latter's schools (Noer 1973: 14-15). 12 Furthermore, there was no set rule 
to 'authorize' qualified teachers. Some returned to their home village to start their own 
schools after a couple of years of study at a pesantren, 'considering themselves ready to 
become a teacher' (Noer 1973: 14). 
With the emergence of the modernist movement m the early twentieth century, 
however, a more modem mode of religious schooling was introduced, bringing about 
some uniformity of curriculum (Noer 1978: 24-25). The modernist leaders realized that 
they needed to reform their traditional modes and activities to uphold Islam to compete 
with the challenges posed by Dutch colonialism and Christian penetration. Many 
modernist organizations established by prominent ulama focused on educational 
activities (e.g., Noer 1973: chap.2). In some schools, for example, modernized teaching 
methods were introduced: the system of classes, the use of school desks, a more 
organized curriculum, and the student's obligation to pay for their tuition (Noer 1973: 
46). Some other schools, founded by Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and 
Persatuan Islam, followed the Dutch model, in which general (non-religious) subjects 
as well as religious instruction were stressed (Benda 1958: 48; Noer 1978: 27). Despite 
such improvements, the disorganized nature of the religious schools by and large 
remained untouched, especially among the pesantren run by the traditionalist ulama. 
It was after these minor changes were recognized that the Dutch began to offer 
subsidies to private religious schools. Moreover, Dutch vernacular secondary schools 
introduced religious lessons. The lesson, however, was usually given only once a week 
12 The lack of organization and uniformity was also evident in the mode of teaching at these traditional 
religious schools. Basic religious teaching for the early years of childhood was more or less standardized. 
But, huge discrepancies persisted in the religious subject taught at the higher level, due to the lack of a 
standard curriculum or any grade system. What was called a class in the pesantren was merely a group of 
students, sitting around the teacher. There was no curriculum, and it was up to the students to choose what 
disciplines they wanted to learn and at what particular stage of the lessons they wanted to start. Many of 
them withdrew from the school after a few years of study (Noer 1973: 12-14). 
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as an extracurricular subject, and attendance was not compulsory. No religious 
instruction was given in the general primary schools. After all, the Dutch government 
was not particularly interested in developing or promoting religious education; their 
sponsorship for religious schooling was intended to control the private religious schools, 
some of which were seen as increasingly 'political' (Noer 1978: 26). 
Religion Yes, Politics No: Vigilance against a Threat of Islam 
The colonial government's general apathy about Islamic affairs was reflected in its 
noninterventionist policy in other sectors, including the management of zakat and other 
financial and welfare related affairs. The zakat system was privately organized and 
managed by individual ulama, kiyai, or Islamic organizations. The kiyai, as an amil 
(agent), received the zakat as well as fitrah and passed these taxes to their rightful 
recipients (Noer 1973: 15). In general, the traditional care of the unprivileged was left to 
· the individual's initiative. Even the payment of zakat was usually not compulsory but 
left to the willingness of the Muslims concerned (Noer 1973: 80). This situation was 
quite different from the Malaysian situation where the zakat management was placed 
under the jurisdiction of the royal religious councils. In theory at least, any .other third 
parties were barred from dealing with the business of zakat. 
In short, state intervention in Islamic affairs in pre-independence Indonesia was kept 
minimal, greatly diminishing the level of institutionalization of the state Islamic 
administrative apparatus. The Dutch colonial government's essentially 
noninterventionist approach allowed various private Islamic organizations and activities 
to flourish, as long as the latter did not exhibit any indication of 'political' mobilization 
and agitation. The traditional religious leaders-kiyai and ulama-were able to exercise 
their authority over a range of religious affairs relatively independently from the 
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colonial authorities. The considerable degree of religious freedom accorded to the 
Islamic groups and individuals-both traditionalist and reformist alike, however, was not 
always favorable to the interests of the religious leaders. For them, the problem of 
competition and coordination among various Islamic groups and factions on 
organizational, ideological, and theological fronts, as much as the colonial government's 
negligence of Islam, posed a great obstacle to the development of coherent mechanisms 
supervising Islamic affairs. 13 Moreover, these Islamic organizations were not entirely 
averse to association with the government; quite the contrary, they sought attention and 
recognition from the government. They wanted to have their system of justice and 
education, and social mechanisms such as haj (pilgrimage to Mecca), based on Islamic 
tenets and values officially recognized and supported. They sought and appreciated 
financial assistance-if any-to maintain and develop these institutions. However, it 
was precisely this type of attention that the Islamic organizations hardly ever received. 
The colonial government's negligence of Islamic affairs had an effect not only on the 
level, but also on the mode of state intervention. Despite its principle of noninterference 
in religious affairs, the Dutch government, in practice, rendered some support for the 
development of Islamic institutions, as discussed above. The important question here. is 
not only how much they did, but also how they did it. The virtual absence of an 
officially sanctioned and established set of rules meant that state involvement in the 
Islamic sector, allocation of official funds for example, was sporadic, ambiguous, and 
personalistic. Moreover, the overall isolation of the religious agencies from the other 
parts of the administration dominated by foreign and westernized local officials 
reinforced this 'patrimonial' and incompetent character of the religious administration. 
At independence, therefore, the Indonesian state did not possess an adequate 
13 About the growing division and animosity between the reformists and traditionalists, see, for instance, 
Benda (1958: 47-51). 
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administrative foundation to support and regulate the operation of Islamic affairs. 
Although the Department of Religious Affairs was created as a concess10n to the 
Muslims, its jurisdiction over Islamic affairs was largely nominal. 14 Moreover, the 
Department was not exclusively in charge of Islamic matters but also other official 
religions in compliance with the national ideology Pancasila. 15 
The fundamental difference between colonial rule in Malaysia and Indonesia was not 
drastically altered in the period after independence. In Malaysia, the government's 
attitude towards Islam essentially remained accommodative on both the ideological and 
institutional fronts. Most notably, Islam secured an official place in the Constitution. 
Although this formality by itself meant little at the institutional level, it had a very 
important symbolic effect; it guaranteed official recognition for religious leaders within 
the state. In Indonesia, in contrast, the essentially 'secular-nationalist' Muslim 
leadership chose to put Islam aside. The political and socio-economic divide between 
the western-educated nationalist elites on the one hand, and the traditional religious 
leaders on the other, remained significant, leaving the latter outside the corridors of state 
power. 
The following chapters investigate our pnme mqmry, the cause of state 
institutionalization, by focusing on the Malaysian case where the state bureaucratic 
structures overseeing Islamic affairs expanded in scale and scope after the global rise of 
Islam in the 1970s. 
14 The Department was primarily set up on behalf of Islam and therefore the Islamic section has been by 
far the largest. For the origins of the Department, see Boland (1982: 105-12). 
15 The other 'official' religions are Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. Pancasila 
consists of the following five principles which are included in the Preamble to the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1945: belief in God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian 
democracy through consultation and consensus, and social justice. 
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CHAPTER3 
UMNO Dominance, Patronage and Political Ascendancy: 
Patronage-maximizing Incentive Structures and the Rise of Islam 
The rise of Islamic reformist movements in the Muslim community in the late 1970s 
provided the context in which Islam emerged as a more significant ideological and 
institutional force in politics. One aspect of this phenomenon was the 
institutionalization of bureaucratic structures overseeing Islamic affairs. The federal 
government's involvement in Islamic affairs that fell constitutionally under the sultans 
in individual States allowed it greater leverage over a range of 'church' functions such 
as the administration of Syariah. Moreover, increasing numbers of religiously-educated 
Muslims were recruited by the government as salaried officials. 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the institutional foundation of this particular 
mode of state intervention in Islam was laid by the British colonial regime. Under 
British rule, ultimate religious authority was reserved for the sultans at the State level, 
with religious officialdom generally filled by associates of royal families and aristocrats. 
This 'patrimonial' recruitment formula-far from the Weberian model of rational-legal 
bureaucracy-meant that the division between public and private spheres of interests 
was not yet clear as far as the running ofreligious matters were concerned. Nevertheless, 
the colonial regime's official involvement in religious affairs led to the presence of 
religious authorities within the state bureaucracy. This colonial legacy partly explains 
why the Malaysian government chose to adopt its particular strategy in dealing with 
Islamic forces: the use of official bureaucratic channels to regulate religious affairs. 
Other explanations have been put forward. A conventional approach emphasizing the 
77 
significance of societal pressures posits that state involvement in Islamic issues 
occurred as a result of a pressure from the newly emerging Malay urban middle-class 
that was increasingly self-consciously Islamic: a demand for a more systematic, 
competent and consistent system of religious administration. Another often-cited 
explanation is the rising pressures from Islamic opposition parties against the backdrop 
of the resurgence of Islam in the Muslim constituencies. Thus the rivalry between the 
two major Muslim-based parties, UMNO and PAS is said to explain why the UMNO-
ruled government was willing to expand the state regulatory apparatus over Islamic 
affairs, and to make the state more authoritative and Islamic. 
These explanations, however, are not sufficient to explain inter-sectional variation in 
the level of institutionalization observed in post-independent Malaysia. Federal 
measures to intervene in, and institutionalize, the Syariah courts and judges were much 
more successful than in other areas, i.e., religious schools and zakat administration. 
Why did state institutionalization go further in one sector than in others? 
This chapter introduces another explanatory factor emphasizing intra-party tensions 
within the ruling party UMNO: patronage-maximizing incentive structures facing 
individual Muslim politicians within the ruling party. The focus is on how the logic of 
political ascendancy within the party influenced the incentives of Muslim politicians 
and how this mechanism shaped their objectives, decision making and strategies. I 
argue that politicians have incentives to cultivate patronage networks in order to rise 
within the party. Such incentives affected the way in which the state intervened in 
religious affairs and institutionalized religious bureaucracies. And, as the following 
chapters show, the structure of these incentives varied across policy areas, leading to a 
variation in outcomes. 
This chapter shows that particular political and institutional contexts played an 
important role in shaping the incentives of politicians. I focus on two aspects in this 
respect. The first aspect is the UMNO's dominance in the multi-ethnic ruling coalition 
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and in the Malaysian polity in general. Given the one-party dominance that has been 
entrenched in the Malaysian political system since independence, it is crucial to 
understand organizational features of the party. This leads to the second aspect 
emphasized here: the highly centralized party structure and extremely tense-and 
increasingly expensive-intra-party competition to rise up the party hierarchy, 
especially since the 1980s. Party elections, which are an effective gateway to state 
power and capital accumulation, compelled UMNO politicians to seek to expand their 
support base outside their traditional Muslim constituencies. hnportantly, strategies they 
adopted to achieve patronage-maximizing goals varied according to the arena in which 
they were competing. For the federal-level politicians, the enormous expenses they had 
to bear to win higher offices in the party facilitated close ties between them and 
business interests, both Muslim and non-Muslim, but especially Chinese. This clientele 
network made the politicians responsive to the interests of business and the Chinese 
community. For the State-level politicians, their traditional Muslim constituencies 
remained very important. This federal-State divide within the party affected the way in 
which the federal authorities intervened in Islamic affairs. 
The first section of this chapter introduces the birth and development of UMNO. It 
discusses the socio-economic and structural backdrop against which UMNO emerged as 
the center of power accumulation and wealth circulation in the Malaysian state. This is 
followed by an analysis of the patronage-maximizing incentive structures entrenched in 
the UMNO hierarchy. Here I examine the logic of political ascendancy in the party and 
how this influenced objectives and strategies of individual UMNO politicians. I also 
demonstrate why and how the patronage-maximizing incentive structures left UMNO 
politicians responsive to the interests of the business class, both Muslim and non-
Muslim-but especially Chinese. The chapter concludes by examining how these 
incentive structures influenced the way UMNO politicians dealt with the resurgence of 
Islam from the 1970s. 
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UMNO in Historical Perspective: the 'Protector' of the Malay1 interests 
The hegemonic position of UMNO in Malaysia's political system and the official 
position of Islam have their roots in the negotiated pact for independence. The party was 
created by the Western-educated Malay aristocratic elite in 1946 to oppose the Malayan 
Union proposed by the British colonial government. Since its inception, UMNO 
established itself as the 'protector' of the interests of Malay community. Their antipathy 
to the Malayan Union proposal was two-fold: (1) they objected to the transfer of 
sovereignty from the Malay States to the British Crown; and (2) they opposed the offer 
of equal citizenship status to Chinese and other ethnic groups. 2 They feared that the 
proposals would further erode their traditional privileges as well as the Malay's political 
birthright. Fearing marginalization in post-independence Malaya, 3 they appealed to 
Malay ethnic and cultural identity to mobilize the Malay community to fight against the 
proposals (Cheah Boon Kheng 1988: 21-24). Malay nationalism-based on ethnicity, 
language, culture and religion-has formed the ideological foundation of UMNO ever 
since. Against the backdrop of a divided multi-ethnic society, UMNO fully capitalized 
on ethnically-based sentiments to strengthen their political supremacy in the state and 
society at large. This use of ethnicity-exclusivist bumiputeraism4 in particular-aimed 
above all to safeguard the Malays' political and cultural supremacy against the non-
1 In practice, Malays are by definition Muslim. 
2 A large number of Chinese and Indian migrants were brought to Colonial Malaya as mining and 
plantation laborers under the British colonial regime. By 1957, the year of independence, the Malay and 
non-Malay populations of Malaya were roughly equal. 
3 British Malaya, comprised of the eleven Malay States and the two Straits Settlements, Penang and 
Malacca, achieved independence in 1957. Malaya merged with Singapore and the States that now make 
up East Malaysia--Sabah, and Sarawak--to form Malaysia in 1963. Singapore was expelled from 
Malaysia in 1965. 
4 Bumiputera literally means a son of the soil, or indigenous people, but is used to refer broadly to ethnic 
Malays. 
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Malays, especially the economically powerful Chinese (Hamayotsu 2002: 357). At 
independence in 1957, the hegemonic position of the Malay community was 
constitutionally guaranteed. 
Under the Malay-dominated political system established after independence, the non-
Muslim communities (especially Chinese), overall, were perceived and treated as a 
potential threat to the indigenous Muslim community in general, and to the political 
supremacy of the Muslim ruling elites in particular. Even before independence, a multi-
ethnic coalition, known as the Alliance, was formed as a part of a pact among the top 
echelons of three parties, UMNO, MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) and MIC 
(Malayan Indian Congress), each of which represented its own ethnic group (Malay, 
Chinese and Indian). This UMNO-dominated multi-ethnic coalition ensured Malay 
cultural and political supremacy in return for safeguarding the Chinese economic 
position, and laissez-faire economic and cultural policies (i.e., language and education 
policies). The hegemony ofUMNO was firmly entrenched in the coalition as well as in 
the government, aided to some extent by the dominant personal authority of the first 
Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman (Case 1991: 459-60; Heng Pek Koon 1988: 254-
58; von Vorys 1975: 122-39). Despite UMNO's dependence on MCA an.d Chinese 
businessmen associated with it for electoral funding, the MCA leadership, by and large, 
resolved to accept its status as a junior partner in the multi-ethnic coalition. For the 
MCA leaders, many of whom were businessmen-cum-politicians, protecting their 
business interests was a foremost priority. Against the backdrop of the unquestioned 
Malay-dominant political arrangement, they realized that they had no choice but to 
submit themselves to the dictates of the UMNO leadership. Moreover, UMNO's, 
especially the Tunku's, support of MCA leaders proved crucial in strengthening their 
ability to maintain control of their party when confronted with intra-party conflicts 
(Heng Pek Koon 1988: 257). The cooperation between the top leadership of the two 
parties was based on a mutual understanding that UMNO would not undermine well-
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entrenched pro-MCA Chinese business interests to advance Malay special rights, while 
MCA, in return, would not pursue Chinese equal rights and cultural interests, including 
in education (Heng Pek Koon 1988: 257-59).5 
Islam: Symbol of Malay Dominance 
Under the post-independence pact, Islam had no special prominence other than as a 
symbol indicating that Malaya was the country of the Malay. In the constitution, Islam 
was instituted as the official religion, with the sultans of the individual States as the 
guardians of religious institutions. In practice, however, the Islamic institutions were 
not allowed any significant political role, let alone practical power, within the formal 
state structure; their function was largely ceremonial and symbolic. Jurisdiction over 
Islamic affairs was left by the federal authorities to the individual States which inherited 
from the British colonial regime the administrative mechanisms for supervising Islamic 
affairs (Y egar 1979). However, the lack of administrative and financial resources at the 
State level prevented the State religious agencies from exercising supervisory power 
adequately and effectively. 
The nominal status of Islamic institutions in politics was a result of the general 
indifference ofUMNO leaders to Islamic affairs in the public arena. This attitude in part 
reflected their socio-economic backgrounds and their vision of nation building after 
independence. UMNO in its early years was dominated by western-educated and 
secular-oriented Muslim elites, many of whom were of aristocratic origin (Khasnor 
Johan 1984; Milne and Mauzy 1999: 13-14). Due to the British colonial policy that 
recruited the Malay traditional aristocratic elites into the administrative corps, a large 
number of UMNO leaders had civil service backgrounds. In the first elections held in 
5 The price for these concessions for the MCA leadership was not inexpensive. The party never again 
regained the level of support it had earlier commanded from the Chinese community, while Chinese 
opposition parties attracted growing support in a wider spectrum of the Chinese population. 
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Malaya in 1955, for instance, 80 percent of UMNO's candidates were former civil 
servants (Puthucheary 1978: chap.3, especially 34). The first three Prime Ministers, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, Tun Razak, and Hussein Onn, as well as the founder ofUMNO, 
Onn Jaafar, all shared this same social and professional backgrounds. 
The Western orientation of the first generation of the Malay leaders was evident in 
their attitude toward Islam, which was 'secular' and like 'that of the average European' 
(Milner 1986: 122-24). While they saw great merit in the religious teachings of Islam, 
and allowed Islamic law to play an important role in Malay personal life, they were 
convinced that religion had no place in politics (Funston 1980: 147; Milner 1986: 124-
25). The Tunku believed that Islam was not a suitable guide to the complex problems 
of a modem nation. For him, 'Islam provides spiritual food for thought, while politics is 
concerned with material progress.' Above all, UMNO leaders were concerned that a 
traditional interpretation of Islam might hinder their efforts to modernize their country 
(Funston 1980: 145-46). This was in stark contrast with the later generation ofUMNO 
leaders, especially Mahathir, who propagated the idea that Islam and development were 
compatible because, he claimed, Islam promoted prosperity and material advancement. 
Thus, many of the Muslim ruling elite may have been religious in their personal lives, 
but had no interest in building their newly independent nation on Islam. Reference to 
'the excellence of the religion of Islam and to propagate the same,' was stipulated in 
UMNO's first Constitution adopted in 1949. In the first couple of decades after its 
inception, however, the clause only suggested the building of an Islamic infrastructure 
such as mosques and the provision of elementary religious education (Nair 1997: 23). 
For them, donating to mosques and suraus (prayer houses) and paying religious tithes 
such as zakat were part of their endeavor to render service to the interests of their 
traditional constituency: the rural Muslim community. 6 Although religious scholars-
6 Khasnor points out the importance of the religious element in the relationship between a Malay leader 
and the community in the Malay social context. For example, she suggests, 'it was to the advantage of a 
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ulama-were actively recruited and a substantial number of them were represented in 
the party, this was still within the constraints of an essentially secular party structure, 
leaving the corps of ulama at the margin of party leadership (Nair 1997: 23). 
Ordinary UMNO members, on the other hand, were mostly of humble ongm; 
teachers, village heads, clerks, and farmers, the majority of whom resided in the rural 
areas. In 1981, school teachers made up 41 percent of the delegates to the party general 
assembly.7 It was the grassroots influence wielded by these teachers and village heads 
that mattered in winning votes in the party elections. 8 Furthermore, a large section of 
the Malay electorate generally retained traditional rural lifestyles including strong 
adherence to Islam, in contrast to the essentially secular orientation and Western style of 
the Muslim ruling elites. 
Given socio-economic conditions where a large segment of the Muslim population 
was still rural and poor, improving their living standard and providing better socio-
economic services for them was a major task for the UMNO leaders. Alongside the 
hegemonic position of UMNO in the multi-ethnic coalition government, the pro-Malay 
quota mechanisms formally stipulated in the constitution allowed them to justify the 
provision of public resources to the benefit of the Malay community (Milne and Mauzy 
1999: 16).9 Moreov~r, post-colonial bureaucratic expansion of state functions meant 
that the relatively coherently organized bureaucracy inherited from the British colonial 
regime was placed under the control of the ruling party. In this context, the distribution 
of public funds, a task placed in the hands of the UMNO leadership, became an 
important source for patronage dispensation, and a means to build electoral support. 
Malay officer ifhe showed an interest in the rituals oflslam. Undoubtedly he would rise in the estimation 
of the people if he was seen to perform his religious obligation such as regular attendance at the mosque 
for Friday prayers and ifhe participated in the religious activities organized by the Muslim community in 
his district' (Khasnor Johan 1984: 180-81). 
7 
'Re-inventing UMNO,' ST interactive, 28 February 1999. 
8 
'Joining to serve and not be served,' Star, 24 April 2001. 
9 The special rights of the Malays are protected by the Constitution. The Article 153 states that a 
proportion of positions in the public service (including the military and the police) has to be filled by 
Malays. A similar pro-Malay quota is also applied to provision of scholarship. 
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UMNO politicians, for instance, utilized development projects to compensate their 
supporters. Special privileges granted to the Malays in public service employment, land 
reservation, and the award of scholarships, education grants, licenses and permits were 
all part of the larger project to create a Malay middle class and to facilitate Malay 
capital accumulation (Means 1972: 37-51; Shamsul A.B. 1983). 
The post-independence Alliance formula, however, proved ineffective and inadequate 
to satisfy expectations of the general populace, especially Malays. The government's 
W estem-style approach-in the socio-economic sector in particular-entailed a number 
of contradictions and problems that would eventually require fundamental policy 
readjustment for the newly independent country to·survive as a coherent nation. Overall, 
laissez-faire economic development primarily led by the private sector brought greater 
benefits to the large foreign sector and the domestic Chinese business class, while the 
Malays could make little commercial advance. Limited initiatives to promote Malay 
capital accumulation had only minimal success. 10 Mounting discontent and resentment 
of the intra- and inter-ethnic socio-economic disparities were translated in ethnic terms, 
fueling further ethno-nationalistic sentiments in both the Malay and Chinese 
communities. It was in these conditions that the worst racial riots in Malaysia to date 
took place in 1969. 
UMNO in the Post-May 1969 Period 
In the aftermath of the 1969 racial riots, UMNO, avowedly committed to the cultural 
supremacy and economic advancement of the Muslim-Malays, further strengthened its 
domination in the ruling coalition. This new regime carried out a fundamental 
10 The Tunku's pro-Western and pro-Chinese attitudes and intimate relations with the Chinese business 
elite, and his relative neglect of the Malay interests, caused not only criticism but also a breach within 
UMNO (Funston 1980: 23). It was the widespread feelings of exclusion at the grass-roots level and 
growing resentment among the rank and file in the party towards its leader, the Tunku, that contributed to 
the Alliance's worst electoral performance ever in the 1969 general elections. This eventually led to the 
breakdown of the post-independence political order with the onset of racial riots in May 1969. 
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readjustment of the rules of the game in politics. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
introduced to increase Malay participation in the modem economic sector and to 
eradicate poverty, particularly in the Malay community. Moreover, UMNO' s reinforced 
supremacy in the government provided the executive, and the new Prime Minister Tun 
Abdul Razak, in particular, with greater leverage to implement a wide range of pro-
Malay NEP programs. To achieve NEP goals, the government: expanded existing 
agencies and established new ones intended to help Malays go into business; gave 
· special preference to Malays in the distribution of licenses, concessions, contracts and 
credit; and put heavy pressure on non-Malay and foreign business to accept Malay 
partners. In the area of education, a massive expansion of secondary and tertiary 
institutions took place, scholarships being generously provided to Malay students. 11 
One very important consequence of this NEP regime was vigorous state intervention in 
the economy, and expansion of patronage dispensation opportunities for the Malay 
ruling elite. This patronage dispensation mechanism was used not only to win votes in 
the general elections, but also to win posts in the internal party elections, the key avenue 
for the political ascent of UMNO politicians. As the economic and political stakes of 
public offices increased, the intra-party contestation within UMNO intensified, and 
party elections became the battleground for politicians aspiring for state power and 
capital accumulation. The rising rewards of winning party posts contributed to a rising 
trend of money politics, a trend that came to be firmly entrenched throughout the 
UMNO hierarchy in the post-NEP era. 
11 For the NEP and related issues, see, for instance, Jomo (1984; 1986: especially chap.10), Milne (1976), 
Sharnsul (1983), Stubbs (1977). 
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UMNO Dominance and the Logic of Political Ascendancy 
UMNO's predominance in the multi-ethnic ruling coalition and the government had 
been evident since independence. The introduction of the NEP cemented further its 
hegemonic position within the enlarged coalition arrangement, BN (Barisan Nasional, 
National Front), and the state whose administrative and economic power also expanded 
enormously. 12 Massive state intervention in the economy to develop a Malay capitalist 
class offered UMNO an opportunity to create its own avenues for capital accumulation 
activities. As UMNO secured access to a vast amount of funds, the power balance 
between UMNO and its non-Malay partners tipped sharply in favor of the former. 
UMNO no longer needed the financial assistance of MCA, which had underwritten the 
major part of the ruling coalition's election campaign expenses during the 1950s and 
1960s. 13 This diminished the MCA leaders' bargaining power with their UMNO 
counterparts. 14 Moreover, wealthy Chinese businessmen increasingly preferred to 
contribute directly to their preferred UMNO politicians, and offered more financial 
assistance during elections to Malay politicians than to Chinese politicians (Gomez 
1998: 260; Heng Pek Koon 1988: 269). 
The uneven power balance between the two leading parties in the ruling coalition, 
UMNO and MCA, made the multi-ethnic coalitional structure, the BN, ineffective as a 
decision-making body. The insignificance of the BN organization was evident from the 
fact that it did not hold a convention until 1995 in its almost 20-year history. The BN's 
12 The BN was formed by bringing major opposition parties, including the main Malay opposition PAS, 
into the original ruling coalition, Alliance. The formation of the BN allowed UMNO to consolidate 
further its control over the government (Crouch 1996: 32-34). 
· 13 Despite its mass-based support, UMNO at that time was continually faced with financial problems, 
because the party's mainly rural, peasant membership could not provide it with sufficient funds to finance 
electoral expenses. UMNO therefore had to rely heavily on MCA led by wealthy businessmen-cum-
politicians to fund the Alliance (Gomez 1998: 231-32). 
14 In consequence, by the end of the 1970s, not only were MCA leaders no longer appointed to important 
portfolios like the ministers of Finance and Trade & Industry that had traditionally been held by them, but 
barely a quarter of the almost two dozen cabinet ministers were non-bumiputera (Gomez 1999: 133). 
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Supreme Council meetings, comprising leaders of all component parties, were held 
infrequently and only before a federal or State election. 15 Given the diminishing 
representation and influence of the MCA both in the ruling coalition and the 
government, and the weak BN mechanism, major decisions and policies were first made 
exclusively among the top UMNO leaders and then passed down to their coalition 
partners for endorsement-usually at the cabinet level (Gomez 1998: 254-55). 
Personalization of Power: The Mahathir Administration and UMNO 
After Mahathir' s appointment as Prime Minister in 1981, the concentration of power in 
UMNO became even more pronounced. At the same time, the state's dominance over 
various segments of civil society was further tightened. 16 Progressive centralization of 
power in the Prime Minister's hands that had taken place under his predecessors also 
accelerated, especially after the factional struggle within the UMNO leadership in 1987. 
The struggle left the party split into two, the UMNO Baru (New UMNO) led by 
Mahathir, and Semangat 46 led by his opponent, Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. The 
formation of another Malay-based opposition party led by Razaleigh, an influential 
member of the Kelantan royal family, and its subsequent alliance with PAS, posed a 
great challenge to the Mahathir-led UMNO. The UMNO leadership tightened its control 
over the state machinery to contain this unprecedented challenge. One consequence was 
increasing authoritarianism and declining independence of the bureaucracy, legislature, 
judiciary and monarchy. This helped reinforce further the discretionary power of the 
executive, together with the predominance ofUMNO in the government. 17 
The centralized nature of the state authority structure was facilitated by the 
15 Gomez acknowledges the role of BN as the consultation channel to maintain ethnic cooperation and 
harmony (Gomez 1998: 254-55). 
16 Hwang suggests that the Malaysian political system has become more personalized under Mahathir due 
to great power concentration under the Prime Minister (Hwang 2003). 
17 For a general discussion on the Mahathir administration's increasing authoritarianism, and the UMNO's 
factional dispute in the late 1980s in particular, see Crouch (1992). 
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correspondingly highly centralized authority structure of the ruling party (see table 3.1). 
A vast range of prerogatives was conferred on the party president. The most important 
of these was his effective prerogative to appoint his heir (although his choice had 
ultimately to be endorsed by the party) with the effect of keeping his deputy heavily 
dependent on the president for his prospects of promotion to the top post (Milne and 
Mauzy 1999: 6). Moreover, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were almost 
always the UMNO president and deputy president, allowing the latter massive public 
resources to expand his/her power base within the party. Below the deputy president are 
three vice presidents, offices elected by party delegates at the party's triennial general 
assembly election. Since the vice presidents normally occupy top cabinet posts, and one 
of them is usually elevated eventually to the deputy presidency, competition for these 
vice presidential posts was also very vigorous. 
Table 3.1: UMNO's Organizational Structure 
The link between party and state was reflected in the parallel hierarchies of 
government and party, not only in the national leadership but also at the lowest level, 
making local division-level posts in the party attractive as a step towards holding power 
in the government. With the party's local divisions coinciding with federal electoral 
constituencies, local UMNO leaders aimed at winning a divisional post because they 
expected that holding the chairmanship of the division would increase their chances of 
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becoming a candidate for parliament or the State assembly. Those who lost their 
division seats, on the other hand, ran the risk of losing their posts in the government. 18 
The UMNO's highest decision-making body, the Supreme Council, presided over by 
the party president, amassed a great deal of influence over party affairs. Given the 
predominance of UMNO in the state, ·and the weak BN framework, it also wielded 
substantial authority over government policy-making. The Supreme Council, comprised 
of forty-four seats, includes twenty-five elected seats and nineteen non-elected seats. 
The party president has the prerogative to appoint ten of the non-elected members. 
Council membership is conventionally a ticket to the highest posts in the government, 
and many members serve either as Ministers or Chief Ministers. Therefore, elections for 
the Council membership also attract fierce competition during election times (Case 
1994: 920-21; 1997). The fiercely contested party elections for the top offices give 
some democratic character to the party whose decision-making power is otherwise 
highly concentrated in the office of a few top officials. 19 Important decisions and trade-
offs are usually made at 'secret meetings.' While the power to decide division heads, for 
example, rests in the hands of the delegates, in reality, their power is limited to choosing 
from the lists of candidates often already decided in 'those clandestine get-togethers.' 20 
The selection of party candidates in the general elections is an illuminating case in point. 
The President and a few other top leaders close to him draw up the list of candidates 
(Interview with a journalist, New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 10 April 2000). 
Moreover, the top leaders' blessing gives the edge to certain candidates. Yet, party 
election rules still ensure that only candidates who wield sufficient influence in the 
party rank-and-file can triumph over rivals in the party elections. The most effective and 
secure way to build a broad support base in the rank-and-file is through the distribution 
18 
'Joining to serve and not be served,' Star, 24 April 2001. 
19 Case emphasizes UMNO's internally 'democratic' character by scrutinizing the openly contested party 
elections. He also suggests, however, that its 'democratic' nature receded in the 1996 party election (Case 
1997). 
20 
'Interesting battles shaping up,' Star, 5 March 2001. 
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of patronage. 
UMNO and Patronage Distribution Mechanisms 
With UMNO's hegemony within the ruling coalition BN and the government, Muslim 
politicians in government recognized that they could exploit their positions to dispense 
resources to serve both vested political and business interests. Patronage dispensation 
was used to cultivate support bases not only in their own constituencies, but also within 
the party rank-and-file, and to increase their chances of rising up the party hierarchy.21 
The goal of rising in the party shaped their strategies and policy making-including 
policies related to Islamic affairs. 
In the political sphere, the highly centralized party structure allowed UMNO 
president, along with a few top leaders, prerogatives over the distribution of public 
resources. The most important form of patronage resource in this sphere was the 
appointment of individuals to public offices. Key positions, at the federal and State 
levels, were allocated to individuals allied closely to the top UMNO leadership. As a 
result, the support of the top UMNO leaders became essential to rise within the 
government (Gomez 1998: 257-58). 22 
The rule of the party president and a selected group of people associated closely with 
him over party affairs was nearly absolute. The president's will could readily overrule 
other leaders' decisions. A recent and instructive (but at the same time controversial) 
example was the appointment in 2000 of the Chief Minister of Selangor after the abrupt 
21 For general discussion of patronage politics in UMNO, see Crouch (1996: 36-44). 
22 This does not mean, however, that the president and his circle could ignore circumstances and the 
preferences of other members. For instance, Ahmed Zahid Hamidi, former head of the UMNO Youth and 
once a close associate of Anwar Ibrahim, was allowed to stand as a candidate for a parliamentary seat in 
his home State, Perak, in the first general election in 1999 after the dismissal of Anwar from the party. 
The decision was made on the grounds that he was too popular in his constituency as well as in the party 
to be simply dismissed (Interview with a journalist, New Straits Times, Kuala Lumpur, 10 April 2000). 
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resignation of Abu Hassan Omar.23 The Selangor UMNO nominated a list of eleven 
potential candidates including five State Executive Council members to the party 
president, Mahathir. 24 In the end, however, Mahathir ignored the list entirely and 
handpicked a relatively unknown and inexperienced junior UMNO Youth member, 
Mohd Khir Toyo. 25 Moreover, the decision made personally by Mahathir without 
formal consultation was quickly endorsed by the party.26 
This recruitment pattern based on personal discretion incited sharp competition 
among party members seeking favors from top party leaders to attain higher offices in 
the party. This ascendancy mechanism based on the president's prerogatives of 
appointment helped reinforce the internal authority of the president, keeping party 
members firmly dependent on him. Nevertheless, the rule still stands that the party 
president would be unlikely to select a politician aspiring for higher offices who lacked 
a broad support base in the party. Moreover, even if handpicked by the president, he/she 
still has to cultivate his/her own patronage channels to survive the fierce party rivalry. 
UMNO as a Gateway to Capital Accumulation: Convergence of Political and 
Business Interests 
A similar patronage-based distributional logic operated in the economic sphere, too. 
UMNO hegemony and the massive expansion of the state in the 1970s-including 
public enterprises-gave party leaders access to a wider range of opportunities for 
23 
'MB quits on health grounds,' NST, 11 August 2000. 
24 
'Selangor MB: 11 prqposed,'NST, 12 August 2000. The State Executive Council is the State 
government cabinet. 
25 It should be noted that in the past, too, it was not unusual for Chief Ministers to be selected by the 
Prime Minister, not by the State party. I acknowledge Crouch for this point. 
26 Recruiting young 'new blood' to relatively prominent posts in the party was nothing new in the history 
of UMNO; in fact, it had happened from time to time, and had been acknowledged almost as a party 
tradition to revitalize leadership. Relatively new figures could be picked-even from outside the party 
hierarchy-and brought up into a higher office, if favored by the party's top brass-especially the UMNO 
president. Anwar was an illuminating example in this regard. He was personally picked and awarded an 
exceptional favor by Mahathir, and elevated to higher and prominent offices not only within the party but 
also in the government in a short span of time early period in his political career. 
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patronage dispensation. Their position in government allowed influential UMNO 
politicians to distribute business resources and opportunities-projects, contracts, 
licenses, loans, company shares, etc.-to individuals closely associated with them to 
secure a broad support base (Case 1997: 395-96; Gomez 1996a: 89-93). The 
implementation of the NEP after 1970 raised the economic stakes of government 
office.27 To achieve NEP objectives, state involvement in the economy to acquire and 
develop. assets on behalf of bumiputera grew appreciably. Moreover, the government 
made available for bumiputera a variety of preferential means and opportunities, 
including bank loans. In the name of the NEP, public sector capital was utilized to 
create a Malay business class, while state regulatory mechanisms were put in place to 
limit the role of Chinese as well as foreign businesses which had· dominated the 
economy in the pre-NEP period (Jesudason 1990: chap.4; Sieh Lee Mei Ling 1992: 
104-8). Whereas the NEP achieved a number of genuine socio-economic objectives 
such as reducing poverty, it was also skewed to benefit the interests of Malay politicians 
in UMNO and a selected group of politically-connected business people. 
UMNO Politicians and Malay Businesses 
The implementation of the NEP brought about the emergence of Malay businesspeople 
linked closely to prominent UMNO leaders who had come to own a substantial portion 
of corporate stock due to political patronage. Since their close ties with influential 
politicians allowed them access to business opportunities to develop their corporate 
holdings, such businesspeople in tum were expected to financially support their political 
patrons. Particularly during the 1990s, those businesspeople linked to the three most 
powerful UMNO politicians, then Prime Minister Mahathir, then Deputy Prime 
27 More specifically, the NEP set the target of allowing 'the· Malays and other indigenous people' to 
'manage and own at least 30% of the total commercial and industrial activities in all categories and scales 
ofoperation' (Sieh Lee Mei Ling 1992: 107). 
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Minister Anwar, and then Government Economic Advisor Daim Zainuddin amassed 
vast wealth from this patronage mechanism (Gomez 1999: 141; Gomez and Jomo 1997: 
120-22). Moreover, since the mid-1980s a massive privatization program allowed 
UMNO leaders additional patronage resources to sponsor and enrich more Malay 
businesspeople (Gomez and Jomo 1997: chap.4). 
UMNO was also involved directly in business activities. UMNO acquired equity in 
several major publicly-quoted companies through its holding company Fleet Holdings 
from 1972. After Mahathir became the party president and appointed his old friend 
Daim as chairman of Fleet Holdings, the company became one of the key corporate 
players. The party's dramatic business expansion took place especially during the 1980s 
when UMNO's numerous holding companies took over some of Malaysia's most 
important corporate stock by exploiting the NEP and state patronage. UMNO controlled, 
through its treasurer, vast interests in the private sector. But after its deregistration in 
1988, the party dispersed these corporate assets to the businessmen who had previously 
held UMNO's corporate assets in trust. 28 Those Malay corporate figures entrusted with 
these UMNO-linked business ventures later built corporate empires and made enormous 
fortunes (Gomez 1994: 6-7; Gomez and Jomo 1997: 49-56, 120-23). 
UMNO's dominance in government and the latter's efforts to achieve NEP objectives 
also allowed UMNO politicians to use their official positions to distribute business 
opportunities not only to their clients but also to themselves. This opportunity made the 
high-ranking posts in the party even more attractive. UMNO politicians, together with 
other Malay dignitaries such as royal family members gained substantially from their 
own business ventures. Politicians, almost without exception, emerged as directors and 
shareholders of publicly-listed companies. In the 1980s and 1990s, as a result, a 
28 After Razaleigh's narrow defeat by Mahathir for UMNO's presidency in 1987, UMNO was 
deregistered when twelve Razaleigh supporters claimed that the election should be nullified on the 
grounds that delegates from thirty umegistered branches had attended the UMNO General Assembly. In 
February 1988 the court ruled UMNO an illegal organization. Mahathir subsequently formed UMNO 
Baru (New UMNO). 
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phenomenon of 'businessmen-cum-weekend politicians' became rampant. Among the 
most prominent examples of this trend was former Finance Minister and the 
government's economic advisor, Daim (Gomez and Jomo 1997: 53-:-56). These positions 
were important by providing them with funds for their political campaigns or by using 
such business influence and the media to undermine their political opponents (Gomez 
1994: 40). In other words, economic resources derived from their official posts were 
'recycled' to advance their political ends-to consolidate their power base in the party. 
Intra-party Competition and Patronage-maximizing Incentives 
The massive expansion of the role of the state in the growing economy raised the stakes 
in the competition for high-ranking offices in the government. With UMNO's 
overwhelming dominance within the state, the high-ranking posts within the party 
became an effective gateway to government office and wealth accumulation, and 
competition for higher posts in the party became extremely fierce. UMNO politicians 
realized that they had to secure their own avenues to raise funds to finance increasingly 
expensive party elections. The development of various patron-client relationships and 
structures within the party, in turn, ir~creased competition, factionalism and the cost of 
rising up the party hierarchy even further. Furthermore, as the costs incurred during 
UMNO elections rose enormously, money politics became a serious problem in the 
party in the 1990s (Case 1994; 1997: 396-97; Gomez 1994: 35-44; Gomez and Jomo 
1997-30).29 
To ascend the highly-centralized party hierarchy and to finance the enormous 
29 The battles between former Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO Deputy President Musa Hitam and 
former Minister of Finance Razaleigh for the UMNO deputy president's post in the 1980s, for example, 
required the spending of massive amounts of money and heavily drained their financial resources. It was 
known that 'while Razaleigh's personal wealth and close links with the business elite had apparently kept 
him flush with funds, Musa was believed to have had trouble honoring the debts he had incurred to mount 
his election campaign' (Gomez 1994: 61). It was estimated that a sum of RM20rnillion (approximately 
US$5.3rnillion) was spent during the campaign period (Gomez 1994: 58-59). 
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expenses of party elections, UMNO politicians sought to build close ties with wealthy 
corporate figures-Muslim and non-Muslim alike. Businesspeople, on the other hand, 
were willing to associate with and fund influential UMNO politicians as a means to 
promote their personal business interests. These businesspeople expected that, in return 
for financial contributions, influential politicians would make available to them 
lucrative government contracts and business opportunities. 
Many Muslim businesspeople heavily depended on their personal ties to the 
politicians for almost every aspect of their business activities; establishment, expansion, 
success, revival and survival.30 The active involvement of the state in the economy to 
achieve Malay quotas and the widespread use of patronage also encouraged a 'subsidy' 
and 'get-rich-quick' mentality and behavior among bumiputera (Gomez and Jomo 
1997: 117-20). UMNO was increasingly seen as a 'get-rich' club, thereby attracting 
'business-oriented' members to the party. 
One consequence of this was a radical transformation in the composition of the party 
leadership at the grass-roots level. Once dominated by teachers, UMNO's leadership at 
divisional and branch levels was taken over by urban-based businessmen-cum-
'weekend politicians.' In 1981, teachers made up 41 percent of the UMNO delegates at 
the UMNO General Assembly; this dropped to 32 percent in 1984, and declined further 
to 19 percent in 1987. Businesspeople, on the other hand, constituted 25 percent of the 
delegates in 1987, while elected representatives made up 19 percent. The expansion of a 
rent-seeking business class in the party helped to spread further the trend towards 
money politics (Gomez 1994: 55-56; Gomez and Jomo 1997: 121). 
UMNO and Non-Muslim Constituencies 
The imperative to be associated with prominent UMNO politicians was felt not only in 
30 This does not mean that all the Malay businessmen lacked entrepreneurial skills. There are a few 
prominent cases of Malay entrepreneurial success. 
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the Muslim, but also the non-Muslim, business community. Under the pro-Malay NEP 
regime, non-Muslim businesses also actively solicited business as well as political ties 
with politically well-connected Muslims to secure access to government resources and 
business opportunities. As intra-party competition within UMNO intensified, however, 
Muslim politicians' dependence upon these businesses also grew to finance their 
increasingly expensive party election campaigns. Establishing such patronage links was 
initially a strategy for these non-Muslim businesses to survive the aggressive 
implementation of NEP programs hostile to their business interests (Gomez 1999: 
chap.3, especially 68-72). 31 Such an approach was further enhanced when public 
enterprises-especially bumiputera trust agencies-began to dominate key economic 
sectors such as construction, banking, plantations and mining. Given the declining 
influence of the MCA, and UMNO' s increasing hegemony, Chinese businesspeople 
realized that they could not rely on the MCA to protect their interests by influencing 
policy decisions (Gomez 1999: 133; Gomez and Jomo 1997: 39-49). 
Moreover, many of them came to accept the reality of Malaysia's political economy: 
wealth would come from close links with Muslim elites, especially UMNO politicians. 
Some of them thus readily allied with the top Muslim politicians to expand their 
business empires. In this way, they could secure state protection and patronage, in the 
form of the expeditious clearance of bureaucratic redtape, the granting of licenses and 
business contracts, and simply as capital (Gomez 1999: 151; Heng Pek Koon 1988: 
132-34). 
Competition escalated among big businesses for access to profitable government 
projects, further encouraging patronage-networking activities between UMNO 
politicians and corporate figures. As intra-UMNO rivalry involving various leaders-
and factions centered around them-intensified, and financing party elections became 
31 Discriminatory legislative measures, such as the Industrial Co-ordination Act (ICA), were put in place 
to ensure effective implementation of the NEP. 
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more expensive, the political-business nexus was strengthened. This encouraged 
aspiring Muslim politicians to build their clientelistic links with leading capitalists 
(Gomez 1997: 120-30). 
UMNO 's Pact with the Chinese Community since the 1990s 
The increasing dependence of UMNO politicians for funds from the corporate sector 
left politicians considerably responsive to the views and interests of businesspeople, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim. A select few Chinese corporate figures were especially 
favored and had the ear of Mahathir. It was their entrepreneurship that won the praise of 
Mahathir. Gomez emphasizes Mahathir's personal appreciation of the importance of 
Chinese entrepreneurs-in contrast to the weak bumiputera business community-for 
the national economy: 
Mahathir has ... recognized the importance of Chinese-and foreign-capital 
for sustaining growth and promoting industrialization, necessitating some checks 
on the activities of rentier capitalists. Mahathir has also shown signs that he will 
no longer tolerate rentiers who waste the economic opportunities they secure 
from the state (Gomez 1999: 151). 
The rising bargaining power of the Chinese business community with the UMNO 
leaders, hence, arose not only based on personal grounds, but also on structural grounds. 
UMNO under Mahathir emphasized economic development as a foremost priority, and 
set the national goal of attaining developed country status before the year 2020. Against 
this backdrop, UMNO leaders had to take into account the obvious entrepreneurial 
capacity of Chinese businesses, in contrast to the rather embryonic Malay business 
community which was still heavily dependent on the government for their rise and 
survival (Gomez 1999: 135-37, 189-90). Mahathir's strong faith in Chinese 
entrepreneurs and frustration with their Malay counterparts were evident in this blunt 
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statement by Mahathir about the government's use of patronage: 'those who have 
productively and profitably utilized concessions from the government will stand to 
benefit more from state patronage' (quoted in Gomez 1999: 151). The necessity of 
Chinese capital for the national economy was confirmed during the mid-1980s recession, 
and again, during the region-wide financial crisis in the late 1990s. The 1980s recession, 
the worst in Malaysia's post-independence history, was exacerbated by capital flight 
and limited investment by Chinese businesses. UMNO leaders learnt that they needed to 
keep wooing Chinese businesses to save and develop the national economy. In the 
financial crisis of the late 1990s, UMNO leaders called upon Chinese businessmen to 
take over companies owned by Malays to prevent them from going bankrupt, and to 
help bail out some well-connected Malay businessmen (Gomez 1999: 195-96). 
UMNO leaders' increasing dependence on the Chinese community was also 
pronounced in the political arena. After the considerable loss of Malay votes to its arch 
rival PAS in the 1999 general election, UMNO's electoral dependence on the Chinese 
grew more obvious. This electoral trend, related to UMNO' s declining rural Malay 
support and growing non-Malay backing, was evident even before the 1995 general 
election but continued to accelerate throughout the 1990s. The BN' s landslide victory in 
the 1995 general election depended on substantial support from the non-Malays, 
especially Chinese. The swing of Chinese votes to the BN coalition was evident even in 
the traditional strongholds of the Chinese-dominated opposition DAP (Democratic 
Action Party). For example, in Penang and Kuala Lumpur, where all the MCA 
candidates were defeated in the previous general election, the BN registered victories 
(Gomez 1996b: 31-45). 
Given the eroding support for UMNO among the rural Malay constituencies, the 
support from the Chinese community was all the more appreciated by UMNO 
politicians. In 1990, Kelantan fell to PAS, although PAS was assisted in this victory by 
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its electoral alliance with another Malay-based party, Semangat 46, led by Razaleigh.32 
The UMNO's eroding support in the Malay heartland States such as Kedah and 
Terengganu as well as Kelantan has been primarily attributed to 'the perception of 
Malays in these States of the impact of rapid economic development and modernization 
on the community'(Gomez 1996b: 39-40). Gomez elaborates this point by arguing: 
Many rural Malays appeared to be of the view that they had benefited little from 
the BN government's strong emphasis on urban capitalist industrialization and 
modernization. Some felt that the economic environment that was being created 
by the BN was not only alien but hostile to rural Malay interests and well being. 
There also appeared to be growing frustration among rural Malays that 
government policies were augmenting social differentiation and economic 
disparities in the community (Gomez 1996b: 40). 
Thus, the electoral trend from the 1990s on was related to a general reorientation of 
the UMNO leadership's vision of the national direction: where they wanted to take the 
country, and what kind of nation they wanted to build. Its continual emphasis on 
economic development and the goal of achieving developed-country status before the 
year 2020-envisioned in the national slogan Vision 2020-necessitated that UMNO 
leaders adopt a more accommodative approach towards the non-Muslim community to 
attract robust Chinese capital and the Chinese workforce. In the economic sphere, 
lucrative government contracts were awarded to non-Malay businessmen. In the cultural 
sphere, the UMNO leaders also took new approaches including greater appreciation of 
the importance of English, lifting of the restrictions on the lion dance, displays of 
greater inter-ethnic co-operation, as well as an increase of Chinese and English 
programs on TV and radio. Mahathir went even further by suggesting that Malays learn 
to speak Chinese in view of the language's commercial value. All these liberalization 
initiatives, greatly welcomed and appreciated by the majority of the non-Malays, 
32 Semangat 46 was dissolved in 1996 and Razaleigh rejoined UMNO (Hwang 2003: 262). 
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reflected UMNO politicians' concessions to the Chinese community (Gomez 1996b: 
35-36). 
In short, UMNO leaders were determined to prioritize economic development at the 
risk of marginalizing rural Muslim constituencies. Chinese capital and the Chinese 
workforce were vital to this end. Given the Malay vote split between the UMNO and 
PAS, non-Malay support was a crucial tradeoffto offset UMNO's losses in the Muslim 
dominant rural constituencies. This electoral imperative was further reinforced by 
widespread anti-UMNO sentiments among the Muslim community after Anwar's 
controversial dismissal from government and arrest in 1998, leaving UMNO leaders all 
the more dependent on the Chinese community.33 
The Rise of Islam: Islamization of UMNO and the Politics of Patronage 
Implementation of the government's Islamization policies has to be understood from the 
perspective of patronage politics. UMNO leaders needed to have good relations with the 
Chinese community, especially businesspeople, while simultaneously cultivating Malay 
support. The increasing dependence of Malay politicians on the Chinese community in 
general and Chinese businesses in particular, both at the individual and structural levels, 
had a great effect on decision making among UMNO leaders-including their 
Islamization projects. Even the most 'Islamic' UMNO politicians also could not afford 
to be exceptions. For example, Anwar Ibrahim readily offered the patronage resources 
attached to his ministerial posts to prominent businesspeople, both Muslim and non-
'~ 
. 
33 The political crisis ensued in September 1998 after Mahathir sacked Anwar from his posts as Deputy 
-Pi'1me Minister and Finance Minister, as well as from his positions and membership within UMNO, for 
his alleged sexual misconduct. Anwar, alongside his followers, was subsequently arrested and detained 
under the ISA after leading a street rally in Kuala Lumpur. In a trial that was widely regarded as unfair, he 
was found guilty on multiple charges including sodomy and corruption in the following year. For a more 
detailed discussion about backgrounds of the crisis, see, for example, Weiss (1999). 
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Muslim alike. This was primarily based on his incentives-similar to those of any other 
UMNO politician-to expand his clientele networks to fund increasingly expensive 
party elections, and to reach the highest echelon of party leadership. At the same time, 
UMNO politicians could not afford to risk loss of support among the Malays. The 
government's promotion of Islamization policies and programs offered UMNO 
politicians with patronage resources at various levels and opportunities to fulfill their 
political ambitions: by maximizing avenues for patronage dispensation to build wider 
support bases in their respective Muslim constituencies. These patronage-maximizing 
activities, after all, were crucial for them to rise in the highly competitive UMNO 
hierarchy, and to obtain increasingly lucrative positions in the government. 
The Rise of Islam and the Government's Islamization 
The rise of religious consciousness in the Muslim community in the 1970s dramatically 
increased the importance of Islam within UMNO. From the perspective of top UMNO 
leaders, a major consideration was how to respond to this rising religious fervor in their 
traditional constituencies in a way that would tum it into their electoral advantage. For 
them, performing religious duties such as building mosques for their constituencies was 
nothing new; such contributions had always been part of their service to their electorates, 
and also an avenue for patronage dispensation, just like any other 'pork barreling.' What 
was new this time, however, was the increasingly self-conscious commitment of a new 
generation of young urban middle-class Muslims to Islam, in contrast to the more 
routine Islamic identification of the older generation. Most striking was the 
development of a number of Islamic associations-commonly known as dakwah (Islamic 
missionary) organizations (For example, Barraclough 1983: 959-60; Chandra Muzaffar 
1987: chaps.4-5; Jomo and Ahmad Shabery Chik 1992; Lyon 1979). This was a new-
and challenging-trend to which UMNO had to respond skillfully in the presence of the 
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electoral challenge from its archrival PAS (Crouch 1996: 172). 
One strategy adopted by the newly inaugurated UMNO leadership led by Mahathir 
was the launching of an Islamization campaign. One of the most significant and far-
reaching moves of Mahathir was the co-optation of Anwar Ibrahim, the charismatic 
president of the most prominent non-governmental Islamic organization at that time, the 
Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia or ABIM), into 
UMN0.34 
The co-optation of Anwar to launch vanous government-sponsored Islamization 
policies derived from UMNO's electoral concerns. 35 UMNO leaders attempted to 
preempt Islamic oppositional forces-especially PAS-from becoming too influential 
in the Muslim constituency. The co-optation of Anwar and the religion-related 
programs initiated by him had the effect of appeasing anti-government sentiments 
among confident and idealistic Muslim youth (Jomo and Ahmed Shabery 1988: 849-51; 
Nair 1997: 28-33). Anwar and his colleagues who followed him into UMNO, on the 
other hand, apparently had their own agenda and ideals they wished to achieve from 
within the system. Anwar publicly stated that he would not abandon the principles and 
ideals for which he fought-that he was not selling out, but would fight for ABIM's 
goals from inside the party in power. Soon after, he also asserted that little by little, 
UMNO was doing what ABIM had sought, and that he would be a 'third force' from the 
inside (Mauzy and Milne 1983-84: 637-38). 
Mahathir' s strong confidence in-and support for-Anwar helped him implement his 
34 For various other strategies adopted by the UMNO government, see Barraclough (1983). ABIM's 
political significance both on ideological and organizational fronts, and grass-roots influence especially 
among students, posed a great threat to the UMNO leadership. The growth of dakwah movements, 
especially on the university campuses in the mid-1970s, owed much to the formation of ABIM. ABIM 
was launched in 1971 to provide an organizational platform for young Muslim graduates to play a 
legitimate role in their struggle to build a society based on the principles of Islam (Zainah 1987: 17). 
Since then, ABIM grew rapidly into one of the most influential non-governmental dakwah movements, 
having attracted, among others, increasing numbers of urban young Muslims (Funston 1985: 171; Mauzy 
and Milne 1983-1984: 634-35). 
35 
'Putting up a good front: Islam is the issue as the ruling National Front and opposition Party Islam fight 
a by-election,' Far Eastern Economic Review [FEER], 17 December 1982. 
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ideas and programs. In turn, the presence of Anwar and his extensive grass-roots 
networks was expected to contribute immensely to the Mahathir government's 
Islamization enterprise, by giving the latter a more authentically Islamic outlook. 
Further, it was expected to help outperform PAS' s conservative Islamic vision and 
programs. Soon after joining the government, Anwar was elevated to the position of 
Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister's Department in charge of Islamic Affairs, and 
began playing a central role in piloting the Mahathir administration's Islamization 
enterprise. He helped to formulate new Islamic policies that put the administration into 
competition with PAS and the dakwah movements (Means 1991: 99-100). 
As it has turned out, however, the earlier assertions and expectations of Anwar and 
his ABIM colleagues were greatly hindered by institutional and political conditions. 
The party Anwar and his supporters joined had its own mechanisms-rules and 
norms-that they could not simply ignore if they wanted to survive and rise in the party. 
It was these organizational mechanisms firmly entrenched within UMNO that 
significantly shaped policy implementation at various levels in the government, and 
institutionalization of the state bureaucracies administering Islamic matters. The 
patronage-maximizing incentive structures, as discussed above, shaped the objectives 
and strategies of individual UMNO politicians-including Anwar. Anwar's increasing 
consideration of, and changing attitude to, non-Muslim constituencies since the early 
1990s attest to this point. Islamization policies in which Anwar was involved were 
skewed to meet this condition. 
lslamization of UMNO: The Rise of Anwar 
Anwar' s quick rise in UMNO and in the government stirred a great deal of 
apprehension and fear among the non-Muslim communities, including Chinese-based 
coalition partners within BN, as well as some sections of the Muslim community. Their 
fear was multi-faceted, but one overriding consideration was that a number of newly 
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introduced government programs could be a step towards turning the essentially secular 
state system into an Islamic one. Anwar's rise was not just an electoral strategy to 
preempt the rising influence of its rival PAS; it also seemed to signify a fundamental 
and radical change in the ruling party and the government dominated by it. UMNO 
leaders reiterated that the interests of non-Muslims would not be affected. But, the non-
Muslims feared that nothing could be guaranteed against the backdrop of a visible surge 
in Islamic activities at the societal level, and increasingly sharp rivalry between UMNO 
and PAS (Mauzy and Milne 1983-84: 639-44). 
The victory of Anwar and his allies-called rather glamorously the 'Vision Team' -
and the loss of the incumbent Deputy President Ghafar Baba in the 1993 party election, 
represented a generational change in the party and marked a major turning point in the 
UMNO leadership. The NEP's confidence-building impact was pronounced not only in 
the Muslim electorates, but also in the UMNO leadership. The thirty years of the NEP 
produced a new generation of Muslim leadership that was more assertive and confident 
about its economic as well as politicaI position. Anwar led a team of 'Young Turks' to 
challenge the veteran politicians led by Ghafar, and won the majority of seats on the 
UMNO Supreme Council. Moreover, Anwar as the Deputy President of the party 
established himself as Mahathir' s heir apparent (Ho Khai Leong 1994: 179-83). 
This. new generation of UMNO leaders was not only confident in socio-economic 
terms, but many among them were more Islamic in their aspirations. They were more 
committed to observing and promoting ritualistic aspects of religious faith, while 
initiating more practical programs reinforcing the Islamic character of public affairs 
including finance and education. For much of this generation, Islam was not relegated to 
private affairs; but rather, its role was advanced in wider aspects of public life. 
Moreover, religious credentials became far more important and useful in the political 
and electoral arenas, driving an increasing number of Muslim politicians to attempt to 
appear more Islamic or to capitalize on religious causes. Overall, Islamic issues became 
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central as the religious wave swept through the Muslim constituency. 36 
Their goal of attaining an 'Islamic vision' for industrialized Malaysia contrasted 
starkly with the more secular and Western-oriented old generation of the Muslim ruling 
elite. However, increasingly assertive Muslim supremacy and confidence produced 
growing tensions between the Muslim and Chinese ruling elites that led to occasional 
political crises over such issues as education and law. The MCA and other non-Muslim 
based parties appeared powerless to block Islamic projects proposed by UMNO leaders, 
who themselves were more and more anxious to create and protect their Islamic images 
and credentials in the eyes of their Muslim constituencies. 
UMNO 's Islamization and Non-Muslim Constituencies 
The rise of Anwar best demonstrated the importance of the effective use of patronage 
and the forging of links between Muslim leaders and influential businessmen for 
political ascendancy in the UMNO hierarchy. In the 1993 UMNO party election, then 
vice president Anwar contested the party's deputy presidency, and displaced the 
incumbent, Ghafar Baba, to become deputy prime minister. During this election, it was 
estimated that between RM200million and RM300million (approximately US$53 
million to US$79 million) was spent on the campaign, marking it as the most expensive 
party election in UMNO history (Gomez 1999: 150). Anwar mobilized corporate 
networks personally connected to him not only in the Muslim but also the non-Muslim 
communities. Among Muslims, a young generation of prominent corporate-cum-
political figures offered crucial financial and political backing for Anwar in 
overwhelming Ghafar and a more senior group of politicians. Their support also helped 
to consolidate Anwar's claim to succession to the party leadership. Among non-
36 Shamsul acknowledges the rise of 'Islamic' politicians in the UMNO leadership by the late 1980s. In 
the 1987 party election, for instance, Anwar, Wan Mokhtar, and Abdullah Ahmed Badawi won the vice-
presidencies, while YusofNor won the Supreme Council membership with the highest vote of 1,030. Wan 
Mokhtar, Abdullah, and Yusof were all educated in Islamic studies, while Anwar led the most prominent 
Islamic NGO, ABIM (Shamsul A.B. 1988: 184-85). 
106 
Muslims, prominent Chinese businessmen built a personal connection with Anwar, and 
funded the latter's political campaigns. Hong Leng Group's Quek Leng Chan and MBf 
Group's Loy Hean Heon, for instance, were reported to have supported Anwar' s 
successful bid in the 1993 party election. Those prominent non-Muslim businessmen 
who had benefited from their support for then Minister of Finance, Anwar, also 
included Vincent Tan Chee Yioun and his brother Danny Tan ofBerjaya Group (Gomez 
and Jomo 1997: 124-30).37 
Anwar's ascendancy highlighted two important features of the patronage-maximizing 
mechanism that influenced the behavior of UMNO politicians. First, the party 
president's backing alone was not sufficient to ascend the party hierarchy; building 
personal patronage networks was equally important. Given the importance of non-
Muslim constituencies for his political rise, Anwar attempted to dilute his radical 
Islamic image, while adopting a moderate and accommodative approach to issues 
concerning non-Muslims. Second, Anwar readily utilized prerogatives attached to his 
powerful financial ministerial post to dispense patronage resources to consolidate his 
political base in the party. Anwar, as Finance Minister, was in a particularly strong 
position to benefit from privatization projects. When nearly 1,200 federal and State-
owned companies were privatized in 1993, he benefited from the process politically by 
allocating privatized business interests to businesspeople, who were also members of 
UMN0.38 
Importantly, this logic of patronage maximization significantly influenced the 
government's Islamizationprograms that Anwar and his group were heavily involved in. 
To understand why the government carried out Islamization in the way it did, we have 
to take into account the effects of these patronage incentives so deeply embedded in 
37 See 'Anwar's Friends: Factionalism and Money Politics in UMNO baru,' Aliran Monthly, Vol.13, No.9 
(1993): 35-39. 
38 
'Anwar's Friends: Factionalism and Money Politics in UMNO baru,' Aliran Monthly, Vol.13, No.9 
(1993): 38. 
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UMNO. 
The Clash of Intra-Party Interests? Strategies of Patronage-maximization 
The incentives and objectives shaping the behavior' of the UMNO politicians caused 
clashes of interests, and subsequently, varying strategies among them at different levels. 
Importantly, the strategies these politicians adopted to achieve the same goal-that is, 
maximizing clientelistic networks-varied depending on their respective party locations. 
For the federal level leaders, on the one hand, their close ties with wealthy corporate 
business, especially economically powerful Chinese businesses, became as important as 
their traditional Muslim constituencies, because those businesses financed their costly 
election campaigns. Moreover, the state's implementation of the NEP and rapid socio-
economic changes brought about the rise of urban business/middle-class Muslims and 
an increasing class divide that corresponded in part to urban-rural divisions. These 
urban middle-class Muslims, unlike their rural counterparts and the old generation of 
Muslims, tended to hold strong aspirations for both material and spiritual advancement. 
The federal leaders could not dismiss-and in fact were keen to boos-these urban 
Muslim aspirations. Consequently, these clientelistic ties left them considerably 
responsive to the interests of corporate business and the urban middle class, and 
significantly, the Chinese community. 
Given the constitutional provision that Islamic affairs fell under the jurisdiction of the 
respective States, however, UMNO leaders at the federal level found themselves 
constrained in launching and implementing Islam-related policies. Any federal initiative 
that might impinge on the religious jurisdiction of the individual States generally (but 
not always) faced resistance from the State authorities-both administrators and 
politicians alike. The State leaders' oft-used justification was that Islamic affairs were 
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the prerogative of sultans, the heads of the individual States, and thus their consent 
needed to be attained first (Interview with a JAKIM official, Kuala Lumpur, 3 May 
2000). 
For the UMNO leaders at the State level, particularly those from predominantly 
Muslim rural States, on the other hand, their ties with traditional Muslim constituencies 
still remained very important. To win the support of the rural Muslim constituencies, 
Islam was the key. This was especially so, since Islamic affairs were one of the very few 
areas where political authority was conferred on them. Since religious leaders are 
politically very influential in the local Muslim community, State prerogative over 
Islamic matters offered them valuable patronage-dispensing resources to consolidate 
their support base. Issues such as Islamic schooling, for example, could be used as an 
avenue for the dispensing of patronage relatively independently from the federal 
authorities. 
One hypothesis that could be deduced from this structural condition is that the 
UMNO politicians at the State level might be interested in defending with equal vigor 
their prerogatives from federal intervention in all the sectors involving Islam, judicial, 
or educational. However, their approach was different across sectors. Against our 
expectations, State politicians defied and obstructed some policies-but not others-
initiated by the federal government. Importantly, this variation in strategy was derived 
from the same patronage-maximization incentives of the Muslim ruling elites in UMNO, 
as demonstrated by the three case studies taken up in the chapters that follow. These 
chapters show how the patronage-maximizing incentive structures ofUMNO politicians 
brought about diverging strategies among them at the federal and State levels, and 
subsequently the variation in the level of institutionalization of Islamic bureaucratic 
authority structures. 
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CHAPTER4 
Institutionalization of a Syariah Judicial Regime: 
Becoming 'Modern' or 'Traditional'? 
We only reject the interpretation and laws of Kelantan PAS which are not 
compatible with the Syariah. The rejection of something that is wrong is 
compulsory if we are to hold on to the teaching of Islam. 
-Mahathir Mohamad. 1 
A reform drive in the Syariah judicial apparatus spearheaded by the federal government 
since the 1980s has brought about an unprecedented institutional development on the 
constitutional, legislative, and administrative fronts. Institutionalization in this sector 
specifically meant the organizational development and greater administrative 
competence of the Syariah judicial structures. The administrative machinery overseeing 
Syariah courts and Islamic laws was reorganized and expanded with increased authority 
and autonomy within the country's still essentially secular civil-dominant judicial system. 
This included the development of a central agency-the Federal Department of Syariah 
Courts (Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia or JKSM)-recruiting better qualified 
Syariah personnel and coordinating enforcement of Islamic laws. Moreover, the federal 
authorities drafted a number of more specific Islamic laws to ensure that the Syariah 
officials apply a moderate approach to Syariah and do not deviate from the progressive 
Islamic regime that they intended to build. 
The Syariah reform, thus, brought about a relatively high level of institutionalization of 
1 
'Reject hudud laws, say Dr.M' (NST, 4 March 1994). 
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the state Islamic apparatus in the judicial sphere-the highest among the three cases 
observed in this study. The incentive structures of the Muslim ruling elites within UMNO 
to maximize patronage resources so as to rise in the party made the Syariah reform 
politically very attractive to some leaders. For UMNO politicians, the threat from the 
Islamic opposition party, PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia)-and its plea to implement a 
wider scope of Syariah in particular-was undoubtedly a source of concern in this 
judicial sector. PAS 's electoral threat alone, however, was not sufficient to determine the 
particular way in which the UMNO politicians approached Syariah issues. The 
conservative pressure-to implement conservative interpretation of Syariah-came not 
only from PAS but also from within UMNO and the state religious departments. This was 
a particularly problematic trend for the federal UMNO politicians since it could alienate 
the business and Chinese communities-important patronage sources for their political 
survival. The federal government's efforts to standardize administration of Syariah courts 
and judges as well as Islamic laws were meant to exert greater control over the Syariah 
apparatus in order to prevent such conservative elements from gaining influence within 
the state. UMNO politicians'. Syariah agenda, and ultimately the level of 
institutionalization, was largely shaped by the patronage-maximizing incentives and 
varying strategies UMNO politicians adopted at various levels of the party hierarchy. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section overviews institutional changes that 
have taken place since the 1980s. It shows that the federal government's reform initiative 
by means of constitutional, legislative, and administrative measures brought about a 
relatively high degree of institutionalization in the Syariah court apparatus. The next 
section highlights a good deal of coordination between state and societal actors as well as 
among intra-state agencies that contributed considerably to the course of Syariah reform. 
The section that follows points out the limitation of the proposition that Syariah court 
reform stems from this societal input. An alternative-and key-explanation is 
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introduced here to emphasize the political incentives that operated in the ruling party. In 
the final section, an analysis of two cases demonstrates how UMNO politicians' incentive 
structure had an important effect on the particular outcome observed. 
Syariah Reform in Theoretical Perspective 
Syariah reform in Malaysia was concerned not only with the content of Syariah laws 
themselves but also the way in which they were administered. In contrast to the 
'traditional' system of the past in which the Syariah courts were the responsibility of the 
Sultans and the State governments, the Syariah court system was modernized and 
institutionalized at the national level. The application of Syariah laws, however, remained 
as limited as before. The Syariah courts have no authority over non-Muslims and the 
Syariah laws continue to apply mainly to family matters, inheritance, religious 
observance and belief, and relations between the sexes. Syariah did not apply to 
commercial law except, as will be noted later, to some Syariah-influenced provisions 
which were made available to Muslims in regard to banking and insurance. The federal 
constitution effectively side-stepped severe Islamic sentences by defining limits on the 
punishments that could be meted out by the State Syariah courts, including maximum 
sentences of imprisonment and maximum fines. 2 
One important overall effect of the Syariah reform process was greater federal 
intervention in Syariah matters (hitherto the State governments' turf except in the federal 
territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan which followed national laws). This brought into 
being better organized state structures at the federal level regulating enforcement of 
2 The Syariah courts have limited jurisdiction in criminal matters under federal law and can only deal with 
offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years, or a fine not exceeding RM5000 (US$1320), or 
caning up to six strokes or the combination of all these (Kamali 2000a: chap.3, especially 44). 
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Syariah matters. Bringing in administrative competence in the Syariah apparatus, 
however, was only part of the Syariah reform agenda; a more important effect was state 
extension of control over religious authorities whom the top UMNO politicians 
considered 'too conservative'. By incorporating religious officials who run Syariah 
courts and laws in the tightly organized government bureaucracy, the ruling politicians 
sought to keep in check conservative and radical elements-both from outside and within 
the government. At the same time, they pledged to promote a liberal application of 
Syariah. 
It is important to note that the effect of the reform initiative was not equal across 
various actors: some actors benefited-while others did not. Federal government 
authorities-both political and religious-for example, promoted the reform initiative 
since it was expected that they could exert greater control over the State-level authorities 
as well as over non-governmental Islamic actors. Even within the government, however, 
tension sometimes arose with regard to implementation of Syariah; politicians tended to 
support 'liberal' interpretations and to avoid strict implementation, while religious 
officials were inclined to adhere to 'conservative' interpretations and to insist on 
tighter-and broader-enforcement of Syariah. Reaction from the State governments, on 
the other hand, was mixed; some States opposed the plan since it meant the transfer of 
their already very restricted powers to federal leaders, whereas other States endorsed it 
quietly. Some societal actors including Syariah experts and Muslim Women's 
organizations were strong supporters of the reform. This does not necessarily mean, 
however, that these societal actors concurred with one another in terms of ultimate goals 
and expectations. Conservative Syariah experts, for example, expected the Syariah-based 
judicial system and supporting institutions to expand and prosper as part of the country's 
judicial system which they had regarded as being 'too secular.' Women's organizations, 
by contrast, hoped otherwise. For them, the worst possible development was that a 
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conservative Syariah regime would gain power from greater formal authority in a system 
that they already felt was becoming 'too conservative.' They expected that the 
strengthening of federal rule would result in the Syariah personnel becoming more 
professional, competent, consistent, and-above all-sensitive to the interests of women. 
Moreover, they hoped for the adoption and establishment of liberal interpretations of 
Syariah laws so that Muslim women's rights would be protected in ways favored by 
women. Such conflicting interests, expectations, and objectives as these among various 
actors made the reform process highly contentious and political. 
In general, legal reform is not a simple business; rather, it is a matter of 
'fashioning working relationships between judges, prosecutors, police, 
advocates, notaries, bureaucratic personnel, law faculties, political leadership, 
and more, all under the influence of ideological principles and myths constantly 
reinforced by near daily repetition and experience' (Lev n.a.). 
In brief, the short and long-term interests of various actors get in the way, making a 
reform process complex, time- and resource-consuming and, most of all, highly political. 
The complexity of this universally acknowledged problem oflegal reform was multiplied 
by at least two other factors in the case of Malaysia's Syariah judicial reform. First, what 
was at stake was not simply a matter oflaw and courts, but religion. In Malaysia, Islam is 
the official religion of the federation. Despite the country's otherwise highly centralized 
politico-administrative system, Islamic matters-including the administration of Syariah 
courts and laws-were nonetheless placed under the formal control of the Sultan in each 
State assisted by State religious agencies, the Majilis Agama Islam (Council of Islamic 
Religion or Religious Council) and the Department of Religious Affairs (or Religious 
Department).3 These religious authorities at the State level were generally resistant to 
3 The council and the department practically share religious authority at the State level, with separate 
jurisdictions supervised by the one or the other. The balance of influence between these two agencies varies 
from one State to another. For the case of Johor, for instance, see Abdullah Alwi (2000); for Kelantan, 
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federal interference, jealously guarding their administrative turf. This federal-State 
tension over religious authority had a high potential to hold back the reform process. 
Second, Malaysia's multi-ethnic/religious circumstances add a further complication to 
Syariah reform. Questions abound: Does the Syariah reform ever affect non-Muslims 
and, if so, in what way? Do non-Muslims care about Syariah issues at all? An 'Islamic 
state' controversy provoked by the electoral success of the opposition Islamic party, PAS, 
after the Anwar crisis seems to suggest that they do (Lim 2001). If, as therefore seems 
likely, they do care, can they influence, by supporting Muslim interests in one way or 
another, an institutional adjustment of Muslim affairs? These questions raise the issue of 
nation-building, one of the biggest challenges to the post-colonial national leadership. 
Furthermore, these issues were also associated with the problem of political legitimacy 
for Muslim ruling elites. 
Seen against the backdrop of such difficulties foreseen for the reform process, the 
degree of institutionalization of the Syariah legal apparatus appears comparatively high, 
both from cross-national and cross-sectional perspectives. In Indonesia, for example, 
Syariah courts were allowed to survive under an essentially secular-nationalist regime 
after independence. The Indonesian constitution adopted in 1945 rejected the idea of an 
Islamic State and instead incorporated the nationalist ideology of Pancasila (Five 
Principles). The jurisdiction of the Syariah courts applied only to Muslims and was 
largely restricted to a few domestic affairs primarily involving marriage and divorce.4 
Even then, unlike Malaysia, the Islamic judicial procedure was optional for Muslims; 
they were free to take their cases to the secular (civil) courts-much to the chagrin of 
Syariah experts and Islamic leaders in general. Even after the government under Suharto 
began taking a more accommodative approach towards Islam in the late 1980s, the 
Roff(1974). 
4 For the best account of the development of Syariah courts in Indonesia, see Lev (1972). 
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subordinate position of the Islamic courts remained fundamentally unaltered.5 Neither the 
government nor the major mainstream Islamic organizations called for the 
implementation of Syariah (Kadir 2002). 
What was most striking about Malaysia's Syariah reform was the quality of the 
Syariah institutions (including laws) that have emerged. Apparent Islamization of the 
judicial apparatus was not so much a jurisdictional expansion of the Syariah system; it 
came with modernization-administrative competence--0f the Syariah court 
mechanism, reminiscent of the process seen under the British colonial regime (Yegar 
1979). A number of enactments were passed by Parliament and put into effect to regulate 
the administration of Islamic rules. 6 In other words, the divine laws (Syariah) were 
formatted into modem legal form by legislative means. In this way, interpretation and 
adaptation of Syariah in a contemporary context was specified and fixed to make 
execution of Islamic laws coherent and consistent. Moreover, reformers of the Syariah 
court system spent much effort to establish a more formal system of recruitment of 
Syariah personnel. Formal qualifications and training of Syariah judges was greatly 
emphasized to standardize enforcement of Syariah nationwide. The standardized 
religious legal regime consequently granted Syariah judges increased authority and 
autonomy-at the expense of some discretionary power to interpret Syariah. 
Furthermore, Islamic laws adopted as such in the Malaysian context were ones 
carefully chosen from various schools oflslamic jurisprudence. A selective approach was 
taken and any moves to introduce radical Islamic laws were rejected as a result. Whether 
the laws adopted were of a liberal character could still be contested, but they were still 
considered as fairly reasonable even by members of the most vocal progressive Muslim 
5 For state-Islamic relations under Suharto's New Order regime, see, for.instance, Effendy (1994); Adnan 
(1990); Liddle (1996); Hefner (1997). 
6 The Administration of Islamic Law Act, for example, stipulates jurisdiction, appointment and other 
procedural matters concerning Syariah courts as well as other religious offices. 
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force in the country, Sisters in Islam.7 Why and how did the Syariah reform go as far as it 
did? Before seeking an answer to these questions, we will assess in more detail 
institutional changes that occurred m the judicial sector in general and in the 
administration of Syariah in particular. 
The Expansion of the Syariah Court Apparatus 
A most important dimension of the Syariah reform launched by the UMNO government 
was the increased autonomy of the Syariah courts and Islamic laws vis-a-vis their civil 
counterparts. This did not mean, however, that the civil legal structure had been replaced 
by one based on the Syariah. Nor did it intend to hint that the country's judicial system 
had grown more Islamic in essence. In theory and in practice, Malaysia's civil-law 
judicial system inherited from the British colonial regime was very much dominant. The 
authority of the civil courts had hardly been seriously threatened by the rise of a more 
authoritative Syariah court mechanism.8 The tradition of English common-law practices 
still remains intact. What matters, however, is that the Syariah reform has had the effect 
of upgrading the status of the Syariah courts and officials through the use of 
constitutional, legislative and administrative instruments. Physical conditions, 
qualifications of officials, and bureaucratic machinery overseeing the Syariah legal 
service were improved dramatically. Such institutional restructuring in the Syariah area 
had a profound effect overall: promoting the empowerment and autonomy of the state 
administrative apparatus governing Islamic legal affairs. 
7 Personal conversations with Sisters in Islam members during field research I conducted from 2000 to 
2002. 
8 There has been a strong sense of fear in the Bar, however, that Islamic aspects have been excessively 
tolerated and reinforced in the country's legal system. Contesting views about such an 'Islarnization' trend 
caused tension within the rank and file in the Bar Council. It is said that the ousting of the Council President, 
Sulaiman Abdullah, in 2000 was due to his open endorsement of that trend (Interview with Bar Council 
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In view of the universally acknowledged difficulties entailed in legal reform, the move 
towards a relatively high level of institutionalization of the Syariah judicial apparatus is 
striking. Major coordination problems, stemming from the transfer of authority from one 
place to another, were resolved quite effectively. The federal government, through the 
leadership of JAKIM (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, the Department of Islamic 
Development), the central religious agency, managed to minimize any 'separatist' 
tendencies among the individual State religious authorities. This prevented them from 
building a completely separate religious-legal regime based on their own localized 
interpretation in each State. The containment of this tendency in tum facilitated the 
establishment of a relatively coherent and authoritative religious-legal apparatus 
nationwide, despite some unresolved procedural problems. 
The Post-colonial Judicial System: The Inferior Status of the Syariah Courts and 
Personnel 
A brief overview of the overall judicial system surrounding the Syariah courts. provides a 
background for appreciating the effect of the institutional reform under discussion. At 
independence, Malaysia inherited a relatively well-organized judicial system from the 
British colonial regime. Under the system that was strongly influenced by British rules 
and traditions, the civil courts enjoyed a wide range of jurisdiction. Judicial officers and 
lawyers in the civil courts, like other post-colonial societies, formed an influential and 
highly respected elite class in the local community.9 
On the other hand, the powers of the Syariah courts-running parallel with the civil 
member, 19 December 2000). 
9 It is noteworthy that a number of prominent Malay nationalist leaders who led the independence 
movement were law graduates. Those include the first Prime Minister Tunk:u Abdul Rahman, the second 
Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, and the third Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn. 
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courts-were restricted and defined separate from, and made 'inferior' to, those of the 
civil courts in the wake of colonial rule. Islamic law was strictly applied to Muslims in 
matters relating to family and inheritance and some Islamic criminal offences such as 
drinking, deviant worship, and sexual offences (e.g., khalwat). In the field of criminal 
law, in particular, the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts was very limited. 10 With Islamic 
affairs placed under the authority of the sultans in their respective States, the Syariah 
courts were excluded from the federal system dominated by the civil courts. Moreover, 
this system of Syariah courts comprised only two levels: the Court of the Chief Kadi 
(Kadi Besar) and subordinate Court of the Kadi (Wu 1999: 63-64). The leading figure of 
the Syariah reform, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim, characterizes the common perception 
among Syariah personnel of their inferior position in this way: 
In contrast [to the civil courts] the Syariah courts were for along time neglected 
and forgotten. There was no independent judicial and legal service for them and 
the judges and officers belonged to the general administrative service and were 
subject to the control of the Religious Councils and the religious departments. 
The judges of the Syariah High Courts did not have the independent status, 
remuneration and terms of service of the civil judges. The facilities provided 
for the Syariah courts were far below those provided for the civil courts 
(Ahmad Mohamed Ibrahim 2000: 194). 
Such disparity between the civil and Syariah courts, in favor of the former, continued 
to fuel a sense of discontent, envy and inferiority among Syariah officials and experts. It 
is in this context that the UMNO government undertook the Syariah reform in the 1980s. 
10 Before the reform, the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts could not be exercised in respect of any offence 
punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or with any fine exceeding RMI 000 
(approximately US$260) or both. After the reform, the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts in the field of 
criminal law was extended to deal with offences punishable with imprisonment up to three years or a fine 
not exceeding RM5000 (approximately US$1320) or caning up to six strokes or the combination of all 
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Overview of the Institutionalization of the Syariah Judicial Apparatus 
The government adopted several statutory initiatives to enhance the overall authority and 
autonomy of the Syariah courts and officials. In the constitutional sphere, the Federal 
Constitution was amended in 1988 to give more jurisdictional leverage to the Syariah 
courts. Article 121 (lA) was added to ensure that decisions made within the jurisdiction 
of the Syariah courts could not be reversed by the civil courts. 11 Jurisdiction of the 
Syariah courts still remains restricted to matters concerning family, inheritance, and 
religious offences and regulations. This constitutional amendment, however, had a 
far-reaching effect: upholding the legitimacy and dignity of the Syariah courts and 
officials and protecting their administrative turf. The symbolic and psychological effect 
of the amendment was very real not only on the Syariah side, but also on the civil side of 
the judiciary. Before the amendment, Syariah judges had no capacity to challenge but 
could only acquiesce when appeals against their judgments were 'transferred' to the civil 
courts and ended up being overturned. After the amendment, however, such appeals to the 
civil courts ceased in principle although the civil court was still exclusively entitled to 
decide which court had jurisdiction to hear particular Cases when a conflict of 
jurisdictions arose. 12 Moreover, changing perceptions and attitudes in favor of 
'Syariah-ization' within the legal community were striking, too. The civil high court 
judges who made a historic judgment to return a case to the Syariah court in the light of 
Article 121 were celebrated as 'pro-Syariah' within the Syariah court community and in 
these. 
11 In a number of cases in the past, there was a conflict between the decisions of the Syariah courts and the 
civil courts, and the civil courts usually prevailed. After the constitutional amendment, this trend has been 
reversed. For the general background of the amendment, see, Ahmad Ibrahim (1989). 
12 About cases which brought to light unsettled problems concerning the conflict of jurisdictions after the 
constitutional amendment, see Kamali (2000a: chap.3). Apostasy cases involving non-Muslim converts 
were one prominent example. For issues concerning apostasy, see the section on the apostasy controversy in 
this chapter. 
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the Muslim community at large. The fate of the judges who decided otherwise, on the 
other hand, was rather miserable; they were regarded as 'anti-Syariah,' a label not favored 
in the Muslim community. 13 
The government also widely used legislative measures to reorganize and upgrade the 
Syariah mechanism. Legislation pertaining to the administration of the Syariah laws and 
courts was passed in each State on the initiative of the federal religious authorities. A 
most important effect of legislation was the dismantling of power concentrated in the 
State Religious Council under the previous Syariah regime governed by more general 
(and ambiguous) Muslim Law enactments at the individual State level. The new laws set 
a legal framework for a clear division of power among three principal entities, namely the 
Religious Council, the Mufti, 14 and the Syariah courts. The separation of the Syariah 
courts and personnel from the State Religious Departments and Religious Councils was 
an especially important outcome. This organizational separation between the two 
functions, one judicial and the other executive, guaranteed greater independence to the 
former-in a physical, administrative, and financial sense. Moreover, the Syariah courts 
were reorganized into a three-tier hierarchy: the Syariah Subordinate Court, the Syariah 
High Court, and the Syariah Court of Appeal (Ahmad Mohamed Ibrahim 2000: 140; Wu 
1999: 164). The impact of the reorganization of the courts on personnel matters was 
particularly great. The organizational upgrading and standardization required an 
emphasis on the classification, qualifications, and professionalism of the Syariah 
personnel at various levels of the court hierarchy. Previously, those Syariah experts 
formerly known as kadi were 'judges' in a very broad and ambiguous sense; they were 
administrative functionaries attached to the religious departments. For example, the 
13 This observation is based on my interviews and conversations with Syariah judges, Syariah experts, and 
lawyers as well as civil judges who were personally involved in these cases. 
14 The Mufti is the supreme authority in respect of all matters concerning Syariah law in the respective 
States. He is authorized to issue, modify, or revoke fatwa (Islamic decree) on any unsettled or controversial 
question of Syariah law (Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemlah Joned 1995). In recent years, whether fatwa 
should be subjected to the normal legislative processes has become a focus of controversy (For instance, 
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unsystematic circulation of officers among vanous posts m the State religions 
departments meant that a general religious officer with little legal expertise could be 
assigned to the kadi office. On the other hand, a kadi could be assigned to a non-judicial 
post in the department. 15 Now, these officials were accorded specific jurisdictional 
authority to execute the functions as professional judges in the Syariah courts more 
independently and professionally. This organizational independence, authority, and 
professionalism brought about a Syariah judicial mechanism in a more formal sense of 
organization-for the first time in the country's history. 
To initiate the statutory adjustments, the federal religious authorities exercised a great 
deal of leadership in inducing the otherwise highly fragmented State religious judicial 
officialdom to comply with the federal line. Furthermore, the new Islamic legislation 
placed great emphasis on procedure and evidence; laws that regulate the conduct of 
judges as well as the operation of the courts. This emphasis was not only intended to 
upgrade and standardize the operation of the Syariah judiciary system, but also extend 
control over Syariah officials and the application oflslamic laws nationwide. 
A number of measures adopted on the administrative level also had a great effect in 
promoting the organizational development of the Syariah judicial mechanism. The most 
significant development in this area was the establishment of the Department of Syariah 
Courts (Jabatan Kehakiman Syariah Malaysia or JKSM) under the Prime Minister's 
office in 1998. This was an alternative administrative instrument that the federal 
authorities were trying out in an effort to nationalize the Syariah judicial apparatus. In this 
way, they aimed to offset the jurisdictional constraint imposed by the constitution on 
federal involvement in the Syariah courts. On agreeing to join this federal system, 
Syariah judges and officials previously employed by individual State governments were 
NST, 22 July 1997). For this issue and related debates, see Kamali (2000a: chap.13). 
15 Interview with International Islamic University of Malaysia (UIAM) lecturer, Selangor, 20 July 2000 and 
13 January 2001. 
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to be placed under the Syariah official common-use scheme (Skim Guna Sama 
Perkhidmatan Pegawai Syariah) (BM, 28 May 2000; UM, 23 December 1998). Under 
this system, Syariah judges may be transferred among the participating States, allowing 
them better chances of promotion. This career-focused incentive did, in fact, appeal to 
many Syariah officials. Despite the State religious authorities' continuing resistance to 
any steps which hinted at federal intervention, Syariah judges in all the States-including 
even Kelantan ruled by the opposition PAS-agreed to join this federal scheme. Thus, 
although the Syariah courts remained within the jurisdiction of the States as provided in 
the constitution, their judicial personnel in effect joined the federal system. Although, for 
a variety of reasons, some States have yet to implement this agreement, this federal 
mechanism is expected to help close gaps between the States in the procedures and 
execution of the Syariah judicial machinery. 16 
The emphasis of the reform agenda on the development of a system to recruit more 
qualified Syariah officials is particularly noteworthy. The federal Public Service 
Department (Jabatan Perkhidmatan Awam or JPA) introduced a new set of Syariah 
service schemes including qualifications for recruitment. This set the rules specifying 
official ranks, qualification, remuneration and other merit-based reward programs. To 
prepare better trained officials, the International Isla~ic University of Malaysia 
(Universiti Islam Antarabangsa, Malaysia or UIAM), as well as Islamic studies faculties 
at other local Universities, launched new programs and curricula. All these programs 
contributed to organizational improvement of the Syariah court service, making Syariah 
judges to somehow resemble their civil counterparts. 
16 Interviews with Syariah judges, the Public Service Department (JPA) officials, and legal experts at the 
International Islamic University conducted during my field research from 2000 to 2001. 
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State-Society and Intra-State Coordination Mechanisms 
The relative success of the institutionalization of the Syariah judicial apparatus stemmed 
in part from a remarkable level of coordination between governmental and private actors 
-both on the Syariah and civil-court sides. The pivotal force in this pact was the strong 
leadership of the late Professor Ahmad Ibrahim-a famous figure in Malaysian judicial 
and legal circles. He was the most vocal proponent of the establishment of a 
comprehensive judicial system based on Syariah principles. His belief was that the 
pre-colonial indigenous system of laws-that is, those laws based on Syariah-ought to 
be the law of the land, because the present Malaysian legal structure was inherited from 
the British colonial regime involuntarily (Ahmad Mohamed Ibrahim 2000: 131-33). 
Against the backdrop of the rising tide oflslamic consciousness, public objection was 
hardly heard at least among Muslims. On the contrary, strong support for Professor 
Ahmad's stand was expressed openly-especially by Syariah-educated academics and 
officials. To understand the judiciary's aspiration for Islamization, one has to take note of 
the subordinate status unwillingly assumed by the Syariah courts and officials in the 
post-colonial era. As suggested earlier, the Syariah experts had been .ranked as 
second-class in the civil-dominant judicial system and were looked down upon by their 
highly elitist civil counterparts. Moreover, public confidence in the Syariah system was 
very low. In addition, these Syariah instrumentalities came to be overtly criticized by 
increasingly vocal women's groups. In the latter's campaigns that were widely publicized 
in the local media, they were depicted almost as the prime source of the problems faced 
by the Muslim community (for instance, FEER, 18 December 1997). Syariah reform was 
mea:nt to remedy this long-standing damage to their reputation and dignity, by elevating 
the Syariah system-not only physically, but also administratively and constitutionally. 
Furthermore, such unprecedented attention to the Syariah branch of the courts and law 
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meant that more official resources would be allocated to the teaching of classical religious 
studies at the tertiary level. For Islamic scholars and teachers, the Syariah reform project 
thus offered an opportunity not only to extend their career prospects but also to put into 
practice their learning and their interpretation of the classic texts. 17 
What is striking about Syariah reform was that support came not only from the Syariah 
experts but also from officials and experts on the civil side. Two factors accounted for the 
better coordination between the Syariah and civil courts. First, the large majority of the 
bench was comprised of Muslim judges. As of 2003, fifteen of the nineteen 
highest-ranking judges in the Federal and the Appeal courts were Muslim. 18 Being 
Muslim, the judges themselves were not immune to the growing Islamic consciousness in 
the Muslim community. For them, assisting the upgrading of Syariah meant offering 
service-and doing justice-to the ummah (Muslim community) at large. As an example 
of this type of service, some higher court judges voluntarily sat on the Syariah Appeal 
court panels in some States, despite little material incentive to do so. 19 
Second, Professor Ahmad was a key driving force and a valuable asset for mobilizing a 
. wide range of actors with particular vested interests to work for the common goal of 
establishing a better Islamic legal system. He wielded extraordinary authority not only .in 
Syariah but also in civil legal circles. It is widely acknowledged that there was none 
comparable to him in terms of expertise and experience both in civil and Syariah laws. He 
founded the law faculty, first at the University of Malaya (Universiti Malaya or UM), and 
later at the International Islamic University (Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Malaysia or 
UIAM) and taught and trained large numbers of high-profile judges, lawyers, and legal 
officers. To honor his contribution, UIAM's law faculty incorporated his name into the 
faculty's title. Many of his students came to hold senior posts in the bar, bench, 
17 The author acknowledges an observation of Virginia Hooker on this point. 
18 http://www.kehakiman.gov.my/judiciary.html#khakim (accessed on 30 August 2003). 
19 Interview with Appeal court judge, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 2001. 
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Attorney-General Chambers and government, and in other positions which influenced 
decision-making and the drafting oflaws on both civil and Islamic matters. His students' 
high regard for his authority-and confidence in his remarkable expertise-helped a wide 
spectrum of groups and individuals to reconcile their conflicting interests and views and 
to work for their common goal of establishing a better system of Syariah. Large numbers 
of experts-civil and Syariah judges, common law and Syariah law academicians, 
lawyers as well as both religious and legal officials-sat together in the Committees 
chaired by Professor Ahmad to coordinate Syariah and common laws and to upgrade the 
standard of the Syariah service.20 
These actors, whose work strongly suggests the significance of societal input, no doubt 
played a very important role in pushing for the demanding task of Syariah reform. The 
value of the Syariah system in the process of Islamization of the state is almost 
universally acknowledged in the Muslim community. The significance attached to 
Syariah among the Muslims in general, and religious elites in particular, was translated 
into pressure for-and acceptance of-greater Syariah prominence in the judicial 
structure. Nevertheless, such societal pressures alone do not adequately account for the 
particular type of legal administrative arrangements that emerged from the 1980s on, as 
outlined above. The task of drafting Islamic laws, for example, was not left entirely to 
Syariah and legal experts. The committees for Syariah and civil law coordination in 
charge of the practical drafting of the Islamic laws were placed under the JAKIM, a 
central Islamic agency directly under the Prime Minister's Office. The drafts submitted 
by the Committees were almost always scrutinized closely and altered, if necessary, 
before being passed in the Parliament, where the ruling party's dominance was 
unquestioned. The best example in this respect concerned the handling of apostasy (see 
below). The provisions pertaining to specific rehabilitative and regulatory measures on 
20 Interviews with UIAM lecturer, Selangor, 21 July 2000; Legal advisor, JAKIM, Kuala Lumpur, 24 March 
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apostasy-although included in an original draft presented by the Coordination 
Committees-were excluded from a final model draft which was scheduled to be 
presented to the State governments.21 
What was crucial in explaining the particular institutional development was the 
political incentives of state actors-specifically, Muslim ruling elites within UMNO. 
Lavish government sponsorship-political, institutional and financial-was lent to the 
advocates of Syariah reform, as long as they remained within the boundaries and rules set 
by the interests of UMNO politicians. For example, UMNO leaders pressed Professor 
Ahmad Ibrahim not to talk on behalf of, let alone lend expertise to, PAS. At the same 
time, former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who had a long association with 
Professor Ahmad, continually promised him full government backing.22 
For the UMNO leaders, Ahmad Ibrahim was the best possible individual to lead the 
challenging task of Syariah reconstruction in the right direction for two reasons. First, his 
British training in civil law-not Al-Azhar training in Syariah laws-was highly valued. 
It was expected that his modem educational background would help counter excessive 
conservative input from other Middle-Eastern trained Syariah experts who had always 
dominated the Syariah service. Moreover, Professor Ahmad had had an extensive and 
outstanding career in the legal service in Singapore before he came to Malaysia; among 
numerous prominent official positions he held, was that of Attorney-General of 
Singapore in 1963-1967. 23 Second, his massive authority in legal circles especially on the 
civil side, meant that he commanded high respect not only among Muslim but also 
non-Muslim elites. This contributed to confidence building among the non-Muslims 
2001. 
21 The sensitivity of the apostasy regulation was evident in recent controversies prompted by the Apostasy 
Bill proposed by the Perlis State government. For a more detailed discussion about the Apostasy Bill, see 
the case study on apostasy in this chapter. 
22 Interview with Syariah expert, Akademi Pengajian Islam, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 4 
August 2000. 
23 About his remarkable educational and career background, see, for instance, 'Memperingati Ahmad 
Ibrahim,' UM, 10 April 2000, and Pengenalan Ringkas: Profesor Tan Sri Datuk Ahmad Bin Mohamed 
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about the Syariah-ization process in the legal system. A semor member of the 
organization most vocally critical of the Syariah reform, Sisters in Islam, acknowledges 
that 'the Syariah court system could have gone in a terribly wrong and conservative 
direction unless a highly authoritative figure like Professor Ahmad Ibrahim was present 
to take a strong lead in the Syariah reform process.' Undoubtedly, 'his relatively liberal 
background was attractive to UMNO leaders who wanted to ensure that the reform 
brought about a moderate and progressive Syariah system. ' 24 Most importantly, Professor 
Ahmad was appointed to head the UIAM's Law Faculty-an experimental arrangement 
combining the two branches oflaw (civil and Syariah) under one roof-in the year of the 
establishment of UIAM in 1983. 
UIAM's role in the development of the Syariah system was extremely important. Two 
factors have to be emphasized. First, UIAM's Faculty of Law was equipped with a large 
number of both national and international legal experts on a wide range of legal 
matters-both Syariah and civil. The Faculty offered a central forum and bank of 
expertise for the reform of the Syariah judiciary and laws by regularly organizing 
seminars and workshops in conjunction with the federal religious agencies such as 
JAKIM and IKIM (Jnstitut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia, Institute of Islamic 
Understanding Malaysia). 25 They set agendas for general discussions and proposed 
specific programs to achieve reform objectives in the Syariah courts. By incorporating 
across the board Syariah officials and experts as well as religious leaders into the 
dialogue process, they managed to disseminate their reform agenda and ideas to a wider 
spectrum of the Muslim audience nationwide.26 The active initiative of these religious 
Ibrahim. 
24 Interview with Sisters in Islam founding member, 25 December 2000. She, however, also believes that 
Professor Ahmad's stand on Islam was not as progressive as they had hoped, especially on issues 
concerning Muslim women. 
25 IKIM was created under the Prime Minister's Department to lead the federal government's project to 
promote progressive Islam. The development and functions of the institute are discussed in chapter 7. 
26 Various seminar papers from IKIM archive. The author attended a number of these seminars during her 
field research conducted between 2000 and 2002. 
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experts at the societal level was particularly important for involving a large number of 
religious leaders of various political backgrounds. Given the extraordinary politicization 
of Syariah issues by UMNO and PAS, overt involvement of UMNO politicians could 
have been harmful for bringing success to the reform outcome. 
Second, the Faculty introduced comprehensive legal training programs, combining 
both Syariah and civil elements. These programs, among others, were implemented with 
the intention of training a new breed of Syariah officials, familiar not only with Islamic 
but also common law and procedures (Ahmad Ibrahim 1993; Mahmod Saedon Awang 
Othman 1993). These DIAM-trained Syariah experts were expected to be more sensitive 
to, and compatible with, Malaysia's local cultures and circumstances. In this way, one of 
the UIAM's long-term missions was to replace the traditional Syariah experts educated 
in-and hugely influenced by-the Middle-Ea~tem system, who customarily dominated 
the Malaysian Syariah courts, with the new generation of local trained Syariah experts. 
As of 2000, only four Syariah judges held degrees from the UIAM but all the rest of the 
Syariah judges who were already in the service were required to complete the Diploma in 
Administration oflslamic judiciary, a newly introduced requirement for admission to the 
Syariah legal service. 27 This course, specifically tailored for them by the Faculty of Law 
allowed senior Syariah judges including the first director-general (Ketua Pengarah) of 
the department of Syariah Courts, Sheikh Ghazali Abdul Rahman, to receive extra 
. . . . 28 
m-serv1ce trammg. 
The UIAM system was intended to produce not only a new generation of judges but 
also lawyers qualified in both branches of law, civil and Syariah. The Faculty of Law 
27 This is indeed a very small figure when the total number of Syariah officials nationwide (134) is taken 
into account. This has more to do with the unexpected unpopularity of the Syariah program at UIAM, 
however. The higher standard and longer-duration required to complete the program are claimed to have 
discouraged student emollment at the program and ultimately affected recruitment of Syariah judges 
(Interviews withSyariah courtjudge, Selangor, 16 February 2001; Public Service Department officer in 
charge of the development of Syariah official service scheme, Kuala Lumpur, 5 September 200Q). 
28 A large number of high-ranking Syariah judges are educated in the Middle-East, especially at the· 
prestigious Al-Azhar in Cairo (Interview with the Director-general, the Department of Syariah Judiciary, 
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offered two program options to this end. The first option was the LLB (Syariah), a 5-year 
first-degree program combining both civil and Syariah law programs. The second was a 
one-year Diploma program in Syariah legal practice. This course offered civil lawyers 
who were already in service an opportunity to familiarize themselves with Syariah laws 
and procedures. On completing the course, they could be qualified for admission to the 
Syariah legal service.29 
These programs, indeed, had a profound effect on the development of the Syariah 
judicial apparatus; they not only produced a number of better trained Syariah lawyers 
qualified both in Syariah and civil laws and procedures, but also offered civil lawyers an 
opportunity to learn about Syariah legal practice. Moreover, the emergence of better 
trained Syariah lawyers drastically altered the tradition of Syariah court operations. In the 
past, it was very common that court cases were heard without representation of lawyers. 
Now, attendance of lawyers at courts is increasingly a common practice. An unexpected 
irony was that many UIAM law graduates opted to practice in the civil rather than the 
Syariah court because the civil practice was more rewarding financially. 30 The original 
mission of the program to train better qualified Syariah lawyers was therefore somewhat 
thwarted by market forces. Overall, however, the contributions of the University 
observed here suggest that the establishment of UIAM was not merely a superficial 
Islamization effort by the UMNO leaders to fight PAS; it had a substantial practical 
consequence for the development of the state religious apparatus in the judicial sector. 31 
Kuala Lumpur, 17 July 2000). 
29 Interviews with civil and Syariah lawyers, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2000 and 16 June 2001. There is 
minor inter-State variation in the admission procedure of Syariah lawyers. Some States such as Johor and 
Kelantan, for example, require proficiency in Arabic. The UIAM's Diploma program helped to set a 
qualification standard nationwide. For various problems related to the admission of Syariah lawyers, see 
also 'Have one rule for Syariah admission,' NST, 23 April 2002. 
30 Interviews with DIAM-graduate lawyers, Kuala Lumpur, 16 June 2001. 
31 This is a received view about UIAM's role in the UMNO's Islamization project. 
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The Making of a Syariah Regime a la UMNO: Political Incentives of the Muslim 
Ruling Elite 
Despite the significant role played by some societal actors, societal pressures are not the 
sole determinant of policy change. A popular societal pressure paradigm, for example, 
explains the development of the state Syariah apparatus by primarily looking at the threat 
from PAS. The electoral threat from PAS may explain why UMNO leaders were willing 
to intervene in Syariah affairs; but this factor alone could not fully explain why they could 
have done so to the degree they did. Nor can the societal perspective clarify why 
institutionalization took place in the particular way it did. 
UMNO's concern about the electoral pressures emanating from PAS's Islamic 
assertiveness undoubtedly had some implications for the UMNO government's campaign 
for Syariah reform. The key issue here related to the question of political legitimacy 
within the Muslim-Malay community. As Islam grew important as a factor defining 
legitimacy to rule the umma, UMNO needed to be seen as assisting the Islamic cause, but 
without hampering the party's modernist credentials. Standardizing and upgrading the 
Syariah judicial system nationwide was an instrument to achieve this end. Moreover, the 
effort served to preempt PAS in its attempt to fulfill its aspiration of building an 'Islamic 
state' on its own terms. A controversy stemming from the Hudud Bills proposed by the 
PAS-led State governments in Kelantan and Terengganu, and ensuing tension between 
UMNO and PAS illuminated this point. Further, the UMNO's backing for the creation of 
a well-organized national system recruiting qualified Syariah judicial personnel was 
intended to keep the administration of Syariah free from the interference of private 
interests outside the government-especially PAS. 
Despite the significance of the electoral threat posed by PAS, however, one could not 
expect that UMNO would adopt a strategy just to follow the lead of PAS because of this 
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pressure. This, in fact, was precisely the course avoided by UMNO. In this Syariah sphere, 
PAS's strategy and focus were quite different from those adopted by UMNO. PAS's 
primary concern was to extend the scope of Syariah laws in their States, especially in the 
field of criminal offences, as seen in their introduction of the Hudud (Islamic criminal 
code) Bills. They also insisted initially that this Islamic criminal code should be applied 
not only to Muslims but also non-Muslims. Moreover, PAS leaders were not particularly 
focused on developing an efficient and competent Syariah court apparatus. Thus, 
appreciation of the electoral threat of PAS alone cannot give us a picture of the strategy 
UMNO leaders would adopt and what consequences their strategies would bring to 
institutional change. 
To help understand the choices taken-and the emphasis given-by the UMNO 
leadership in the course of Syariah reform, we need to focus on the incentive structure of 
the ruling Muslim politicians. The political incentives facing UMNO politicians to 
maximize opportunities for patronage in order to rise in the party hierarchy strongly 
influenced the extensive governmental support for Syariah reform and the high level of 
institutionalization of the religious legal structure. 
It is important to note, however, these political incentives worked very differently to 
bring about the various choices and strategies of Muslim politicians according to their 
place in the party. For the federal-level UMNO politicians, the intra-party logic of 
political ascendancy-the necessity to build close ties with urban business 
communities-meant that they had to be more attentive to the concerns of the 
non-Muslims in the Syariah area. But, they had to do this without alienating the Muslim 
constituency. It is commonly understood that the Chinese in Malaysia were not 
particularly concerned about Syariah-related issues, unless their interests were directly 
affected. After all, Syariah only applied to Muslims. The increasingly intense electoral 
competition between UMNO and PAS over the last two decades, however, aroused 
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anxiety and susp1c1on among the non-Muslims. Their fear was that the UMNO 
government would adopt more drastic Islamization measures to stem the tide of PAS's 
influence. PAS 's proposal to introduce hudud laws further reinforced this fear. Despite the 
substantial popularity of Islamic law within.the Muslim community, the hudud proposals 
stirred massive apprehension and opposition in the urban areas, especially within the 
business and Chinese communities because they feared that they might be extended to 
cover non-Muslims.32 
The Muslim ruling politicians' sensitivity to the urban middle-class and corporate 
interests-both Muslim and non-Muslim-meant that they had a special aversion to 
radical and conservative types of Islam. Although many well-educated Malays favored 
Islamic policies, most did not endorse the full application of Syariah law. For them, a 
prime threat of this conservative type oflslam came from PAS. After it came to power in 
the northern State of Kelantan in 1990, the Islamic party launched a campaign to 
introduce the hudud law, a law generally considered too harsh. PAS's heavy commitment 
to this law undoubtedly remained a source of serious concern to the UMNO top leaders. 
Differing from UMNO's more secular outlook, PAS had long aspired to establish an 
'Islamic state' based comprehensively on Islamic laws and principles in Malaysia. Its 
commitment to this goal against the backdrop of the considerable popularity of the law in 
the rural Muslim community meant that UMNO leaders could not bluntly quash it; on the 
contrary, they needed to apply adequate care and skill in dealing with the subject. 
UMNO top leaders who pledged commitment to a progressive Islam compatible with 
economic development regarded the PAS's 'Islamic state' vision as a threat to UMNO's 
vision of creating a modem Malaysia as well as progressive Muslim urban middle-class. 
32 For non-Muslim reactions to the Bill, see, for instance, 'Hudud laws: What worries non-Muslims,' NST, 9 
October 1994. In the face of strong objections from non-Muslim organizations, the PAS-led Kelantan 
government changed its initial stand by deciding that the hudud laws would not apply to non-Muslims 
(NST, 19 October 1993). The treatment of non-Muslims in the proposed hudud laws remained highly 
controversial, leaving the stance of PAS leaders on this subject ambiguous ('Hudud "will not apply to 
non-Muslims'',' ST, 2 July 2002; 'Terengganu says Islamic laws will eventually cover non-Muslims,' Star, 
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Within the context of rising Islamic consciousness among the party's traditional support 
base, the Muslim-Malay community, UMNO leaders were alarmed that PAS's 
commitment to the full and stringent implementation of the hudud law might frustrate this 
vision. Moreover, UMNO's defensiveness against PAS was all the more understandable if 
UMNO's preoccupation with economic development was taken into account, a factor 
claimed by PAS to be a cause of secularization and moral decay (See, for instance, Star, 6 
October 2001; UM, 1 October 2001). 33 
For the federal UMNO leaders, the intra-party logic of political ascendancy-the 
necessity to build close ties with urban business interests, both within Muslim and 
non-Muslim communities-made Syariah reform in the form of institutionalization 
politically very attractive. By implementing reforms that strengthened the authority and 
prestige of the Syariah courts, UMNO politicians hoped to counter pressure from PAS to 
extend the application of Syariah beyond its current limited scope and thus avoid 
alienating business interests, both non-Muslim and Muslim. 
For the State-level UMNO leaders especially in Malay-dominated rural States, m 
contrast, serving the interests of urban business and middle-class communities was not 
essential to achieve political ascendancy in the party. The demogr~phic and 
socio-economic gap between urban and rural areas influenced the difference in strategy 
between the federal and State leaders. UMNO leaders m predominantly 
Muslim-populated rural States in general faced more serious electoral challenges from 
the Islamic opposition party, as for example in such States as Kelantan, Terengganu, 
Perlis, Kedah and to some extent in Pahang. Their primary interest was to attract the 
hearts and minds of the rural Muslim constituency with the result that they were less 
9 July 2002). 
33 The UMNO's frequent use of 'threat' rhetoric-rhetoric to embellish the threat of PAS in an extremist 
light-was intended to contain this electoral challenge from PAS. Furthermore, the UMNO leaders even 
started claiming that Malaysia was already an 'Islamic state.' This was largely seen as a way of countering 
the unprecedented electoral threat from the Islamic opposition since the Anwar crisis in 1998. 
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attentive to non-Muslim interests. They may have to build friendly relationships with 
Chinese businessmen, just like other UMNO politicians aspiring higher posts in the party. 
But, the cost of losing a more immediate party constituency was higher than the likely 
benefit gained from entertaining a small group of non-Muslims. 
It was therefore reasonable that UMNO leaders in rural States were very interested in 
introducing conservative Islamic laws (such as the one on apostasy) by making use of 
their prerogatives over Islamic affairs. Apart from their individual personal convictions, 
this was a strategy to maximize their chance to rise in the party. They could prove their 
Islamic credentials in the eyes of their generally conservative Muslim constituency. Their 
strategy was not well accepted by the party top brass in Kuala Lumpur. But the cost of 
losing the latter's favor was overwhelmed by the benefit of winning popularity among the 
local religious dignitaries and the Muslim constituency more generally. 
UMNO politicians in more urbanized States with larger non-Muslim populations, 
however, needed to be more responsive to more liberal and cosmopolitan middle-class 
interests in their multi-ethnic constituencies. For them, the electoral challenge from PAS 
was less urgent. They had to be concerned about appeasing pressµres from liberal rather 
than conservative forces. Moreover, they had the task of serving the interests of the large 
corporate community, a task not so immediately required of UMNO leaders in the rural 
areas. Thus, those leaders in urbanized States could not afford to adopt the same strategy 
adopted by the State leaders in rural areas to meet the same end: maximizing 
opportunities to build individual patronage networks. In Selangor, for example, 
proposing a law on apostasy might provoke a backlash among large middle-class and 
non-Muslim constituencies.34 This, logically, was not a wise move for those politicians 
who needed favor from the top party leaders, especially the former party president 
34 Some Kuala Lumpur-based NGOs such as Sisters in Islam were already on alert when a proposal to 
introduce the apostasy law was put forward by the Perlis State government ('It's not right to legislate on 
faith,' Star, 30 September 2000). 
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Mahathir and his successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. They were aware that UMNO 
leaders at the national level were fully committed to a campaign to inculcate a progressive 
Islamic culture in the Muslim community. They would not like to lose any points in the 
notoriously hard-fought party competition; the favor of the party president was crucial to 
winning in this race. These diverging attitudes and strategies between urban- and 
rural-based politicians became conspicuous in the controversies on the Hudud Bills and 
the law on apostasy, as seen below. 35 
In addition to these considerations, for State-level politicians, retaining control over 
Syariah administration at the State level did not offer major patronage benefits. In any 
case they lacked technical and financial resources as well as political will to commit 
themselves to institutionalization of the Syariah court apparatus at that level. Their 
privilege of appointing Syariah officials, for example, was not particularly useful for their 
patronage distribution purposes, given that there were very few posts to be filled at the 
State level.36 The relative lack of patronage opportunities in the Syariah sector was in 
stark contrast to the two sectors discussed in the following chapters. In the education 
sector, for example, the chances to expand channels to distribute patronage were much 
higher than in the judicial sector because there were many teaching posts available at 
State-run religious schools. Moreover, the excessive supply of religious teachers (more 
than the State religious schools could accommodate) meant that the bargaining power of 
the State government leaders was higher and the patronage effect could be maximized in 
their favor. This patronage effect accounted for considerably less resistance among the 
State-level UMNO leaders against federal intervention in the Syariah sphere. 
35 Polygamy issues also caused controversy and revealed intra-party tension. 
36 Even in the largest State, Selangor, there are only thirteen Syariah judges. In the smallest State, Perlis, 
there is only one Syariah judge (Interview with JPA official in charge of the Syariah legal service scheme, 
Public Service Department, Kuala Lumpur, 5 September 2000). · 
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Intra-government Threat of Conservative Islam 
It is important to emphasize that the threat of conservative and radical Islam to UMNO's 
liberal regime did not always come from outside the government; it also came from 
within the government. The proposition that exclusively focuses on the electoral threat 
from PAS does not count this internal conservative element. This element, as discussed 
below, caused great apprehension and irritation for the top UMNO leaders and had a 
critically important effect on the outcome of Syariah reform. 
One source of this tension derived from officials of the Islamic religious bureaucracy. 
Their conservative approaches greatly agitated UMNO's top leadership, especially 
Mahathir. This intra-governmental tension between appointed and elected officials grew 
more evident in the late 1990s when disputes between the two took place regarding such 
issues as women's rights. This culminated in the 'beauty contest' controversy in 1997.37 
The UMNO federal leaders' perception of these religious officials as a threat to their 
liberal regime motivated the former to adopt firm measures to control the latter. The 
UMNO leaders' strong support for the campaigns to standardize and upgrade the Syariah 
judicial apparatus was meant to exert tighter control over the conservative and 
inconsistent behaviors of these religious administrators and to compel them to endorse 
UMNO's policies. 
An even more threatening adversary to the UMNO's liberal regime, in fact, came from 
within the party's rank and file. Excessive focus on the divide between the 'secular' 
UMNO vis-a-vis the 'Islamist' PAS in the conventional analytical approach resulted in 
the neglect of intra-party differences with regard to a party member's position and 
approach on Islamic issues. Despite its modernist and secular label, for example, there 
were members m UMNO who personally believed in-and formally 
37 A later section discusses in more detail the beauty contest controversy. 
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supported-implementation of hudud laws, which was proposed by PAS but blocked by 
the UMNO federal leadership. Moreover, some of the State-level UMNO politicians 
insisted on the implementation of the law on apostasy and a 'rehabilitation' measure to 
punish apostates-against expectation of the federal leaders. 
The State-level politicians' campaigns for these Islamic measures were their strategies 
to achieve political advancement within the party in the context of fierce intra-party 
rivalry. The inconsistency of their strategies with the federal leadership sometimes led to 
controversy in some areas related to Syariah within the party, despite UMNO's highly 
reputed consensus-making that was facilitated by its centralized power structure. The 
UMNO top leaders were particularly concerned about the growing influence of 
conservative elements within the party and regarded it as a threat to their supremacy as 
well as party unity and survival. The Syariah reform and greater federal control over the 
Syariah court apparatus as well as Islamic laws were important means to prevent these 
conservative elements from gaining influence within the party and the government. 
UMNO's Incentive Structures and Syariah Legal Reform 
Federal UMNO politicians' political incentives-and their close ties with corporate 
communities in particular-thus significantly shaped the outcomes of Syariah reform. 
Under the present constitutional framework, Syariah jurisdiction was tightly restricted to 
areas concerning family, inheritance, and more general religious-related matters, 
including religious offenses. Since this condition was kept intact, the Syariah reform did 
not pose a serious threat to the interests of the corporate business sector. There was no 
reason for corporate actors to be seriously bothered about whether UMNO politicians 
wanted to make the judicial system slightly more Islamic for their own political ends, as 
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long as Malaysia's liberal-capitalistic business practices were left untouched. For the 
UMNO leaders who were keen to keep corporate businesspeople happy, it was not a 
sensible approach to introduce a radical Syariah program that could harm the country's 
business environment. 
On the other hand, the Is.lamization of laws was quite welcome when it was found to 
serve business interests and to encourage business activities. A few legal changes were 
introduced in the business sector to promote economic transactions based on Islamic 
principles. The Islamic Banking Act was passed in 1983 as an effort to regulate the 
increasingly popular Islamic banking service (Zakariya Man 1988). A law pertaining to 
Takaful (Islamic insurance) was a similar mechanism introduced to oversee Islamic 
insurance activities (Kamali 2000a: chap.12). Moreover, the Syariah and Civil Law 
Coordination Committee under the federal government proposed to introduce additional 
Islamic laws in this area-for instance, one dealing with the administration of property.38 
Two important facts have to be noted here. First, these business-related Islamic laws 
were introduced without replacing parallel civil laws. Second, the administration of these 
laws remained under the jurisdiction of civil courts. These facts suggest that the 
Islamization of law in the business-related area was primarily intended to facilitate 
business activities-both for Muslims and non-Muslims-without altering the basic judicial 
framework. In other words, there was almost no real effect on the jurisdiction of the 
Syariah courts and officials in this area. 
A greater threat to corporate business interests, in fact, was posed by the inauguration 
of the more conservative PAS regimes in Kelantan and Terengganu. There was concern 
that PAS's radical application of Syariah laws might scare off foreign investors and 
hamper domestic business activities. Such fears compelled the corporate business sector 
-both Muslims and non-Muslims-to favor the more liberal legal regime under UMNO. 
38 Interview with Appeal court judge, Kuala Lumpur, 17 April 2002. 
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Moreover, the expansion of more professional and better organized Syariah judicial 
structures was a reasonable development for the business community as well as others. 
Two high-profile cases further illustrate how the political dynamics outlined above-
intra-party tensions in particular-shaped the outcomes of the Syariah reform. The first 
case is the Hudud Bill controversy in 1993; and the second is the Apostasy controversy in 
2000. The final section of the present chapter examines these cases to demonstrate how 
the incentive structures facing Muslim ruling politicians shaped the high level of 
institutionalization of the Syariah legal structures. 
Hudud Bill Controversies: 'Islamic State' a la PAS in the Making 
The Hudud39 Bill controversy occurred in the wake of the introduction of the Syariah 
Criminal Code (II) Enactment by the PAS government in the Kelantan State in 1993 
(Kamali 2000b; Kamarul Zaman 2000; Rose Ismail 1995). Since PAS was elected to 
power in Kelantan in 1990, the introduction of hudud laws was the highlight of the party's 
Islamization campaign. After winning the Terengganu State in the 1999 general election, 
the party leadership, once again, attempted to introduce hudud laws at the State level. The 
UMNO-ruled federal government was adamant in opposing these attempts, and relied on 
the Constitution for this purpose. The implementation of the hudud law would require the 
amendment of the Constitution, which imposed limitations on punishments imposed 
under State laws-including Islamic laws. Given the parliamentary dominance of the 
ruling coalition, BN (Barisan Nasional, National Front), in which the UMNO's 
supremacy was unquestionable, the federal government's use of the Constitution enabled 
it to block the PAS's plans without making UMNO leaders appear to be opposing hudud 
39 Hudud (plural for hadd, Arabic for limits or restrictions) are offences for which punishments are 
specified by the Qur'an. One of three main categories of what is understood as hudud comprises six 
offences: theft, highway robbery, fornication, intoxication, false allegation and apostasy. The mandatory 
punishments for these offenses are stringent including amputation of limbs, death, and whipping. 
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laws. Even ifUMNO had agreed to introduce such an amendment, it would have needed 
to persuade the non-Malay parties in the BN coalition to support the amendment in order 
to obtain the two-thirds majority needed to amend the Constitution. In other words, it was 
almost impossible in any circumstances that the PAS's campaign to implement the hudud 
laws would succeed. Both UMNO and PAS politicians knew this. Then why did they 
bother? 
For PAS leaders, the whole point of pushing for the hudud laws, in fact, was to 
demonstrate to their Muslim constituency that they failed to achieve their stated goal of 
implementing the hudud laws because of UMNO s objection to their implementation. In 
doing so, they also meant to underline their claim that UMNO politicians were 
'anti-Islam.' For UMNO leaders, on the other hand, damage control was essential; 
because the PAS's claim was rendering their Islamic (and thus political) credentials 
suspect in the eyes of the rural Muslim constituency. At the same time, however, they 
could not afford to have their pledges to promote progressive Islam damaged in the eyes 
of the urban business communities-non-Muslim and foreign investors in particular. The 
use of the constitutional argument was one of their strategies to achieve this end with 
minimal damage to their interests. 
Since the onset of the controversy, the UMNO leaders thus emphasized the 
constitutional provisions in the name of non-Muslim interests. They kept claiming that 
the treatment of non-Muslims under this 'unjust' law was their utmost concern, despite 
the PAS's later decision to exclude non-Muslims from its provisions. What is worth 
noting is that the Muslims themselves in Kelantan were not averse to the introduction of 
the hudud laws. The proposal, in fact, seems to have been quite popular.40 Due most 
likely to both personal conviction and political calculation, the two UMNO members in 
40 The author appreciates an observation of Harold Crouch on this point. A survey conducted by PAS's 
research center also supports this trend. According to this survey, many Muslims in the northern belt of 
Perlis, Terengganu, Kedah and Kelantan favor the imposition of an Islamic panel code (ST, 14 August 
2002). 
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the State assembly supported the passage of the Bill.41 On the personal level, for example, 
Wan Mohd Najib Wan Mohamad, one of the two UMNO State assemblymen, 
acknowledged that 'their support for the Bill was unquestionable because as Muslims 
they agreed to the laws' (NST, 28 November 1993). No less important was their concern 
for its implications for their electoral support at the grassroots. The sensitivity of religious 
issues in generally conservative rural Muslim areas did not allow them to appear to 
oppose the hudud law. Moreover, increasingly fierce intra-party competition among 
second-echelon UMNO leaders who aspired to rise up the party hierarchy, coupled with 
the weight of local delegates in the party elections, meant that they could not ignore the 
religious sentiments of their grassroots supporters (FEER, 28 May 1992). 
Such grass-roots considerations, however, did not mean that the Kelantan UMNO 
leaders could entirely ignore another iron rule of UMNO politics: the mandate of the 
central party leadership required for their survival and political ascendancy. Despite his 
open support for the hudud bill, Wan Mohad Najib justified his defiance of the central 
party leadership by claiming that his intention was to give a chance to the PAS-led 
government so that 'the people would be able to study in-depth the principles and 
methods as well as PAS's ability to struggle for Islam and whether they have benefited 
from it or not.' In this way, he claimed, 'we also hope that any prejudice against UMNO 
on the question of Islam will be eliminated and at the same time free Islam from being 
used as a political tool by PAS.' His claim was that his action was ultimately to defend the 
party's interest by exposing the incompetence and the lack of credibility of the PAS 
government (NST, 28 November 1993). Further, he also argued, the move should 
invalidate allegations by PAS leaders that 'UMNO was against the hudud laws' (NST, 5 
December 1993). 
41 In the case of the Syariah Criminal Offences (Hudud and Qisas) Bill 2002 passed by the PAS-led 
Terengganu State government, four UMNO State assemblymen defied a federal Cabinet directive to vote 
against the Bill by abstaining from voting (Star, 9 July 2002; ST, 14 August 2002). 
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The UMNO leaders' steadfast objection and their ultimate decision which led to the 
scrapping of the hudud bills-despite the latter's popularity in a large part of the Muslim 
cornrnunity--cannot be explained by electoral considerations alone-particularly those 
related to the PAS's electoral threat. In the face of the same challenge from the PAS, 
UMNO politicians at different levels adopted different strategies. While the national 
leaders campaigned to block the PAS's hududproposal, UMNO leaders at the State level 
endorsed it. The incentive structure facing the ruling party politicians, again, played a role 
in explaining this outcome. As mentioned above, the UMNO national leaders, in general, 
perceived Islamic conservatism, or whatever appeared 'fanatical' and/or 'radical,' as a 
major threat to their capital accumulation and nation-building activities. Such instances 
of 'extremism' were not at all welcome because worries about Islamic extremism and 
conservatism were widespread among non-Muslims both within and outside the country. 
The UMNO leaders feared that such antipathy might discourage active participation of 
Chinese and foreign capital in the Malaysian economy. To promote foreign direct 
investment, on which the Malaysian economy heavily relied, a politically 
conducive-namely an extremist-free-environment was of utmost importance. For the 
UMNO national leaders, the hudud laws symbolized no more than a radical element of 
Islam, which they did not wish to see becoming too visible. Among the urban business 
and middle-class constituencies, UMNO managed to mobilize such sentiments, 
contributing to tacit support for the UMNO's stand on the hudud issue. The source of 
trouble needed to be nipped in the bud, but this was not possible without incurring the 
party some cost; the UMNO had to sacrifice some votes in the rural Muslim 
constituencies. 
The UMNO politicians in the Muslim-dominant rural States, however, could not afford 
to forgo the support of the rural Muslim constituencies by taking the same approach as 
their bosses in Kuala Lumpur. Losing their support not only meant the immediate loss of 
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their seats in the State assembly; the loss of rural grass-roots support was also detrimental 
to their bids in the party elections. But they also had to take into account the price that 
they would have to pay for their defiance against Mahathir and other UMNO leaders in 
the capital. At stake was their prospect to rise in the party hierarchy. It was proved, 
however, for these UMNO politicians at the State level, the cost ofrejecting the bill was 
much higher than that of defying the party leaders. 
The hudud controversy exemplified a dilemma confronted by UMNO national 
leadership. On the one hand, they were extremely uneasy with, and intolerant of, 
'extremist' and 'fanatical' varieties of Islam. This 'extremist' character of Islam was 
domestically represented by PAS. Hudud laws were one such example. The problem for 
the UMNO leadership, however, was that the hudud laws were not considered as radical 
but were quite acceptable to many Muslims including a number of rank-and-file members 
within the party.42 Nevertheless, it was not politically possible for the UMNO national 
leadership to approve the laws. Hence, one tactic they adopted to overcome this problem 
was to label the laws as 'extreme,' 'harsh,' and 'unjust' as well as exemplifying a 'PAS's 
version of 'incorrect' Islam.43 
The UMNO national leaders' major concern here was not simply their electoral 
competition with their archrival PAS. Nor was it their popularity among their traditional 
electoral base in the rural Muslim community. An even more important consideration for 
them was the expected reaction of non-Muslim and business interests who provided an 
indispensable foundation for their national development objectives. Equally importantly, 
. they were concerned with the rising influence of conservative elements within the party. 
To tame unfavorable conservative elements seen as the greatest threat to these 
42 There are no reliable statistics publicly available on this question. It was believed, however, that Muslims 
generally supported, or at least did not oppose, introduction of the hudud laws. In fact, as suggested above, 
the laws seem to have been quite popular in the Muslim community in Kelantan. In any case, the UMNO 
leaders' defensiveness on the controversy was a clear indication of strong endorsement of the laws among 
the Muslim community. 
43 Mahathir adopted this rhetoric on numerous occasions. See, for example, 'Islam guarantees Justice for all 
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interests-and their own, the UMNO leaders readily exploited whatever resources were 
available to them. The costly efforts to upgrade and standardize the Syariah judicial 
machinery were one such instrument, contributing to the relatively high level of 
institutionalization of the Syariah apparatus and the government's adoption ofrelatively 
liberal Syariah laws. Furthermore, professionalism of the Syariah officials was 
emphasized to help make the latter immune to interference from conservative elements 
not only from PAS but also within the party. 
The Politics of the Apostasy Law: Shall the State Approve or Hinder Conversion? 
The apostasy controversy that took place in 2000 illuminated more publicly than any 
other prior cases tensions within the government about application of Syariah: the 
conflict of interests and approaches among UMNO politicians, and the discord between 
UMNO leadership and religious officials. The case demonstrated that a force UMNO top 
leaders regarded as 'extreme' was strong not only outside but also within the government 
and the party. Despite considerable support for apostasy measures within the Muslim 
community, however, the UMNO central leadership led by Mahathir decided to 'put off' 
introduction of a law on apostasy. Moreover, the UMNO leaders were not particularly 
concerned about the constitutionality of the Bill when they hampered the adoption of the 
bill. They evaded engagement with the constitutional argument concerning 'freedom of 
religion' while a few liberal NGOs opposed the bill on the grounds of their 
unconstitutionality. 
In this case, again, the electoral threat from PAS was not the sole-or even 
primary-factor that shaped the federal government's stance on apostasy-related issues. 
Both the apostasy proposal by some State-level UMNO leaders and the federal 
citizens' (NST, 4 March 1994). 
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politicians' opposition to the proposal were a result of the patronage-maximizing 
incentives facing UMNO politicians. For some UMNO politicians, the proposal was 
meant to appeal to the Muslim constituencies and to impress-unsuccessfully-top 
UMNO leaders. For federal politicians, the opposition was meant to attend to the 
concerns of non-Muslim and business communities on which top UMNO leaders became 
more dependent both on economic and political fronts than ever before. The federal 
leaders' fight against 'conservative' elements within the government and the party 
resulted in greater federal intervention in the Syariah court apparatus. 
The apostasy controversy derived from the introduction of the Bill on apostasy (Rang 
Undang-Undang Perlindungan Akidah Islamiah or Faith Protection Bill) by the Perlis 
State government in 2000. The UMNO-ruled State government presented the bill and the 
State Assembly passed it subsequently. This law regulated conversion of Muslims-that 
is conversion out of Islam. The Johor State government (also under UMNO rule) 
proposed a similar Islamic regulation in the same year. This initiative was aimed at 
extending and tightening punishment against offences recognized by Islam, but not 
included in the penal code under the civil courts. This included, for example, caning and 
jailing for offences like pimping, lesbianism, prostitution, sodomy and the teaching or 
organizing of events contrary to Syariah laws (Maznah Mohamad 2001: 215). This 
Islamization initiative came not only from the State level; the federal religious authority, 
JAKIM, made a similar proposal. The parliamentary secretary in the Prime Minister's 
Department, Noh Omar, announced in September 2000 that a bill on apostasy (Rang 
Undang-Undang Pemulihan Akidah or Restoration of Faith Bill) would soon be 
presented as an attempt to prevent an alleged trend toward apostasy and deviation from 
the faith (MM, 17 September 2000). However, the Federal government retracted the 
proposal soon after, and ultimately decided to put the bill on hold pending thorough 
studies. The 'postponement' was primarily justified on technical grounds: the 
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government lacked the capacity to implement it. Moreover, then minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department, Abdul Hamid Othman, elaborated on the government's decision 
by pointing out the necessity to study 'social implications' more carefully. He 
acknowledged 'a lot of people have raised concerns over the issue' and therefore 'the 
matter must be handled carefully' (NST, 6 October 2000; Star, 6 October 2000). 
A proposal to introduce a law on apostasy was nothing new. PAS always intended to 
introduce a law on apostasy. The hudud law proposed by the party in Kelantan in 1993 
included a punitive measure to regulate this particular offence. In the late 1990s, again, 
the party attempted to table a bill in Parliament to make apostasy a capital offence (Star, 6 
October 2000). Unlike the relatively lenient sanction proposed by UMNO for apostasy, 
PAS took an uncompromising approach to regulate apostasy: the death sentence as 
required by the Qur'an. 
Muslim politicians were not the only group proposing a law to control apostasy. Legal 
experts also suggested the necessity to do so. The technical Committee of Syariah and 
Civil Laws, for instance, had long proposed to introduce a specific provision on apostasy 
into the Islamic law.44 Their suggestion was primarily based on technical grounds, unlike 
the politicians'; the absence of a provision-specifically one on conversion out of the 
faith-had caused a conflict of jurisdictions between the civil and Syariah courts. 45 
Indeed, many cases causing such a jurisdictional problem were related to apostasy, such 
as ones involving non-Muslim converts (Abdul Hamid Mohamad 2000). 
What is often neglected is the fact that Muslims in general were not particularly hostile 
to a law on apostasy. Quite the contrary, they believed in the law in principle; where they 
differed, however, was whether the law should be enforced in practice. For example, the 
44 The committee, composed of Syariah and civil law experts, was formed under the central religious 
agency, JAKIM, to draft and coordinate Islamic laws at the national level. 
45 Interviews with Appeal (civil) court judge, Kuala Lumpur, 16 March 2001; civil lawyer, Selangor, 4 
April 2002; Syariah court judge, Selangor, 14 August 2001; Syariah lawyer, Kuala Lumpur; 19 December 
2000. 
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President of a mainstream Islamic NGO, ABIM (Angkatan Beria Islam Malaysia, the 
Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), readily acknowledged the importance of 
prohibiting apostasy. He also admitted, though, that it would be very difficult to sanction 
it in practice in Malaysia's multi-ethnic context.46 At a workshop on apostasy organized 
by UMNO in Johor, a number of participants expressed a sense of apprehension regarding 
the difficulty for the government to readily implement Islamic laws-including the one 
on apostasy (Maznah Mohamad 2001: fn.15). It is also worth recalling that the hudud law 
proposed in Kelantan was very popular despite the UMNO's effort to portray it as 
'extreme', 'radical' and 'draconian.' Furthermore, non-Muslim parties-both MCA and 
DAP-were conspicuously silent on this apostasy issue. 
Despite all this evidence indicating support for the bill in the Muslim community at 
large, UMNO central leadership was not interested in entertaining these demands. 
Mahathir was particularly unsupportive of the proposal. He suggested that 'Nor (the 
parliamentary secretary who announced the federal bill on apostasy) had got things a little 
mixed up,' and denied-albeit cautiously-the possibility that the Federal government 
intended to introduce the apostasy law in the immediate future (BH, 25 October 2000; 
Star, 30 September 2000). Furthermore, then Minister in charge oflslamic affairs, Abdul 
Hamid, supported Mahathii:'s position by insisting that there were very few apostasy 
cases among Malays, and thus no need to introduce the law. It was the opposition, he 
added, that 'had exaggerated the issue (increasing incidence of apostasy) for political 
mileage as it was sensitive among the rural folk' (NST, 25 October 2000). 
The Federal government's rejection of the proposal, however, attested to the fact that 
such pro-apostasy pressure within the party was not sufficient to determine the central 
government's policy course in the legal sector. Nor was the concern of the legal experts in 
regard to the technical problems adequate. Moreover, oppositional pressure from PAS 
46 Interview withABIM President, Kuala Lumpur, 16 January 2001. 
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was strong, but this apparently did not determine UMNO's formal policy against the 
apostasy law. The Islamic party had exerted heavy pressure on UMNO since the general 
election in 1999 as it took away substantial support from the ruling party. Many observers 
suspected that the two Muslim parties would intensify their Islamization battle, with the 
result that the legal system would become more Islamic. 
For UMNO politicians, handling of apostasy involved a number of complex 
considerations. On the doctrinal front, UMNO leaders were neither ready nor equipped to 
question the validity of apostasy. In general, apostasy was regarded as a serious offence in 
the Muslim community, even though the question of whether the death penalty should be 
imposed in practice remained very much contested. Moreover, in reality, very few 
Muslims, after all, were inclined to renounce the religion.47 
A unique sociological factor m Malaysian society-its multi-communal 
character-further complicated the question of apostasy. Apostasy cases were 
occasionally associated with inter-faith marriages. Inter-faith marriage, however, was still 
a controversial issue both for Muslims and non-Muslims, unlike in neighboring Indonesia 
where inter-marriage was not too difficult or uncommon. Although marriages between 
Muslims and non-Muslims were not uncommon, the non-Muslim partner was required to 
convert to Islam. A controversy over a young Muslim woman and her Christian boyfriend 
in 1997 offered a prominent example (Kamali 2000a: chap.10). The problem of this 
couple was that the Muslim woman, Nor Aishah Bokhari, decided to renounce Islam 
(become apostate) to get married to the Christian boyfriend and defied common practice 
as a result. Because she abandoned her family who attempted to block her conversion and 
marriage, this initially trivial family matter brewed into a communal and ultimately 
political issue on a national scale. 
This case highlights three important issues for the purposes of our discussion. First, 
47 Interview withABIM President, Kuala Lumpur, 16 January 2001. 
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apostasy (conversion out of the Islamic faith) is a sensitive communal matter for Muslims 
in Malaysia. This communal element makes conversion extremely difficult, and readily 
pushes aside such ideas as 'freedom ofreligion' stipulated in the Constitution. The issue 
cannot be relegated exclusively to the private domain; this is not a question of choice or 
rights-a right to choose one's own faith, as argued by more liberal Islamic NGOs. As the 
Nor Aishah case proved, the pressure of public opinion in the community strongly 
discourages apostasy among Muslims (Kamali 2000a: 210). 
Second, the question of apostasy emanating from intermarriage poses a legal question 
that has yet to be resolved; jurisdictional conflict between civil and Syariah systems of 
law. Under the present system, whether a civil court or a Syariah court should hear an 
apostasy case is still highly contested. A number of apostasy cases, as suggested earlier, 
raised the question of jurisdictional conflict. In theory, this problem should have been 
settled since the constitutional amendment in 1988. However, the problem concerning the 
handling of apostasy still remains because there is no specific provision in Islamic law for 
deciding how to settle an apostasy case.48 The Nor Aishah case, due in part to extensive 
media attention, highlighted this unresolved legal problem. This high-profile controversy, 
again, reminded authorities of the need to draft a specific law on apostasy (Kam.ali 2000a: 
205, 213). 
Third and finally, the legal controversy raised a fundamental ideological question: 
whether the 'secular' rule (the Constitution) or the 'Islamic' rule (not stipulated yet) 
should prevail. Against the backdrop of the ideological climate in the Muslim community, 
there is a high risk of being labeled by conservatives as 'anti-Islam' or 'secular' if a 
Muslim sides with the argument in favor of the constitutional claim of 'freedom of 
48 There was a famous apostasy case where the civil court decided to hear and settle the case after the 
constitutional amendment in 1988. The civil judge who heard the case supported this position (Interviews 
with Appeal court judge, Kuala Lumpur, 23 February 2001, 16 March 2001; the lawyer who argued against 
the decision, Selangor, 4 April 2002). See also the lawyer's paper published in a local law journal 
(Pawancheek 1998). 
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religion.' Such Muslims may be seen as a threat to the solidarity of the Muslim 
community and Islam. 
It is therefore unsurprising that few Muslims, aside from some urban-based 
progressive NGOs, opposed the introduction of the Apostasy bill. The most vocal 
opposition came from an Islamic women's group, Sisters in Islam. The group objected to 
the Apostasy Bill on almost all possible accounts-constitutional, doctrinal, social, 
administrative and procedural. A particular concern for them was the question of 
'religious freedom.' The group, for instance, insisted on the point in a memorandum to a 
local newspaper in the following way: 'freedom of religion must necessarily recognize 
the freedom to change religion. How can Muslims demand this notion of religious 
freedom for those wishing to convert to Islam and at the same time argue the denial of this 
freedom to those wishing to repudiate their faith in Islam?' (Star, 30 September 2000).49 
It was on the same constitutional ground that a few other groups, such as the Malaysian 
Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism, objected to the 
proposal. They all referred to Article 11 of the Federal Constitution that guarantees 
freedom of religion and worship to argue that controlling personal faith by legal means 
was not valid constitutionally (Star, 30 September 2000). 
UMNO central leadership, however, was extremely reluctant to engage in.the debate to 
defend the constitutional position, although they objected to the apostasy proposal. Then 
Minister in the Prime Minister's Department Rais Yatim (de facto minister of legal 
affairs) hinted only in passing that the government was aware that Article 11 of the 
Federal Constitution should not be violated in drafting the proposed enactment on 
apostasy (NST, 29 September 2000). He did not, however, elaborate any further on 
whether the proposed bill contravened the Constitution. It became clear that whether the 
49 Due to the group's position on this and other Syariah related issues, Sisters in Islam is perceived as an 
'extremist' and 'dangerous' group by a large segment of the Muslim public (Interview with Sisters in Islam 
founding member, Selangor, 25 December 2000). 
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case in hand was constitutionally appropriate or not was a secondary consideration for 
UMNO leaders. What was more crucial for them instead was whether it was politically 
feasible. In other words, constitutionality was not a prime concern and could be adjusted 
according to their political circumstances and calculations. 
Ideological or Political? The Modernist vis-a-vis Traditionalist Divide within the 
Muslim Ruling Elites 
What is significant about this apostasy case is that it exposed ideological discord within 
the government as well as within the ruling party concerning the state's position on Islam: 
What kind of Islam should formally be implemented and how? This reflected a tension 
inherent in the state's involvement in religious affairs, a tension between the Muslim 
politicians, especially Mahathir and Anwar, and the traditionalist group including 
religious officials or government-sponsored ulama (theologically trained Islamic 
scholars). Whereas the former group championed a progressive approach to Islam, the 
latter defended a conservative position. UMNO leaders viewed the rise of a conservative 
religious force within the government as a threat to their liberal-modernist regime and 
wanted to block it at all costs. Their decision to put aside the apostasy bill meant that the 
traditionalist approach and a group of ulama who advocated it would be prevented from 
exercising too much influence in the government. 
The religious officials-including the Mufti, religious prosecutors, and Syariah 
judges-on the other hand were very keen to introduce the law on apostasy. The 
legislation would also empower Syariah Courts to prosecute those who practiced 
deviationist teachings among Muslims and detain them for up to a year at rehabilitation 
centers located in Negeri Sembilan and Selangor (NST, 6 October 2000). 50 The 
50 State Syariah courts have always had powers to prosecute deviationists but rehabilitation centers is a new 
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law--once introduced-would give religious officials wider administrative authority and 
legitimacy to control the religious activities of the Muslims. This also meant that their 
presence within.the government and society would be more visible. 
The empowerment of the religious officials, however, was not in the interest ofUMNO 
politicians. Neither did some progressive women's groups wish to see them being given 
more regulatory power. In reality, UMNO leaders considered the behavior of some of the 
government ulama running the state religious agencies as 'retrogressive' and 
'oppressive,' and became increasingly impatient with them. Intra-governmental tension 
between some of the top UMNO leaders and the generally very conservative religious 
officials grew as UMNO politicians campaigned to promote a progressive type oflslamic 
thinking. UMNO leaders felt that some religious officials took advantage of the power 
conferred on them to impose their conservative and stringent interpretation of religious 
rules. They feared that this would pose a threat to their liberal regime. As the 
government-sponsored Islamization campaigns accelerated, discord between these 
UMNO leaders and the religious officials with regard to enforcement of Syariah laws 
became more common. 
The beauty contest controversy in June 1997 provided the best example of this 
intra-governmental tension. The controversy occurred in the wake of the prosecution of 
three young Muslim women by the Selangor religious authorities. They were charged 
under section 31 of the State Islamic Crime Enactment for 'dressing indecently' and also 
for violating a fatwa (authoritative Islamic decree) of the Selangor Mufti that prohibited 
Muslim women from taking part in beauty contests. 
Mahathir and Anwar were particularly disturbed by the attitude of the Mufti as well as 
religious officials whom they considered as extreme. Mahathir bluntly criticized the 
Selangor religious officials and urged them 'not to use their "little power" to merely arrest 
instrument to tighten enforcement. 
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and handcuff those who broke Islamic laws.' He also contended that 'it does not help 
strengthen the people's belief. We can take other methods of action which are more 
effective' (NST, 23 July 2000). Anwar, similarly, expressed unease at these religious 
officials, stressing that a rational approach was important when dealing with 
implementation of Syariah laws (NST, 18 August 1997). Moreover, the federal 
government decided to tighten control over religious officials. Mahathir called on all 
States to stop gazetting fatwa until a Prime Minister's Department committee had 
completed a study of the system. This action brought about a further deterioration of the 
already tense relationship between Mahathir and the religious officials. Mufti and ulama 
used mosque sermons to fight back against the government-in which they were 
functionaries-and its leaders (Australian, 15 August 1997). As a result of this rebellious 
behavior, the Mufti of the Selangor State, Ishak Baharom, could not get his tenure 
renewed, an often-used tactic to punish 'rebel' officials in the public service (Australian, 
18-19 October 1997). 
Combating a Conservative Threat: Controlling the Traditional Religious 
Authorities-Mufti and Fatwa 
The beauty contest incident raised a number of important questions concerning the place 
of religious authorities in the government and their jurisdiction and power in general. It 
also prompted federal politicians to extend control over these religious officials. The most 
important issue was the jurisdiction of the Mufti and the validity of fatwa that had hardly 
ever been questioned in the Muslim community (NST, 22 July 1997; Star, 31 August 
1997). After the incident, a few top UMNO politicians-especially Mahathir-not only 
verbally campaigned against the religious officials but also maneuvered to gain more 
effective means of controlling religious offices nationwide. These campaigns naturally 
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exacerbated a sense of unease felt by the Mufti as well as other government ulama. While 
denying the speculation that they wanted to abolish the office of Mufti, UMNO leaders 
were obviously not hesitant to reduce the influence of these officials. To this end, 
Mahathir announced that the government would review all Islamic laws in the country, 
and those found to suppress Muslims or put the official religion in a bad light would be 
repealed (Star, 9 August 1997). A committee headed by Mahathir was also formed under 
the Prime Minister's Department to study the function of fatwa (Star, 31 August 1997). 
Mahathir particularly questioned the qualifications and thus the legitimacy of ulama. 
He claimed that the main problem (with the implementation of Syariah laws) lay with the 
'wrong' perception within the Muslim community of the position of the ulama, and 
suggested, 'there are many who claim being ulama ... those who consider themselves as 
descendants of the Prophet, thus their words cannot be rejected. This is incorrect' (NST, 9 
August 1997). By arguing that 'there is no university anywhere in the world which can 
award an ulama degree', Mahathir overtly challenged the legitimacy and doctrinal 
monopoly ofreligious officials (Sun, 13 August 1997). 
The UMNO leaders' reluctance to enforce the apostasy law-and other initiatives they 
spearheaded in the judicial sphere-has to be seen against this backdrop of 
intra-governmental contestation. The incentive structures of the UMNO politicians again 
accounted for the government's policy on the apostasy law. 
UMNO leaders' patronage-maximizing incentives, and close business ties with 
non-Muslim and corporate communities in particular, left them obsessed with the image 
question of Islam. They were especially disturbed by a widespread negative image of 
Islam and Muslims in the eyes of non-Muslims both at home and abroad. Their 
fundamental concern can be summarized by Mahathir's comment that: 'the world doesn't 
know the difference between Kelantan and the rest of Malaysia' (FEER, 28 May 1992). 
Mahathir's antipathy towards ulama-both within and outside the government-was 
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founded on this image problem: 'the image oflslam has been tarnished by the actions of 
extremists who use force ... who have only divided the Muslims. In a way, they have 
become the tools of the enemies oflslam (emphasis added).' Mahathir continually urged 
the State governments to ensure that the implementation oflslamic law would not paint a 
negative image of the religion (NST, 9 August 1997). 
UMNO leaders' obsession with creating a moderate image of Islam stemmed from the 
incentive to attract non-Muslims as well as a large segment of the Muslim community to 
their liberal developmentalist regime both economically and politically. Then minister in 
charge of religious affairs, Abdul Hamid, reiterated, 'if the government threatens the 
people with proposals of harsh sentences against Muslims as proposed by PAS, our 
mission of attracting people to Islam will fail' (Star, 11 July 1999). The apostasy bill was 
proposed at a time when the Malaysian economy confronted the most serious slump in 
recent decades after the region-wide finanCial crisis in 1997. Foreign investment was 
greatly needed and domestic capital-especially Chinese-was equally important. With 
the opposition Islamic party PAS rapidly expanding its influence within the Muslim 
community after the Anwar crisis in 1998, non-Muslims' concern about the ascendancy 
of a more conservative Islamic regime was more acute than ever before. This was 
especially since PAS spearheaded a vigorous campaign to establish an Islamic state after 
the party emerged as a leading opposition force in the general election in 1999. On the 
other hand, the UMNO-led BN coalition was dependent upon the non-Muslim vote as a 
result of its eroding support in the Muslim constituency. Thus, to follow PAS by 
implementing radical Islamic measures-such as the apostasy law-was not a politically 
a feasible option for the UMNO leaders. They could not afford to lose non-Muslim 
support. 
Seen from this perspective, Mahathir's apprehension about the apostasy bill 
proposal-and concerns about non-Muslim as well as business reactions to it-was quite 
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understandable. It is intriguing that he retracted the proposal despite the absence of much 
public opposition from any organized interests. There was little visible opposition from 
non-Muslim parties and organizations against the apostasy bill. Nor was there any 
marked reaction from the business community; but there was obvious unease about the 
idea of an apostasy law on the part of some UMNO politicians, especially Mahathir. 
Mahathir's reaction to the proposal initiated by one of his own party leaders at the State 
level was conspicuously swift; he obviously wanted to circumvent any debate about the 
bill and prevent the issue from developing into a big controversy. His reaction can be 
explained in two ways. First, UMNO leadership did not want to allow PAS a chance to 
exploit the issue. It was very likely that PAS would have portrayed UMNO's rejection of 
the apostasy law un-Islamic-just as it did in the Hudud bill controversy. Given the 
considerable acceptance of the apostasy law within the Muslim community, UMNO's 
calculation was reasonable. Second, UMNO leaders, at the same time, did not want the 
party to be seen as extremist. A few, but very vocal, NGOs, such as Sisters in Islam, were 
ready to raise their voices against the proposal. They aimed at appealing to the urban 
middle-class (not only non-Muslims but also Muslims) who were anxious about the 
consequences of the apostasy law. It is arguable that fear among UMNO top leadership of 
possibly losing non-Muslim support and confidence was so grave that the radical 
proposal needed to be killed without even being considered. On the other hand, there was 
little need for the Chinese-based parties or organizations to make even a little fuss about 
the proposal because UMNO leaders were already aware of the implications of any 
moves pushing toward policies that would make non-Muslims anxious. Moreover, those 
non-Muslim groups which benefited from close personal ties with top UMNO politicians 
developed private channels through which they could get their views adequately heard. 
They did not need to make their views public; nor did they need to organize a lobbying 
forum to influence the policy choice taken by UMNO leadership. 
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The apparent absence of Chinese and business pressures against the Apostasy Bill, 
thus, should not be interpreted to mean that they did not object to, or care about, it. There 
is no doubt that they would have been deeply alienated by the implementation of the 
apostasy law. The crucial point was that UMNO leaders already anticipated such a 
reaction. UMNO leaders' fear of alienating urban non-Muslims as well as business 
communities stemmed from the incentives of UMNO politicians: the pressure to retain 
the support of the urban business communities. Against the backdrop of UMNO 
politicians' dependence on these communities for their economic and political survival, 
especially since the Anwar crisis, this pressure was more acutely felt. This compelled top 
UMNO leaders to swiftly suppress the 'radical' proposal to adopt the apostasy law. 
The federal government's efforts to standardize the Syariah judicial apparatus and 
Islamic laws nationwide were intended to contain a threat of radical and conservative 
Islamic forces emanating not only from outside but also within the government. By 
placing the 'conservative' religious elites within the orbit of the federal government, 
UMNO leaders hoped to curb their conservative views, while promoting an official 
progressive version of Islamic thinking and ruling. Moreover, newly introduced Islamic 
laws emphasized procedural aspects to effectively limit interpretational di~cretion of 
Syariah judges. UMNO's attempt to promote moderate Islam in the judicial sphere was 
meant to preempt possible alienation of non-Muslims-especially the economically 
important Chinese. As UMNO grew more dependent upon the Chinese-not only 
economically but also politically, from the late 1990s-the UMNO leaders had little 
choice but to eliminate any possibility of the rise of extremist forces-either outside or 
inside the ruling circle. They had to do so even though this resulted in a loss within their 
traditional support base in the rural Muslim constituency. UMNO central leaders' 
receptiveness to the new constituencies derived from their incentives to maximize 
political support and resulted in greater federal interference in Syariah affairs. 
159 
It is also important to note that the State-level politicians had different views and 
strategies from their bosses in Kuala Lumpur, but strove to achieve the same ultimate goal. 
The apostasy bill initiated by the Chief Minister of Perlis, Shahidan Kassim, should be 
seen from the perspective of political incentives. By proposing the bill, he intended to 
impress his predominantly Muslim constituency and UMNO central leadership. Shahidan 
stated very prpudly: 'the Perlis government is better than the PAS governments in 
Kelantan and Terengganu because it is more serious about protecting the faith in the 
Muslim community' (UM, 8 April 2000). 
The incentive structure of UMNO politicians had an important effect not only on the 
degree but also the type of federal interference in Syariah matters. UMNO politicians' 
interest in controlling the corps of Syariah officials nationwide, and in creating a modem 
system of Syariah administration, was largely meant to assure their urban middle-class 
and business constituencies about this essential point: the government's Islamization 
policy would never undermine its modernist developmentalist project. The 
institutionalization of a body of a professional, law-bound, and competent Syariah 
officials was a key to protecting the state organization of Islamic administration from 
conservative and radical religious forces; a major threat to UMNO's modernist 
developmentalist regime. Furthermore, increased federal control over the Syariah 
apparatus provided top UMNO leaders-the party president in particular-an 
institutional means to punish rebel officials in the religious bureaucracy and to defend 
their supremacy in the government. 
Syariah reform is still far from complete and various procedural problems remain 
unresolved. Moreover, problems of jurisdictional conflict between the Syariah court and 
the civil court will continue to surface as long as the aspiration to introduce more Syariah 
laws in the legal system stays alive. Nonetheless, the reform process in the past two 
decades has brought about an extremely important consequence: the formation of the 
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better organized and relatively effective state apparatus overseeing enforcement of 
Syariah. The administrative structure was institutionalized to a relatively high degree and 
in a way that made it more professional and effective. At the same time, this made the 
Syariah system less vulnerable to private interests-both within the state and the societal 
spheres-and to corrupt practices.51 Despite a potential vulnerability to intervention from 
the ruling politicians-whether UMNO or PAS-the institutionalization of the Syariah 
legal apparatus has provided Syariah officials with much-sought authority and 
jurisdictional independence; independence from interference of the civil court, and the 
State religious agencies. Such a high degree of institutionalization of the state religious 
organization in the judicial sector stood in marked contrast with the two other sectors 
examined in the following two chapters that we tum to next. 
51 For example, in Kelantan, Muslim politicians both from PAS and UMNO were charged for polygamy 
offences in the Syariah court. The two Syariah cases indicated a degree of impartiality in the Syariah court 
despite considerable political pressure ('PAS leader jailed for polygamy,' ST, 23 May 2002; 'UMNO leader 
jailed for polygamy,' Star, 14 June 2002). 
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CHAPTERS 
The Politics of Religious Education: 
lslamization of the National Schooling System and 
The Challenge of Nation Building 
Islamization and institutionalization of the educational system took place in many ways, 
but not to the extent of the judicial sphere. With an intra-governmental coordination 
mechanism at the federal level introduced, jurisdictional expansion of the state apparatus 
running Islamic education was evident in general since the 1980s. The number of 
federal-sponsored religious schools, religious teachers as well as students enrolled in 
religious classes newly introduced by the federal authorities grew significantly. 
Moreover, bureaucratic mechanisms were reorganized to support and regulate these 
institutions and personnel. In particular, the federal government took steps to build a 
system of recruiting better-qualified religious teachers nationwide. Further, the federal 
government introduced various measures to extend tighter control over State as well as 
private religious schools and personnel. 
Despite these developments, poorer coordination between the federal government on 
the one hand, and the State governments as well as private religious teaching institutions 
on the other, was painfully evident. The federal government's attempt to take over full 
administrative control of the State and private religious institutions has been unsuccessful 
so far, prompting it to try out other means. Its initiatives, however, made the increasing 
number of State- and private-sponsored religious schools and teachers more dependent 
upon federal assistance than ever before. But, a number of them managed to resist 
complete federal take-over and retain a considerable degree of administrative autonomy. 
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All these brought about a somewhat fragmented and less coherent administrative 
mechanism overseeing Islamic education. 
The intermediate level of institutionalization in this issue area cannot be explained by 
societal pressures alone, that is, pressures from the younger generation of 
religion-oriented urban middle-class Muslims to get their children into Islamic schools 
run by qualified teachers. Nor was oppositional pressure from the Islamic party adequate 
to account for the particular pattern of institutional arrangement. A received wisdom is 
that private religious institutions are loyal supporters of PAS on ideological grounds, and 
therefore tend to oppose UMNO's Islamization initiatives. In reality, however, a number 
of private religious schools-even ones in opposition-ruled Kelantan-in fact supported 
the federal government's take-over initiative. Who held back the federal initiative? One 
needs to understand the incentive structures of Muslim politicians in the ruling party and 
intra-party rivalry in particular to answer this question. The intra-party logic of political 
ascendancy and the patronage-maximizing incentives shaped the implementation of 
Islamization initiatives in the educational area. 
The Islamic Education System in Historical Perspective 
A brief historical overview of the traditional Islamic educational system will help us to 
assess the institutional transformation that occurred in the period under discussion. 
Before the British regime introduced a secular educational system in Colonial Malaya, 
the traditional Islamic schools were the sole form of education available to the Malay 
community (Yegar 1979: 235). 1 It was the tradition among Malays to send their children 
1 The British initially established schools through Christian missionaries as early as 1816 in Penang, with 
English as the medium of instruction. English and Malay vernacular education in the Malay States was 
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to a religious teacher when they reached the age of five or six (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 19). 
The history of Islamic education can be traced back to the fourteenth century, when 
Islam was first introduced to the Malay Peninsula. The earliest form of Islamic education 
was the Qur'anic school, where five or six-year-old children were taught the Arabic 
alphabet and reading the Qur' an in Arabic. It was only after they had mastered the Qur' an 
that children went on to study the Malay language. This fact reflected the importance of 
equipping children with basic Islamic teachings among the Muslims. These schools were 
usually conducted in the homes of religious teachers, in mosques, or in the surau (prayer 
house). The teachers were usually the imam (the leader of the congregational prayer) 
attached to the local mosques or a hajji (one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca). 
They were normally farmers or fishermen who taught in their spare time (Rosnani 
Hashim 1996: 18-20). Most of them lacked formal qualifications. The only qualification 
required for them was basic knowledge ofreading Arabic or the simple fact that they had 
undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca (Yegar 1979: 235). 
This primitive form of traditional Islamic education evolved into a pondok2-type 
school in the mid-nineteenth century. Despite very limited formalization, however, the 
management of the religious schools was still far from organized. Education in the 
pondok was free and open to Muslims of all ages. The minimum requirements for 
admission were the ability to read the Qur'an, to read and write injawi, (the Arabic-based 
script used for writing in Malay) and to have adequate financial support. A number of the 
advanced students who completed their basic instruction in the Qur'anic schools 
continued their education in the pondok (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 21 ). The curriculum in 
the pondok schools emphasized Islamic religious studies, with very little attention given 
to practical skills or other academic subjects. Some of them conducted the classes in 
introduced following the Pangkor Treaty of 1874, which formalized British protection (Rosnani Hashim 
1996: 42-43). 
2 Literally hut; in Islamic education it refers to a village religious school. 
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Arabic, as a preparation for admission into universities in Cairo or India (Syed Othman 
Alhabshi 1997: 4-5). 
Private individuals or organizations often run the pondok. Their expenses were met 
through donations, charity, zakat (Islamic tithe) and meager fees, and teachers were not 
paid a salary. It was only later that tuition fees were imposed on the students. There were 
no examinations or school certificates. Upgrading of students to a higher level largely 
depended on their individual abilities (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 21-22; Syed Othman 
Alhabshi 1997: 4-5). In pondok, the teachers exercised a wide scope of authority and 
discretion in running programs. The syllabus and methods of teaching depended on the 
teachers. The school timetable was flexible and left to their own preferences (Rosnani 
Hashim 1996: 22-23). Importantly, the pondok were not subject to government control 
and determined their own system of education (Syed Othman Alhabshi 1997: 4-5). 
The Expansion of Madrasah Education 
In the early twentieth century, the Islamic education system underwent further 
transformation from largely informal pondok-type schools to the more formal and 
better-organized madrasah (Islamic school or college) system. The growth of the 
madrasah system was a reaction to socio-economic transformations in the local Muslim 
community. One was the rise of the reformist movement (Kaum Muda). These 
progressive Muslim scholars attempted to mobilize awareness among the Malays of the 
importance of education (Roff 1994: chap.3; Rosnani Hashim 1996: 25-26, 29). 
The madrasah were organizationally more systematic than the pondok system in a 
number of respects. Students were divided into classes according to age and academic 
ability. Examinations were used to determine upgrading. The class timetable was fixed 
and certificates were awarded to stuqents who completed the full course of study. In the 
most advanced madrasah, there were three levels of study: tahdiri (preparatory), ibtidai 
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(primary), and thanawi (secondary).3 
In terms of curriculum, there was inter-school variation except for some core subjects. 
However, the madrasah schools commonly underwent some changes from the pre-World 
War II period to the post-independence period. In the pre-War period, religious subjects 
dominated the curriculum. After the War, however, the curriculum was broadened to 
include some academic subjects such as history and geography. In the post-independence 
period, subjects offered in the national examination (such as English, Malay literature, 
science and economy) were further added to the madrasah curriculum (Rosnani Hashim 
1996: 28). 
Despite some organizational and technical improvements after the introduction of the 
madrasah system, the traditional type oflslamic educational institutions remained largely 
unsystematic and pre-modem. These schools were usually funded and controlled by 
individuals-mostly ulama-or by local communities. The curriculum and syllabuses 
varied from one teacher to another. Further, there was no age restriction and thus almost 
everybody was welcome to attend the schools (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 5). 
The Decline of Traditional-type of Islamic Schools 
This unsystematic mode oflslamic education proved unsustainable against the backdrop 
of wider socio-economic transformation in the post-independence period, however. The 
traditional Islamic schools confronted a number of problems and challenges. Student 
enrollment both at madrasah and pondok plunged as a result, bringing about the decline 
of these schools in the 1960s. For example, between 1967 and 1971, the number of 
madrasah in Kelantan dwindled from 151 to 111 (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 62).4 
3 In practice, most of the madras ah included only preparatory and primary levels. 
4 The factors encouraging the decline in emollment at the religious schools were many, but the most 
important one was the establishment of national secondary schools. With the implementation of the 
National Education Policy, Malay pupils could easily continue on to state secondary schools (Rosnani 
Hashim 1996: 60). 
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The madrasah faced increasing financial difficulties, especially in the post-War period. 
These schools found themselves unable to survive financially without resorting to 
external funding. Various State Islamic religious departments and religious councils 
(established during this period), thus, took over the management of some of the 
madrasah. Moreover, State governments themselves began establishing their own 
Islamic schools (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 5). 
The involvement of State religious authorities in Islamic education brought into being 
two types of madrasah school. The first type was funded and managed by the State 
religious authorities-either State religious departments or State religious councils. 
These schools came to be known as Sekolah Agama Negeri (State Religious School). The 
number, level and scale of schools and the curriculum, however, varied from one state to 
another. Whereas some States allowed sufficient resources to provide comprehensive 
Islamic education up to the secondary level, most could only afford primary-level 
schooling. Johor, for example, had a very unique-and the most 
comprehensive-religious education system. It was made compulsory for every Muslim 
child to attend the religious school financed and administered by the State government. 
These religious schools were held in the afternoon either at the Malay schools or the 
mosques so that Muslim children could attend the religious class after the morning 
session at the secular Malay schools (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 42; Syed Othman Alhabshi 
1997: 4). 
The other type of madrasah was founded and administered by local committees 
through funds collected from donations, zakat, and waqf (Islamic system of trusts and 
endowments). These madrasah were also known as the Sekolah Rakyat (People's School) 
or Sekolah Agama Rakyat (People's Religious School). Financial difficulties in these 
private-run religious schools were particularly acute, and affected the quality of schools 
and teachers, and teaching equipment and materials. Financial issues continued to 
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impinge on the administration of the private-run Islamic schools in the years to come. 
Importantly, the issues developed into a major political controversy between the religious 
schools, the federal government and the Islamic opposition party PAS. 
The most important challenge to the traditional-type religious schools came from the 
concurrent development of language-based secular schools (Malay, English and Chinese 
schools) under the colonial regime, and the implementation of the National Education 
Policy after independence (1957). One of the biggest disadvantages of the religious 
schools was their curriculum. Because of the limited scope of their curriculum that 
emphasized religious subjects and Arabic language, there was little market value for 
graduates of the Islamic school system. The lack of facility in the religious schools in 
preparing students for national examinations in academic subjects (particularly in 
science, mathematics, and English) put them at a disadvantage when seeking employment 
or places for higher studies (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 9, 60-62). 
This was an unsurprising consequence, however, since many of the Islamic secondary 
schools were primarily meant to prepare students for entry into prestigious tertiary 
institutions oflslamic learning in the Middle East or the Subcontinent-most notably the 
University of Al-Azhar in Cairo. Moreover, the madrash system produced a steady 
supply of religious teachers and officials. Given that courses leading to careers as 
religious teachers or religious officials were among the most popular for the madrasah 
students, it is arguable that the traditional-type of Islamic educational system could only 
be sustainable as long as wider Islamic administrative structures were retained and 
expanded (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 29). 
The popularity of the madrasah schools in the pre-independence period, however, 
dwindled after independence. In the pre-independence period, a combination of factors 
contributed to a general inclination towards the religious schools among Muslims. In 
contrast, the Malay vernacular school established to cater specifically for the Muslim 
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community was not a popular option. The unpopularity of the Malay vernacular school 
derived from, among others, strong suspicion towards-and unhappiness about-their 
secular character; the fact that these schools did not offer Islamic education was a major 
concern. 
After independence, however, the secular school system-both Malay and English 
schools-began to gain popularity among Muslims on both religious and socio-economic 
grounds. On the religious front, in 1960, the government accepted the Rahman Talib 
Report5 and decided to make Islamic education compulsory for all Muslim students in all 
the government-sponsored schools-including the national schools (formerly the Malay 
vernacular schools) and the national-type English schools (formally the English schools) 
(Abdullah Ishak 1995: 149-157; Rosnani Hashim 1996: 7). On the socio-economic front, 
Muslim parents found that graduates from the national schools would have better 
employment opportunities than those from the religious schools (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 
60). Moreover, prestige attached to the 'religious professions' such as religious teachers 
or religious officials steadily declined in an environment of wider socio-economic 
changes in the Muslim community, contributing further to the falling popularity of the 
traditional-type religious schools. 
The private-run religious schools found themselves under huge pressure to reconcile 
themselves to such challenges if they wished to remain relevant. In some States, for 
example, schools agreed to adopt a uniform curriculum prepared by the State Religious 
Department in exchange for accepting financial assistance. At the secondary level, the 
curriculum was revised to correspond to the National Education Policy; incorporating 
secular subjects such as English, Malay language, mathematics, geography, history, and 
5 The Rahman Talib Report (1960) laid the foundations of the post-independence national education policy 
stipulated in the Education Act of 1961. The Report was instrumental in ensuring that Islamic religious 
instruction-which was made compulsory for all Muslim students in government-assisted schools-was 
fully implemented and supported. It recommended, among others, that the federal government contribute 
partially to the payment of teachers for religious instruction in government-assisted primary schools. For a 
more detailed discussion about the Report with regard to Islamic education, see Rosnani Hashim (1996: 
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general science (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 60-61). Further, some schools (at the secondary 
level) had to transfer the administration of teaching staff to the government, thereby 
allowing their administrative autonomy to be compromised (Abdullah Ishak 1995: 157). 
For the private religious schools, thus, how to preserve their Islamic character while 
preempting excessive government intrusion in their operations became a topmost 
concern, as discussed in more detail in the section that follows. 
On the other hand, the government's involvement in Islamic education-following the 
introduction of the Education Act 1961-brought about significant transformation in the 
Islamic educational apparatus in general and the administration of religious teaching staff 
in particular-albeit very limited in scale and scope. The curriculum for Islamic 
education was for the first time formulated for the government-sponsored schools. And 
the units of Islamic studies were restructured. While religious teachers at the 
government-sponsored primary schools remained under the jurisdiction of the State 
governments, their counterparts at the secondary schools were placed under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Education. Recruitment of the religious teachers was also 
systematized, putting greater emphasis on formal qualification such as the completion of 
the form 4 (Empat Thanawi), 6 a certificate from the Islamic College, and the bachelor 
degree from the University of Al-Azhar, Cairo. Moreover, the Ministry of Education 
offered in-service training courses to standardize the quality of religious teachers at the 
secondary schools.7 
From the perspective of the school board, the government's efforts to sponsor Islamic 
education within the formal educational framework threatened the interests of their 
schools-the administrative autonomy of the schools in particular. From the perspective 
58-59). 
6 The form 4 is equivalent to the forth year at the secondary school and the first year at the high school. 
7 Similar training courses were also offered to the religious teachers at the primary level. These courses 
were initially arranged by the religious authorities in the individual State, but later taken over by the 
Ministry of Education (Abdullah Ishak 1995: 157). 
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of teachers, on the other hand, such governmental intervention was not necessarily a bad 
thing; they could possibly expect better material rewards (in the form of financial 
assistance) from the more resource-rich government. Given that many of them lacked 
appropriate qualifications required by the authorities, however, the danger was that they 
could be excluded from mainstream educational mechanism. Further, all these 
bureaucratization processes had the potential for destroying the special Islamic character 
of the traditional religious schools. 
Despite limited improvements, however, the level of state institutionalization of the 
mechanisms regulating religious education remained low until the late 1980s. The federal 
government's attempt to revamp the private religious schools was largely unsuccessful; 
the Ministry of Education attempted to persuade the State religious departments and 
religious councils and the boards of governors of the schools to place 150 religious 
schools under its control, but succeeded in taking over only eleven of them (Rosnani 
Hashim 1996: 69). An important consequence of this policy failure was that the 
administration of these private religious schools was left untouched, retaining the 
notoriously disorganized nature of the entire religious educational system. Although 
some State religious authorities attempted to standardize and regulate the running of the 
schools at the State level, such efforts were generally unsuccessful due largely to the lack 
of finance. The status of religious teachers within the formal educational structure 
declined, and their material conditions remained dismal as a result. The monthly salary of 
a religious teacher in Selangor in 1963, for example, was as meager as RM58.60 
(approximately US$15), lower than the salary of school gardeners (RM80).8 Even after 
he passing Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM), the minimal qualification to be accredited as 
a teacher at the government schools, material conditions improved little: the base salary 
was raised to RM72 (US$19), to which a small amount of allowances were added to make 
8 These rates are based on exchange rates in 2005. 
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the monthly earning RM90 (US$26) in total. Moreover, an unsympathetic response from 
a Ministry of Education official to appeals to address such grievances typified the 
Ministry officials' -and the government's-general disregard for religious teachers: 
'how can religious teachers be on the same level as the Ministry of Education's teachers 
who hold the SPM certificate! ' 9 
The federal government's neglect oflslamic schooling in the post-independence period 
left the corps of religious teachers unqualified, unauthorized, and highly disorganized. 
Although a system of certifying religious teachers emerged at the individual State level, 
the weak enforcement capacities of the State religious agencies left these teachers more or 
less unchecked. In short, Islamic schooling was largely left to private actors until the late 
1970s, with the level of state institutionalization in this religious education sector 
relatively low. 
The Medium level of Institutionalization of the Islamic Education Apparatus 
Rising Islamic Consciousness and the Renaissance of Islamic Education 
The waning popularity of the religious schools among the Muslims after the 
consolidation of the National Education Policy in the post-independence period did not 
mean that these schools faded away altogether. Nor did the interest of Muslim parents in 
equipping their children with Islamic learning disappear. Quite the opposite, the Islamic 
educational institutions were given fresh attention and official emphasis, and were 
revitalized at all levels against the backdrop of rising Islamic awareness since the late 
1970s. 
The state Islamic schooling machinery-policy measures, schools, teaching staff, and 
9 
'Memartabatkan guru,' UM, 16 May 2000. 
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the bureaucracy to administer them--developed dramatically, especially since the 
mid-1980s when Anwar Ibrahim was the Minister of Education (1986-1991). The 
government's will to attend to the growing interest in Islamic schooling among the 
younger generation of Muslim parents was evident even before Anwar took office. 
Hence, the expansion of Islamic education was in part a result of the government's 
response to such demand, and was not exclusively of his making. Anwar's aggressive 
policy input and political initiative during his tenure, however, had a marked effect on the 
overall development of Islamic education in the years to come. By fully exploiting 
prerogatives conferred on the office, he laid down new legislative and administrative 
frameworks under which Islamic schooling-as well as Islamic teachers-was given a 
wider official presence, together with larger material allocations, than ever before. 
The federal authorities-namely, the federal Islamic agency, JAKIM, and the Ministry 
of Education--developed a joint administrative mechanism to coordinate the efforts to 
promote Islamic schooling from the primary to the secondary levels nation-wide since the 
early 1980s. Separate initiatives from State governments as well as private organizations 
and individuals to expand their own schooling programs, however, restrained federal 
initiatives to create a more standardized high-quality Islamic education system across the 
country. Resistance from the private-run religious schools (Sekolah Agama Rakyat) 
against what they perceived as political intrusion was especially persistent, although the 
teachers themselves were not necessarily unhappy about the federal interference. The 
State religious departments in charge of State-run religious schools (Sekolah Agama 
Negeri) on the other hand, were put on the defensive against increasing federal 
encroachment upon their sphere of influence. Further, the Ministry of Education 
developed its own national-type religious secondary schools, Sekolah Menengah 
Kebangsaan Agama (SMKA), fully funded by the federal government. As a result, three 
tiers ofreligious schooling system came into being at the federal, State, and private levels, 
with little formal coordination between them. Competition grew intense among these 
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schools to recruit better students as well as qualified teachers, while such a large-scale 
Islamization trend within the government schools helped drive away non-Muslim 
students (especially Chinese) to ethnic-based national-type/independent (private-run) 
schools. 10 
Given the jurisdictional constraint on the federal government with regard to religious 
affairs, the federal government employed policy and administrative measures to develop 
and standardize Islamic education nationwide. Unlike in the judicial sector, it is important 
to note, the government did not express any particular interest in resorting to more 
authoritative constitutional measures. Nor was a nationwide statutory mechanism 
introduced, although JAK.IM prepared legislation reinforcing State religious agencies' 
supervisory power over private and State religious schools. 
On the policy front, the federal government exploited its jurisdictional authority over 
educational matters through the Ministry of Education and employed a range of policy 
tools to intervene in religious education at all levels. In 1987, the Ministry introduced a 
new concept into the National Education Philosophy emphasizing a 'holistic approach' 
with specific reference to 'a firm belief in and devotion to God' (Malaysia 2000: v). 
Although ambiguity remained about its reference to God (which was not exclusively 
Islamic), the introduction of the new concept was considered as a step toward 
Islamization of the national education system. 
In line with this concept, a number of important steps were adopted at the secondary 
level. Federal-funded national religious secondary schools (SMKA) were spawned 
nationwide (table 5.1). In 2000, fifty-three SMKAs were in operation. It was expected 
'
0 In March 2002, the National Union of the Teaching Profession (NUTP) submitted a memorandum to the 
Ministry of Education claiming that there was growing segregation along religious/ethnic lines in a number 
of national schools due to the existence of religious stream classes and other religious related activities. 
This memorandum caused a political controversy involving the Prime Minister (Malay Mail, 22 March 
2002; 25 March 2002; 28 March 2002). This concern continues to be aired by non-Muslims (e.g., Star, 10 
April 2005). There are also other reasons for this outflow of non-Muslim students into the increasingly 
popular Chinese schools. Outstanding performance of students studying at these schools at the national 
examinations is one such example. The main reason since the 1970s has been the language issue. 
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that the number of these schools would grow to sixty-seven before 2003. Likewise, 
student enrollment in these schools also steadily increased (table 5.2). 
Table 5.1: The Number of National Religious Secondary Schools (SMKA) 
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Although the growth in the number of SMKA appeared moderate on paper, the overall 
reputation and popularity of these schools grew dramatically among Muslims (especially 
among more urban higher-educated Muslims). Applications for entry continued to rise 
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every year throughout the 1980s and 1990s since students from these schools excelled at 
the national examination. I I The academic results of these students proved that SMKA's 
unique emphasis on religious education (lacking at regular national schools) did not 
prevent the integration of top-quality education in both fields-religious and secular 
(Interview with Ministry of Education officials, 8 September 2000, Kuala Lumpur). Such 
characteristics of SM.KA were particularly attractive to the Islam-aware generation of 
middle-class Muslim parents who valued highly the attainment of religious knowledge 
without neglecting regular academic subjects. 
Religious education was also given additional emphasis in national schools. The time 
allocation for Islamic religious education for Muslim students was increased from three 
to five periods a week. IZ Moreover, the federal government introduced an additional 
Aliran Agama (religious stream) course in some national schools in the early 1990s; an 
effort to accommodate rising-and unfulfilled-demands for places in the SMKA. I3 
Since its inception this supplementary course grew steadily. By 2000, such classes had 
been introduced in 342 national secondary schools, with 48,312 students enrolled 
nationwide (Jabatan Pendidikan Islam dan Moral, Ministry of Education, 2000). 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Education took some significant steps outside the core 
curriculum, thus transforming the overall atmosphere of the national secondary schools 
into one that was more Islamic. Friday prayers were made compulsory for all the Muslim 
students in the national secondary schools. I4 The Ministry also launched a campaign to 
inculcate strong Islamic values and teachings in national schools teachers. Is 
11 See, for instance, 'SPM: Keputusan meningkat 0.7%,' UM, 5 April 2000. 
12 
'Kelas agama Islam akan ditambah,' BM, 27 March 1988. 
13 Those rejected would usually apply for the State or private religious schools. 
14 
'Pelajar Islam akan diwajib sembahyang zohor berjemaah,' UM, 10June1989. 
15 
'Guru perlu tingkatkan kefahaman Islam di sekolah-sekolah -Anwar,' UM, 12 December 1986. 
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Administrative Mechanisms to Supervise Religious Education 
In the administrative sphere, the most important step taken by the federal authorities was 
the formation of the Advisory Council for the Co-ordination of Islamic Education 
(Lembaga Penasihat Penyelarasan Pelajaran dan Pendidikan Agama Islam or LEPAI) in 
1983. A major function of the council was to coordinate the teaching and management of 
all religious schools not administered by the Ministry of Education, that is, private- and 
State-run Islamic schools (both at the primary and secondary levels). Its secretariat was 
placed under the federal religious agency, JAKIM, but the majority of its staff was 
seconded from the Ministry of Education. This staffing mechanism facilitated 
intra-governmental coordination at the federal level and to a lesser degree, between the 
federal and State governments. 
LEPAI was also intended to improve cooperation between the federal and State 
governments. With the majority of the States controlled by the ruling party UMNO, one 
might expect that the religious authorities in the UMNO-ruled States would be willing to 
comply with federal initiatives. In practice, that was not the case, however; it was often a 
time- and resource-consuming process for the federal religious authorities to persuade 
their State counterparts to agree to-let alone implement properly-their policies. The 
primary problem, after all, was the lack of statutory power in the hands of JAKIM 
(Interview with JAKIM officials, 5 June 2000; 11 September 2000). 
Given such legal constraints, LEPAI's influence over the State religious agencies 
largely depended upon the abundant financial means available to them. Within the 
framework of LEPAI, federal funds were channeled through the State religious 
departments to authorized private religious schools for financing teachers' salaries, 
renovation of facilities, and the purchase of teaching materials (Interview with JAKIM 
officials, 11 September 2000). In other words, these financial assistance schemes 
provided the federal government with a tool not only to coerce the State religious 
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authorities to comply with federal initiatives, but also to control private and State 
religious schools. As demands for upgrading school infrastructures and the quality of 
teaching staff increased, the cost for non-federal religious schools to meet these demands 
rose, too. Being generally resource-poor, they found themselves increasingly vulnerable 
to these material incentives offered by the federal government. 
The federal government also took the initiative to provide additional opportunity for 
Islamic education at the primary level. In 1990, JAKIM, in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Education introduced voluntary Qur 'anic and Fardhu 'Ain (obligatory 
personal duties for Muslims) Studies Classes (KAFA) nationwide outside the regular 
curriculum for primary-level pupils at national schools. A major consideration was that 
existing religious classes offered at the national primary schools-six classes a 
week-were not sufficient for pupils to master even very basic knowledge regarding 
Islam. KAFA was intended to rectify this weakness by offering primary-level pupils 
(from Standard One to Six) an optional course on basic religious skills and knowledge 
such as reading the Qur'an and writing Jawi. These classes were usually conducted for 
two hours daily at venues such as national schools, community halls, or private 
residences outside regular school hours (either in the morning or afternoon). To run the 
classes, JAKIM allocated RM88 million (approximately US$23 million) (2001) with as 
many as 30,000 religious teachers employed each year across the country. The student 
enrollment approximately amounted to 1 million (JAKIM, Maklumat KAFA Negeri: 
2000; Interview with JAKIM official, 8 January 2001). 
Traditionally, a large number of Sekolah Agama Rakyat (SAR) offered primary-level 
religious education for those who were interested in attaining extra-curricula religious 
knowledge and skills. Except in Johor where religious schooling was compulsory at the 
primary level, attendance at these schools was optional. Although comprehensive 
national statistics are not available (except for 1998 and onwards), it appears that the 
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number of private religious schools (SAR) that registered with-and received assistance. 
from-the government, as well as the number of students and religious teachers, 
increased since the 1980s. By 1998, 1,327 private religious schools offered primary 
religious education and 303,676 students were emolled in these schools nationwide 
(Statistics from JAKIM). Since the availability of these religious schools varied not only 
across States but also across areas within States, one needed to find an alternative channel 
if there was no such school in the neighborhood. The introduction of KAPA helped to 
meet the needs of such Muslims. 
Despite all these developments oriented towards the enhancement of federal 
jurisdiction over religious education, however, signs abound to suggest that the federal 
apparatus overseeing Islamic education was not fully in place, leaving the control of some 
areas to private as well as non-federal actors. The coordination both within the 
government-as well as between the government and non-governmental actors-was 
much more problematic in this educational sphere than the judicial sphere. 
A major obstacle to better intra-governmental coordination-especially between the 
federal authorities and the State religious departments-was the lack of executive power 
on the side of the federal government to enforce designated policies at the State lev'el. 
JAKIM could advise the State governments, but not bind them to federal policy guidance. 
In this educational sector, no single authority oversaw Islamic education. In other words, 
there was no central agency that supervises Islamic education matters as there was with 
Syariah judicial matters. The absence of a JKSM equivalent has impeded the emergence 
of a coherent administrative mechanism overseeing Islamic educational activities and 
securing efficient policy implementation nationwide. 
To overcome such statutory weaknesses, the federal government proposed a legislative 
measure to the State governments: codification of the Administration of Islamic 
Religious Schools Enactment. This law, once passed, will stipulate that all types of 
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private religious institutions should obtain licenses from State religious departments for 
their operations, and will give the department the prerogative to oversee and regulate 
them. The fact that the law has yet to be passed in many States, however, is indicative of 
the State governments' implicit resistance of the federal proposal. Moreover, the presence 
of many private Islamic educational institutions still operating without licenses revealed 
the weak enforcement capacity, or indeed the reluctance of the State governments to 
tighten supervision over the private religious institutions (Interview with JAKIM official, 
Kuala Lumpur, 11 September 2000; State religious department official, Selangor, 22 
August 2001). 
The relatively weak intra-governmental coordination in the educational sector raises 
two important questions relevant to our inquiry into institutionalization: first, in the case 
of Syariah, the central authority, JKSM, was created by government policy. Just like in 
the educational sector, the federal authorities were confronted with the same 
constitutional obstacle in the judicial sector: the lack of statutory power for them to secure 
State compliance. The creation of JKSM was meant precisely to overcome this weakness. 
Why couldn't an equivalent central agency be created in the case of education? 
Second, the Administration of Islamic Religious Schools Enactment, if implemented 
successfully, would give the State authorities additional power over private religious 
educational institutions in their respective States. This may not be a bad deal for the State 
authorities. Why, then, were the State governments unable or unwilling to pass the 
enactment? An answer to these questions is sought in the internal organizational 
mechanisms of the ruling party. 
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Patronage-maximizing Incentive Structures of UMNO Politicians: The Threat of 
'Extremist' Islam and the Strategic Position of Religious Schools 
The intermediate level of institutionalization in the educational sphere was closely related 
to the ruling party's organizational mechanisms. Societal-pressure views may suggest 
that state intervention in religious education was a response from the government 
dominated by the Muslim-based UMNO to a new demand conspicuously growing in its 
Muslim constituency: a demand from the younger generation of urban middle-class-and 
self-consciously more Islamic-oriented-Muslims to get their children better quality 
religious education. Meeting such demands would require the government to develop a 
systematic institutional framework to provide adequate religious teaching materials as 
well as qualified religious teachers. 
UMNO politicians, for their part, were becoming more religious just like many other 
Muslims. Their willingness to serve the religious cause, therefore, was reasonable, a 
distinctive trend and departure from the more secular and western-oriented UMNO 
leaders of the past generation. 16 More importantly, the changing religious inclination in 
society-especially in their traditional Muslim constituencies-offered UMNO 
politicians both challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, their Islamic credentials 
became far more important in appealing to the Muslim constituencies, both rural and 
urban. In the context of electoral rivalry between UMNO and PAS, Islamic issues grew 
far more prominent. On the other hand, a strong religious identity or a religious cause 
could give extra political mileage and contribute to their political ascendancy in the party 
as well as the government. Religious as well as political credentials came to be more 
intertwined than ever before (For instance, Shamsul A.B. 1988: 184-85). 
The rising pressure from the Muslim constituency to upgrade the religious schooling 
16 See chapter 3 for this trend. 
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system alone, however, cannot explain why the level of institutionalization in this sector 
was only moderate. Similar social pressures to systematize the administrative 
mechanisms were also evident both in the judiciary as well as the zakat sectors; but the 
level of institutionalization varied across sectors. Another oft-cited explanation is the 
rising pressure from Islamic opposition parties trying to capture votes from Muslim 
constituencies in the rising tide of Islamic consciousness. The sharp rivalry between 
UMNO and PAS, for example, is said to explain why the UMNO-ruled government was 
willing to expand the state regulatory apparatus over Islamic affairs including education, 
and to make the state more authoritative and Islamic. The pressure from the Islamic 
opposition party, however, was equally evident both in the judicial and educational 
sectors, but with varying outcomes. 
The key to fill this gap lies in the patronage-maximizing incentive structures that shape 
objectives and strategies of individual Muslim politicians to secure broad-based support 
and to ascend within the ruling party hierarchy. The intra-party logic of political 
ascendancy and patronage-maximizing incentives drives the UMNO leaders at various 
levels to a particular pattern of decision making and policy implementation. This 
incentive mechanism ultimately brings about a particular type of administrative 
arrangement and a particular level of institutional capacity. 
The Patronage-maximizing Incentive Structures and Societal Interests 
The logic of political ascendancy-and increasingly competitive patronage-networking 
activities-within the UMNO party hierarchy left Muslim politicians responsive not only 
to the traditional Muslim constituencies, but also to other social interests: the business 
class-both Muslim and non-Muslim, and the Chinese community in general. Indeed, the 
interests of their traditional support base-the Muslim constituencies-had to be taken 
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into account with special care, against the backdrop of the persistent threat from their 
Islamic archrival PAS. But, the views and interests of the corporate and Chinese 
constituencies grew far more important than ever before as shown in chapter 3. 
The federal-level Muslim politicians' orientation towards these interests had brought 
about more specific effects on their decision making and policy implementation in the 
educational sphere. First, the UMNO leaders' receptiveness to corporate and Chinese 
interests made the former particularly alert to the emergence of 'conservative' 'extremist' 
and 'anti-establishment' demands. For the business community, the growth of such 
Islamic forces in any visible form could have an unfavorable impact on the business 
environment. For the non-Muslim community, this might create a hostile social context, 
altering the inter-ethnic equilibrium in a way harmful for the non-Muslims (Interview 
with a female DAP politician, Penang, 10 February 2001 ). For the UMNO leadership, the 
pressure to contain the threat of conservative Islam, thus, was quite high, although an 
overt and organizationally unified form of extremist threat-such as the one seen in the 
judicial area-was not observed at first glance in the educational arena. A highly charged 
challenge from PAS like the proposal to introduce hudud (Islamic criminal codes), for 
instance, was absent. The apparent lack of urgency on the side of the UMNO leadership, 
however, did not mean that the ruling party lacked any political stake in this area. On the 
contrary, for UMNO leaders, the political stake here was very high, and increasingly so in 
the context of the rising popularity of religious schooling and the increasingly sharp 
electoral competition between UMNO and PAS. The political stakes increased even 
further after the September 11th terrorist attacks in the U.S. and subsequent anti-terrorism 
operations-primarily carried out by the UMNO government on the domestic front. 
Under these circumstances, the Muslim ruling elites targeted the traditional-type of 
religious schools as a breeding ground for 'radical' and 'anti-establishment' elements . 
. Second, Chinese interests-traditionally well organized and very strong in the 
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educational area---constrained the UMNO leaders in formulating policies related to 
Islamic education. One might expect that the Chinese community in general-and the 
Chinese educational organizations in particular---cared little about Islamic education. 
This issue, for them, was exclusively a Muslim matter, and therefore it was not an issue 
for them to be greatly bothered about; this was especially so in the overtly pro-Muslim 
institutional and political context of the post-NEP period. As long as their Chinese 
interests-that is, the welfare of Chinese-medium schools-were intact, they would only 
make trouble for themselves by blatantly intervening with Muslim affairs. Outcomes in 
fact defied such expectations, however. The expansion oflslamic education meant that a 
disproportionate amount of public resources would be allocated to pro-Malay policies 
and interests. What is important here is that the issue was not simply material but also 
symbolic and political. In the post-NEP era, the Chinese community at large felt that their 
interests had eroded in relation to the majority Malays, and grew highly defensive of 
whatever interests were left for them. Education and language were such issue areas 
having enormous symbolic value and political consequence (Tan Liok Ee 1992). The 
Chinese educational organizations, for example, in collaboration with Chinese-based 
political parties, exploited this symbolic value to mobilize their community against some 
important policies proposed by the government in the educational sector. As the 
importance of the Chinese grew both in economic and political terms, moreover, UMNO 
national leaders could not afford to ignore the pressures and demands expressed by them. 
It has to be reiterated that the influence of Chinese businessmen was felt and the latter's 
financial power appreciated not only at the organizational level, but also at the individual 
level as an important source of electoral funding for political ascendancy within the party. 
Third and finally, in addition to their obvious aversion to Islamic extremism, the 
business community had little interest in enhancing Islamic education. In general, they 
were more interested in securing high quality recruits from local universities as well as 
tertiaryinstitutions abroad. They valued highly a workforce equipped with practical skills 
185 
and knowledge useful for the modem economic sectors such as economics, accounting, 
science and engineering; religious knowledge was secondary. To put it more bluntly, 
corporate people tended to see those Muslims from religious educational backgrounds as 
'not modem enough,' 'incompetent,' or else 'useless.' This meant that the UMNO 
leadership could not allocate too many resources on the development of Islamic 
education. Indeed, since the late 1990s and in public Mahathir expressed concern that 
government policy had given too much attention to Islamic education, only to produce 
pious yet practically incompetent members of the workforce. This excess, he also 
suggested, needed be rectified. 17 In conjunction with NEP programs intended to upgrade 
the socio-economic status of Malays, moreover, the government sent a massive number 
of Muslim youth to tertiary institutions in UK and other Western countries every year. 
It is in these conditions that the federal government's interventionist policies-and 
resistance from the State authorities-need to be understood. What was distinctive about 
the federal initiative in this religious education sector was that much effort was spent on 
the take-over and centralized administration of traditional-type private religious schools. 
An answer to this question, again, was related to the incentive structures of UMNO 
politicians at the various levels. 
Three specific concerns motivated the UMNO leaders at the federal level to take steps 
towards the nationwide centralization of the private religious schools. First, many of the 
traditional-type private religious schools-and religious-educated teachers to man these 
schools-were seen as· a source of political umest or as agents for oppositional 
anti-establishment and anti-modernization mobilization. If unchecked, the UMNO 
leaders considered, these institutions could be breeding grounds for PAS support or even 
deviant extremist teachings seen widely as a threat to national security in general-and 
the UMNO-dominant liberal regime in particular. 
17 See, for instance, 'Pendidikan Islam perlu dirombak,' BH, 27 May 2000; 'Blame it on choice of subjects, 
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Second, religious teachers and traditional religious schools run by them were usually 
perceived as a strong electoral base for PAS. For UMNO leaders at all levels, wooing 
them by offering material incentives was not simply meant to extend administrative 
control over these institutions. It was for an electoral effect that UMNO leadership 
expected to obtain the endorsement of the religious elites. 18 For the leadership of the 
Islamic party, the authority of religious teachers or ulama is paramount. Unlike 
Indonesia's Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah which operate and 
shelter a network ofreligious educational institutions under their umbrella, PAS in theory 
and in practice does not possess an organizational structure with which religious schools 
and teachers are formally and tightly affiliated. PAS runs its own schools and 
kindergartens in geographically restricted areas, but many of the private religious schools 
are politically independent in theory. Allegiance of loosely associated religious teachers 
to the Islamic party is essentially on a voluntary basis, and may be upset or shift to 
UMNO-often for materialistic reasons. 19 It is nevertheless commonly believed that 
these religious teachers tend to be sympathizers of PAS and its policies. Given their 
socio-political standing and influence in the Muslim community in general and in rural 
areas in particular, there is a strong reason for UMNO leaders to attempt to win the hearts 
and minds of religious teachers. Public resources were lavishly spent to this end (e.g., 
Syed Othman Alhabshi 1997: 8). 
Third and finally, the federal UMNO leadership considered the traditional-type private 
religious schools as wasting human resources, a vital source for national economic 
development. Many of them still used traditional modes of teaching and mainly 
emphasized a religious (traditional-type) curriculum, neglecting other regular subjects. 
Physical and teaching infrastructure was lacking and the quality of teaching was not 
jobless Malay grads told,' ST interactive, 5 May 2002. 
18 
'Kerajaan carijalan terbaik ambil alih SAR,' UM, 4 July 1999. 
19 This fluid nature of political allegiance within the Muslim community is pointed out by Crouch (1996: 
64-69). 
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adequate, with many of the teaching staff under-qualified. For the pro-development 
UMNO leadership, reproducing religiously-obsessed Muslims unequipped with practical 
skills and knowledge was not doing Muslims any good when their socio-economic status 
was already backward. This was, after all, not compatible with UMNO's vision of 
building a modem industrial nation.20 
The lower echelons of the party leadership-the State leaders in particular-however, 
did not always endorse these considerations and objectives of the UMNO leadership at 
the national level. The clash of interests and strategies between the federal and State 
leaders within the ruling party, in fact, had a significant effect on the way in which federal 
Islamic policies were implemented. In principle, the highest level of the party leadership 
in Kuala Lumpur tends to dominate policy-making in the party. The highly centralized 
policy-making apparatus-and party members' heavy dependence on the top leaders for 
their political ascendancy and business opportunities in particular-meant that in 
principle little space was allowed for the State-level party leaders to overtly object to 
proposals initiated by the central leadership. In practice, however, some of the federal 
policies were frustrated by a set of incompatible interests and objectives of UMNO 
politicians at the State level. Importantly, it was precisely the same logic working along 
the party hierarchy that brought about somewhat conflicting objectives and strategies 
between the national- and State-level leaders: the incentive to create their own avenues 
for patronage practices, and to maximize opportunities to build broad-based support to 
secure ascendancy in the party. One important consequence was inadequate 
implementation of federal policies. 
In the context of the rising popularity of Islamic schooling among Muslims, 
contributions to religious education in general and to private religious schools and 
teachers in particular offered one of the most rewarding patronage-dispensing channels 
2
° For instance, 'Keeping an eye on religious education,' NST, 1 June 1986. 
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for State-level UMNO leadership. Two specific considerations need to be taken into 
account in this respect. First, State leaders (such as the Chief Ministers) could exercise 
relative discretion in dispensing State as well as federal funds to develop and renovate 
State and private religious institutions. Monitoring by central leadership on their 
activities is minimal unless they are seen as overtly contravening the interests of the 
former. As long as the jurisdiction ofreligious education, including schools and teachers, 
remained under individual State governments, these public funds could be distributed to 
particular constituencies to bring about patronage benefits for State leaders. The massive 
expansion of State-sponsored Islamic educational institutions at all levels could also be 
best understood from this patronage perspective. For State-level leaders, especially Chief 
Ministers, their jurisdictional prerogative over Islamic education was a valuable resource 
for maximization of patronage avenues as well as authority in their Muslim 
constituencies. Their efforts to build and renovate religious schools at the State level were 
intended not only to meet their constituents' demands for better Islamic schooling; but 
more importantly, to meet their own interests to expand their clientelistic networks within 
the religious circles and to secure their political ascendancy within the ruling party. 
Second, the scale and scope of the patronage-maximizing impact of extending material 
assistance to private religious schools and teachers could be extensive for the State-level 
leaders if one takes into account the number of religious schools and teachers who 
benefited from the assistance. The impact may even be more significant when this is 
compared with the very limited patronage effect of retaining and developing the Syariah 
court system by individual State governments. For State-level UMNO leaders, it was not 
a particularly attractive option to retain the jurisdiction of Syariah courts from this 
patronage perspective. It was precisely for this reason that they did not resist the 
increasing level of federal interference in the judicial sector. By contrast, the State 
UMNO leaders had good reason to hope that the administration of religious schools 
would remain firmly under their control. The registration system of private religious 
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schools that emerged so far, for example, was the best possible arrangement for them. 
Under this system, financial assistance derived from an unprecedented amount of federal 
funding was distributed to private religious schools that had registered with individual 
State religious departments. Given that the task of allocating these federal funds was 
subcontracted to the State religious departments, this financial assistance mechanism 
could best serve the State-level UMNO leaders' personal interest to maximize 
opportunities to dispense patronage resources and build a broader personal support base 
in their own constituencies.21 
In short, the administration of religious educational institutions was institutionalized in 
a way that served the incentive mechanisms of individual UMNO politicians at the 
various levels to maximize patronage-dispensing opportunities, as shown in detail in the 
sections that follow. 
Co-optation of Private Islamic Schools and Teachers: 
The Federal Take-over Campaigns and Resistance 
The federal government spent much effort to take over the administration of private 
religious schools and teachers and to place them under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Education. The take-over exercise was first launched in the late 1970s, but accelerated in 
the 1990s (Rosnani Hashim 1996: 69-70). The federal authorities' campaigns, however, 
proved not so successful after all. A conventional explanation of this failure points to 
resistance against the plan from PAS, which governed the predominantly 
21 See, for instance, 'MB kecewa cara Jakim agih bantuan,' UM, 10 January, 2001; 'MB kecewa sekolah 
tentang kerajaan terima bautuan Jakim,' 11 January, 2001. 
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Muslim-populated State-Kelantan. 22 The structure of resistance against the federal 
take-over initiative, however, was not so simple; resistance came not only from PAS but 
also from some leaders within UMNO. Moreover, not all the private religious schools and 
teachers opposed the plan; in fact, some 'supported it. 
Resistance from religious schools and teachers against the federal government's 
take-over plan was based on administrative and political grounds. From a school's 
perspective, the take-over meant that the schools would have to concede a substantial 
share of administrative autonomy to the government. While this arrangement was 
intended to lesson the financial burden of the schools, it was by no means an option 
desired by the schools. The schools would have to adopt the teaching curriculum 
prescribed by the Ministry, allowing them little leeway to decide what they could teach. 
They were extremely afraid of losing their individual school character-especially 
religious instruction-preserved for many years with the support of neighboring 
communities. Further, they were equally anxious about the prospect of being 
'secularized' by conforming to the curriculum set by the government. 
We should not underestimate the importance of retaining control of the religious 
curriculum for ulama. The character of traditional-type religious schools is primarily 
determined by religious instruction conducted by the individual teachers who run these 
schools. The personal teacher-pupil relations were also an important and unique aspect of 
the individual schools. Some students even travel to places far away from their home to 
acquire religious knowledge from particular prominent teachers and/or at renowned 
schools. State interference with school affairs in general and the curriculum in particular 
meant that such unique characteristics of the traditional religious schooling might be 
disturbed. Their resistance to the federal government's take-over plan hence was not 
unexpected. 
22 PAS governed another predominantly Muslim State, Terengganu, from 1999 to 2004. 
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To induce the reluctant schools, the government offered a range of material incentives 
such as financial assistance to renovate old facilities, higher salaries for teaching staff as 
well as various allowances (by incorporating them into the national public service 
schemes); and providing free training for unqualified teachers. From the perspective of 
the school management, this financial assistance from the government was increasingly 
important and appreciated as the cost of running schools and securing qualified teachers 
became more expensive than ever before. Pupils and parents, on the one hand, would 
expect not only traditional religious subjects but also regular academic subjects to be 
taught. Offering regular subjects was not an easy task for resource-poor religious schools; 
it required not only authorization from the relevant governmental agency, but also hiring 
qualified teachers (Interview with a teacher at an ABIM-run school, Kajang, Selangor, 4 
May 2000). 
Religious teachers, on the other hand, were generally dissatisfied with their poor 
working conditions-especially their remuneration scale. Compared with teachers at the 
national schools, their salary was extremely low with inadequate allowance and welfare 
schemes.23 Some of them were even required to do agricultural work or other part-time 
jobs to earn extra earnings, because their salary earned from teaching at the religious 
schools was not sufficient to make ends meet. 
The government's approach, however, proved only partially successful, with many 
private schools remaining still independently run or unauthorized (Interview with a 
Ministry of Education official, Kuala Lumpur, 8 September 2000). The continuing 
tension between the Ministry and the religious schools cannot be explained by technical 
or material factors alone. The political dimension also played a very significant role. As 
suggested above, the government's general view was that religious teachers were 
sympathizers of PAS and private religious schools and teachers the latter's support base. 
23 For instance, 'Kesatuan usaha dapatkan gaji minimumRM450,' BH, 31May1999. 
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On the other hand, the schools-whether indeed PAS sympathizers or non-partisan-
tended to perceive the Ministry's interference as an UMNO trick to neutralize them 
politically, while tempting them with the material benefits needed for their own survival. 
The PAS-ruled Kelantan State offered the most conspicuous and tense battleground for 
this conflict, symbolizing both material and political dimensions. Involving the foderal 
government/Ministry of Education, an alliance of private religious teachers, and the 
incumbent PAS government, the controversy developed into a trilateral battle. It is, in 
fact, suggested that the Ministry was about to achieve agreement on the administrative 
transfer of the religious schools in exchange for material reward before the late-1990s 
(Interview with Rosnani Hashim, Department of Education, UIA, Selangor, 9 March 
2000). The controversy was partly derived from a petition submitted to the Ministry of 
Education by an association of private religious teachers in Kelantan, Persatuan 
Guru-Guru Sekolah Agama Rakyat Bantuan Kerajaan Kelantan (PGSARBK). Their 
claim was that their welfare had been neglected by the State government, and thus the 
federal government should take steps to rectify their grievances.24 
The Ministry's take-over attempt this time, thus, was made apparently justifiable: there 
was a demand from a group of discontented religious teachers about their material 
conditions. Moreover, then Minister of Education, Najib Tun Razak, assured that the 
characteristics oflslamic instruction would be maintained after the take-over, an action to 
preempt protest from parties suspicious of the federal authority's motive. He also claimed 
that the Ministry's true intention was to upgrade the physical conditions of the schools as 
well as teachers, with the quality of teaching elevated for the benefit of students. The 
Ministry, in other words, declared its responsibility to safeguard the interests and future of 
those students studying under such poor conditions.25 
24 
'Guru sekolah agama kecewa,' and 'Persatuan SAR minta runding,' EH, 27 July 1999. 
25 
'Pendidikan Islam kelolaan kementrian lebih teratur,' EH, 3 July 1999; 'Pengurusan SMAR akan diambil 
alih berperingkat,' UM, 21June1999. 
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The PAS leadership in the Kelantan State strongly resisted the take-over plan. The 
Chief Minister Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat expressed his determination not to 'give up the 
private religious schools in Kelantan to the central government.' 26 Further, he even 
threatened the private religious school teachers sponsored by YIK (Yayasan Islam 
Kelantan, Kelantan Islamic Foundation)27 by urging them to resign if they wanted the 
federal government to take over the administration of the schools.28 At the same time, 
PAS leaders apparently managed to mobilize suspicion and anxiety among the teachers 
about the hidden motives behind the federal campaign initiated by UMNO leaders, 
namely the aim to secularize the religious institutions. The Ministry of Education was put 
on the defensive and urged to reiterate that religious education would never be 
secularized after the federal take-over. 29 
Despite the federal government's blandishment-and in response to PAS leaders' 
mobilization against the federal campaign-the religious teachers decided to remain 
under the supervision of State authorities. An unanticipated political event was partially 
responsible for this outcome. The sacking of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar 
Ibrahim and the ensuing political crisis in 1998 occurred at a time when the Ministry of 
Education was campaigning to take over the administration of private religious schools. 
This fueled the contestation between UMNO and PAS even further, allowing the Islamic 
opposition party to take the offensive. Every initiative by the federal government and 
Ministry of Education hereafter was seen in the light of partisan politics, making 
conciliation between the government and the religious schools extremely difficult. 
Moreover, the particularly crude way in which Anwar was ousted from office put the 
UMNO leadership in a very negative light not only on a political, but also on a moral 
26 SMAR: Nik Aziz digesa terima cadangan Pusat, UM, 2 August 1999. 
27 YIK is a semi-governmental organization under the Kelantan State government handling Islamic 
education affairs, among others, in the State. It provides financial assistance to religious teachers at the 
private religious schools in the form of monthly allowances. YIK exerts considerable influence over the 
administration of those religious schools. 
28 
'Kesatuan guru, CUEPACS gesa Nik Aziz tarik ancaman,' UM, 2 August 1999. 
29 
'Karikulum agama Islam SMAR tidak akan diubah,' UM, 24 August 1999. 
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basis and was perceived in religious terms. UMNO as a Muslim-based party was seen as 
morally wrong and thus un-Islamic. The 'secular' label that PAS had long exploited to 
discredit the religious credibility of UMNO was somehow validated in the eyes of 
Muslim constituencies. Given the surrounding context, the Islamic opposition leaders 
played up the politics of secularism, damaging the credibility of UMNO leaders on issues 
related to Islam-including education. 
Despite the impact of this moral force behind the federal government's unsuccessful 
take-over bid, the role played by material incentives should not be ignored. On top of the 
'stick' measures mentioned above, PAS leaders did not forget to offer 'carrots' to the rebel 
schools to pacify them. The Kelantan State government decided to grant an extra bonus as 
well as a 10 percent salary rise to all the religious teachers under the supervision of the 
YIK including those teaching at State-assisted as well private schools. The deal was along 
the lines of the measure taken by the federal government: a 10 percent salary rise for all 
the federal-employed public servants.30 The pressure to counter the UMNO's offensive 
by material measures suggests that the moral base alone was not sufficient to secure the 
political loyalty of religious teachers. The Kelantan case also suggested that religious 
teachers in Kelantan would not simply stay quiet; they exercised whatever power they 
possessed to maximize opportunities to benefit themselves materially. In short, a 
combination of moral and material forces brought to an end the federal government's 
attempt to take over the private religious schools. 
Intra-party Conflict of Interests: The Logic of Patronage Maximization and 
Distribution 
The failure of the take-over campaign by the Ministry of Education cannot be fully 
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explained by the electoral competition between UMNO and PAS alone. Resistance 
against the take-over plan came not only from the PAS-ruled States, but also from an 
UMNO-ruled State: Johor. The Johor Sate government led by the Chief Minister, Abdul 
Ghani Othman, continued to administer the religious schools in the State, while 
appreciating-and agreeing to receive-annual allocation of developmental assistance 
from the federal government. The decision was made from the two options proposed by 
the Ministry of Education: either to give up entirely the administrative control over 
religious schools to the Ministry, or to receive an annual allocations of development funds 
from the Ministry which would be directly distributed to the religious schools.31 This 
specific set of choices in itself was proof that the Ministry of Education intended to 
diminish authority of the State government over the administrative control of religious 
schools, while reinforcing its own. On the other hand, the episode proved that UMNO 
leaders at the State level would not necessarily concede to pressure from the central 
leadership. 
The intra-party tension within UMNO leadership over religious educational 
affairs-and why the Johor Chief Minister was unwilling to give up his control over 
religious educational institutions-was explained by the patronage-maximizing incentive 
structures for individual politicians within the ruling party. The control over the religious 
educational institutions-especially religious teachers-is a very lucrative patronage tool 
for Muslim politicians. The federal leadership may want to take over or at least to exert 
influence over it. Their political as well as financial might was fully manipulated to this 
end. The State-level leaders, however, do not want to simply let go their administrative 
control over the religious schools since it helps them build up their personal support base 
in their home States. Their jurisdictional independence on religious educational affairs 
assures them that the federal religious agency JAKIM will have little scope for 
30 
'2,020 guru Yayasan Islam Kelantan naik gaji, terima bonus,' BH, 4 January 2001. 
31 
'Johor terns urus sekolah agama,' UM, 23 October 1999. 
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interference in their affairs; either in regard to allocation of federal funds or appointment 
of religious officers and teachers. Moreover, the growing allocation of federal funds to 
individual States-a federal effort to court the religious schools---discouraged the 
State-level leaders even further from giving up their limited yet immensely valuable 
administrative authority. 
On top of these general circumstances, an additional factor had an impact on the case of 
Johor. The Johor State had developed a well-structured compulsory religious schooling 
system unrivaled by any other State. Further federal intervention was not welcome 
because it might disturb an already well-established system. A vital factor that ultimately 
deterred the J ohor State leadership, however, was the clientelistic relationship embedded 
in the structure that perpetuated the patronage-maximizing incentive mechanism of 
individual UMNO politicians at the State level. This had to be tightly safeguarded to 
maximize the interests of those politicians tied to the structure-particularly the Chief 
Minister Abdul Ghani Othman. Abdul Ghani took the chief ministerial post in 1995, a 
gateway to the highest office in the party and thus in the government. 32 Yet, highly 
competitive party politics in Johor meant that Abdul Ghani needed to consolidate his 
power base at the State level. To outperform his peers within the party, Abdul Ghani had 
to exploit whatever prerogatives attached to his office. The administrative and financial 
control over State as well as private religious schools was one such area that was full of 
patronage-maximizing advantages. Abdul Ghani's decision to retain this control while 
agreeing to receive allocations of annual development funds was meant to maximize 
these advantages. 
This same patronage concern also accounted for the Minister of Education's zealous 
take-over initiative at the federal level. Najib was not only the Minister of Education, a 
32 
'UMNO's Men-In-Waiting: Behind five candidates for the three vice-presidential slots,' Asiaweek.com, 
12 May 2000, http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0512/nat.malaysia.htrnl (accessed on 
April 25, 2005). 
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post traditionally held by promising UMNO politicians; but he was also a Vice President 
of the ruling party when Deputy President Anwar lost his post in 1998.33 With the general 
election as well as the party election on the horizon in the coming years, Najib needed to 
mobilize all the resources available to him to increase his chance in this race. 34 The 
intra-party contest among the top national leaders was growing tense after the sacking of 
Anwar. Najib was one of the party leaders who benefited from Anwar's elimination, and 
was aiming at the post made vacant by it. For him, the educational ministerial post 
provided a source of abundant patronage to be utilized for his personal ends. Against the 
context of rising tension between UMNO and PAS, winning administrative control over 
the private religious schools-a base of anti-governmental political mobilization-would 
not only be a gain for the party, but more importantly, equip him with extra 
patronage-dispensation instruments. 
Legislative Measures: State Authorization and Material Reward 
The federal government also attempted to adopt legislative measures to expand the 
registration/authorization regime nationwide. The Enactment of Administration of 
Islamic Schools was proposed to reinforce the supervisory capacity of the State 
authorities over private religious schools. Under this mechanism, the private religious 
schools would be required to register with the religious department in their respective 
States. In a way, this was a second best option for the federal religious authorities that 
failed to take-over the administration of the private religious schools, and yet hoped to 
exert some influence over them. 
33 There are three Vice Presidential posts. Normally a vacancy at the Deputy Presidential level would be 
filled by one of the Vice Presidents. 
34 The General Elections and the UMNO party election were held in 1999 and in 2000 respectively. Both 
Najib and Abdul Ghani were contenders for UMNO's three vice presidential posts. 
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This measure could enable federal religious authorities to exercise some control over 
the operation of the schools by obtaining basic information about them to identify, for 
example, how many religious schools were run in various States, how many students 
attended these schools, and how many teachers were employed by them. Under the 
previous weak supervisory regime, even such basic information was lacking. It was thus 
almost inevitable that a large number of private religious schools were left largely 
unregulated. The deal under the new regulatory regime was that the federal government 
-through the State religious departments-would allocate financial assistance for staff 
salaries and other necessities; in return, the authorized schools would be required to 
adhere to the curriculum as well as other administrative regulations prepared by the 
government. 
However, only a few governments such as Negeri Sembilan were enthusiastic about 
adopting the measure proposed by the federal authorities. A key puzzle here was the 
State-level UMNO leaders' reluctance to fully enforce the Enactment, despite the fact that 
the central authorities-also under the same party-supported the plan. This puzzle _of 
intra-state tension, again, had to do with eonflict of interests within the ruling party: the 
incentive structures of individual UMNO politicians to secure their own avenues for 
patronage dispensation. 
This measure, if fully implemented, would help State religious authorities tighten 
control over private religious institutions by legal means, thereby making the former 
more authoritative. But, at the same time, it would also entrench a more legal-bound 
bureaucratic mechanism regulating not only how the school should be run, but also how 
public funds should be dispersed. Further, it would reinforce federal encroachment upon 
the individual State agencies. In other words, it was not only the private religious schools, 
but also the State government authorities-politicians as well as administrators 
alike-that would be affected by the implementation of the administration enactment. 
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This could be especially damaging to the patronage interest of State UMNO leaders by 
restricting their discretionary power in dispensing 'public goods' to their intended 
constituencies. On the other hand, the enthusiasm of the federal religious agency, JAKIM, 
in urging State authorities to adopt the measure was equally understandable from the 
same patronage-maximizing perspective. The head of JAKIM, the Minister in the Prime 
Minister's office in charge of religious affairs, Abdul Hamid Othman, could expect to 
gain substantially from the successful implementation of the enactment, with more 
patronage instruments in his own hands. However, quiet resistance from the State-level 
UMNO leaders helped impair the nationwide implementation of this legislative measure. 
Introduction of the National Religious Examination (STAM) 
A most recent-and perhaps the most momentous-administrative measure taken by the 
federal government was the introduction of the new national religious examination called 
STAM (Sijil Tinggi Agama Malaysia) effective in 2001.35 Previously, there had been no 
uniform nationwide examination mechanism, allowing . across-State and even 
across-school variance in the system certifying religious school graduates. Individual 
States and even some schools managed their own certificate mechanisms based on 
particular criteria such as Kelantan's Sijil Tinggi Ugama (Religious Higher Certificate, or 
STU). This patchy system did not harm students as long as they could be admitted to 
tertiary institutions to pursue Islamic studies-the most prestigious of those being the 
Al-Azhar University in Cairo. In addition to its high prestige among Islamic scholars and 
students, Al-Azhar's relative openness to Malaysian students as well as low tuition fees 
attracted a large number of graduates from various religious schools nationwide. 36 It is 
important to note here, however, that their entry to the University was secured solely on 
35 Warta Pendidikan, No.3 (September-December 1999); Abdul Monir Yaacob (2000: 14-18). 
36 Among 5,724 Malaysian students studying at the Al-Azhar as for 2000, 70 percent of them were 
self-sponsored ('Malaysians do badly at Al-Azhar,' NST, 18 September 2000). 
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the ground that Al-Azhar agreed to acknowledge the certificates issued by the State 
governments on an individual basis.37 
With this new system effective, however, passing the STAM examination was made a 
prerequisite for admission to Al-Azhar, and the existing 26 examinations including Sijil 
Tinggi Ugama and Sijil Tinggi Agama conducted by the various States were abolished. In 
other words, any other certificate-either from the State governments or individual 
schools-would no longer be acknowledged as an entry ticket to the Al-Azhar 
University. 38 The ruling was particularly detrimental for private religious schools because 
many of them aimed at sending their students to Al-Azhar or other Islamic tertiary 
institutions, both abroad and locally. They were not intended nor equipped to prepare 
these students for any other options but religious study courses. 39 
A challenge posed to private religious schools is how to prepare their students for this 
new exam. They have to train their teaching staff to be familiar with the new mechanism, 
and if necessary, have to hire teachers trained under the government program. This will 
incur extra costs for the resource-poor private religious schools, encouraging the latter's 
compliance to governmental rules. In addition, they have to secure access to information 
from the government in order to prepare for the new system. Otherwise, students may 
simply leave, seeing no future in staying in out-dated schools. For the schools, isolation 
from government may be too costly in the long run.40 
37 See, for instance, 'Kerjasama Universiti Al-Azhar iktirafkelulusan pelajar Azuddin akan diusaha,' UM, 6 
January 1986; 'Al-Azhar iktirafSijil PelajaranAgama Selangor,' BH, 15 March 1986. 
38 
'Kelantan students' Al-Azhar hopes may be dashed,' NST, 19 September 2000. 
39 Some modern types of private religious schools acknowledged the problems deriving from the limited 
offering of courses exclusively focused on religious subjects, and began accommodating secular subjects in 
their curriculum. 
4
° For implications of the introduction of STAM for religious teachers at private religious schools, for 
instance, 'Religious teachers set to get better pay,' Star online, 10 June 2002. 
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Demobilizing Islamic Teachers: the State's Manipulation of 'Stick' and 'Carrot' 
Tools 
Religious teachers were beyond doubt attracted to bett~r salary schemes, training, and 
various additional material incentives offered by the federal government. Their 
socio-economic standing, by any standard, was extremely low and the relatively high 
esteem they enjoyed in the Muslim community in the past had dramatically diminished as 
socio-economic development proceeded at such a rapid pace and on an overwhelming 
scale. It is unsurprising that they sought better career opportunities to upgrade their 
qualifications and achieve better socio-economic standing (Interview with religious 
secondary school teachers from Johor and Pahang, Kuala Lumpur, 29 August 2000). 
Importantly, their lack of resources-not only financially but also organizationally and 
politically-meant that they could not organize a forum powerful enough to 
pressure-and negotiate a better deal with-the federal authorities to their advantage. 
Thus, the government could take advantage of their organizational and financial 
weakness whenever necessary. The religious schools' financial dependence on the federal 
sources, in particular, offered federal authorities a 'stick' to penalize politically defiant 
institutions by threatening to terminate financial aid. 
The possible use of the stick was not merely meant to threaten private religious schools 
associated with opposition parties to give up their anti-UMNO stance and to concede to 
federal initiatives. The federal government, in fact, used the stick to punish them, finding 
that private religious schools were penetrated and mobilized by PAS for anti-government 
campaigning. The government decided to suspend grants and financial aid to all private 
religious schools on the grounds that they had been 'misused to teach children politics 
instead of religion.' The Prime Minister Mahathir was particularly alarmed that 
opposition parties were using the schools to sow anti-government sentiment among 
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students especially after the dismissal of Anwar in 1998. There was also a general 
concern that these schools had ignored a syllabus for religious studies required by the 
government. 41 
The tightening of administrative control over religious educational institutions took 
place not only at the federal but also at the State level. In UMNO-ruled Negri Sembilan, 
for example, the State government passed a bill to amend the State Islamic Schools 
Regulation Enactment 1996. The amendment authorized the State religious department to 
seal illegally-run Islamic schools and kindergartens and bring the school authorities 
before the State Syariah Court. This measure was intended to facilitate the State religious 
authorities to act against anti-government elements that had an objective of 'infusing 
negative political influence and religious extremism in young children. ' 42 
All these measures were obviously targeted at opposition parties-especially PAS. 
After the dismissal of Anwar in 1998 culturally unacceptable to many in the Muslim 
community, anti-government sentiment was running very high. Private religious 
educational institutions-at all levels from kindergarten to college-provided 
oppositional forces an outlet for anti-UMNO mobilization. To contain the spread of such 
oppositional forces through Islamic channels, UMNO leaders took advantage of their 
control over the state administrative apparatus. The federal government's proposal to 
introduce the national religious examination, STAM, was one such measure, and caused 
great agitation among the opposition leaders. 
PAS attempted to mobilize the private Islamic schools to counter this proposal as well 
as other federal government's initiatives to strengthen its administrative control. After 
learning that Al-Azhar would no longer consider students without the STAM certificate, 
the Chief Minister ofKelantan and spiritual leader of PAS, Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, led a 
41 
'No aid for "religious" schools,' Star Online, 26 October 2002; 'Anti-government sentiments in private 
madrasahs,' ST, 31 October 2002. 
42 
'Closure for religious schools not registered with Negri department,' NST, 3 November 2000; 'No 
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State delegation to the Al-Azhar University in Cairo to negotiate a special deal for 
students from the religious schools in Kelantan.43 Al-Azhar officials, however, did not 
heed the PAS leaders' plea and advised them to negotiate directly with the Federal 
government.44 Despite the PAS leaders' resistance campaigns, STAM was put in effect 
after all, with the opposition party as well as relevant religious schools left in despair 
(Interview with the PAS Secretary-General, Selangor, 16 April 2002). 
All these episodes suggested that 'carrots' offered by the federal authorities could 
readily be turned into 'sticks' to discipline private religious schools and teachers when the 
latter proved a source of unfavorable activities. The administrative apparatus that was, in 
theory, erected to protect the social-welfare interests of the private organizations was 
abused in practice to fulfill private interests ofUMNO politicians. 
The Politics of Education: Power of the Chinese and Business Interests 
The patronage-maximizing incentive structures of UMNO politicians left the latter 
responsive not only to Muslim concerns but also to pressures from the non-Muslim 
constituencies. The pressures especially from the Chinese community were much more 
strongly felt and politically and systematically expressed here than on Syariah issues, 
altering the contour of the Islamic education system. The Chinese community was not 
particularly happy to see the government allocating disproportionately large resources 
exclusively for the development of Islamic education and thus for the interests of 
Muslims. They had long been unhappy with the unequal distribution of public funds on 
educational matters. The sense of discontent was further intensified as the government 
politics in school, warns Negri MB,' NST, 19 March 2001. 
43 
'Nik Aziz appeals to Al-Azhar,' Star, 30 July 2000; 'Kemasukan pelajar ke Al-Azhar diseragam,' UM, 23 
September 2000. 
44 
'Kelantan students' Al-Azhar hopes may be dashed,' NST, 19 September 2000. 
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began relocating an increasing amount of federal funds to the expansion of religious 
educational mechanisms since the 1980s. They felt that their interests, in contrast, were 
not sufficiently served (Interviews with Chinese educationists, Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 
2001; Selangor, 1 August 2001; the Education bureau chief, DAP, Kuala Lumpur, 10 
April, 2002). 
For the Chinese community of the post-independence era, these issues were very 
contentious. Chinese educationalist organizations were established and grew politically 
prominent to protect the cultural rights of the community, especially Chinese-medium 
schools and the Chinese language (Kua Kia Soong 1999; Tan Liok Ee 1992, 2000). The 
presence of the highly organized and influential lobby groups focused on education 
enabled the educational issue to be translated into a larger communal problem in the 
political arena. Against the backdrop of eroding Chinese representation within the 
UMNO-dominant government and strong oppositional pressure from the mainly Chinese 
DAP (Democratic Action Party), the Chinese-based political parties within the ruling 
coalition such as MCA (Malaysian Chinese Association) felt desperate to prove the value 
of their presence. They needed to reclaim lost support in the community they were 
supposed to represent (Kim Hoong Khong 1991: 27-32). Together, these circumstances 
allowed the formation of a broader community-based coalition to resist the government's 
excessive intervention in their educational affairs. 
The Chinese-based parties-both in the ruling and oppositional fronts-and 
educational pressure groups, for instance, formed an informal alliance in 1987 to 
mobilize Chinese resistance against-and put pressure on-the then Minister of 
Education, Anwar Ibrahim, to quit office. He was seen as intervening excessively in the 
administration of Chinese primary schools while allocating too many resources-and 
visible patronage-to the Islamization of the national education system. There was a 
growing fear on the side of the Chinese that their schools would be merged into the 
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national school system-one that was becoming increasingly Islamic and alien to them 
(Interviews with Chinese educationists, Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 2001; Selangor, 1 August 
2001). 
The federal government-especially the Minister of Education-faced a dilemma: if 
they wanted to expand Islamic education within the framework of the national education 
system, it would alienate non-Muslims from the national schools and they would move to 
the ethnic-based Chinese-language national-type primary schools. On the other hand, 
they needed to accommodate the rising demand from the Muslim community to provide a 
wider range ofreligious subjects within the national educational system. Otherwise, they 
could simply lose students to State government- and private-run religious schools with 
own curriculum.45 On political as well as ideological grounds, this was not a favorable 
option for UMNO leaders. Politically, the outflow of students from the national schools to 
private religious schools might help expand opposition support bases, given that many of 
these schools were seen as PAS sympathizers. Ideologically, the danger for them was that 
more students would be exposed to deviant, anti-establishment, or potentially radical 
Islamic teaching and ideas at these private religious schools, not fully regulated by 
government religious authorities. 46 This dilemma was never resolved, contributing 
further to fragmentation of the national education apparatus. 
At the national level, UMNO top ieadership was aware of the value of the role of the 
economically dynamic Chinese businesses in national economic development, and also 
of their essential political support in elections. Hence, they could not afford to ignore the 
strong and well-organized Chinese demands in the educational sphere. The power of 
Chinese pressure, however, was felt equally firmly at the individual level. As shown in 
the earlier section, the logic of political ascendancy within the party hierarchy and the 
45 Mahathir reiterated the government's hope that the people send their children to national schools instead 
of religious schools, given the popularity of the latter (For instance, 'PM: Acquire both spiritual and 
academic knowledge,' Star Online, 28 November 2002). 
46 
'PendidikanAgama Islam: Kemahami KBSM,' BH, 3 February 1989. 
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incentive to max1m1ze opportunities for dispensing patronage affected the decision 
making and policy implementation of individual UMNO politicians. Since the late 1980s 
the increasing value of businesspeople-both Muslim and Chinese-as political 
financiers for individual UMNO politicians meant that Muslim ruling politicians were 
obliged to address the particular interests of corporate figures. The Muslim businesses, on 
the one hand, might generally be sympathetic to the predicaments of the Islamic schools. 
Yet, they were more concerned about recruiting those trained in more practical areas such 
as economics, accounting, engineering and sciences. Increasing the religious content of 
the national education system was not their topmost priority. The important point here, 
however, is that many of the Muslim businesspeople-unlike their Chinese 
counterparts-heavily depended on their personal ties with UMNO politicians for their 
business success and survival. Their relative lack of bargaining power meant that their 
views about Islamic education issues could readily be overruled by decisions made by 
UMNO politicians. 
The circumstances of Chinese businesspeople were rather different. Their 
entrepreneurial skills and networks were highly valued by business-oriented UMNO 
leaders. For the Chinese businesses, too, their personal ties with individual UMNO 
politicians grew important for their business expansion. But UMNO politicians' 
increasing willingness to associate personally with Chinese corporate figures to finance 
massive electoral expenses, in an environment of increasingly expensive intra-UMNO 
competition, allowed the latter more leeway to have their views heard by these Muslim 
politicians at higher echelons of government. 
Overall, both the business and Chinese communities as well as the urban middle-class 
Muslim community, found the moderate type of Islam promoted by the liberal UMNO 
regime more acceptable than the conservative type of Islam associated with PAS. One 
way to preempt the spread of PAS's Islamic vision was to institutionalize the 
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administrative control over the private Islamic schools and the corps ofreligious teachers 
who run them. This had to be done without UMNO leaders appearing to be suppressing 
Islamic schools and therefore anti-Islam. The federal government's initiative to build 
their own religious educational structures within the national school system-and to take 
over the administration of the private religious schools-was one such effort. 
However, achieving these objectives was not easy, because the perception that this was 
a step towards Islamization of the educational system agitated the Chinese community 
and helped drive away Chinese students to the ethnic-based vernacular schools. The 
necessity to balance these contradictory pressures led to the moderate level of 
institutionalization of the state machinery overseeing religious education. 
UMNO Politicians and Chinese Interests: Anwar s Islamization Drive in Education 
The campaigns to Islamise the national education system pushed by the then Minister of 
Education, Anwar Ibrahim, in the late 1980s best demonstrated UMNO politicians' 
patronage-maximizing incentives-and their vulnerability to Chinese and business 
pressures. Alongside the Chinese pressures, the lack of corporate business interest in this 
area meant that UMNO leaders at the national level had comparatively little incentive to 
be overly attentive to these issues. It was when Anwar was the Minister of Education 
(1986-1991) that the Islamic educational apparatus expanded rapidly at the national 
level. 47 A new concept emphasizing a 'holistic approach' was introduced into the 
National Education Philosophy; the time allocation for Islamic religious education for 
Muslims students was increased; and federal-funded national secondary religious schools 
(SM.KA) were spawned nationwide. Moreover, his care to get his religion-focused policy 
line maintained by the ministers and officials who followed reflected Anwar's special 
interest in inculcating Muslim youth and teachers with strong religious values (Interview 
47 For instance, 'Anwar janji perbaiki pendidikan Islam,' BH, 11 July 1986. 
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with one of Anwar's close associates, Kuala Lumpur, 15 January 2001). 
Importantly, it was the patronage-maximizing incentive that was also driving Anwar's 
aggressive Islamization campaigns when he was at the helm of the Ministry of Education. 
The expansion of the Islamic schools and classes at the various levels resulted in an 
increasing number of religious teachers being employed and given a larger official 
presence in the national education system, together with better material benefits.48 One of 
the most prominent Islamization projects in this educational sector with which Anwar 
was closely associated was the establishment in 1983 of the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia (UIA), the highest Islamic educational institution. His personal 
commitment to the expansion and operation of the University was seminal; he allowed 
himself to become the second President of the University, and a number of his close 
associates and supporters-both old and potential-to hold teaching as well as executive 
positions. Anwar's networking through this project went beyond the administrative 
realm. Tens of thousands of students studying at, and graduating from, the University 
were key targets of his Islamization projects. 
UIA offered local students-especially those religious-educated-a new avenue to 
study Islamic-related subjects locally. An unique character of this Islamic university, 
however, was not only its emphasis on religious training in such an area as Islamic 
jurisprudence or Islamic laws, but also its quest to produce better qualified Muslims both 
in religious as well as secular fields. 49 Since its inception, UIA had been successful in 
these goals; a number of UIA graduates took up prominent professional positions in a 
range of sectors including the judiciary, business, industry and the public service, fields 
where theologically trained Muslims were traditionally under-represented. These 
religiously better-grounded and professionally better-equipped young urban middle-class 
Muslims came to form a strong support base for Anwar. 
48 
'Ulama diminta bangunkan umat: Gunakan pendekatan Islam dengan bijaksana,' BH, 3 August 1988. 
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Through these official Islamization programs, Anwar also expanded an extensive 
clientelistic network within religious circles to which an increasing number of 
better-qualified and better-treated religious teachers and officials were linked. It was not 
at all surprising that Anwar was popular and highly regarded among religious teachers 
and experts, even amongst the opposition.' 50 Given their influence in the Muslim 
community in general and on students in particular, Anwar's patronage-maximizing 
activities through the educational channels had the multiple effect of cementing his 
personal support base among those urban middle-class Muslims as well as theologically 
trained religious teachers and officials. It was those urban middle-class Muslims, 
especially students who participated in the anti-government reformasi movement after 
the sacking of Anwar in 1998 (Weiss 1999: especially 428). 
His aggressive campaign to revamp the national education system and to expand 
Islamic education in the late 1980s, however, not only paid him handsome rewards, but 
also cost a huge price: coupled with his Islamization campaigns, his heavy interventionist 
approaches towards Chinese-medium schools, offended the Chinese as well as business 
communities. 
The key controversy that caused trouble for Anwar was his (his Ministry's) move in 
1987 to appoint non-Mandarin-educated Chinese teachers to administrative posts, 
including as assistant headmasters and senior assistants in Chinese national-type primary 
schools.51 On its own such a move seems minor, but it developed into a controversy 
confirming that educational issues could easily be politicized in conditions of tense inter-
and intra-ethnic rivalry. The Chinese-based opposition party, DAP, in collaboration with 
the Chinese educationalist organizations, the United Chinese School Committees' 
49 For instance, the law major students are required to take both Syariah and civil law subjects. 
50 Interviews with Anwar's close associates, Kuala Lumpur, 14 June 2000; 15 January 2001. See also, 
'Persatuan Guru Agama sokong langkah tambah masa pengajaran Islam,' UM, 19 June 1987. 
51 Government-sponsored primary schools are categorized in two types. One consists of the national 
schools, which use Malay, and the other includes the national-type schools teaching in Chinese. While the 
former are fully funded by the federal government, the latter are only partially supported by the 
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Association Malaysia (MCSCAM or Dong Zang) and the United Chinese Schools 
Teachers' Association (MCSTAM or Jiao Zang), took up the issue and objected to the 
proposed appointments. These groups had always been suspicious of any plan proposed 
by the Ministry that might be a step towards full integration and 'Malayization' of 
Chinese schools. They perceived the recent exercise as an attempt by the government to 
change the character of Chinese schools.52 They felt that they needed to take firm action 
against the new systems of appointments to preempt any further interference in their 
schools. Their animosity towards the government was immediately translated into 
condemnation of the Chinese-based parties within the ruling coalition BN, especially 
MCA. Yet, the issue was too critical for MCA's reputation in the Chinese communities to 
be ignored, in the context of their eroding electoral influence. Some MCA leaders, led by 
the deputy president and Labor Minister, Lee Kim Sai, joined with DAP as well as 15 
other Chinese-based organizations to form a joint action committee to protest against the 
Ministry of Education's policy. They not only urged the Ministry to cancel the 
appointments, but also called on Anwar to resign from office. 53 Further, in some States 
such as Penang and Malacca, they called for a boycott of classes. 54 The issue was not 
simply ethnic, nor inter-party rivalry between DAP and MCA. Intra-party factionalism 
within the two ruling parties, UMNO and MCA, also played some role in exacerbating 
the already wide discrepancy between the government and the Chinese community even 
further. 
The Chinese business community also adopted a strong stance against the Ministry. 
The Kuala Lumpur and Selangor Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, for 
instance, urged the government to ensure promotion of teachers with Chinese language 
government. The number of non-Malay pupils in the national schools has been declining. 
52 Interview with a DAP leader, Petaling Jaya, Selangor, 13 June 2001; 'Why the Furor - Posting of 
non-Chinese educated teachers to Chinese schools: The issues' NST, 11 October 1987. 
53 
'MCA, Gerekan, pledge support for resolutions,' NST, 10 October 1987; 'Kim Sai tells Woon: Settle 
issue or quit,' NST, 12 October 1987; 'UMNO members hold protest,' NST, 12 October 1987. 
54 
'Get them back to school: Call to parents as thousands of pupils stay away from classes,' NST, 16 October 
1987; 'Lessons as usual in most schools,' NST, 17 October 1987. 
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qualifications to fill the vacancies for administrative posts in Chinese primary schools. It 
also called on the government to train more teachers with Chinese qualifications to solve 
the problem of shortage of teachers in the Chinese schools. The president of the 
Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Malaysia (ACCIM), 
likewise, expressed 'full support' for the resolutions adopted by the joint action 
committee, while suggesting that 'the UMNO leadership should respect the wishes of the 
Chinese community and not deliberately hinder the Chinese community from striving for 
their legitimate rights.' 55 
· For Chinese organizations, increasing Islamization trends at the national schools were 
already a source of sufficient concern, since these had the inevitable consequence of 
negligence of non-Muslim interests (Interview with a Chinese educationist leader, 
Kajang, Selangor, 1 August 2001). But, on top of this, the Ministry of Education's overt 
interference in the management of the Chinese-medium schools, evidently, was a grave 
offence beyond their tolerance. Other political factors, such as deep-seated intra-party 
factionalism within MCA as well as UMNO, helped incite ethnic mobilization, and 
escalate the dispute out of proportion, eventually causing the arrest of a number of 
Chinese community leaders. But what should not be overlooked in the context of our 
discussion is that Anwar himself did not take an overtly hostile step against the Chinese 
organizations. He initially expressed his readiness to take drastic action against those who 
did not comply with the Ministry's decisions. 56 However, he soon acknowledged the 
sensitivity of the issues dealing with Chinese schools, since he faced fierce resistance 
from Chinese organizations. He publicly conceded that he would handle promotion and 
transfer exercises of non-Chinese educated teachers 'with more care and consideration.' 57 
The UMNO Youth led by Nazib Tun Razak planned mass rallies to threaten the Chinese 
55 
'Call on Government to promote Chinese teachers,' NST, 14 October 1987. 
56 
'Anwar warns school heads: "Provide right leadership or face action",' NST, 18 September 1987. 
57 
'We've been flexible, says Anwar: "More care" in future appointments of teachers,' NST, 11 October 
1987. 
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organizations to withdraw their resolutions, but Anwar largely stayed away from open 
confrontation. 58 It was apparent that Anwar did not want to be personally involved in the 
conflict and to harm his name any further. Yet, some Chinese leaders still recall that 
Anwar's tenure at education was a bad time for the Chinese community in general and the 
Chinese schools in particular. His aggressive 'Islamic activist' image apparently 
remained too vivid to be erased among them, an image unfavorably compared with his 
rival, Abdullar Ahmad Badawi, who had been the Minister of Education in the early 
1980s (Interview, a Chinese educationist leader, Kuala Lumpur, 27 July 2001 ). And, this 
was precisely the image that he modified to expand his support base. Since the late 1980s, 
as the other chapters show, the UMNO leadership began taking an accommodative 
approach towards the non-Muslim communities, and especially the Chinese. This new 
nation-building attitude-envisioned in Vision 2020-essentially derived from the 
UMNO leaders' recognition that they would need Chinese capital and Chinese skills to 
survive the worst recession to date, and in the long term, to achieve their goal of national 
economic development. Moreover, a number ofUMNO top leaders-especially the new 
generation of Muslim politicians represented by Anwar-began individually to build 
clientelistic partnerships with wealthy corporate figures including Chines(f to secure 
funding sources to rise up the party hierarchy. It was not prudent for them and Anwar to 
keep offending their communal interests. 
All these political considerations had two important effects on policy making and 
implementation on the national education system. First, Chinese schools were left largely 
intact after their clash with the Ministry of Education in 1987. In fact, their popularity 
grew even further despite a shortage of financial support from the government. The 
Ministry of Education may have held a view to fully integrate them into the national 
education system one day. But it was simply impossible without a strong political 
58 
'UMNO Youth rally to be held at TPCA,' NST, 15 October 1987; 'UMNO Youth to stand firm: No 
compromise with Kim Sai - Najib,' NST, 18 October 1987. 
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incentive for UMNO leadership. It was precisely this incentive that was lacking in the 
context of patronage-maximizing incentive structures embedded within UMNO. The 
necessity to continually court the Chinese community in general and the business class in 
particular discouraged the ruling Muslim politicians from taking drastic steps against the 
Chinese schools. 
Second, UMNO leadership, on the other hand, could not neglect growing demands 
from Muslims to provide their children with adequate religious education. Despite the 
increasing significance of the non-Muslim and business communities, the Muslim 
community-both rural and urban-remained their important electoral base. Some 
parents thought that the religious content of the national schools was not sufficient, while 
others considered the national school system too secular. One alternative way to meet 
their demands was to send their children to private religious schools, some of them 
outside the government's administrative orbit. This allowed the latter not only to survive, 
but also to thrive despite poor physical conditions and a lack of qualified teachers. 
UMNO leaders, thus, needed to develop a formula to accommodate them within the 
national education system, while preventing them from being attracted to the 
unauthorized religious schools. The increasingly Islamization of the national schools and 
the development of the national religious secondary schools (SMKA) as well as extra 
religious classes were measures to meet this need. Further, the federal authorities 
proposed to take over the management of private religious schools by offering material 
rewards to teachers. However, this bid proved largely unsuccessful, forcing the federal 
leadership to adopt other administrative and policy measures to exert influence over the 
private religious schools and teachers. The federal authorities' various 'carrot' and 'stick' 
tactics brought about a mixed result, leaving some of the responsibility of providing and 
regulating religious education to State and private actors. 
These patchy arrangements were primarily a result of patronage-maximizing incentive 
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structures of individual UMNO politicians, and intra-party conflict of interests and goals 
among them at various levels-precisely derived from these incentive structures. These 
patronage-maximizing incentives created a new dilemma for UMNO politicians; that of 
balancing contradicting pressures from the Muslim community and the non-Muslim 
community, especially Chinese. Mahathir acknowledged this nation-building problem all 
too well. He pointed out the failure of the national school system to forge understanding 
between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. He lamented that 'the Chinese felt that the 
national schools were "too Malay" while the "Islamic factor" also played a part in their 
perception. On the other hand, the Malays preferred to go to religious schools.' 59 Given 
the patronage-maximizing incentive mechanisms for UMNO politicians, and clientelistic 
networks firmly entrenched within the ruling party hierarchy as a source for intra-party 
political ascendancy, this nation-building dilemma in the educational sector was never 
resolved. 
The overall outcome of all these considerations and arrangements was a medium-level 
of institutionalization of the state mechanisms regulating religious education. 
Non-federal and private actors continually shared the responsibility for providing 
religious education in an arrangement perceived widely as unsatisfactory. 
59 Star Online, 24 November 2002. 
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CHAPTER6 
In the Name of the Muslim Poor: 
UMNO's Patronage and the Privatization of 
The Islamic Taxation (Zakat) 
The Islamization policy inaugurated under the Mahathir administration in 1981 created 
and revamped a range of Islamic institutions. As the prior two chapters have shown, the 
jurisdiction of Islamic agencies was expanded-to various degrees and in a variety of 
ways-within the state. Moreover, the Muslim religious elite, known as ulama, had 
become better-qualified with the influx of theologically trained graduates who had been 
produced at the Islamic educational institutions that had thrived since the 1980s. This new 
religious elite was swiftly incorporated into the civil service as Islamic court officials, 
teachers and Islamic affairs officers in government agencies. 
Given this conspicuous trend toward institutionalization of state Islamic agencies 
across sectors, the comparatively low level of state institutionalization of administration 
of zakat, one of the five pillars of the Muslim faith, was intriguing. In this charity-based 
welfare-financial sector, there were some organizational efforts by individual religious 
authorities at State level to incorporate new expertise and develop new mechanisms and 
schemes. A primary objective of these efforts was to increase zakat revenue as well as 
diversify distribution of collected funds to a wider range of less-privileged Muslims. 
Efforts to make the management of zakat funds more efficient and reliable were also 
evident. Extremely limited official, and unofficial, coordination among vanous 
governmental agencies, however, left the system of zakat administration weakly 
organized and with little authority. Moreover, the concurrent development of an Islamic 
welfare mechanism equivalent to the zakat but outside the formal bureaucratic structure, 
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personally sponsored by powerful UMNO politicians, further undermined the reputation 
and morale of the zakat institution and religious officials who ran it. UMNO politicians 
promoted the development of zakat-like mechanisms not only for religious reasons, but 
also as a means to create their own avenues for the practice of patronage. This 
arrangement was, after all, intended to maximize opportunities to build up broad-based 
support to secure ascendancy in the party hierarchy. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The· first section briefly overviews the 
fundamental mechanisms, as well as structural problems, of zakat management. This is 
followed by a review of the organizational development of zakat management since the 
late 1980s. The subsequent sections examine how patronage-maximizing incentive 
structures of individual UMNO politicians have shaped the institutionalization oflslamic 
welfare mechanisms within and outside the state. Here, the logic of intra-party political 
rivalry is introduced as the key explanatory variable. 
The Underdevelopment of the National Zakat Mechanism 
Outdated and Incompetent Zakat Management 
A brief overview of the zakat management structures helps us identify issues that 
influenced the reform campaigns spearheaded by the federal and State religious 
authorities since the late 1980s. Zakat, theoretically, is an obligatory payment for all 
Muslims. Zakat funds are dispersed to the asnaf(those entitled to receive zakat payments) 
according to rules set by the Syariah (Islamic laws). In principle, zakat is an instrument to 
help eradicate poverty, and it functions as a 'taxation' mechanism for social and welfare 
purposes and for the redistribution of wealth. In reality, the institution of zakat is 
interpreted broadly to tax a wider range of revenues and to sponsor a wider range of 
social-welfare and financial schemes. The scope and the scale of zakat, therefore, vary 
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across time, place and circumstances. 
In Malaysia, unlike some other Muslim countries, the legally recognized 
administration of zakat is solely managed by the government. There is, however, 
variation between the States in the administration of zakat payment, collection and 
distribution. In view of this, in the late 1980s, the federal and State religious authorities 
initiated a reform campaign to improve the management of zakat. 
Since Islamic affairs fall under the jurisdiction of the State governments, specifically 
the Heads of States or sultans (except in Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Malacca as well as the 
East Malaysian States), the State authorities handle administration of zakat. In all States 
except Kedah, the Maj/is Agama (Religious Council), which is responsible to the sultan, 
runs a zakat office. In other words, the zakat fund was administered exclusively at the 
State level. There was almost no coordination among the State governments or between 
the federal and State authorities. The limited coordination among the Religious Affairs 
Departments in the management of zakat was a major contributory factor to the 
inefficient and ineffective implementation of this fund nationwide (Aidit bin Ghazali 
1991: 85-87). 
The most widespread problem faced by the zakat offices was the shortage of 
resources-physical, financial as well as technical expertise-to develop and enforce 
new programs and mechanisms. The zakat departments were almost exclusively staffed 
by those trained in Islamic Studies-ulama and ustaz (religious teachers). Expertise in the 
Syariah was, however, not an adequate qualification to operate zakat funds. Zakat 
officials were also poorly equipped with key secular knowledge, in such fields as 
accounting, finance and administration. The lack of financial resources, and limited 
political attention, had left the zakat offices unequipped to mobilize adequate resources 
and develop a better system of zakat administration. For example, bookkeeping was not 
systematic, and survey or census data that could facilitate zakat administration in their 
planning was not adequate. The problem of nonpayment was left unattended as a result 
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(Aidit bin Ghazali 1991: 104-105; A.Manap Said and A.Ghani Otlunan 1980). 
Furthermore, since public campaigns were rare, due to inadequate manpower, many 
Muslims were uninformed of their religious duty. A problem arising from such public 
unawareness was that many Muslims misunderstood their obligatory zakat payment as 
limited to the annualfitrah tax (zakat collected at the end of the fasting month), and were 
ignorant of other types of zakat. 1 The fitrah tax was very small, usually, RM3-5 
(US$0.8- l .3), compared to other taxes with much more potential to raise funds for 
welfare purposes. 
In addition, a public perception that the zakat is a royal matter and thus these funds 
cannot be touched has provided zakat offices with much insulation from both the 
government and society.2 Therefore, allegations of corrupt practices, such as the misuse 
of zakat funds, were common. An outcome of such allegations, as well as the other 
shortcomings, was that some Muslims paid zakat directly to mosques or orphanages 
known personally to them. Since there was no administrative control over these unofficial 
zakat collections by third parties, this created an opportunity for illegal activities, such as 
bogus collectors. On the whole, public confidence was very low in the way the zakat 
offices were managed and these funds were distributed (See, for instance, Aidit bin 
Ghazali 1991: 106). 
In addition to these problems was the issue and impact of partisan politics, involving 
the long-standing rivalry between UMNO and PAS. Partisan politics had had a major 
influence on the pattern of zakat payment. PAS supporters, for instance, tended not to 
make contributions to zakat institutions in States ruled by UMNO. They had little faith in 
1 The rate of zakat fitrah was changed every year and varied from one State to another. (For the rates 
charged in the individual States in 2000, see BH, 7 December 2000). In some small States, such as Perlis, 
the expenditure incurred by the collectors took up a major part of the zakat income, leaving little for welfare 
purposes (Aidit bin Ghazali 1991: 100). 
2 The level of administrative insulation of zakat management from the royal house varies from State to State 
depending on, for example, who is the head of the religious council. If the chief minister or the head of the 
religious department leads the zakat office, as is the case in Negri Sembilan, the State government 
obviously possesses considerable influence over the way these funds are managed. 
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the impartiality of zakat managers, especially in the way they dispersed funds, in 
UMNO-led States (Harakah 16-30 August 200i). It was against this backdrop that the 
Religious Councils in some States launched a reform campaign in the late 1980s to 
restructure the outdated and inefficient system of zakat management. 
Limited Evolution of National Zakat 
D{iring the early 1990s, all States recorded a dramatic increase in zakat revenue, primarily 
due to economic growth, a rise in personal income and a stronger religious consciousness 
and sense of obligation among increasingly affluent Muslims (see table 6.1 ). In some 
States, especially those in the more developed west coast of the peninsula, the zakat 
agencies developed new mechanisms to collect funds more efficiently or they revamped 
their administration to introduce more innovative revenue sources, for example, the 
business zakat (zakat perniagaan ). Other types of zakat include zakat harta (property 
zakat), zakat pendapatan (income zakat), zakat simpanan (saving zakat) and so forth. 
These types of zakat revenues, in fact, take up a major part of the annual zakat revenue in 
most States (PPZ, Laporan Zakat, 1999-2000: 78). 
The most notable development in the 1990s was the establishment of a corporate body 
under the Religious Council solely to manage the collection of zakat in six States. The 
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur initiated the new experiment in 1991, followed by five 
other States-Selangor, Penang, Pahang, Malacca and Negri Sembilan. These corporate 
bodies introduced a computerized management and accounting system, new programs, 
document forms, advertisements and PR activities and other services. These new 
instruments were introduced not only to increase revenue but also to transform a system 
traditionally seen as inefficient or corrupt into one that was transparent and efficient. 
Kuala Lumpur the-most advanced technologically-even developed its own on-line 
networking system that links the headquarters to various branch offices. This device 
allowed any branch officers access to up-to-date information, thereby making the 
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management system more efficient, systematic, and customer-friendly.3 In tl~e late 1990s, 
Selangor and Penang went one step further by allowing these corporate bodies to take 
over the zakat collection as well as distribution operations. 4 This was a remarkable 
development because the religious councils were normally very hesitant to relinquish 
even a small amount of authority, let alone give up control over distribution of religious 
funds, as a means to exert influence over Muslims. Moreover, these corporate bodies 
employed a large number of non-Syariah educated officials-those trained in fields such 
as accounting, economics, business and public administration-to run the zakat offices. 
In Kuala Lumpur's zakat collection agency, PPZ (Pusat Pungutan Zakat), for example, 
only five out of the thirty-three staff were educated in Islamic theology. Twenty of these 
thrity-three staff were employed to perform administrative duties. The top management 
staff all had some business background-academic qualifications as well as career 
experience-while some were even educated abroad (and not in the Middle-East). Their 
3 Interview with the zakat collection agency official, PPZ, Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 2000. For the 
development of the zakat management in Kuala Lumpur, see Mohamed Dahan (1998). 
4 For the changes that occurred in the State of Penang, see Ismail Saad (2000: 12). 
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emphasis on professionalism and efficiency was in sharp contrast with the attitude of the 
theologically trained officials that had originally managed the zakat departments. 
These improvements were, however, essentially technical in nature,. involving little 
reform of the organization and administration of zakat. Since the 1980s, when UMNO 
launched a variety oflslamization programs, there had been occasional calls from Islamic 
scholars and economists to develop and standardize zakat management nationwide. 
Against the backdrop of an Islamic resurgence in Malaysia, the economics departments in 
the public universities-in conjunction with Religious Departments--organized 
seminars and workshops aimed at exploring ways to develop the zakat system into a 
comprehensive welfare program.5 It was not until the early 1990s, however, that the 
federal Islamic Development Department (Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or 
J AKIM) expressed particular interest in encroaching upon the management of zakat. The 
zakat was originally not high on JAKIM's agenda. 
In 2000, Abdul Hamid Othman, the Minister in the Prime Minister's Department 
responsible for religious affairs, announced that the federal government would 
standardize nationally the system overseeing both the collection and distribution of zakat 
funds to ensure optimal performance in all States. To this end, a new national 
administrative agency, Lembaga Urusan Zakat Malaysia (LUZAM, or Malaysian Zakat 
Management Board), was proposed. Under the proposed system, a fixed-rate (2.5 per 
cent) of zakat would be deducted from the income of Muslim individuals. The Inland 
Revenue Board was to be responsible for collecting this tax (NST, 21 June 2000; UM, 21 
June 2000). However, no formal administrative coordination between the federal and 
State governments has emerged so far. 6 
Even prior to this new proposal from the federal government, zakat officials had 
5 The newly established Islamic think-tank sponsored by the federal government, Institut Kefahaman Islam 
Malaysia (IKIM, or Institute oflslamic Understanding, Malaysia) ~lso organized some seminars on zakat. 
6 When this mechanism is put into operation, the current zakat management offices in the States will 
become redundant. It is, therefore, not surprising that almost no State has responded positively to this 
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viewed new developments in other States with envy, and competed with one another in 
terms of annual revenue targets. 7 Competition existed not only among zakat offices in the 
various States, but also among institutions within a State, making coordination even more 
difficult. Sultans, the constitutional heads of religious affairs in each State, and the 
religious councils were extremely suspicious of any attempt to impinge on their fiscal 
authority. For example, they did not give their consent to a suggestion to subcontract 
distribution of zakat funds to corporate bodies after the notable success of the corporate 
mechanism in collection, leaving the system organizationally less integrated. 8 Their 
resistance to change weakened attempts to enhance transparency, efficiency and 
accountability in the management of zakat funds. 
The biggest obstacle to the reconstruction of zakat management was the weak 
enforcement powers conferred on its officials. Unlike the other two sectors-judiciary 
and education-no legislative measures were introduced to facilitate the administration 
of zakat. In other words, the state religious authorities had little executive power to 
impose new types of zakat and enforce the obligatory payment (in a legal sense).9 Even 
though some States were now equipped with a range of very innovative zakat programs 
and new technologies to advance them, these payments-unlike ordinary taxes-were not 
legally authorized. Thus, payment of these new types of zakat was left solely to the 
goodwill of individual Muslims. Zakat officials acknowledged that the absence of legal 
authority to collect payments was the main hindrance to the full implementation of zakat 
collection. It was not easy, they argued, to persuade Muslims, who were often 
unenthusiastic about being levied extra taxation, to see the payment as an obligation. 10 
proposal. 
7 Such inter-State rivalry was understandable since the State zakat agencies, especially the corporate ones, 
had to be self-sufficient with little or no external financial assistance. 
8 This suggestion was only adopted in Selangor and Penang. The reluctance to adopt this suggestion was 
apparently because it involved loss of discretionary power to determine how the funds were distributed. 
9 Some States, such as Malacca and Johor, did attempt to introduce legislation involving the zakat (BH, 24 
October 2000). 
10 Interviews with various zakat officials in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor in 2001 and 2002. 
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Patronage-Maximization and Minimal Institutionalization of Zakat Administration 
The absence of intra-governmental coordination, specifically between the religious 
departments and the Ministry of Finance, was the most critical administrative barrier to 
the state institutionalization of a better-organized zakat system nationwide. The type of 
zakat collection mechanism that emerged in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur is an 
illuminating case. The zakat levied on individual income earners evolved into a 
successful program, bringing substantial funds into the coffers of this agency. On the 
other hand, the failure to expand this tax on business, possibly the most lucrative source 
of zakat revenue if enforced successfully, contrasted sharply with the success of the 
personal income zakat. Despite relatively large contributions from some prominent (often 
Muslim-led) firms, the business zakat did not take off. Even Islamic-based corporate 
contributors, such as the Tabung Haji (the Pilgrims Management and Fund Board) and 
Bank Islam, regularly contributed business zakat primarily because this was required 
under the legislative provisions governing their operation (e.g., Akta Lembaga Urusan 
dan Tabung Haji l 969 and the Islamic Banking Act 1983). 11 
Zakat officials from the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Selangor (the States 
registering the highest collection ofrevenue and which were the most innovative in terms 
of management) acknowledged that the unwillingness of corporate bodies to pay zakat 
was very problematic and disturbing. 12 Without the statutory power to compel company 
owners to pay business zakat, the only avenue left to zakat officers was to deploy 
Syariah-trained officers to patiently preach to them about the importance of fulfilling 
their religious duties. 13 
11 For an in-depth discussion on the Tabung Haji, see Radiah (1991: 154-55). 
12 See, for instance, Pusat Zakat Selangor, Asnaf(February 2001: 9). 
13 Interview with zakat official, Kuala Lumpur, 19 June 2000. 
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The non-payment problem arose primarily because of the reluctance of the Ministry of 
Finance to grant corporate contributors a tax rebate incentive in return for zakat payment. 
The impact of the tax rebate was potentially significant as the case of the rebate on 
individual income tax shows. In the case of individual income zakat, the revenue from 
this source increased dramatically after a tax-deduction scheme (potongan gaji) was put 
into effect. This scheme encouraged Muslims to make zakat payments as part of their 
regular tax payments without taking the trouble of going to a zakat office to make the 
payment. Potential zakat payers, especially those living in urban areas, apparently 
appreciated this service as the old procedure of zakat payment could be very 
time-consuming. Even with this tax-deduction instrument, however, there was a loophole. 
For this scheme to be implemented properly, employers had to agree to send to the 
taxation office the deductions made from their employees' income. In practice, a 
considerable number of private companies have yet to utilize this scheme to make the 
deductions. 14 This fact alone suggests that there was inadequate pressure from any one of 
the parties involved-employers, employees or the Ministry of Finance-to enforce this 
religious obligation. The inadequacy of the scheme, without legal compulsion, was 
painfully evident. 
It appeared that the Ministry of Finance had little confidence in the capacity of the 
religious officials in either JAKIM or the State Religious Councils to competently 
manage vast sums of public funding. This was evident when JAKIM, as well as zakat 
officials, approached the Ministry of Finance to seek the latter's assistance in their efforts 
to standardize the zakat operation. When asked to grant tax rebates for zakat (business 
zakat in particular), the ministry officials urged JAKIM to first standardize its operations 
14 In 1999, in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, for instance, only 227 employers adopted this tax 
deduction arrangement. Despite various new facilities introduced by the zakat office, some people still 
preferred the over-the-counter payment method, reportedly to get a feeling of having performed a religious 
obligation (Pusat Pungutan Zakat, Laporan Zakat 1999-2000: 27). Another important factor discouraging 
private companies to agree to this tax deduction arrangement is that many of the companies are owned by 
non-Muslims, especially Chinese. 
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to make it more professional. In other words, the Ministry of Finance sought a 'mission 
impossible' from JAKIM: unless all the States consented to conceding jurisdiction over 
zakat to federal authorities, the idea of granting a tax rebate for a corporate zakat would 
not be considered. The Ministry of Finance's distrust of officials from religious agencies 
thus posed a great obstacle to the institutional advancement of the zakat administration. 
The failure of zakat officials to forge a wider intra-governmental pact was in contrast 
to the better coordination established among various agencies in other sectors. In the case 
of the judiciary, for instance, there was good coordination among various state actors, i.e., 
between the Syariah court officials and their civil counterparts, as well as among federal 
and State religious departments. This helped bringing about a high level of 
institutionalization of the Syariah court. 
Even in education, where the institutionalization of the national religious educational 
system was modest, some intra-governmental coordination to create a more 
comprehensive administrative mechanism overseeing these Islamic institutions emerged 
at the federal level as well as between the federal and State authorities. The Advisory 
Council for the Co-ordination of Islamic Education (Lembaga Penasihat Penyelarasan 
Pelajaran dan Pendidikan Agama Islam, or LEPAI) was formed in 1983 in an effort to 
coordinate the teaching oflslam in all religious schools not administered by the Ministry 
of Education (i.e., private as well as State-run religious schools). Its secretariat was 
placed under JAK.IM, but a majority of the staff was seconded from the Ministry of 
Education, facilitating intra-governmental coordination at the federal level and to a lesser 
degree, between the federal and State governments. 
The importance of intra-state coordination among various government agencies was 
also seen in the 1980s with the establishment of the Islamic bank and Islamic insurance 
company (Takaful). Malaysia's Bank Islam was the first Islamic bank to be established 
with direct government involvement. To successfully develop Bank Islam, the goodwill 
of various authorities including officials from the Ministry of Finance and Bank Negara 
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(the central bank) was imperative. This was especially so because there was some 
concern, among Muslims and non-Muslims, that the establishment of Bank Islam was a 
first step toward the Islamization of the entire financial sector (Zakariya Man 1988). 
As for the zakat, the lack of intra-state coordination reflected-and was the result 
of-the reluctance of UMNO's top leadership. to intervene to secure its proper 
implementation. UMNO's reluctance to intervene in this matter was rather odd given its 
stated commitment to its Islamization policy and the rising religious consciousness 
among Muslims and their economic affluence. The zakat system, in fact, could 
potentially be developed and utilized as a comprehensive social welfare mechanism. 
Indeed, the zakat revenue rose and charity (sadaqat) activities became common in the 
Muslim community since more Muslim attained material affluence in the past decades. 15 
Given this condition, building a better zakat system could have earned Muslim politicians 
extra political points. An especially attractive incentive for Muslim politicians was the 
Islamic rhetoric that they could articulate to advance charity welfare activities for their 
Muslim constituencies. Indeed, the initiatives of some UMNO politicians holding office 
at State level (for instance, as the chief minister) helped to develop the administration of 
zakat in some States, such as Malacca, Negeri Sembilan and the Federal Territory of 
Kuala Lumpur. These State leaders made use of their prerogatives to do service in the 
interests of Muslims-their chief electoral constituency. Nonetheless, only some 
relatively minor UMNO politicians carried out these efforts to promote zakat; the 
involvement of federal-level leaders was minimal. Zakat officials suggest that even 
Anwar Ibrahim, a most resourceful and celebrated UMNO politician as far as Islamic 
matters were concerned, did not express particular interest in centralizing the system 
despite, they believe, his capacity to do so, particularly after becoming the Minister of 
15 For the general trend of these activities in Southeast Asia, see, for instance, Mohamed Ariff. In Islam, the 
concept of sadaqat (charity), an action of rendering assistance to the under-privileged, is highly cherished 
and strongly recommended (Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi 1991). 
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Finance in 1991. 
Anwar, of course, did not oppose entirely the proposal to standardize the 
implementation of zakat. He, in fact, fully acknowledged the need and the benefit of 
revamping the management of zakat nationwide, and expressed a desire to do what he 
technically could to achieve this objective. For instance, he proposed that zakat should be 
collected just like the income tax and that all Muslims, including the Sultans, pay the 
zakat (Star, 29 January 1993). He also revealed that the Ministry of Finance was 
consulting various experts, including ulama and legal experts, to develop efficient and 
systematic zakat programs (NST, 29 January 1993). In substance, however, his 
contribution to the promotion of zakat was minimal. 
Anwar's reluctance to promote zakat was especially puzzling if one considers the 
potential effect of developing a sophisticated Islamic system to reduce poverty, a personal 
agenda advocated by him since the beginning of his political career. Anwar 
acknowledged that 'the zakat system was based on compulsory assistance to the poor 
rather than voluntary charity, and an efficient modem method of disbursal was needed to 
ensure that it reached those most in need' (NST, 29 January 1993). Why, then, was Anwar 
unwilling-or unable-to get involved in the zakat? 
UMNO's patronage-maximizing incentive mechanisms provide an explanation for the 
reluctance of top party leaders to deal with zakat operations, and its underdevelopment as 
a national administrative system. The patronage-maximizing mechanisms, and the 
intra-party logic of political ascendancy in particular, had a significant effect on decision 
making among top UMNO leaders. 
Three points need to be reiterated to appreciate the impact of the 
patronage-maximizing incentive mechanism on the institutional formation and 
development of the zakat. First, the UMNO's growing dominance within the ruling 
coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) and the highly centralized party structure meant that the 
UMNO president, along with a few top leaders, were endowed with massive prerogatives 
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over the distribution of public resources for both vested political and business interests. In 
the political sphere, key public offices at federal and State levels were allocated to 
individuals allied closely with UMNO top leadership. An important result of this was that 
the support of these UMNO leaders, especially the president, became essential to rise 
within the party and the government. The same patronage-based distributional logic 
operated in the economic sphere, too. Business resources and opportunities-projects, 
contracts, licenses, loans, company shares and so on-were distributed to individuals 
closely associated with influential UMNO politicians (Case 1997: 395-96; Gomez 1996a: 
89-93). 
Second, to ascend the highly centralized party hierarchy and to finance the enormous 
expenses to contest party elections, UMNO politicians sought to build close ties with 
wealthy corporate figures-Muslim and non-Muslims alike. Businessmen were willing 
to associate with and fund influential UMNO politicians as a means to promote their 
personal business interests. Competition escalated among big businesses for access to 
profitable government projects, further encouraging patronage-networking activities 
between UMNO politicians and corporate figures (Gomez and Jomo 1997: 120-30). 
Third, the increasing dependence of UMNO politicians on funds from the corporate 
sector made politicians considerably amenable to the views and interests of businessmen. 
This influenced decision making among UMNO leaders, including the development of 
Islamic welfare agencies. Moreover, given their emphasis on economic development, 
UMNO leaders had to take into account the obvious entrepreneurial capacity of Chinese 
businesses, in contrast to the rather embryonic Malay business community which was still 
heavily dependent on the government for their rise, success and survival (Gomez 1999: 
135-37, 189-90). An important result of this was that UMNO leaders became very 
receptive to business interests, especially those owned by Chinese. 
In this context, the political drawbacks of alienating businessmen through business 
zakat had to be weighed against the potential gains from promoting the zakat to assist 
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·poor Muslims. Another factor encouraging UMNO leaders to consider alternatives to 
zakat was that neither PAS nor any other organizations posed an immediate threat to them 
in terms of developing or promoting this welfare system. If there had been such a threat, it 
might have motivated UMNO politicians to reinforce federal control over zakat 
management. The lack of an attempt by a third party to develop a 'private' zakat 
organization allowed UMNO leaders to consider developing and institutionalizing 
alternative patronage-maximizing mechanisms, similar to the zakat, but outside the 
formal bureaucratic sphere. 
In the Name of NGO: Rise of Islamic Welfare Organizations 
The reluctance ofUMNO's top leaders to contribute to the expansion and centralization 
of the zakat does not necessarily mean that they cared little about this religious duty or the 
need to upgrade the welfare of underprivileged Muslims. The value of the Islamic welfare 
mechanism and its impact on their political profile, in fact, were well recognized by 
UMNO politicians, and Anwar in particular. 
Anwar committed himself-and provided ample political and financial patronage-to 
the expansion of a financial-cum-welfare organization equivalent to the zakat, but under a 
different label. Most importantly, this institution was placed outside .. the ambit of the 
federal bureaucracy, taking the form of a non-governmental organization (NG0). 16 
One prominent welfare organization was the Yayasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Islam 
Malaysia (YPEIM, or Malaysian Islamic Economic Foundation), previously an inactive 
quasi-government foundation established in 1974. Having noticed its potential for 
16 Other prominent UMNO politicians used this yayasan (welfare foundation) formula as a means to 
promote their political profile. One example was the former Mentri Besar (chief minister) of Selangor, 
Muhammad Taib, who established the Yayasan Basmi Kemiskinan Selangor (YBK, or Foundation for the 
Eradication of Poverty, Selangor). For a discussion on the formation of this organization and the role it 
played in helping to promote Muhammad's political objectives, see Tuan Nooriani (2001: chap.3). 
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developing Islamic economic activities, the Islamic Consultative Council (Badan 
Perunding Islam) chaired then by Anwar took up the task of re-capitalizing and 
revamping the foundation in 1984. Prime Minister Mahathir lent his quiet backing to this 
endeavor as its founder, but his involvement in the foundation was minimal at best. That 
YPEIM had access to preferential government treatment was evident when the Ministry 
of Finance authorized that all corporate contributions to this foundation could be declared 
as a tax deduction, a privilege not granted to the government-run zakat office. 
The list of corporate contributors to YPEIM (see Table 6.2) and the size of each 
contribution underline three important points. These points help explain why Anwar--or 
any other UMNO politician-was unwilling to concentrate on the official zakat, and 
instead sought an alternative channel to advance the welfare cause. First, some of the 
business contributors to YPEIM were Chinese-owned companies. In other words, this 
type of charity mechanism, although Islamic in principle, could draw donations not only 
from Muslims but also from non-Muslims. The zakat, in contrast, is a charity system 
meant exclusively for Muslims, both the contributors as well as the beneficiaries. If 
non-Muslims are involved in a business, zakat is imposed solely on the Muslim 
shareholders. Thus, compared to the zakat agency, a yayasan (foundation), in theory, can 
expect a larger volume of donations from a wider source of contributors. Second, the size 
of the contribution by each individual or company can be large. No company was willing 
to contribute such a large amount as the zakat purpose-without legal compulsion-as 
long as this payment was not tax deductable. On the other hand, the size of the donations 
by corporations to YPEIM, led by an influential politician, was usually quite large; even 
ifthe tax rebate for its corporate contributors is discounted. Third and finally, a number of 
the contributors were politically well-connected companies, mostly having ties to Anwar 
or UMNO. They had a history of being granted lucrative government business 
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Table 6.2: List of Corporate Donors to YPEIM 
Company 
1. Talam Corporation Bhd. 
2. Lankhorst Pancabumi Sdn. Bhd. 
3. DRB-Hicom Bhd. 
4. Classic Horizons Sdn. Bhd. 
5. Hong Leong Foundation 
6. Darul Sasarn 
7. Philleo Allied Bank Bhd. 
8. Malaysian Resources Corp Bhd. (MRCB) 
9. Malaysia Alliance Assurance Bhd. 
10. MBF Group of Companies 
11. Affin Holdings Bhd. 
12 Gopeng Bhd. 
13 ABRAR Group International Sdn. Bhd. 
14. Koperasi Tunas Muda Sungai Ora 
15. Southern Bank Bhd. 
16. Bank of Commerce Bhd. 
17. Permodalan Nasional Bhd. (PNB) 
18. Supura Holdings Bhd. 
19. KFC Holding Bhd. 
20. Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd. 
21. Syarikat Takaful (M) Bhd. 
22. Guthire Bhd. 
23. Scomi Sdn. Bhd. 
24. Syarikat KMZ Sdn. Bhd. 
25. Tegastia Sdn. Bhd. 
26. Kumpulan Syarikat Safa 
27. Tetuan Tarmili, Azhar & Co. 
28. IBSOL Holdings Sdn. Bhd. 
29. Hisyam, Sobri & Kadir 
30. Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd. 
31. Avon Cosmetics (M) Sdn. Bhd 
32. BBIM Securities Sdn. Bhd. 
33. Koperasi Kesatuan Guru-Guru Melayu 
Source: Bulletin YPEIM. 
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Size of donation 
RM 2,000,000 
RM 1,000,000 
RM 750,000 
RM 500,000 
RM 200,000 
RM 160,000 
RM 100,000 
RM 60,000 
RM 30,000 
RM 25,000 
RM 20,000 
RM 10,000 
concessions through these political ties. 17 Taking all of these factors into consideration, it 
is reasonable for us to suspect that such sizable contributions to this politically 
well-connected organization were motivated by more than purely religious 
considerations. 
The special favors granted to YPEIM included not just the tax rebate for corporate 
contributors. The federal government, through the Prime Minister's office, circulated an 
instruction to the public sector, at both federal and State levels, that individual 
departments introduce a potongan gaji (salary-deduction) arrangement for its employees 
with YPEIM. This was to encourage public servants to make 'voluntary' contributions to 
YPEIM's charity-welfare schemes (Maklumat YPEIM). This type of assistance from the 
highest echelon of the federal government was not offered to the zakat agencies, although 
some State governments provided a similar salary deduction facility for their employees. 
The corporate contributions, along with other government sponsorship, brought in a 
significant amount of funding for YPEIM's operational expansion. It is particularly 
noteworthy that YPEIM's dramatic organizational expansion and high profile occurred 
after Anwar took over the Ministry of Finance in 1991. The Ministry made available to 
YPEIM considerable funding and facilities through the Ministry-linked banks, most 
notably the Bank Islam and Bank Rakyat, for developing new Islamic schemes and 
expanding branches nationwide. For instance, an Islamic pawn scheme (Skim 
Ar-Rahnu/Pajak Gadai Islam) was launched in 1993 through Bank Rakyat, in 
conjunction with Bank Negara, the central bank. Bank Rakyat's branches and finance 
facilities were utilized to provide the service nationwide. What is significant is that 
individuals associated with Anwar through ABIM18 were appointed as senior officials in 
YPEIM. 
Although YPEIM had abundant funding, it lacked the mechanisms, skills and 
17 The author appreciates Terence Gomez for this observation. 
18 Anwar had long ledABIM, the most prominent Islamic NGO in Malaysia, before his entry into UMNO. 
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information to reach out to the poor at the grass-roots. To offset its weak institutional 
framework for welfare work, cooperative ties were developed by YPEIM with another 
prominent NGO, the Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM). AIM was originally established by 
some academics based in the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM, or Science University of 
Malaysia) in the State of Penang, as a micro-credit financial program aimed at uplifting 
the livelihood of the hardcore poor. 19 The program, based on the Grameen Bank 
micro-credit concept, did not have any particular Islamic consideration when it was first 
introduced. 20 Nor did AIM have any intention of customizing its program exclusively for 
Muslims. AIM managed to secure attention of high-ranking Malay bureaucrats who were 
willing to offer assistance to further the NGO's welfare program. AIM then drew 
substantial financial support, as well as official backing from the government at both 
federal and State levels, enabling it to rapidly expand geographically and operationally.21 
The potential of AIM's program, in reaching out to underprivileged Muslims, caught 
the attention of YPEIM-and Anwar. Through YPIEM and other official and personal 
channels, Anwar and individuals associated with him offered lavish financial assistance 
and provided much publicity to AIM in exchange for access to its technical skills, 
expertise and grass-roots networks. What made this pact unique was that AIM was urged 
to adjust its operations to one clearly based on Islamic principles. The riba (interest) 
elements were eliminated from the loan scheme, and a fixed administration fee was 
introduced instead. This Islamization effect, in fact, had a positive impact on AIM: the 
growth of Muslim membership. Muslim members, however, soon came to see the 
program as their own, driving off non-Muslims members as a result. 
In the mid-1990s, Anwar and individuals closely linked to him apparently plotted a 
takeover of AIM. The original AIM management staff was sidelined and replaced by 
19 For more detailed information on AIM, see Gibbons and Sukor (1990). 
20 Grameen bank is a micro-credit system for the poorest of the poor in rural Bangladesh. The program was 
introduced by Professor Muhammad Yun us, the founder of Grameen Bank and its Managing Director. 
21 Interview with David Gibbons, Kuala Lumpur, 14 December 2000; Sukor Kasim, Penang, 9 February 
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ABIM associates linked to Anwar. This takeover maneuver had a number of significant 
outcomes. On the political front, AIM's flirtation with one of UMNO's most prominent 
politicians undoubtedly earned the organization extra mileage in terms of drawing 
abundant financial assistance from, and recognition by, the government. The 
government's five-year Malaysia Plans made special reference to AIM to acknowledge 
its contribution to poverty eradication among the hard-core poor (Malaysia 1993: 66). 
Following this management takeover by ABIM members, AIM's fundamental principle 
of a non-partisan approach-a prime source of its success-was abandoned, thereby 
locating the program in Anwar's personal turf. 
This political maneuvering seems to have had a high cost on the operational front. 22 
Under the new management, the orientation of AIM's program was skewed more towards 
business. New programs, such as entrepreneurship development, were emphasized, while 
the fundamental objective of the organization-poverty eradication of the hard-core 
poor-was neglected. The organization's new orientation then encouraged the less poor 
and even the non-poor to become members, thereby alienating the poorest-AIM's chief 
clients. These old members came to see that the program was evolving into one similar to 
existing government development strategies, which aimed to distribute benefits to the 
poor, but the actual beneficiaries were the non-poor (Sukor Kasim 2000: 279). 
Consequently, the membership dropout rate rose dramatically (Sukor Kasim 2000: 
chap.12). 
The most important political consequence of the AIM takeover was the 
patronage-maximizing benefit accruing to Anwar. With AIM under his control, Anwar 
managed to extend his personal patronage networks to the poorest Malay communities. 
Through AIM, he could utilize more flexible, redtape-free, non-bureaucratic channels to 
,2001; various issues of AIM annual reports. 
22 The analysis in this section is drawn largely from the evaluation by Sukor Kasim, AIM's former director 
see Sukor Kashim (2000), as well as my interview with him, Penang, 9 February 2001. 
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reach out to poor Malays. This was, indeed, a politically astute move. Anwar's associates 
justified this takeover on the grounds that he had little confidence in the capacity of the 
state religious agencies to implement an effective social welfare program. He chose to 
launch his own program in the non-government sphere rather than wasting time and 
resources by making use of the inefficient and incompetent state agency. 23 Anwar's 
association with a welfare-charity NGO helped further enhance his profile as an 
exemplary Muslim leader willing to fight for his fellow underprivileged Muslims. 
UMNO-Business-Chinese Nexus 
The development of two overlapping, and competing, systems based on the same Islamic 
charity principle highlights, and is best explained by, the patronage-maximizing 
mechanisms influencing UMNO politicians. The importance of contributions by business 
corporations-both Muslim and non-Muslim, especially the Chinese-to UMNO 
politicians to help them ascend the party hierarchy has shaped the institutional formation 
and development of these Islamic agencies. 
UMNO leaders at the federal level considered it politically imprudent to promote the 
zakat controlled at State-level, and thus had little incentive to encourage Malay 
businessmen to contribute funds to this agency. Moreover, a majority of Malaysian 
businessmen appeared very anxious about the religious rhetoric advanced by PAS. They 
feared that PAS 's growing influence would lead to an increasing Islamization trend,within 
UMNO, which would have a negative effect on investment patterns in Malaysia. The 
concerns of this business community were understandable given the increasing inroads 
made by PAS in the Malay heartland during electoral contests, diminishing UMNO's 
23 Interviews with various close associates of Anwar, Kuala Lumpur, January 2001. 
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presence m parliament. These businessmen w~re more assured that their capital 
accumulation activities would not be altered or hindered in any significant way under 
UMNO, given the party's secular outlook and emphasis on economic development. . 
An increasingly obvious Islamization trend had been emerging in UMNO, alarming 
the business community. A most clear indication of the Islamization of UMNO was the 
co-optation of Anwar into the party and his meteoric rise within its ranks. The personal 
backing offered by party president Mahathir to Anwar was crucial for the latter's rapid 
ascendancy in UMNO. Anwar was appointed to key ministerial posts one after another 
after his induction into UMNO, posts that only a select few could dream of attaining in 
such a short span of time: as Minister of Youth and Sports, Agriculture, Education and 
finally Finance. Along the way up, Anwar fully utilized the prerogatives attached to these 
ministries to 'Islamize' public policies and programs. His aggressive approach and 
popularity among the younger generation of Malaysians stirred a measure of concern 
among some Muslims as well as non-Muslims, especially the Chinese.24 
The Islamization of the business sector was an extremely risky endeavor for UMNO 
leaders who depended on corporate figures for funding as well as to promote economic 
development. Even though the Islamic banking system in Malaysia eventually received 
international acceptance, it had been difficult for UMNO leaders to promote the idea 
initially. They had to spend a considerable amount of effort and resources convincing the 
business community of the importance of this Islamic project. A lesson for UMNO 
leaders from the implementation of the Islamic banking project was that an Islamization 
initiative in the modem corporate sector would necessitate substantial coordination and 
cooperation between the government and business to secure acceptance. These initiatives 
could also be politically costly, unless they were handled with care. 
Anwar was aware of the need to handle the Islamization of the business sector 
24 Interviews with Chinese association leaders, Kuala Lumpur and Selangor, July -August 2001. 
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carefully, especially when the premiership came within his reach after he won the Deputy 
Presidency in the 1993 UMNO election. Anwar's reputation as a radical Islamic leader 
was still vivid in many people's minds. And this reputation was not one that was held in 
high regard by the business community. Anwar's 'un-UMNOish' traits stemmed from his 
youth days. Before joining UMNO, he led activist student groups and later the leading 
Islamic NGO, ABIM, in the struggle to promote social justice. Poverty, capitalist 
exploitation of the economy and the injustices resulting from socio-economic inequalities, 
for example, were among ABIM's chief concerns. ABIM utilized Islamic idioms and 
Islamic organizational networks to mobilize popular protests against the government. 
Given the relative scarcity of prominent Islamic NGOs and figures in Malaysia, Anwar 
emerged as an icon of progressive Islamic ideas, a reputation he retained even after he 
gained prominence in the corridors of state power. 
As Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, however, Anwar needed to banish his 
past radical image and to cultivate a new image as more than just a progressive Islamic 
leader, in order to be seen by businessmen, especially the Chinese and foreigners, as a 
moderate and reliable successor to Mahathir. These businessmen were not only a primary 
source of investment for the national economy, but also an important source of funds for 
political activities.25 The promotion of an Islamic tax on businesses for welfare purposes 
was not a particularly wise policy strategy from a political point of view. 
Moreover, UMNO politicians, including Anwar, had little faith in State-level zakat 
management known for its inefficiency and corruption. The key question for them was 
whether a revamp, of this agency would be rewarding politically. It is important to note 
that there was little patronage incentive in this zakat operation for top UMNO politicians: 
even if the zakat was operationalized more efficiently, UMNO leaders could not use the 
agency as a means to dispense patronage as they had little control over the way these 
25 For a study of Anwar's close ties with prominent businessmen and their role in his rise in UMNO, see 
Gomez (1993). 
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funds were distributed. In theory, Syariah provides a set of inflexible rules over the way 
zakat funds should be distributed. Inter-State variation in the dispersal of this fund 
indicates that zakat officials are permitted some flexibility and inventiveness, but only 
within the limits set by Syariah. A rather extreme example of such flexibility was the 
interpretation of one of the eight asnaf, ar-riqab (those who need assistance to free 
themselves from slavery), to include a means to eliminate illiteracy by offering library 
facilities. 26 Only in this way could zakat agencies enhance the scope of their operations. 
On the whole, however, Syariah regulations are tight, thus restricting the interpretation of 
its codes by zakat officials to more conventional understandings. 
One key issue within the zakat that made it especially unattractive to UMNO 
politicians was its strict rule on investment. A majority of zakat officials adhere to the 
interpretation of Yusuf Qaradawi, a famous scholar of zakat laws. His ruling was 
essentially 'don't take any risks'; in other words, commercial investments were 
unacceptable. Moreover, zakat money collected during one particular year should be 
spent before the end of that year, since there is no shortage of people in need of immediate 
financial aid; long-term investments, therefore, were not recommended. On one occasion 
when Yusuf Qaradawi was invited to give a talk in Kuala Lumpur, Anwar, who was 
chairing the session, alluded to a government plan to invest zakat funds in low-risk shares. 
He emphasized that such funds would only be invested on a short-term basis and would 
not be utilized for investment purposes alone (Star, 24 January 1993). Anwar's cautious 
attitude, and the fact that no initiative was taken to implement this plan, illuminated the 
potentially high cost of altering the rules and norms dictating the zakat. If Anwar had 
been more forceful in his attempt to determine the use of zakat funds, he might have 
offended a corps of ulama, an act not politically prudent for a Muslim politician then 
aspiring to a higher office in an impending party election. 
26 Interview with a zakat official, Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 2000. 
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Moreover, the government's social welfare expenditure and programs for the poor, 
either at federal or State level, were commonly integrated into UMNO's patronage 
networks in the villages (Shamsul A.B. 1983). However, these social welfare resources 
available to UMNO leaders varied between federal and State levels, resulting in different 
strategies adopted by them to expand their personal patronage networks. For UMNO 
leaders at State level, for example the chief ministers and State assemblymen, welfare 
funds from the zakat made available to them was one of a few alternative sources of 
patronage. They could use these non-federal funds to promote their political interests, 
expanding their individual patronage networks in their own areas. They could do so 
relatively independently of the federal leadership, albeit within UMNO's organizational 
boundaries. Control over the zakat funds arguably grew even more important for UMNO 
State leaders as intra-party rivalries intensified from the late 1980s. UMNO State leaders 
also had limited access to patronage-maximizing opportunities compared to politicians 
holding office at federal level, such as the Minister of Finance. 
The competition among UMNO leaders to secure control over patronage-maximizing 
mechanisms was also intense at federal level. Thus, the exceptional enthusiasm of the 
Minister in charge of religious affairs, Abdul Hamid Othman, for the nati.onal zakat 
concept, LUZAN (Lembaga Urusan Zakat Malaysia, Malaysian Zakat Management 
Board), introduced in early 2000 was perplexing; the Minister of Finance and other 
UMNO top leaders, on the other hand, were unenthusiastic about the concept. Hamid's 
behavior was quite logical in the light of the 'patronage maximizing' incentive 
mechanism. During UMNO's Islamization drive, Hamid's· educational background in 
Islam proved valuable for his rise within the party. Like any other UMNO politician, 
Hamid needed to cultivate his own patronage networks to climb the party hierarchy. 
Islamic-related matters were the most important-and perhaps the sole-issue that he 
could exploit to promote himself: if he handled them adequately, he could accumulate 
extra points; otherwise, he could easily lose out in the UMNO's power struggles. 
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Since his value within the party almost exclusively depended on his contribution when 
dealing with contentious Islamic issues, he needed to constantly demonstrate that his 
Islamic credentials were important to UMN0.27 In this regard, the UMNO's substantial 
loss of Muslim votes to its arch rival PAS in the general election in 1999 put politicians 
with Islamic credentials under tremendous pressure .. PAS's rising influence was 
interpreted as evidence that UMNO was not doing enough to promote Islam. Indeed, 
during the 1999 elections, Hamid lost his parliamentary seat to a PAS candidate. During 
the 2000 UMNO election, Hamid also found his ranking in the Supreme Council had 
declined. Hamid only managed to retain his ministerial post when Prime Minister 
Mahathir appointed him a senator. 28 He, however, was soon urged to resign from his 
ministerial post, although he was given a newly created position, as Special Religious 
Advisor to the Prime Minister. It was against this backdrop that Hamid almost 
single-mindedly pushed for the centralization of the management of zakat. 
Since federal Islamic projects and funds under the supervision of JAKIM had 
increased appreciably since the early 1980s, Hamid had access to a patronage instrument 
that he could exploit to develop his support base in UMNO. For example, federal funds 
for private- or government-run religious schools and their teachers were allocated to exert 
federal influence over these educational institutions. JAKIM's control over the allocation 
of this relatively large volume of funds provided the agency and the minister in charge 
with many patronage-maximizing resources. 
Moreover, successful centralization of Islamic affairs, including administration of the 
zakat, meant that through JAKIM, Hamid would secure control of a considerable amount 
of resources-funds, licenses, offices, w~lfare programs, to name a few. Given UMNO's 
27 Shamsul points out that the 'Islamic factor' was crucial when individuals like Anwar, Wan Mokhtar and 
Abdullar Badawi secured victories during UMNO election contests for the post of Vice-President. Similarly, 
when YusofNoor obtained the largest number of votes during the contest for a seat in UMNO's Supreme 
Council in 1987, his Islamic credentials held him in good stead (Shamsul A.B. 1988: 184-85). 
28 Only members of parliament, including the Dewan Negara or Senate, are allowed to hold cabinet 
appointments. 
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hegemony over the bureaucracy, this transfer of jurisdiction would provide the Minister 
with the power to distribute these resources to designated areas and individuals in a way 
that would benefit him and the party. If management of zakat was nationalized as 
proposed by JAKIM, this agency could determine how zakat funds collected nationwide 
could be re-allocated to individual States according to an appropriate 'quotas' and 
'needs.' Unsurprisingly, JAKIM and the minister in charge of religious affairs were 
enthusiastic about nationalization of the zakat administration. 
The limited interaction between JAKIM and the Ministry of Finance over zakat 
administration, thus, was not simply a question of coordination problems. The key issue 
was politics, specifically intra-party rivalry for control over massive public resources. 
The logic of patronage-maximization had influenced the choices and strategies of 
individual UMNO politicians holding government posts. 
It is in this context that the decisions made by Anwar during his tenure as Finance 
Minister need to be understood. According to some officials, the rather frosty relations 
between Anwar and Yusof Noor, formerly the minister in charge of religious affairs as 
well as an UMNO Supreme Council member,29 had a significant impact on Anwar's 
decision not to interfere in the zakat sector. Yusof was a key figure who Erst offered 
political backing to the idea of establishing a corporate body for zakat collection in the 
federal territory of Kuala Lumpur. Azakat official felt that the uneasy relations between 
Yusof and Anwar were a major reason why the latter showed little interest in the 
management of the zakat. Indeed, Anwar hardly ever showed any interest in invitations 
from the Federal Religious Department for ceremonies or workshops on zakat-related 
issues; nor did he offer support for the promotion of the zakat. 30 Both men apparently 
understood that the zakat was 'Yusof's personal turf.' For Anwar, interfering overtly in a 
29 YusofNoor had also once held the post ofUMNO vice president. His influence in the party had been 
waning from the early 1990s, after Anwar had secured the post ofUMNO deputy president in 1993. 
30 Interview with zakat officials, Kuala Lumpur, 19 June 2000. 
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rival's territory and offending the latter would lead to unnecessary tensions with other 
high-ranking UMNO politicians and thus impose extra political cost. 
By using the NGO formula, on the other hand, Anwar could bypass the politics within 
UMNO while also promoting himself as a champion of the poor. The NGO formula had 
positive political impact on at least three counts. First, it was far easier and more efficient 
for a politician to create or take over an agency outside the state bureaucratic sphere and 
staff it with his own men than to intervene in an agency controlled by the state 
bureaucracy. Being free from red-tape, rules and protocols, NGOs, unlike the bureaucracy, 
could be managed more efficiently and used more expediently for political purposes. 
Moreover, the government-run zakat management was renowned for its inefficiency and 
lack of professionalism. To replace this agency-with a long history and royal 
connections-with a new institution would have been a costly and time-consuming affair. 
Second, poor Muslims viewed NGOs like AIM as politically neutral, thus freeing them 
from any obligation to a party during elections. Whether they supported UMNO or the 
· opposition did not matter when they made a claim for benefits. This was not the case with 
government agencies, which were usually abused by the ruling party. This political 
neutrality was essentially the organizational strength of AIM and a reason for the success 
of its poverty-eradication programs (Gibbons and Sukor Kasim 1990: 94). In view of 
AIM's non-partisan character, when PAS took control of the Kelantan State government 
in 1990, this NGO was allowed to expand its operation in this State, provided its poverty 
eradication program did not discriminate against any party supporters.31 
Third and finally, the support for such welfare-oriented NGOs like AIM put Muslim 
politicians in a very positive public light. It also strengthened their appeal to the 
middle-class electorate. On the whole, the use of the NGO formula served Anwar's 
political interests remarkably well. 
31 Interview with Sukor Kasim, 9 February 2001. 
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As for the corporate sector, smce a majority of businesses were non-Muslim, 
especially Chinese, enterprises, it was not practical for them to re-allocate a substantial 
amount of tax payment to Islamic institutions specifically aimed at the underprivileged 
Muslims. Moreover, a good record of tax payments would have provided businessmen 
with some political leverage over government in dialogues over economic policies. On 
the other hand, it was important for corporate leaders to cultivate ties with Anwar through 
financial contributions to private institutions associated with him. Anwar was then not 
only the Minister of Finance, but widely viewed as Mahathir's heir apparent. It is difficult 
to prove how their contribution to the Anwar-connected organization could have 
influenced financial decision making in the Ministry of Finance. But it is not difficult to 
expect that the business leaders were willing to 'invest' in Anwar's Islamic charity 
program in exchange for his favor possibly being shown toward their business interests. 
This was even more so if they were granted a tax incentive. The point here is that the 
UMNO politicians recognized-and had to take seriously-such business interests. 
The promotion of an NGO carrying out a function similar to the state-run zakat under 
the auspices of an UMNO politician earned the party some publicity. But the chief 
beneficiary of this mechanism was Anwar himself. Moreover, the promotion of a more 
professional and politically well-connected alternative system helped further undermine 
the efforts and reputation of the government-run zakat, possibly damaging its authority 
too. It has to be emphasized, however, that patronage-based political connections can be 
an ingredient for disaster if the patron falls from grace. The logic is quite simple: when 
their patrons are on the rise, they prosper with them; but their fortunes can easily tumble 
when their patrons fall into trouble. Anwar's dismissal as UMNO Deputy President and 
imprisonment in 1998 seems to have had a considerable impact on the organizations 
connected with him. AIM's future, for example, appears uncertain. The organization has 
been under investigation for allegedly misappropriating welfare funds (BH, 6 April 2002; 
NST, 8 April 2002). 
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In sum, the patronage-maximizing incentive structures influencing the behavior of 
UMNO politicians impaired the level of state institutionalization and development of 
zak~t management. As a result, the system was left organizationally fragmented and 
without much authority, and its enforcement capacity inevitably limited. The puzzle of 
why Anwar, then the powerful Minister of Finance and Deputy President of UMNO, was 
unwilling and unable to promote the zakat was answered by the logic of intra-party 
political ascendancy that dictated the behavior of UMNO politicians. Since UMNO 
politicians have continually cultivated close ties with prominent corporate figures, 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike, to fund their political activities, this has left the former 
rather dependent on the latter. This trend became even more conspicuous as intra-party 
rivalry intensified from the early 1990s, at a time when Anwar and his allies were 
consolidating their position within UMNO. This _patronage-based political-business 
nexus kept UMNO leaders receptive to the interests of the business elite. Coupled with 
the government's single-minded pursuit of economic development, this 
patronage-maximizing incentive had an important effect on UMNO's top leadership; 
specifically making them value the contribution of Chinese businesses, not only as a 
dynamic domestic entrepreneurial community but also as a source of funds for their 
campaigns in party elections. This meant that implementation of the government's 
Islamization policies was largely left vulnerable to-and skewed in favor of-the private 
interests ofUMNO politicians. 
The value of this business class was well recognized by Anwar, greatly restraining his, 
and the government's, choices when formulating policies related to the Islamic welfare 
system. Anwar rode the Islamic factor to power within UMNO, fully exploiting state 
prerogatives made available to him by the Prime Minister's strong personal backing, 
primarily to mobilize support from rural Malays as well as the ascendant, 
Islamic-conscious, middle-class urban Muslims. Yet, his Islamic rhetoric had to be 
tempered when he began to pursue the office of Deputy President of UMNO. This was 
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due to his recognition of the need to maximize clientele networks with businessmen, 
including the Chinese, to ascend the UMNO hierarchy. The patronage-maximizing factor 
largely influenced the behavior ofUMNO politicians, resulting in the relatively low level 
of institutionalization of Islamic-based welfare structures within the state. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Rise of the Federal Religious Authority and the Co-optation of 
Ulama 
Today, the bishop, the priest, and the preacher are in fact no longer, as in early 
Christian times, holders of purely personal charisma ... Nowadays, in spite of 
the partial survival of the old theory, such religious leaders are officials in the 
service of a functional purpose, which in the present-day 'church' has become 
routinized and, in turn, ideologically hallowed (emphasis added). 
-Max Weber. 1 
There is no university anywhere in the world which can award an ulama 
degree. 
-Mahathir Mohamad.2 
The institutionalization-albeit incomplete and uneven-of the Islamic administrative 
machinery resulted in an increasing number of theologically trained religious scholars 
and teachers-commonly known as ulama and ustaz-being mobilized and employed 
by the government to support its national development efforts. The secular outlook and 
image of the UMNO leadership, however, were not easily erased by its vigorous 
decade-long Islamization campaigns both at the organizational and ideological levels. 
UMNO continually confronted a challenge on the religious front from its archrival PAS, 
which had an ideological advantage due primarily to its religious-based party doctrines 
1 Quoted in Gerth and Mills (1948: 199). 
2 Sun, 13 August 1997. 
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and leadership. Moreover, the UMNO leaders' heavy emphasis on material development 
was seen as supporting the PAS's accusation that UMNO was a source of the 
widespread materialism and secularism in the country at large. 
This popular paradigm, secular UMNO versus spiritual PAS, however, should not 
obscure the structural tr~sformation that took place under the Islamic regime a la 
UMNO. This chapter assesses the overall effects of institutionalization of the state 
religious bureaucracies on the state capacities to regulate religious mobilization. Who 
benefited from the process? Who were the losers? Why did the Malaysian government's 
co-optation strategy go as far as it did? 
To adequately appreciate the political effect of institutionalization of the religious 
administrative apparatus, examination of the three sectors alone is not sufficient. One 
needs to take into account the relations between ruling politicians and Islamic 
bureaucrats within the federal government. The chapter examines the rise of two federal 
Islamic agencies that grew prominent under the Mahathir administration. It specifically 
assesses how their corps of officialdom was recruited and organized, and whether the 
expansion and greater presence of the federal organizations benefited a group of 
theologically trained Islamic elites-the ulama. 
Institutionalization and Co-optation of Ulama 
The UMNO's Islamization campaign in various sectors led to large-scale recruitment, 
and upgrading in some respects, of the corps of theologically trained religious 
officialdom. This process had at least three very important political effects. 
First, these recruits came to be incorporated into the tightly defined national public 
service schemes, thereby making them heavily dependent upon the state for their 
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authority and livelihood, as well as career prospects. Unlike Indonesia where religious 
authority depended considerably on the traditional and personal modes of authority of 
individual religious leaders (personal charisma and lineage, for example), in Malaysia, 
religious authority was traditionally determined by the 'office' held by individual ulama. 
Prestige attached to religious offices in the government was high in the Muslim 
community. Religious officials such as imam and kadi were highly respected and 
influential figures at the grass-roots level. Such prestige, however, was not necessarily 
complemented by material benefits. Their economic status was very low as shown in the 
prior chapters. These unfavorable material conditions made the religious professions 
rather unattractive career options, especially since more lucrative-and perhaps more 
glamorous-career opportunities were available to educated and qualified Muslims in 
the post-NEP era.3 Yet, for religious-educated Muslims, various posts in state religious 
agencies continued to provide a modest yet stable long-term career option. Once 
admitted to the public service, for example, a pension was guaranteed on retirement. 
Given the very restricted career opportunities outside the religious sectors, appointments 
to the state religious agencies offered reasonable career prospects. Over the past few 
decades, the opportunities for ulama and ustaz did not diminish as a result of the 
UMNO government's modernization drive. Rather, their welfare was reasonably well 
taken care of, and their socio-economic status somewhat upgraded under the 
government's Islamization project. 
Second, the process of institutionalization provided a significant degree of protection . 
for their influence within the government while safeguarding their political and 
socio-economic standing within society at large. Under a highly modernist and liberal 
developmentalist regime such as UMNO, it was quite plausible that these religious 
officials could have been completely neglected or deprived of any official position and 
3 For various effects of the NEP, see chapter 3. 
251 
authority. Instead, they were given what they saw as their rightful place in national 
development-however limited (Mauzy and Milne 1983-84). They may not have been 
particularly happy with UMNO politicians and their rule that they perceived as too 
secular. Nor may they have been entirely satisfied with their subordination to these 
secular rulers in formal decision making. As federal intervention in Islamic affairs 
intensified, friction between Muslim politicians and religious officials flared up from 
time to time with regard to interpretation and application of Islamic rules. Religious 
officials usually had to give in to the dictates of politicians or otherwise their careers in 
the government could have been put at risk. Nevertheless, the government's official 
recognition of the role of the religious scholars and teachers-together with increased 
career opportunities and material benefits-meant that they benefited from the 
expansion and modernization of the religious establishment despite their loss of 
autonomy. Moreover, UMNO politicians were aware of the grass-roots influence of 
prominent religious officials. They made a considerable effort to keep religious officials 
happy. In Pahang and Malacca, for example, the State governments decided to upgrade 
the status of Mufti to the same level as State Executive Council members (State-level 
cabinet members). This decision, it was specifically emphasized, would 'entitle the 
Mufti to the same level of benefits and allowances granted to the Executive Council 
members.' Furthermore, it would allow their views about religious matters to be heard 
and appreciated at the highest echelon of the State government (UM, 12 November 1994 
and 5 October 2000). 
Indeed, some high-profile Islamic scholars and officials appeared to enjoy the 
'celebrity' status accorded by government-sponsored Islamization in the era of Islamic 
renascence: close association with powerful politicians, publicity in the. media and, 
perhaps most important of all, the prestigious title of 'Dato' that was often bestowed on 
them. Many appeared to not care at all about the 'disrepute' into which they fell in the 
252 
eyes of some Muslims as a consequence of compromising.their religious autonomy and 
integrity by serving the interests of the secular politicians.4 For the few 'very fortunate' 
ones, the fame and benefits attached to these offices were too attractive to decline, 
particularly against the backdrop of the gloomy past which had been full of neglect, 
humiliation, and lack of reward. 'Not so fortunate' Islamic figures, on the other hand, 
could still dream of attaining such celebrity status one day. The very existence of the 
expanded Islamic establishment meant that there were still opportunities ahead. 
Moreover, one has to understand the political, socio-economic and cultural context in 
which these theologically trained Muslims lived. As chapter 3 demonstrates, association 
with the UMNO in general and with its individual politicians in particular was an 
essential gateway to the corridors of power and wealth at all levels from the villages to 
the capital in Kuala Lumpur. Moreover, the prevailing culture of patronage was 
combined with a Malay culture that exhibited, to quote Peletz, 'greed, envy, and malice' 
and the 'display of status and prestige' .5 Condemnation and disparagement by the 
'more Islamic' ulama and their supporters was perhaps an acceptable price for the 
co-opted ulama to pay for much-sought prestige and material benefits in the era of 
Islamization and modernization. 
Third and finally, the co-optation of an increasing number of religious scholars in the 
state administrative apparatus brought about a very important political consequence to 
the benefit of the ruling party: splitting a potential united oppositional force under the 
banner of Islam. In general, throughout the Islamic world, the organizational and 
ideological strength of Islamic parties greatly depended on the leadership of ulama. 
They are the source of inspiration, moral guidance, and above all, political mobilization 
4 It should be noted, however, that despite PAS's occasional disparagement, high-ranking state religious 
officials such as Mufti are still accorded high respect as well as popularity in the Muslim community (see, 
for instance, 'Lifting the veil on a burning issue,' Star, 22 October 2000; 'PAS questions Ismail's 
appointment as fatwa council head,' Star, 11 April 2001 ). 
5 For this point on culture, see (Peletz 2002). This, of course, is not to suggest that such characteristics 
are peculiarly Malay and inherent in their 'culture.' 
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and organization. Moreover, the Malaysian case, as well as many other nations in the 
Muslim world, demonstrated that a corps of ulama could pose a powerful oppositional 
threat against secular Muslim ruling elites. The prime examples of this trend included 
Iran, Algeria and Sudan. One scholar of Muslim societies highlights the universally 
observed socio-political significance of such religious elites in this way: 
The 'ulama' have not only continued to respond-admittedly, with varymg 
degrees of enthusiasm and success-to the challenges of changing times; they 
have also been successful in enhancing their influence in a number of 
contemporary Muslim societies, in broadening their audiences, in making 
significant contributions to public discourses, and even in setting the terms for 
such discourses. In many cases, they have also come to play significant 
religiopolitical activist roles in contemporary Islam (Zaman 2002). 
Co-optation of these ulama into the tightly organized state bureaucracy has had a 
significant effect on the state's capacity to regulate religious-political mobilization of 
oppositional Islamic forces. By becoming part of the tightly defined state bureaucracy, 
an increasing number of theologically trained Muslims now had to comply with the iron 
rule of obedience and acquiescence. Institutionalization thus gave Muslim ruling 
politicians the vital means to control the religious elites and prevent them from gaining 
too much power within the state bureaucracy and the Muslim community in general. 
Institutionalization also equipped the Muslim ruling politicians and the state dominated 
by them with an institutional tool to define 'correct' Islam while limiting the influence 
of unfavorable Islamic elements. In this way, it enabled the ruling politicians to carry 
out Islamic policies relatively independently and effectively. 
Furthermore, the Malaysian government now became a chief provider of tertiary 
education, job security, career opportunities, and welfare for religious school graduates. 
The religious-educated youth in Muslim societies often fall victim of the state's policy 
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of modernization and the expansion of modem sectors of the economy. These Muslim 
youth could have been socio-economically marginalized and displaced under an 
aggressively modernizing regime such as Malaysia's. The ideology of Islam-and 
justice-could have offered these religious graduates an attractive ideological rational 
for the mobilization of discontent against the government. The Malaysian government's 
Islamization policy-and co-optation of theologically trained Muslims-not only built 
an infrastructure for traditional religious schooling (as did other Muslim nations), but 
also created recruitment mechanisms within the public sector to ensure that there were 
not too many 'losers.' By keeping them dependent on the state, the Islamization policy 
helped to nip the bud of discontent and radical religious mobilization. As a result, 
religious graduates were much less inclined to tum against the Muslim ruling 
politicians. 
The Rise of the National Religious Bureaucratic Apparatus 
The federal government's co-optation of ulama and intervention in various Islamic 
issues brought about a concurrent development of federal agencies managing Islamic 
affairs at the national level. The examination of the rise of two federal Islamic agencies 
that expanded and grew prominent under the Mahathir administration helps us to 
appreciate the political effect of institutionalization of the religious administrative 
apparatus. The key question here is to what extent religious officials retain autonomy 
from the UMNO politicians. 
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JAKIM: The Federal Islamic Development Department 
The most prominent among these was the Federal Islamic Development Department 
(Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia or JAKIM), previously known as Pusat Islam 
(Islamic Center). JAKIM was the central agency administering a range of issues related 
to Islamic affairs. In the early years after its inception, the role of the federal agency was 
largely restricted to dakwah (missionary) activities. 6 Yet, it steadily grew in scale and in 
scope to become the most high-profile and powerful Islamic agency to date. Given its 
conspicuous influence on religious matters, some people came, with considerable 
exaggeration, to dub JAKIM as the 'Vatican' of Malaysia. 
The body considered as JAKIM's predecessor was first set up as a secretariat to the 
National Council for Islamic Affairs (Majlis Kebangsaan bagi Hal Ehwal Ugama Islam 
or MKI). The National Council was created in 1968 to coordinate religious 
administration across the peninsula; too many complexly overlapping Islamic agencies 
at the State level had caused a great amount of confusion and inefficiency. The Prime 
Minister chaired it and its members were representatives from the State governments. 
For the first decade after its inception, the council appeared to play a merely nominal 
role; it met only infrequently, and even when it did, it did not produce any concrete 
answers or directions for the problems it was expected to resolve. It was after Mahathir 
became Prime Minister and launched his Islamization initiative that the council was 
transformed into a more active organization. The federal government's will to activate 
and utilize the council as an effective agency to carry out its Islamization policies 
nationwide was illustrated by the new composition of the council membership. Initially, 
the head of the Religious Affairs Department or the Religious Council represented each 
6 Dakwah is usually directed more to strengthening religious commitment among Muslims than to 
converting non-Muslims. 
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State government; after 1984, however, the Chief Minister, or a member of the State 
Executive Council (State-level cabinet) in charge of Islamic Affairs in the case of the 
Chief Minister not being a Muslim, represented each State government (JAKIM n.a.: 
46-47). 
Alongside reactivation of the council, its secretariat-JAKIM's predecessor-also 
grew in size, function, and influence. The agency w'as initially a religious division in the 
Prime Minister's Department, and renamed in 1985 as the Division on Islamic Affairs 
(Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam or BAREIS) (JAKIM n.a.: 50-51). The division was 
entirely funded by the federal government and placed under a cabinet minister attached 
to the Prime Minister's Department.7 Its prime task was defined as policy making and 
planning, and coordination and standardization of the administration of Islamic affairs at 
the national level; yet its actual functions were not specific, and in any case, its 
influence was extremely limited (JAKIM 1999: 12-13). 
Since the 1980s, however, its function has become more comprehensive and specific, 
and its organization more complex. For example, it took up the task of conducting 
missionary campaigns (dakwah) both within the government and in the Muslim 
community. The growth of the government-sponsored agency committed to missionary 
activities-despite the existence of the longstanding and well-established departments 
of religious affairs in individual States-symbolized the federal government's attempt to 
preempt increasingly popular and influential non-governmental dakwah groups without 
upsetting the established arrangement of religious administration at the State level 
(Shamsul 1994). 
In 1997, the division was organizationally upgraded to the rank of department, and 
renamed as the Islamic Development Department (JAKIM). Along the course of its 
development, the department took up additional issue areas ranging from laws (Syariah) 
7 Initially a Deputy Minister, and after the division was upgraded as a department, a Minister in the Prime 
Minister's Department. 
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to education, information, training and research, each being organized into separate 
divisions. To upgrade its dakwah activities, it also launched its own TV and radio 
programs nationwide. Given its jurisdictional restriction as a federal agency, these 
media offered JAKIM a useful tool to widely disseminate its policies in general and its 
version of the Islamic message in particular. As of 2000, JAKIM was staffed by no less 
than 1,000 permanent officers and supporting staff (JAKIM 2000: 5). 
Despite its obvious functional expansion and sophistication, however, the extent to 
which JAKIM exercised actual authority was still debatable. Moreover, a particular 
pattern of recruitment cast some doubt not only over the level of authority of the 
organization but also on the overall effect of institutionalization on the co-optation of 
ulama. 
JAKIM's organizational weakness was identified from three perspectives. First, 
JAKIM's control over non-governmental actors appeared paramount. In reality, however, 
JAKIM suffered from the lack of a constitutional and administrative base to 
independently exercise executive power nationwide. This structural weakness left 
JAKIM heavily dependent on UMNO politicians to enforce policies. As a result, 
JAKIM found their stance, policies, and authority readily compromised to serve the 
interests of particular non-governmental actors; this was especially so when the latter 
were close to high-ranking UMNO officials. A case in point was JAKIM's dealing with 
Muslim women's organizations. Religious officials generally had a problematic 
relationship with women's groups and the issues they advocated. Women's groups 
perceived them as insensitive to women's rights and criticized them for not doing 
enough to improve the welfare of Muslim women. Religious officials, on the other hand, 
considered these Women's groups as far too liberal and dangerous. Despite their 
generally 'conservative' and 'unsympathetic' attitudes to women's issues, JAKIM 
officials decided to take sides with women's groups, when the latter formed a coalition, 
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the Coalition of Women's Rights in Islam, to launch a 'Monogamy campaign' in 2003. 
The campaign was intended to discourage polygamy, but was interpreted by many 
ulama as attacking the institution of Islam. It thus caused uproar among high-ranking 
religious officials including a number of Mufti as well as Islamic bodies. Many of them 
demanded that the coalition stop the campaign immediately.8 After a meeting with the 
coalition, however, JAKIM Director-General Mohamad Shahir Abdullah announced that 
'the controversy was actually due to misinformation and unbalanced reporting and there 
was no need for the campaign to be called off.' 9 JAKIM's compromise was not 
surprising. The Acting Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi's wife, Endon 
Mahmood launched the campaign. Moreover, Sisters in Islam, whose good political 
connection with high-ranking UMNO politicians, including Mahathir and Abdullah, was 
widely suspected by the ulama, of initiating the campaign. Abdullah's meeting with 
JAKIM top officials and his statement to 'leave the matter to JAKIM' conveyed the 
message to JAKIM. Io Given the blessing of the Acting Prime Minister, JAKIM had 
little choice but to 'endorse' the controversial campaign. 
Second, JAKIM's influence within the state-especially over the religious authorities 
at the State level-was not absolute, either. JAKIM had to be very careful not to offend 
the latter in imposing federal policies because JAKIM did not have its own secretariats 
manned by its staff at the State level (except Sabah and Sarawak). Inevitably, JAKIM 
had to depend on the State religious authorities for effective implementation of its 
policies at the grassroots across the States. I I JAKIM invested a substantial amount of 
resources to rectify this weakness. Under the auspices of JAKIM, for example, a variety 
of forums and training schemes were organized to promote coordination and 
8 
'Understand nature of polygamy,' Star, 18 March 2003; 'Muftis hit out at "one husband, one wife" 
initiative,' ST, 19 March 2003. 
9 
'JAKIM: No need to call off campaign,' Star, 25 March 2003. 
10 
'Pak Lah; Refer monogamy campaign proposals to Jakim,' Star, 19 March 2003. 
11 Interview with JAKIM officials at various departments, JAKIM, Kuala Lumpur, 3 May 2000, 12 June 
2000, and 11 September 2000. 
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cooperation between the federal and State governments as well as among State 
governments. Furthermore, a substantial sum of financial aid was distributed to 
resource-poor State religious departments to help finance the latter's administrative 
costs (For instance, JAKIM n.a.: 309-10). 12 Yet, securing the States' compliance 
remained a difficult and costly business. When confronted with the States' defiance, 
JAKIM could not help but seek 'assistance' from UMNO leaders who could employ 
various other political tools to secure compliance. But this reinforced even further 
JAKIM officials' dependence upon and allegiance to UMNO leaders, thereby leaving 
them highly vulnerable to the latter's political interference. 
Third, JAKIM's weakness in relation to extra-bureaucratic actors was combined with 
its internal organizational weakness to affect the level of institutionalization of the 
national religious administrative machinery. Compared with other longstanding and 
established State religious agencies such as the Religious Affairs Departments (Jabatan 
Agama Islam Negeri or JAIN) and the Religious Councils (Maj/is Agama Islam Negeri 
or MAIN), JAKil\1 was a relatively new organization. In the course of organizational 
development, J AKil\1 had a clear aspiration 'not to become like them.' In the 
department's development plan for national religious administration, both the religious 
departments and the religious counCils were categorically branded as 'inefficient' 
'incompetent' and 'disorganized.' The plan proposed that the two agencies undergo a 
comprehensive overhaul since they could not simply be eliminated. The chief task for 
JAKil\1 in this context was to 'help achieve efficient, effective, and uniform 
administration of religious affairs nationwide in organizational, legal, and procedural 
respects. The task, more specifically, covered areas ranging from the development of 
system and human resources, codification and standardization of laws, and 
standardization of administration as well as dakwah matters' (JAKIM, n.a.: 75-76). The 
12 JAKIM distributed about RM90 million annually for the management of the primary level student 
Qur'an class program (KAFA) alone. 
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development plan emphasized the creation of an 'efficient and competent' officialdom 
to run religious affairs. More specifically, it proposed to equip JAKIM with officials and 
staff skilled and qualified in the relevant managerial field (JAKIM n.a.: 76). 
The JAKIM's plan identified two strategies to achieve this goal. The first strategy 
was to train officials through an in-service training program. This program, however, 
had limitations. It was found that the academic background of the currently employed 
officials-that is, Islamic Studies-was not adequate in preparing them for certain 
fields; whatever training they received, the theologically trained ulama officials would 
not easily be transformed into 'qualified administrators.' The second strategy aimed to 
off-set this weakness by bringing in officials qualified in relevant (non-religious) fields 
from outside JAKIM on a short-term basis, or opening the service to candidates from 
other fields rather than Islamic Studies (JAKIM n.a.: 76). 
What is worth noting here is that creation of competent, efficient, and effective 
religious officialdom was interpreted as the large-scale employment of officials 
educated and qualified not in the field of Islamic Studies, but in non-religious/secular 
fields. In a way, JAKIM's development plan implicitly acknowledged that theologically 
trained officials were of little use in running religious affairs efficiently. 
The vision of creating an effective religious officialdom nationwide was reflected in 
the pattern ofrecruitment of JAKIM officials in two respects. First, JAKIM employed a 
number of loaned officials (pegawai pinjam) from other secular services and agencies. 
Although some of these loaned officials had a minimum level of religious knowledge 
and qualification, the real value of these officials was not their religious qualification 
but their training in non-religious fields and experience in other parts of the public 
service or governmental agencies such as the Ministry of Education. For example, the 
Director of the Legal Affairs Division was a federal legal officer (Grade 1) seconded 
from the Attorney-General's office. Having expertise and experience in civil laws, he 
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was designated the task of assisting the codification of Islamic laws. 13 Officials from 
the elite Administrative and Diplomatic Service (Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik) 
were also appointed to posts dealing with managing and planning. According to the 
director in the administrative and financial affairs division, himself an official from the 
administrative and diplomatic service, about 30-40 percent of JAKIM's officials and 
staff have non-religious backgrounds. 14 
Second, the federal government proposed an introduction of the officer common-use 
scheme (Pegawai guna sama) in 1997-similar to the mechanism introduced in the 
syariah system. Once put in force, religious affairs officers previously employed by the 
individual State governments could be placed under the federal public service scheme 
(Skim Pegawai Hal Ehwal Islam, Islamic affairs officer scheme), and be allowed to be 
posted in any of the States that joined the scheme. On the official level, this was an 
effort of the federal government to standard,ize and upgrade religious officers 
nationwide. At the unofficial level, however, it was a federal tool to exert tighter control 
over religious officials who proved defiant from time to time. Given some States' likely 
hesitation, JAKIM offered additional material incentives such as better chances for 
promotion, something unknown to them under the previous State public service scheme. 
As of 2000, seven States had agreed to join the schemes, but full implementation had 
yet to be achieved. 15 
Despite all these efforts to make the religious service more effective and efficient, 
however, it is not entirely clear whether-and how-these policies contributed 
practically to the organizational development of JAKIM, and to efficient and effective 
running of religious affairs. 16 It is important to note that JAKIM continued to be 
13 This division is in charge of drafting Syariah laws at the federal level. Once passed at the federal level, 
these laws are presented to the State governments for consideration and eventual adoption by the State 
parliaments. 
14 Interview, JAKIM, Kuala Lumpur, 12 June 2000. 
15 Interview with JAKIM official, Kuala Lumpur, 12 June 2000. 
16 Anecdotal evidence suggests that JAKIM is comparatively 'efficient' and 'successful' among various 
governmental agencies in terms of 'budgetary spending.' This is apparently a standard measurement used 
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dominated by Islamic affairs officials with Islamic Studies backgrounds (Pegawai Hal 
Ehwal Islam). This category of officials commonly shared the same educational 
background with the traditional type of religious officials at the State level; for example, 
graduates from Islamic Studies at the National University of Malaysia (Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia, or UKM). Some of the high-level officials (above Grade 3) held 
higher qualifications like master's degrees in Islamic studies from Western universities. 
Yet, in essence they had not broken away from the old and standard socio-economic 
milieu-in contrast to graduates from the International Islamic University (UIA). 
Moreover, the top posts-including the director.:.general and deputy directors-were 
almost always reserved for religious-trained Islamic officials. 
The persistent domination of religious-trained Islamic officials m JAKIM had a 
significant effect on the character and image of the organization. A former high-ranking 
official of IKIM (Insititut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia, the Malaysian Institute of Islamic 
Understanding), a semi-governmental federal agency created to promote UMNO's 
progressive Islam, for example, claimed that difficulties he encountered to 'get things 
done' when he coordinated some Islamic projects with JAKIM had much to do with the 
background of JAKIM officials; many prominent JAKIM officials came from a 
traditional Islamic studies background. Quite a few projects he and his organization 
initiated were 'lost' or not properly implemented. These failures, according to him, were 
primarily due to the incompetence of JAKIM officials. 17 
The blatantly negative view of this governmental official about JAKIM, in fact, 
characterized a typical perception about ulama officials among other secular-trained 
Muslim officials, both politicians and bureaucrats alike: an outdated, unsophisticated, 
inefficient and ineffective group of people. For UMNO politicians and government 
officials who were eager to achieve fully developed country status, these religious elites 
by officials to assess the efficiency of governmental organizations (Interview with the Director in the 
Administrative and Financial Affairs Division, JAKIM, Kuala Lumpur, 12 June 2000). 
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were seen increasingly as 'nuisances' and 'hindrances' to their goal of national 
development. 
Especially frustrated with them (and their conservative attitudes in particular) was 
none other than then Prime Minister Mahathir. However, Mahathir was not openly harsh 
towards them in the beginning when his administration launched an aggressive 
campaign to promote progressive Islam in the early 1990s. Nor was he brave or reckless 
enough to offend them publicly. Quite the opposite, he and his former deputy, Anwar, 
attempted to incorporate them into their vision of national development, a development 
emphasizing a balance between material and spiritual attainment. That Mahathir was 
resolved on this point was quite clear in one of his landmark speeches delivered at a 
congress entitled 'Towards the 21st Century: Islam and Vision 2020': 
An Islamic administration must strive to ensure that its nation achieves rapid 
development so that it can compete with the rest of the developed world. 
Nevertheless, efforts to retain moral standards and high values of life that are 
demanded by Islam must not be neglected. The culture and civilization of 
Islamic countries must balance between spiritual attainment and material 
development ... The country's objective is to be a fully developed country by 
the Year 2020. The definition of a developed nation has already been explained. 
It definitely does not mean material development which disregards spirituallty. 
Our objective is a nation which is developed in terms of knowledge, efficiency 
and affluence without losing our moral values and religious teachings 
(Mahathir 1993). 
In this vision intended to incorporate Islam as a key ingredient, religious elites should 
have an important role to play. Some prominent controversies implicating State 
religious officials, however, seem to have convinced Mahathir that they were not up to 
the task; their 'conservative' and even 'reactionary' approaches in handling religious 
issues revealed that they would only undermine UMNO's efforts to promote progressive 
17 Interview with former IKIM official, Kuala Lumpur, 9 June 2000. 
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Islam both at home and abroad. Mahathir was increasingly impatient with these 
religious officials and his hostility towards them grew more public in the late 1990s (i.e. 
the beauty contest controversy and sacking of Mufti). It was hardly surprising that such 
an increasingly hostile climate put these religious elites in the government on the 
defensive. 
Overall, the extensive use of officials from other secular administrative agencies in: 
the JAKIM hierarchy, coupled with an increasingly hostile climate for the religious 
elites, meant that esprit-de-corps in the religious officialdom long bound by common 
traditional religious schooling was badly hurt. The practice of loaning officials across 
governmental agencies was nothing unusual in Malaysia's public service. For the 
religious affairs agencies, however, this was a relatively new and uncommon 
phenomenon. It was not so surprising that the religious-trained officials felt that this 
trend toward 'secularization' was a threat to their turf; the only sphere where they could 
exhibit their expertise and usefulness with a sense of pride and integrity. 
'Neutralized' Co-optation 
These employment patterns in the most influential religious agency at the national level 
had an important implication for the co-optation effect of institutionalization discussed 
above. The religious affairs agencies-either on the federal or State level-were 
traditionally the bastion of Islamic studies graduates. In the past, official posts in the 
State religious agencies were respected and popular professions among Muslims. The 
posts in the State religious departments and religious councils attracted a number of 
'qualified' Muslims in the relevant field, although the recruitment mechanism to these 
posts was rather dubious. 18 As the Muslim community went through dramatic 
18 Roff's study, for example, indicates that the membership of the influential Council of Religious Affairs 
in Kelantan was filled by 'the ruler's own men.' In other States such as Selangor, Perak or Johor, similar 
religious bodies were heavily dominated by members of the ruling house and the hereditary aristocracy 
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economic development that made available many more (lucrative and glamorous) career 
opportunities in such areas as business since the 1970s, the popularity as well as 
socio-economic status of these religious positions waned. Those Muslims educated at 
religious schools were 'losers' in this situation; their training and qualifications in 
Islamic studies were seen as impractical and irrelevant, while career opportunities 
outside the religious sectors were extremely limited. 
This socio-economic context, combined with the shortage of autonomous 
private/social organizations that could have otherwise provided them with alternative 
career opportunities, maximized the co-optation effect of institutionalization of the state 
Islamic administrative apparatus. They could have sought employment outside the 
public sector such as in private religious schools. But, this did not promise a particularly 
rewarding and stable long-term career option; the return was so small that some of them 
had to take secondary employment outside office hours. Others even had to depend on 
farming in villages to make ends meet. 19 Such economic circumstances forced many of 
the private schools and teachers to seek financial assistance from the government 
simply to survive. Under such circumstances, posts and jobs created in the public sector 
-judicial, educational, or administrative-offered those Islamic studies graduates a 
precious refuge: relatively secure and rewarding career opportunities. 
The large-scale recruitment and involvement of officials and staff with non-religious 
educational backgrounds in JAKIM, however, meant that the expanded authority of 
religious agencies and increased employment opportunities within them at the federal 
level did not necessarily bring great benefits to religious-trained Muslims. Moreover, a 
generally hostile climate to the religious elites in the government, and Mahathir's 
obvious low opinion of them in particular, put them very much on the defensive. The 
co-optation effect of institutionalization of religious administrative apparatus was 
(Roff 1974). 
19 Interview with Ministry of Education officials, Department of Religious Education, Kuala Lumpur, 8 
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reduced somewhat as a result. 
IKIM: Ideological Vehicle for the 'Progressive' Islamic Regime 
Islamic scholars who had always urged the government to stress Malaysia's Islamic 
identity generally welcomed the government's Islamization policy. The policy, of course, 
provided limited yet high-profile and rewarding career opportunities for selected 
Islamic scholars. The patronage aspect of the Islamization policy should not be 
forgotten, but material rewards were not the sole incentive for them. The expansion of 
career opportunities for religious-educated Muslims meant that more official resources 
would be spent for advancement of Islamic learning including the teaching of classical 
religious studies. For Islamic scholars and teachers, the Islamization initiatives offered 
rare and valuable opportunities not only to extend their career prospects but also to 
apply in practice their learning and their interpretation of the classic texts of Islam. This 
scholarly interest seems to have helped Islamic scholars and leaders to come together to 
support the government initiatives. The rise of another high-profile and influential 
federal Islamic agency, the Malaysian Institute of Islamic Understanding (Insititut 
Kefahaman Islam Malaysia or IKIM) was a product of this trend. IKIM was established 
by the federal government in 1992 as a supplement to such organizations as JAKIM and 
the Institute of Islamic Thought and. Civilization (ISTAC), the educational institution 
established by Anwar.20 
Institutionalization of the religious bureaucracy, alone, did not necessarily guarantee 
the ideological impact that UMNO politicians expected; it could more likely-and often 
actually did-benefit 'conservative' ulama by entrenching their authority and rule 
February 2000. 
20 ISTAC was officially opened in 1991 and was the brainchild of a prominent Islamic thinker, Syed 
Naquib al-Artas; who was its founder-director. In its early years, ISTIC received much support and 
patronage from the government. Anwar Ibrahim was the first chairman of the institute. 
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within the state bureaucracy. The establishment of IK.IM was meant to promote 
progressive Islam in a way that UMNO politicians envisaged would prevent traditional 
ulama from gaining too much influence within the state bureaucracy and in the Muslim 
community at large. At the official level, the prime aim of the institute was to assist the 
government's policy of Islamization by promoting the progressive understanding of 
Islam (Star, 29 May 1993). Then IKIM Director-General Ismail Ibrahim described the 
role of the institute as: 'to produce Muslims who are not only morally strong but also 
progressive, in line with the Government's Vision 2020' (Star, 29 May 1993). To this 
end, the institute organized conferences and seminars to bring together a wide spectrum 
of Muslim elites in religious administration, including State religious department 
officials, Syariah court judges, academics, as well as religious teachers. It was hoped 
that these activities would present to these religious officials and leaders an integrated 
approach and practical solutions to building high moral values among Muslims. These 
forums were also meant to publicize to these religious officials and authorities the 
modernist version of Islamic teachings and concepts. The UMNO leadership expected 
them to propagate this progressive type of Islam to the Muslim community at the 
grassroots. 
The institute's activities were not only targeted at the Muslim community. They were 
intended to enhance understanding of a progressive modernist Islam among the 
non-Muslim and business communities as well as urban middle-class Muslims. A local 
academic, and member of the prominent Penang-based NGO, Aliran, Ariffin Omar, cast 
this goal in positive light, commenting in this way: 'Perceived as modern and 
progressive, non-Malays seem to feel very comfortable and positive with IKIM's views 
and activities. ' 21 Given extensive publicity and funding, IKIM served as an ideological 
vehicle for the Mahathir administration to propagate the UMNO version of modernist 
21 Interview withAriffin Omar, Science University of Malaysia (USM), Penang, 17-27, February 1997. 
268 
Islam. In so doing, it attempted to limit the influence of a more conservative version of 
Islam that the UMNO leaders-Mahathir in particular--did not want to see widespread. 
The overall effect of this ideological campaign had two aspects. The Mahathir 
administration's ideological campaigns to promote the progressive type oflslam and the 
rise of its vehicle, IK.IM, had considerable impact on the standing of the traditional 
ulama who were viewed in a more negative light as backward and conservative, 
especially by the urban middle-class Muslims. Mahathir's open hostility towards them 
aggravated this impact.22 On the other hand, the glamorous presence of IKIM-and 
abundant material rewards-attracted a number of religious experts to serve the cause 
and interests of the UMNO leadership, especially Mahathir and Anwar. IKIM became 
instrumental in producing a new breed of Islamic intellectuals rivaling the conservative 
group of ulama, whilst acknowledging the ideologically and politically strategic 
position of the UMNO leaders. 
The employment of a new type of religious official to run this flagship institution in a 
way to serve the purposes of the UMNO leadership required the latter to circumvent the 
established system of public service recruitment. IKIM was administratively placed 
under-and fully supported by-the Prime Minist~r's office at the federal level, but 
operated as an extra-bureaucratic semi-governmental agency.23 Its officials and staff 
were placed outside the formal public service scheme, therefore allowing the UMNO 
leadership considerable leeway to appoint men who were adequately qualified to meet 
the UMNO leaders' expectations. 
What was noteworthy about this apparently personalistic mode ofrecruitment was the 
22 His exceptionally harsh attitude towards ulama, however, was often seen as rather offensive. A close 
associate of Anwar states retrospectively that Anwar had to appease the traditional ulama who had been 
alienated by the Prime Minister. 
23 In this respect !KIM followed in the steps of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) 
that was set up as a special think-tank to provide independent analysis of foreign and defense policy. 
IKIM was formed as a limited company under the Company Act 1965. It was headed by five-member 
board of directors under the chairmanship of the then Chief Secretary to the Government Ahmad Sarji 
Abdul Hamid (NST, 22 March 1994). 
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relatively high formal qualifications of its personnel. Moreover, their qualifications 
were not only in the field of Islamic studies. At the highest echelon, only a very few 
officers had formal qualifications in Islamic studies. Some, like the former 
Director-General Ismail, taught at the Faculty of Islamic Studies at the Malaysian 
National University (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia or UKM). Others had PhD 
degrees in Islamic-related fields. Yet, the main corps of IKIM officials differed from the 
traditional type of ulama in significant respects. First, the value of the IKIM officials 
was not so much based on religious qualification but more on practical expertise. For 
example, many officials did not have formal qualifications in Islamic Studies, but were 
qualified in secular fields such as economics. The majority of the director-level officials 
had qualifications (often PhD) in such fields as economics, science, and sociology. The 
best example for this was former Deputy Director-General Dr. Syed Othman Alhabshi. 
He became widely known and was seen by government leaders as a model of the 
progressive Islamic intellectual and an architect of Mahathir's modem Islam project. He 
wrote about a range of Islamic issues including Islamic finance and Islamic education. 
Despite his reputed Islamic credentials, he had no official qualification in Islamic 
studies and in fact his PhD degree was in Econometrics.24 
Second, some had high qualifications (PhD for instance) in Islamic fields not from 
institutions in the Middle East but from ones in the Western countries. The former 
Director-General Ismail, for instance, held a PhD degree from St. Andrew's University, 
a British university with a reputation for Islamic studies. Several other high-ranking 
federal Islamic officials had also graduated from St. Andrew's, including the former 
Minister in charge of religious affairs, and currently the religious advisor to the Prime 
Minister, Dr. Abdul Hamid Othman. Their Western education distinguished them from 
the traditional high-ranking religious elites who were almost always graduates of 
24 Interview with Syed OthmanAlhabshi, Kuala Lumpur, 9 June 2000. 
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Al-Azhar in Cairo. 
Third, another distinctive 'Western' attribute of IKIM officials was their clothing. Not 
a single IKIM official was dressed in 'Arabic' Islamic attire (such as the white long robe 
and turban relished by many traditional-type ulama). Instead they were always dressed 
in a conventional Western-style suit just like officials in the non-religious agencies or 
businessmen. This modem outfit signified their efforts to promote IKIM's progressive 
image and to differentiate themselves from the old type ofreligious officials.25 
The UMNO leaders' expectation that this new genre ofreligious scholar would play a 
pivotal role in their Islamization campaign was indicated by the appointment of the 
Director-General of IKIM as the Chairman of the National Fatwa Council, the highest 
official religious body with the authority to issue fatwa (BH, 13 September 2000). 
The federal government's recruitment of individuals favored by UMNO politicians 
from outside the formal bureaucratic structure to high-profile posts in the government, 
however, meant that the authority of these officials and the organizations they led were 
not fully entrenched in the government. One could expect that their influence over other 
governmental Islamic agencies (such as those at the State level) would not be automatic 
or unconditional. Their influence at the societal level was not absolute, either. Their 
achievement of high-profile posts was not based on organizational support or 
recognition in society; their authoritative dominance in the national Islamic 
administration primarily depended on the favor of UMNO politicians. Their inevitably 
partisan stance seemed to damage their professional and religious credentials. PAS often 
questioned the legitimacy of the government..:.sponsored religious officials and their 
rulings.26 
Moreover, the institute's close association with UMNO-especially 
25 About the symbolic effect of this dress 'code', see (Peletz 2002). 
26 See, for instance, 'PAS questions Ismail's appointment as fatwa council head,' Star, 11 April 2001. 
Farish also points out that the 'middle-class' character of IKIM (alongside other government-sponsored 
Islamic institutions) was responsible for the limited appeal and influence of the institute in the rural 
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Mahathir-outside the formal administrative channel meant that the fate of the 
organization as well as its personnel tended to be influenced by its patron's fate. Since 
the Anwar crisis badly undermined the moral (and thus religious) credentials of both 
Mahathir and the government, the religious bodies associated with him also seem to 
have lost some respect. The damage to the religious bodies was especially severe 
because it was precisely on religious grounds that the opposition condemned Mahathir. 
This system of apparently personalistic recruitment, however, should be differentiated 
from pure nepotism and favoritism widely observed in countries such as Indonesia. 
These religious officials might have been recruited on the basis of their expected loyalty 
to ruling politicians. But, this was not the single and most important criterion for their 
appointment. Nor were their appointments based simply on being 'brothers' or 'in-laws' 
of some prominent figures. It is important to note that their religious knowledge and 
expertise in other professional fields mattered equally. This somewhat meritocratic 
element in the system seems to have saved their credentials and authority both within 
the government and society from being tarnished too badly by their flirtation with 
UMNO politicians. 
Conclusion 
The two cases involving JAKIM and IKIM strengthened a new type of religious elite at 
the expense of the theologically trained traditional religious leaders. On the one hand, as 
proved by the JAKIM case, the federal leaders' emphasis on creating a systematic, 
efficient and competent organization administering Islamic affairs nationwide 
reinforced the importance of formal qualifications, rather than more traditional forms of 
Muslim community (Farish A. Noor 2003b ). 
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authority (such as those based on personal charisma or family lineage at the community 
level). Moreover, it had the effect of increasing the proportion of officials with secular 
backgrounds and loaned officials from non-religious agencies. In a way, 
institutionalization of the federal Islamic agency facilitated 'secularization' of the 
Islamic administrative officialdom, thereby blocking otherwise the absolute dominance 
of theologically trained Islamic officials. 
On the other hand, as illustrated by the IKIM case, the increased authority of the 
federal system of Islamic administration helped marginalize the traditional type of 
ulama as well as those unsympathetic with the UMNO version of progressive and 
materialistic Islam in the corridors of power. Despite the increased emphasis on formal 
qualifications and standards in the process of recruitment of religious officials at the 
federal level, the federal government's concurrent use of extra-bureaucratic agencies to 
pursue their religious policies meant that partial, personalistic, and informal criteria 
were also present. Moreover, the arbitrary and short-term appointment of individuals 
favored by, and loyal to, UMNO politicians to high-ranking posts in these agencies left 
the former highly vulnerable to the latter's private interference in policy implementation. 
Given their ultimate dependence on the UMNO politicians for their posts, livelihood 
and authority, these high-ranking officials had little choice but to serve their patrons' 
expectations on the religious and political fronts. In this way alone, they could defend 
their usefulness. 
The UMNO government's employment of highly qualified Islamic scholars and 
experts combined with its pledge to promote the progressive type oflslam had the effect 
of reinforcing divisions among the theologically trained religious leaders. The enlarged 
· career opportunities for Islamic Studies graduates in the public sector under the 
pro-Islamic UMNO regime, however, meant that a sizable segment of the theologically 
trained graduates was readily mobilized and co-opted to support the Islamization cause 
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of the UMNO leadership. 
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CHAPTERS 
Dealing with Radical Islamic Challenges 
Despite some limitations, the level of institutionalization of the state apparatus 
regulating a range oflslamic activities in Malaysia has grown comparatively high. State 
religious organizations are much more organized and disciplined than they were before, 
and compared with other Muslim nations such as Indonesia and Pakistan. This 
bureaucratic structure allowed federal politicians a considerable amount of authority 
and autonomy to legitimize and enforce their policies related to Islam more effectively. 
The rise of 'organized religion' within the formal state structure, thus, considerably 
increased state capacity to assert authority in the religious sector and to regulate 
religious mobilization at the societal level. 
In practice, however, a few Islamic organizations-most notably the Islamic 
opposition party PAS-remain active outside the state and manage to put considerable 
pressure on the government. Yet, it is important to note, PAS has never b.een able to 
develop into a national movement in the way that, for example, the Islamist Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey has. 1 Its influence is largely limited to rural Muslim 
constituencies in only a few States. Similarly, liberal Islamic movements and figures 
that became active in the 1990s, such as Sisters in Islam, only managed to influence an 
extremely limited urban middle-class Muslim constituency, despite the obvious backing 
of some prominent UMNO politicians. Given that religious institutions comprise 
important bases for political organization and mobilization, to what extent, and in what 
way, has the institutionalization process affected non-governmental Islamic 
1 The Islamist Justice and Development Party won an overwhelming victory in parliamentary elections in 
2002, sweeping out political parties that had dominated Turkish politics for the past decades. 
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organizations and actors? 
This chapter assesses the political effects of the institutionalization of the state 
administrative structures overseeing Islamic affairs and the latter's effect on 
state-society relations. It asks what the effects of institutionalization of the religious 
bureaucracies on the state's capacity to regulate Islamic activities are, and why the 
Malaysian government's co-optation of religious authorities went as far as it did. In 
theory, it is hypothesized that the institutionalization of the religious apparatus within 
the state will strengthen the state capacity to control non-state religious actors. Thereby, 
it will restrain development of politically threatening autonomous religious activities in 
the societal sphere, including oppositional and radical Islamic movements. I examine 
the government's dealing with oppositional Islamic challenges including PAS and some 
extremist Islamic movements, and also bring in comparison between Malaysia and 
Indonesia to test the proposition about religious mobilization. Weak Islamic activism in 
Malaysia contrasted starkly with its neighbor Indonesia where a variety· of societal 
Islamic groups-radical or liberal-remained very active. By comparing the two cases, 
I evaluate how far the institutionalization of the religious administrative apparatus 
reinforced state capacities to regulate oppositional religious movements, and how it 
helped to temper radical religious mobilization. 
Demobilizing PAS's Challenge 
In Malaysia, PAS's leaders managed to mobilize a large section of the rural (and to a 
less extent urban) Muslim community and often succeeded in forcing UMNO regime 
onto the defensive. To express its principles, goals, and aspirations based on Islam, the 
party always bestowed ulama with a special position in the party hierarchy. The 
276 
influence of ulama within the party fluctuated over time, but remained especially high 
ever since the ulama-led 'Young Turks' rose to power in the party in the early 1980s at a 
time when the wave of Islamic revival was sweeping the Muslim community.2 Several 
indicators illustrated this Islamization trend in the party; the supremacy of the Ulama 
Council (Dewan Ulamak) and the spiritual leader (Mursyidul Am), Nik Aziz Nik Mat, in 
the party organization had become almost indisputable; many of the prominent leaders, 
such as the former Chief Minister of Terengganu and the current party President, Abdul 
Hadi Awang, were ulama trained in Islamic law;3 and traditional-type religious schools 
(Sekolah Agama Rakyat or SAR) run by ulama continued to provide an important 
support base for the party. 
The ulama's religious-prescribed moral order and guidance became a special asset for 
PAS when the Anwar crisis in 1998 caused enormous fury in the Muslim community. 
PAS fully exploited religious symbols and vocabularies to criticize-and mobilize 
against-UMNO, and Mahathir in particular, for the crude way in which they dismissed 
Anwar. Their accusations against the UMNO regime, articulated in religious terms, 
appealed to a wide spectrum of the Muslim community, and gave PAS its highest level 
of electoral support since independence in the 1999 general election.4 Yet, UMNO 
leaders' tighter administrative control over key religious institutions including the State 
Mufti and private religious schools greatly hindered PAS's mobilizational capacity. The 
impact of this administrative control was especially significant since the schools had 
2 For the rise of ulama-led leadership and increased emphasis on Islam in PAS, see Hussin Mutalib 
(1990: 113-18). 
3 It is suggested, on the other hand, that the influence of the non-ulama 'professionals' has been growing 
since the late 1990s and an increasing number of party members were recruited from this 'non-ulama' 
group (Interviews with PAS MP from Terengganu, PAS's office, Kuala Lumpur, 14 June 2000; PAS MP 
from Kelantan; Kuala Lumpur, 3 October 2001). This ulama versus professional divide at the top echelon 
of the party leadership drew attention, again, in the latest Muktamar in 2003. The newly elected 
18-member Central Committee was composed · of 10 professionals and 8 ulama ('Hadi: 
Ulama-professional gap is nothing,' Star, 15 September 2003; 'Hassan's win shows ulama still has grip 
on PAS,' Star, 15 September :2003). 
4 PAS 's membership had grown from 500,000 in September 1998 to about 700,000 a year later (Weiss 
1999). The sales of the party's newspaper, Harakah, also went up, prompting the UMNO government to 
take a repressive step; the paper was not only banned from public sale, but also forced to change its 
publication from twice-weekly to twice-monthly. 
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become heavily dependent on the federal government for their survival and therefore 
vulnerable to government interference. 
The co-optation of a number of ulama into the state administrative structure meant 
that a potential source for political mobilization was neutralized. It is important to note 
that the Weberian attribute of state bureaucratic organizations did not ensure state 
enforcement of religious matters to be completely insulated from particularistic social 
interests. Institutionalization having taken place under the one-party-dominant regime 
meant that the implementation was somehow skewed to favor the interests of ruling 
politicians. Although religious officials were recruited to state offices on merit to carry 
out official tasks designated to their office both in theory and practice, the religious 
officials were obliged to comply with the iron rules of obedience and acquiescence in 
the state bureaucracy; they were to serve the 'not so neutral' interests of the Muslim 
ruling elites within UMNO. The process of institutionalization, as case studies in the 
later section of this chapter demonstrate, helped strengthen the capacity of the state in 
handling Islamic activities. Furthermore, it reinforced the power base of the ruling party 
by limiting sources for oppositional religious mobilization. 
The Political Economy of Career Incentives and the Prospects for Religious 
Autonomy: An Unbalanced Demand and Supply Problem 
The Malaysian government's use of co-optation and a corporatist approach is not a 
unique phenomenon. Other Muslim nations also employed similar mechanisms to 
control theologically trained Muslim religious elites. For example, in Indonesia, the 
Suharto regime created several government-sponsored Islamic organizations to co-opt 
prominent Islamic leaders and organizations, and to use them as channels to distribute 
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patronage (e.g, Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996; Porter 2002). In Egypt, too, the government 
attempted to control the most prestigious Islamic institution, Al-Azhar, to co-opt ulama 
into the state (e.g., Moustafa 2000; Zeghal 1999). However, the degree of success of 
co-optation strategies varied across nations. The Malaysian case stood at the relatively 
'successful' end of the spectrum. The government's Islamization policies in the past two 
decades managed to incorporate a large number of theologically trained Muslims into 
the public sector. Despite Islamic opposition's . constant accusations and mockery, 
religious officials command a good deal of authority and esteem in the Muslim 
community. The government's co-optation had the effect of restricting the scope of 
religious autonomy as well as the mobilizational capacities of religious actors in the 
societal sphere. Why do some countries manage to achieve intended goals more 
effectively than others? 
One explanation relates to the type of co-optation. In the Malaysian case, the 
co-optation took on a special character and was carried out by a strategy that contrasted 
starkly with that used in many other Muslim nations. As the prior chapters have shown, 
the government itself took over traditional religious functions and expanded state 
bureaucracies to carry out these functions along Weberian lines. Importantly, religious 
officials were· recruited into the religious establishment within the state as 'salaried 
officials.' This mode of bureaucratic co-optation should be differentiated from 
patrimonial co-optation based on personalistic distribution of public resources through 
extra-bureaucratic channels. 
Comprehensive assessment of the co-optation effect under the UMNO's Islamization 
regime needs to take account of one additional factor: the demand-supply equation of 
career opportunities for religious-trained Muslims. In theory, the significance of 
co-optation will be influenced by two factors: (1) the government's will and capacity to 
provide a steady and sufficient supply of long-term career opportunities for 
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theologically trained Muslims in the public sector, and (2) the deficiency of career. 
opportunities for them in the private sector. In Malaysia, the very limited availability of 
career opportunities for theologically trained Muslim graduates in the private sector 
maximized the co-optation effect of the expanded religious public service. 
Comparison with Indonesia illuminates this point. In Indonesia; the government's 
essentially 'secular-nationalist' approach in the post-independence period meant that 
state intervention in religious administration was moderate, leaving the task of running 
religious affairs largely to societal actors. Non-governmental Islamic organizations were 
the main providers of not only religious functions but also employment opportunities 
· for traditional religious school graduates. The two most prominent religious NGOs, 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, for example, run not only religious 
education, but also medical, social-welfare, and financial services for their followers. 
These functions offered a social network as well as career opportunities for graduates of 
their affiliated schools. Moreover, the lack of necessity (as well as will) of these 
religious elites to depend too much on the government for livelihood as well as religious 
authority helped dilute the effect of co-optation policies adopted by the Suharto regime 
in the late 1980s (Porter 2002). Even then, a massive supply of government funds-
together with official approval of Islamic groups-was very attractive for some 
non-governmental organizations and leaders since they tended to be short of resources 
(both economic and political) to manage their affairs.5 
An unexpected consequence of the government-sponsored Islamization projects in 
Malaysia was a balance sheet problem: the government could not supply sufficient 
career opportunities for religious graduates who disproportionately increased under the 
5 Material incentives of this sort indeed influenced the relationship between the government and 
non-governmental Islamic organizations. The tentative rapprochement of NU (especially its then 
Chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid) and the Suharto regime in the early 1990s was largely explained by this 
factor (Feillard 1997; Kadir 2002). Moreover, receptivity to the government's interference varied among 
organizations. It is a common knowledge that modernist organizations, especially Muhammadiyah, were 
less successful in maintaining their autonomy due to their reliance on state resources. 
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UMNO's Islamization regime. The demand for job opportunities from religious 
graduates was simply too high for the public sector to accommodate. Moreover, these 
religious graduates lacked the skills needed by modem sectors of the economy in the 
private sector. 
UMNO leaders, especially Mahathir, came to realize with much apprehension that 
private religious schools were producing an excessive number of graduates, who only 
possessed what they considered 'impractical' skills and knowledge. To make it worse, 
they claimed, some of them were involved in 'undesirable' political activities, such as 
supporting the opposition to the government. It was UMNO leaders, it has to be 
remembered, that extended generous financial assistance to these Islamic schools and 
teachers in the name of support for the religious cause, albeit in practice to fulfill their 
patronage-maximizing goals. This financial assistance, the allocation of which was 
determined by the number of student enrollments in each school, not only helped them 
to survive financially but also encouraged them to increase student enrollment without 
much consideration of their students' future career options.6 
The problem concerning enlarged student enrollment at religious schools was 
two-fold. First, there was little capacity in tertiary institutions at home to accommodate 
all the potential candidates from private religious schools nationwide. Since the 1990s, 
faculties of Islamic studies at national universities had developed both in qualitative and 
quantitative terms. 7 Coupled with the establishment and expansion of the International 
Islamic University (DIAM), this trend helped to some extent to absorb the pressure of 
religious school graduates aspiring to pursue tertiary level education. However, 
Mahathir administration's promotion of progressive and modem Islam meant that these 
tertiary institutions, at the same time, were pressed to standardize their admissions to 
6 See, for instance, 'Aziz: Some SARs lied to get more govt funds,' Star, 17 February 2003. 
7 Interview with Dean of Faculty of Islamic Studies, the National University of Malaysia (UKM), 
Selangor, 2 June 2000; Faculty member of Akademi Pengajian Islam, University of Malaya, Kuala 
Lumpur, 31May2000. 
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maintain the quality of their programs and students. These Islamic faculties, however, 
often adopted a lenient approach to religious school graduates by admitting them 
without the required school grades. 8 Yet, this only exacerbated the fundamental 
problem that there were insufficient opportunities for too many unqualified religious 
tertiary graduates. Furthermore, those Islamic studies graduates who managed to 
complete their degrees also found that their career prospects were not as bright as they 
had expected. 9 Against the backdrop of rapid economic development, religious 
expertise was not a skill particularly useful or attractive in the modem economic, 
industrial, and administrative sectors. On top of this, the government's drive to 
standardize and upgrade the qualification of some religious offices (e.g., Syariah judges, 
religious teachers), ironically, made the prerequisite for admission too high and 
time-consuming for the majority oflslamic studies graduates. 10 
Second, religious school students also had an option to go abroad (the Middle East 
more specifically) for tertiary education. As suggested in chapter 5, however, relatively 
easy admission to tertiary institutions known for Islamic studies in the Middle East and 
the Indian subcontinent, including the most prestigious Al-Azhar, allowed the 
acceptance of an excessive number of Malaysian Muslim students every year only to 
produce an equally excessive number of unqualified and failed graduates. A select few 
might find high-profile posts in the federal agencies such as JAKIM and IKIM as well 
as Syariah courts. However, many apparently came home to find themselves unfitted for 
Malaysia's booming market place; fortunately some found posts at religious schools or 
State religious departments as religious teachers, imam, or mosque officials. Or else, 
8 Interview with former UIAM academic, Kuala Lumpur, 9 June 2000. 
9 UIAM graduates may be exceptional in this regard. UIAM's principle of training its students both in 
religious and practical fields, in fact, made them very attractive candidates on the job market in a variety 
of sectors including the judiciary, education, finance and industry. This was not usually the case, however, 
with graduates of faculties oflslamic studies at other universities. 
10 The qualification for the Syariah legal service is a case in point. It requires the degree in Islamic legal 
administration in addition to the Syariah law degree previously required. For detailed discussion on this 
point, see chapter 4. 
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they ended up starting their own schools back in their home villages. 
The bleak career prospects for many graduates from Islamic institutions both at home 
and abroad contrasted markedly with secular-educated Muslims who benefited 
enormously from the government-sponsored pro-Malay preferential package. Under 
such conditions, it was not so surprising that some of these religious-educated Muslims 
felt that the government was not doing enough for Islam in general and Islamic 
education in particular. Some of them were readily attracted by PAS's rhetoric against 
the UMNO government's 'secular' outlook. Others became vulnerable to reactionary or 
radical ideas and anti-establishment/anti-West doctrines of fringe religious movements 
and teachers. In Muslim societies, these religious school graduates could be ready 
recruits for oppositional and radical religious mobilization against the government. The 
Malaysian government's recruitment of religious graduates into the public sector under 
its Islamization drive helped to preempt the potential of discontent mobilization that 
would do political harm to the ruling party but did not absorb all of them. 
Dealing with 'Extremist' Islamic Challenges 
Patronage Distribution and Discontent Mobilization 
The balance sheet problem-a surplus of religious-educated Muslims-against the 
backdrop of rapid modernization under the UMNO's developmentalist regime meant 
that not all Muslims benefited from the government's Islamization policies; there were 
some 'losers.' In the environment of widespread patronage norms in Malaysian politics, 
the institutional expansion brought with it an expanding opportunity for 'pork barrel' 
distributional practices-in the form of offices, funds, perks, licenses and various other 
benefits that could be distributed to present as well as potential UMNO supporters. Such 
283 
patronage-oriented distributional politics discouraged the full entrenchment of a more 
meritocratic, rule-bound, and authoritative administrative mechanism in all sectors. For 
example, in the Syariah judicial sector, the upgrading of the status of the Islamic court 
officials helped incorporate the highest echelon of the ulama into the public service and 
thus prevented the highest qualified religious elites from offering leadership to the 
opposition, or even voicing dissident opinions. The courts therefore came to be seen as 
servants of the UMNO government. In the educational sector, the process of 
institutionalization helped incorporate a rising number of religious teachers who could 
have otherwise been dislocated in the context of rapid modernization in the process of 
national development. That the government publicly acknowledged the value of 
religious education meant that religious teachers were given the official recognition they 
believed they deserved. 11 Various material benefits- however limited-to which other 
public servants were entitled were also awarded to them. 12 However, the allocation of 
dramatically expanded funds and posts as a result of newly introduced religious schools 
and classes left them vulnerable to political interference of the ruling party. UMNO 
politicians used the allocation of those public goods not only as 'carrots' to woo 
potential and present supporters, but also as 'sticks' to discipline oppositional elements. 
In the welfare (zakat) sector, prominent UMNO politicians'-especially 
Anwar's-patronage incentives worked to develop an alternative Islamic charity fund 
outside the formal bureaucratic sphere to cultivate a personal support base among the 
underprivileged class of Muslims. The same incentives left the official charity-based 
taxation system-zakat-largely neglected. 
the government-sponsored Islamization project consequently brought about a 
11 More recently, however, against the backdrop of the war against terrorism, the federal government 
began to claim that too much emphasis had been given to religious education, and that religious education 
needed to be revamped (See, for instance, 'A Plan to End Extremism, FEER, 26 December 2002-2 
January 2003; 'KL set to overhaul religious education to blunt political Islam, ST, 24 December 2002). 
12 Interview with Ministry of Education officials in charge of the religious teacher service schemes, 
Bahagian Pembangunan Organisasi dan Perkhidmatan, Ministry of Education, Kuala Lumpur, 12 March 
2001. 
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perception that the state religious agencies as well as the officials who manned these 
offices were 'employees of the UMNO' and did not run religious affairs fairly for all 
Muslims. This perception contributed to a sense of discontent and unease among those 
who did not benefit from the system and provided opposition leaders with political 
grievances on which to capitalize. Thus, the patronage-based allocation of the expanded 
'goods' had a far-reaching distributional consequence, alienating further non-UMNO 
supporters-especially those on the opposition side. 
Islamic movements offered those Muslims who were generally discontented with the 
government policies an ideological and organizational frame to express their discontent. 
In Malaysia, fringe Islamic movements, which the religious authorities generally 
referred to 'deviant' movements, were not unusual, and sometimes caused tension-and 
even occasional violent clashes-with the government authorities. How did the 
Malaysian government deal with challenges from these extremist movements? 
State Capacities to Combat Extremist Movements 
The Malaysian government's battle against 'deviationist' or 'extremist' Islam at the 
national level demonstrated the significance of a well-institutionalized state religious 
bureaucracy. 13 In the context of the War-Against-Terror in the aftermath of the 9/11, 
both policy makers and observers alike tend to attribute the Malaysian government's 
strong capacities to deal with religious radicalism to its security tools-the police 
(especially the special branch) and draconian security acts. However, the government's 
13 In Malaysia, the concept of 'deviationism' (sesat or sonsang) is widely used to describe religious 
movements or activities of an extremist sort. Peletz casts doubt about the Malaysian government's 
exploitation of the concept of 'deviationism' for suppressing 'unfavorable' religious movements on 
religious-legal grounds. He points out that 'the concept of "deviationism" as such does not exist either in 
the Shafi'i legal school of Islam that is institutionalized in Malaysia (and in many parts of the Muslim 
world) or in any other orthodox school of Islamic law; and that the concept of "deviationism" has no clear 
basis in any realm of Malaysia's present-day legal system' (Peletz 2002). The wide currency of the 
concept in the Muslim community in Malaysia is precisely due to its socio-political utility in purging 
socio-politically unfavorable religious movements. 
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dealings with radical types oflslamic activities did not rely exclusively on the use of the 
security forces. Alongside the highly controversial security instruments-most notably 
the Internal Security Act (ISA)-the government extensively used the administrative 
machinery ruling religious activities and teaching in the religio-legal and educational 
spheres. For government leaders, the key concern was not only technical but also 
political; the religious administrative mechanisms not only provided government leaders 
with effective operational tools, but also allowed them to avoid heavy dependence on 
the politically unattractive ISA in combating radical Islamic elements. 
Moreover, the well-organized religious authority structures equipped the Muslim 
ruling politicians with institutional power to define an Islamic group as 'radical' and 
'dangerous' on doctrinal grounds when it posed a political threat to their rule and 
authority. For them, whether targeted groups were genuinely 'deviant' or not was not a 
prime concern; the point was that they developed authority structures within the state to 
dictate the 'official' definition according to their political interests and to discredit 
politically unfavorable Islamic elements. 
Religious officials, on the other hand, were more concerned about doctrinal issues. 
For them, a major task was to monitor religious deviation and enforce the 'correct' 
Islam as they interpreted it. They could prove their function and value by actively 
hunting down radical movements, and in fact exploited the threat of extremism so as to 
extend their operational power and to defend their religious supremacy within the 
Muslim community. 
The ways in which the effectiveness of security operations against religious 
movements considered politically 'dangerous' were crucially dependent on the doctrinal 
authority of the religious bureaucracy are illustrated in the following two cases----one 
negative and the other positive. In the first case, the religious bureaucracy seems to have. 
failed to anticipate the challenge while in the second it backed the security measures. 
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The Memali Incident, 1985 
The Memali incident occurred at a time when UMNO was facing a strong political 
challenge from PAS in the Malay-majority States of the north and northeast of the 
peninsula. In a climate influenced by the Islamic revolution in Iran, younger PAS 
activists were calling for a more vigorous challenge to UMNO. In late 1985 the most 
violent confrontation between government security forces and radical Muslims that 
Malaysia had experienced occurred in Memali, a village in the northern State of Kedah. 
Heavily armed police raided the village to arrest Ibrahim Mahmud, a local religious 
teacher and his lightly armed supporters. The security forces included the para-military 
field force and the federal reserve unit (the elite riot squad). In the ensuing clash, 
eighteen people, including Ibrahim, were killed and a number of policemen and 
villagers were wounded. The police arrested 159 village followers and imposed a 
curfew on the entire area. 
Ibrahim was a graduate of Al-Azhar University and had also studied at Tripoli, Libya. 
He appears to have been a classic case of an alienated graduate of the Islamic 
educational system who lacked the skills needed for 'modem' employment. After his 
return to Malaysia, he worked for the government's Pusat Islam for a while but then 
returned to his home village to set up his own madrasah. Ibrahim was known for his 
fiery rhetoric and radical ideas. He openly criticized the secular government and called 
for an Islamic revolution and the setting up of an Islamic state in Malaysia by whatever 
means necessary. Significantly, he was also an active member of PAS and had 
previously contested an election as a PAS candidate. (Barraclough 1986: 202-03; Farish 
A. Noor 2003a: 216-17). 
The Memali incident raised a number of security and political questions. First, 
skepticism remained strong about whether Ibrahim's group really constituted a 
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significant threat to order and stability while some believed that the security forces 
themselves may have been responsible for exacerbating the violence by their decision to 
storm Ibrahim's compound in the village. The government's various efforts to ward off 
public suspicion were not entirely convincing. In response to PAS supporters in Kedah 
who regarded Ibrahim as a martyr, the Islamic Council of Kedah was urged to issue a 
fatwa that declared that he was not a shadid (martyr) and that those who were killed did 
not die in the name of Islam. Public sympathy for Ibrahim's group remained strong 
enough to damage the government in a State where it faced a strong political challenge 
from PAS. The incident seems to have persuaded some of the government leaders that 
the excessive use of security forces could be politically costly and counter-productive in 
dealing with Islamic radicals. 
Second, the government attempted to implicate PAS leaders as the instigators of the 
violence. UMNO's aim was to discredit Islamic opposition by linking the party with 
militancy and extremism. PAS, however, distanced itself from the violence and 
maintained that the dead religious teacher and those of his followers who were PAS 
members acted in a private capacity and not on behalf of the party (Barraclough 1986: 
202). The linking of PAS to religious extremism and violence became a regular tactic 
for UMNO leaders to discredit PAS by claiming that the party was extremist and 
dangerous. 
Third, and most relevant for the argument of this chapter, the high level of violence 
strengthened the government's conviction that it needed to build a strong and 
centralized religious apparatus to regulate Islamic activities. UMNO leaders seem to 
have felt the need particularly in the face of massive public concern about the 
deployment of coercive forces to deal with Islamic movements after the violent and 
tragic incident at Memali (Barraclough 1986: 203). The failure of local religious 
authorities to counter Ibrahim's movement before the intervention of the security forces 
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provided the government with an important lesson. 
Since the 1980s, the government continually made use of the threat of Islamic 
extremism to build up the state capacity to regulate Islamic activism. The state religious 
officialdom, especially Pusat Islam, was constantly pressed to be more effective and 
efficient in containing deviant movements. After all, Pusat Islam had been a previous 
employer of Ibrahim Mahmud. They were undoubtedly keen to maximize their 
operational capacity to meet this demand. The federal religious bureaucracy expanded 
over the years in a way that met the interest of the federal religious authorities in 
fighting what they perceived as a 'chief enemy': Islamic extremism and 'deviance'. The 
federal religious authorities under Pusat Islam/JAKIM frequently played up the fear of 
Islamic extremism to expand their regulatory functions and jurisdictional authority. 
The Stat<: Campaign against the Al-Arqam Movement 
The government's operation against the Al-Arqam movement (often referred to as Darul 
Arqam or just Arqam), one of the most influential Islamic revivalist movements to date, 
exhibited the value of the well-organized state religious bureaucracy in combating an 
Islamic group targeted as a political threat to the ruling politicians. Arqa:m is a Sufi 
movement that was founded in 1969 by Ustaz Ashaari Muhammad. It aimed to set up 
relatively self-contained communities where Muslims could live a simple life to some 
extent untainted by the secular outside world. For this purpose it established a commune 
on the outskirts of Kuala Lumpur as a model to be followed by Arqam communities 
elsewhere. Although the government had initially enjoyed cordial relations with Arqam, 
by the 1990s it was claiming that the growing influence of the movement was 
dangerous and a 'threat to national security' and banned the group in August 1994. The 
teachings and beliefs of the movement were declared to be 'against true Islamic practice 
289 
and teachings and could mislead Muslims. ' 14 Although Al-Arqam had no record of 
resorting to violence, the government played up the security threat of the movement and 
employed the ISA as well as the police force to terminate it. 
However, by now the Malaysian government had some reservations about the 
excessive use of coercive security tools in handling Islamic movements. Given the 
special political and symbolic value of the religion, being seen as suppressing an 
Islamic movement was not a smart move politically. The government hence preferred to 
take less controversial measures such as co-optation, and/or propaganda through the 
media. 15 Security measures were normally kept as a final resort (Barraclough 1985). 
Even when they adopted a coercive approach, the government leaders concurrently used 
other mechanisms to minimize the political damage inflicted by the excessive use of 
such unpopular measures as the ISA. 
The Malaysian government's campaign against the Al-Arqam movement highlighted 
the inadequacy of security tools and the value of a well-institutionalized strong state 
religious machinery in two ways. First, the banning of the Al-Arqam movement needed 
to be grounded on an official religious ruling. The Prime Minister insisted that the 
government would not take action against the movement without referring to religious 
experts (FEER, 11 August 1994). The National Fatwa Council16 met in Kuala Lumpur 
in August 1994 and ruled that the Al-Arqam movement was a 'deviant' group and thus 
should be disbanded. The council declared that the movement had strayed from the 
Islamic teachings officially prescribed by the government-backed ulama. 17 One 
example was Arqam's belief that its doctrines had been personally conveyed by the 
Prophet Mohammad who had appeared physically before an Indonesian sufi, Sheikh 
14 FEER, 11 August 1994, and various articles from NST, for example, 6 August 1994. 
15 Ho.stile media reporting against the Al-Arqam movement in the state-controlled local media, for 
example, embellished the movement with allegations such as the existence of a secret army and sex slaves. 
Such media campaigns undoubtedly served to undermine the public perception of the movement. 
16 Fatwa is an authoritative legal ruling given by an authorized official interpreting Islamic law. 
17 For instance, FEER, 11August1994; NST, 6August 1994. 
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Muhammad Abdullah Al-Suhaimi, in Mecca. According to Arqam, Suhaimi, who 
according. to others had died several decades ago, was in fact miraculously still alive 
and could be the promised Mahdi who would usher in the end of the current age 
(Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid 2004). The religious ruling issued by the National Fatwa 
Council (under the Prime Minister's Department) was intended to legitimize the 
government's action. This mechanism allowed the politicians considerable leeway and 
authority to implement an otherwise controversial policy related to Islam to their 
advantage. 
Second, security instruments alone could not completely eliminate the movement; 
many of the tasks to achieve this objective required the active participation of religious 
agencies. At the outset of the government's campaign against Arqam, a stringent 
security regime was put in place. The initial phase of the campaign saw police detaining 
some forty-one members in August 1994 alone (FEER, 11 August 1994). In the years 
after the banning, the movement remained under close government scrutiny because 
authorities kept finding it 'difficult to wipe out what was in the members' hearts and 
minds' (Star, 1 June 1996). In 1996, a revival of the movement was detected and met 
with a severe response from the authorities. Ex-followers of the mov.ement were 
detained under the ISA; four in May, and seven in August 1996 (NST, 3 June 1996; Star, 
6 August 1996). But the security authorities could not deal with Arqam alone. The 
problem was that the police could not do much beyond arresting movement followers, 
and could hardly keep on doing that forever. Facing mounting pressure to be more 
effective in stemming the movement, the Deputy Home Minister, Megat Junid, blamed 
religious officials for the ineffectiveness of the campaign to rehabilitate the former 
Arqam members. His claim was that 'police could only make arrests, conduct 
surveillance and monitor the movements of ex-followers, but rehabilitation must be 
undertaken by Pusat Islam (the predecessor of JAKIM)' (NST, 3 June 1996). 
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The central religious agency, Pusat Islam, thus took a number of steps toward the 
dismantling of the movement. On the ideological front, Pusat Islam launched a 
rehabilitation program, carried out at the newly established Pusat Pemulihan Aquidah 
(Faith Rehabilitation Center). The program was drafted by Pusat Islam together with the 
State religious departments, and featured, among others, lectures by experts on Syariah 
laws (Star 8 March 1995; 28 March 1995; 29 June 1995). On the educational front, 
Pusat Islam, in coordination with the Ministry of Education, shut down the Arqam 
schools and urged them to register with the Ministry to comply with the national 
curriculum. They also coordinated the transfer of pupils from Arqam schools to 
government schools. The government placed high priority on this school issue because 
'that is the key to their strategy' (FEER, 11 August 1994). Arqam ran 257 schools 
nationwide at pre-school, primary and secondary levels, taught by 696 teachers and 
attended by 9,541 pupils (NST, 11 August 1994). Moreover, the government shut down 
business operations under Arqam management. By 1993, Arqam had established an 
extensive commercial network not only in all of the Malaysian States, but also 
overseas. 18 The total assets of the company were said to be RM300million 
(approximately US$79million). 19 Security forces were not adequately equipped to stop 
these business operations that funded the expansion of the religious movement. 
The government's campaign to disband the Al-Arqam movement showed that the 
conventional security apparatus alone was inadequate to neutralize religious extremism. 
In fact, few really believed that the security apparatus was needed to deal with the 
18 Its business group, the Al-Arqam Group of Companies (AGC) successfully ran 20-odd subsidiary 
companies and dealt with a wide range of businesses and services; groceries, mini-markets, food stuffs 
and drinks, clothes and tailoring, animal husbandry, restaurants, marketing and distribution, trading, 
transportation, medical services, land and development, media and publication, tourism, finance, high 
technology and many more. 
19 The estimate of the group's worldwide assets varied from one source to another. The group leaders 
estimated their worldwide assets at over RM15 million (FEER, 11 August 1994). The government, on the 
other hand, estimated them at some RM115million (Asiaweek, 20 July 1994). Even if the government's 
claim is correct, the Arqam network was insignificant compared to Chinese conglomerates as well as the 
business empires associated with UMNO leaders. For a summary of Arqam's activities, see Aliran 
Monthly, 14, 8 (1994): 18-27. 
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movement. 20 The deployment of non-security instruments helped mitigate public 
pressures against the government's excessive use of coercive measures, especially the 
ISA. Ironically, strong criticism came from a section of the community that was least 
reflected in the Arqam membership. The continued detention of Arqam members under 
the ISA led multi-ethnic liberal groups such the Bar Council as well as Human Rights 
organizations to express special concern to the government. The council's chairman, for 
example, stated that 'any infringement of religious enactments should be dealt with 
under appropriate laws and not the ISA because freedom of worship was guaranteed 
under the Federal Constitution' (Star, 31 May 1996). UMNO politicians could not 
afford to entirely dismiss such criticism from the politically important middle-class 
constituencies. 
The approach ofUMNO leaders towards Al-Arqam was essentially based on political 
considerations rather than religious doctrinal concerns. It is doubtful that the Arqam 
movement seriously posed a security threat but UMNO leaders had a strong political 
incentive to adopt a firm approach towards the movement. Among the factors that 
agitated UMNO leaders was Arqam's considerable capacity to attract a wide spectrum 
of Muslims ranging from the youth to influential government officials, as well as its 
accusations against the government for deviating from true Islamic practice. 
Involvement of some prominent UMNO politicians in the movement, including a 
former chief minister of the State of Perak: and members of the family of the former 
Deputy Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba, disturbed UMNO leaders because of the potential 
threat it posed to their supremacy and authority within the party. Moreover, Arqam's 
unsophisticated outlook appeared very alien in the eyes of non-Muslims. UMNO 
leaders' aversion to extremist elements-however insignificant-was also intended to 
avoid alienating their increasingly important non-Muslim constituencies and the 
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business community. The political incentives of UMNO politicians helped to forge the 
alliance of political and religious authorities that was determined to ensure that Muslims 
in Malaysia were free from such 'deviationist' doctrines and activities as Arqam. 
Other 'Deviant' Movements 
Throughout the 1990s, a range of so-called 'deviant' movements were targeted by the 
authorities as 'threats to national security' and kept under surveillance.21 Most, in fact, 
were quite small and their influence hardly extended beyond a few villages. Others, 
however, achieved some national prominence but did not constitute genuine 'security 
threats.' Besides Al-Arqam, the authorities targeted, for example, the Jemaah Al-Quran 
Malaysia (JAM) that questioned the authority of the hadith; a group following Shi'ite 
teaching; and a group that originated from the Nakshabandiah Sufi movement in Syria. 
The first group, JAM, was led by a noted Malay literary figure and former socialist 
politician, Kassim Ahmad. It was accused of undermining religious belief by rejecting 
hadith as authoritative sources of Islamic doctrine (Star, 12 July 1995). Although the 
group had only 300 members, the religious authorities banned a book setting out its 
views (Star, 18 July 1995; 23 July 1995; 29 August 1995). The second group, the 
Shi'ites, was said to include sixteen sects with 100,000 followers including some 
foreigners (Star, 25 February 1996; 26 July 1996). The religious authorities were 
particularly concerned about potential ideological discord within the Sunni-dominated 
Muslim community, and the possibility of Shi'ite teaching infiltrating educational 
institutions including universities (Star, 25 February 1996; 24 May 1996; 26 July 1996). 
The third group associated with a prince of a Malay royal family had only about 250 
followers. The authorities' concern was that the group involved many highly educated 
individuals with prominent social status and professional backgrounds, and had strong 
21 According to Ariffin's study, the authorities identified at least fifty groups as 'deviant' (Ariffin Omar 
1995). 
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financial backing (Star, 23 September 1995; 14 September 1995, 28 September 1995). 
In all three cases, however, the authorities took no further action beyond keeping them 
under surveillance. 
Unlike religious officials, politicians had to consider political implications of the 
government's dealing with Islamic matters. Thus the government's treatment of these 
minor 'deviant' groups contrasted starkly with religious officials' aggressive assault on 
Al-Arqam. In response to the 'Anti-hadith' group, for example, Mahathir maintained 
that the government would have to study the matter carefully because it concerned 
religion, and defended his position in this way: 'Islam permits certain differences in 
interpretations and we have to study if the interpretations are actually against Islam' 
(Star, 5 July 1995). He concluded, after all, that the government did not need to take 
action in this case (Star, 7 August 1995). 
From the point of view of security, a more genuinely dangerous, although still very 
small, group emerged in 2000. In July of that year, twenty-nine members of Al-Ma'unah, 
a hitherto unknown group, were convicted following raids on two army camps in the 
Perak State where they stole more than a hundred weapons. They took four hostages, 
two of whom were murdered after a four-day standoff. Al-Ma'unah's leaders included 
military personnel but they appeared to have no international connections. They were 
later convicted and received severe sentences (Martinez 2001: 196; Maznah Mohamad 
2001: 216-17). 
Malaysia's security world changed after 9/11, especially after the arrest of Malaysians 
accused of being part of a plot to blow up foreign embassies in Singapore at the end of 
2001. In that year, twenty-five members of another Islamic group, KMM (Kumpulan 
Militan Malaysia), apparently linked to Al-Qaeda, were arrested under the ISA. The 
government claimed that some members of the KMM had gone for training in 
Afghanistan and maintained contacts with Al-Qaeda. Among the arrested members was 
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Nik Adli, the son ofKelantan Chief Minister, Nik Abdul Aziz (Asian Wall Street Journal, 
8 January, 2002; ST, 9 January 2002). As usual, the UMNO government took the 
opportunity to implicate PAS with religious extremism and militancy and to discredit 
the Islamic opposition, resulting in public suspicions of the validity of the government's 
accusations (Martinez 2001: 196). Following the exposure of the plot in Singapore, 
Malaysians involved in the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah were detained under the 
ISA. 
Against the backdrop of the War-Against-Terror, the government was able to mobilize 
its strong security apparatus to crack down on extremist suspects to the extent that 
concerns were raised about the ruling politicians' abuse of security power to infringe 
religious freedom. Yet, the ruling politicians could also deploy state religious officials to 
justify their actions against Islamic extremists and to minimize political damage. 
The extremist threat helped the government to rationalize a further build-up of the 
state religious apparatus, thereby reinforcing the state's capacity to regulate Islamic 
activism at home. Moreover, the centralization of the religious administrative apparatus 
endowed religious officialdom with the ultimate authority to define and dictate the 
'orthodoxy' of the Islamic faith within the national boundaries and to police and punish 
'unorthodox' variants. This tighter administrative control of Islam had negative 
consequences for the development of civil society in the Muslim community, as it 
restrained not only radical but also liberal religious movements. The danger was that 
ruling politicians could exploit the state religious apparatus to harass oppositional and 
'unfavorable' religious movements in the name of protecting the unity of the Muslim 
faith. Despite this drawback from the perspective of civil activism, the religious 
regulatory structures institutionalized in the state provided the government with a 
critical capacity to deal with Islamic activism at the societal level. 
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Institutionalized Islam and Religious Mobilization: Comparing Malaysia and 
Indonesia 
The Malaysian case suggests that, as much as the state's security mechanisms, the ruling 
party's administrative control over the religious apparatus led by religious-educated 
Muslim officials enhanced the government's ability to regulate religious mobilization 
and organization in the Muslim community. It was precisely in this respect that 
Malaysia differed from other Muslim nations including Indonesia. Comparison between 
Malaysia and Indonesia highlights the significance of the mode of state intervention in 
religious affairs to control religious mobilization at the societal level. 
In Malaysia, as shown in the previous chapters, the Islamic institutions were placed-
and relatively centralized-within the formal state structure where the dominance of 
UMNO was not questioned. Religious officials employed by the government-
including Mufti, Syariah court officials, and religious teachers-were seen as the 
ultimate, and legitimate, source of Islamic rulings and teaching in the Muslim 
community at large. The working environment of non-governmental ulama, .on the other 
hand, was highly restrained. For instance, they were required to obtain a license from 
the government to run their private schools; otherwise, they would be harassed by the 
state religious officials. In the worst case, they were suspected as 'deviant,' and if seen 
as a threat to 'national security,' forced to terminate their activities. Some of them might 
enjoy a limited audience at the grass-roots level; the popularity and the influence of PAS 
ulama, for example, had little to do with official positions in the government, but more 
to do with their personality, comparable to Weber's 'charismatic authority. '22 Their 
personalistic authority, however, was inevitably temporary in nature, and was not 
22 For an explanation of the popularity of the PAS ulama, see, for example, Farish (2003b). 
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powerful enough for them to ignore the influence of the state religious officialdom. 
Moreover, non-theologically trained Muslim individuals and intellectuals in Malaysia 
have been allowed only little space and scope to express their religious views or speak 
out in the name of Islam. When they speak, they can be threatened with legal action by 
state religious authorities who accuse them of having no pr?per religious qualification 
to do so. In short, the Islamic market was highly regulated by the state religious 
apparatus. Deviation from the state-sanctioned religious rulings and teachings could be 
a serious offence in Malaysia's Muslim community. 
Where did this mode of religious authority structure come from in the first place? 
Answering this question is to look at the approach adopted by the government towards 
Islam on institutional and ideological fronts. Overall, in Malaysia, Islam was allowed a 
central place within the state. Islam was instituted as the official religion of the 
Federation at independence and meant to guarantee the cultural and political dominance 
of the majority, yet socio-economically less advanced, Muslims. The place of Islam, 
however, was, in practice, reinforced since the former Prime Minster Mahathir came to 
power. One important consequence of his aggressive Islamization policies was 
unprecedented state intervention in religious affairs; the state apparatuses overseeing 
Islamic affairs were institutionalized-albeit in different degrees across sectors-as 
discussed in the prior chapters. Moreover, the process of institutionalization under the 
paternalistic one-party dominant regime brought about a significant outcome: 
co-optation of Islamic scholars and teachers into the tightly defined public service just 
like any other public servant. Under this mechanism, Islamic elites came to depend 
further on the government for their religious authority as well as material rewards. In 
the educational sector, for example, increasing state encroachment upon private 
religious schools meant that their teaching curriculum as well as their relations with 
followers and students were increasingly regulated. 
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In the context of UMNO's predominance in the state, the expans10n of such a 
regulatory system armed UMNO leadership with the capacity to manage religious views 
more efficiently and effectively. They did not usually need to resort to the notorious 
Internal Security law to achieve this end. Moreover, they also attained relative 
independence in making decisions on Islamic issues. On the other hand, the state 
designated ulama were expected to be responsive to the interests and preference of the 
UMNO leaders in performing their religious duties-including issuingfatwa. 
The relatively high level of institutionalization of the religious apparatus also helped 
facilitate the Malaysian government's handling of the international 
War-Against-Terrorism by curbing manifestations of Islamic opposition. The 
government openly condemned the US bombing and occupation of Afghanistan but at 
the same time it quietly cooperated with the US in intelligence and security matters. The 
government therefore wanted to prevent Islamic groups, including PAS, from 
mobilizing big anti-American demonstrations of the sort that occurred elsewhere. 
Although religious officials had no sympathy for terrorists operating in Malaysia, many 
had at least deep reservations about Western, especially America_n, policy in the Middle 
East, and many strongly opposed it. When the Malaysian Ulama Association issued a 
resolution declaring that 'support of any kind of the military attacks in Afghanistan or 
any other Muslim country should be regarded as haram (forbidden for Muslims),' 
UMNO leaders bluntly dismissed the view as lacking legal 'validity.' Then Deputy 
Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, for instance, said that 'it has no right to make 
any fatwa. Only the National Fatwa Council has the right to do this' (Malaysiakini, 3 
December 2001). The National Fatwa Council Chairman, Ismail Ibrahim, on his part, 
issued a simple statement advising that 'Muslims in Malaysia should stay away from the 
conflicts of other nations and not get caught up by their calls for a holy war' (Star, 26 
September 2001). Given the fact that council was under the Prime Minister's 
299 
Department, it was hardly surprising that his stand was in line with that of UMNO 
leaders. The episode reminds us, again, that the government had the monopoly over the 
issuing of fatwa. Whatever their personal feelings about the US War-Against-Terrorism, 
religious officials remained silent. 
The significance of its administrative control over religious institutions was further 
demonstrated by the government's intensified scrutiny of private religious schools after 
the exposure of the involvement of Malaysians in the planned Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
attack on embassies in Singapore (For instance, Star, 2 January 2002, 19 January 2002 
and 22 January 2002). The use of the state coercive apparatus-most notably the 
ISA-may have been necessary and effective to crush extremist movements. But it 
proved politically quite costly for Muslim politicians in the government to rely heavily 
on the security apparatus to suppress Islamic movements. The religious apparatus, 
located within the state bureaucracy, helped to buffer such political damage by offering 
doctrinal confirmation for actions taken by the ruling politicians. 
In Indonesia, by contrast, religious authority has been largely placed outside the 
formal state structure and dispersed widely in the societal realm. Religious political 
activism at the societal level is diverse and very active. There is no one single institution 
that could claim the ultimate authority over Islamic matters. Even the Islamic court 
system is very decentralized and the government has no monopoly over the issuing of 
fatwa. Various non-governmental Islamic organizations administer their own 
hierarchical orders, run schools, hospitals and various other socio-economic and 
political activities, and wield considerable command over their respective constituencies. 
In particular, private Islamic schools-both traditional- and modem-type-have 
produced numerous independent-minded Islamic scholars and teachers. Some individual 
Islamic scholars-such as the prominent Nurcholish Madjid-were highly respected 
both in their own intellectual capacity and influential as public opinion leaders. Debate 
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on Islamic issues covers a wide ideological spectrum and not only a few, but many, 
organizations and individuals competed to claim 'the true version of Islam' (Hefner 
1997). 23 Under these liberal 'free-market' circumstances, religious dissension-and 
even radical ideas and organizations-was relatively tolerated. Since the fall of 
Suharto's New Order regime, radical and militant Islamist groups such as Laskar Jihad 
and FPI (Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders' Front) emerged and stayed 
active-and vocal-although their support base was limited (Fealy 2004; Kadir 2004: 
211-14). Moreover, an overtly Islamist party, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, 
Prosperous Justice Party), and the, at least formally, Islamist PPP (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan, United Development Party) have won significant electoral success, 
while the mainstream 'secular-nationalist' party, Golkar-has adopted Islam-friendly 
programs and emphasizes Islamic credentials (Baswedan 2004).24 
The Indonesian government's approach to Islam-the way in which the government 
intervened in religious affairs-greatly contributed to such vigorous and diverse 
religious political activism at the societal level. In Indonesia, Islam has only been given 
a minor place in the formal s_tate structure since independence, despite more than 85 
percent of the population being Muslims. The government, in general, adopted a 
'secular-nationalist' approach; it did not adopt the principle that the state and religion 
should be kept separate but that all religions should be acknowledged. At the 
ideological level, for example, it promulgated Pancasila25 as the official ideology of the 
Republic. Pancasila was promoted as the symbol of national integration, and provided 
both Muslims and non-Muslims with an official assurance that the Indonesian state 
23 Hefner is somewhat cautious about this view in his other account. He points out that there is a certain 
'standardization' tendency both at intra and inter-religious levels as a result of state policy (Hefner 1999). 
24 After the fall of Suharto in 1998, political parties mushroomed. Among 141 new political parties, 42 
were Islamic; defined as parties that either explicitly claim Islam as their ideology or draw support mostly 
from Islamic organizations. Only 20 Islamic parties qualified to compete in the 1999 election (Baswedan 
2004: 672). 
25 Pancasila consists of the following five principles included in the Preamble to the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1945: belief in God, a just and civilized humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian 
democracy through consultation and consensus, and social justice. For debates surrounding the national 
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would not prioritize Islam over other religions. Moreover, this ideological position 
reflected-and came to confirm-the received assumption that the state should not play 
a major role in the running oflslamic affairs at the institutional level. 26 
During much of the New Order period (1965-1998), the government's chief focus 
was to monitor and control the political activities of Islamic organizations. It heavily 
relied on security and intelligence agencies to achieve this goal.. Despite the restrictions 
it imposed on political Islam, however, the government under Suharto did not 
discourage religious socio-cultural activities. In fact, its accommodative stance included 
the sponsorship of various Islamic organizations and activities, especially since the 
1980s (Effendy 1994; Hefner 1997; Liddle 1996). It provided massive infrastructural 
support, especially in the field of education and social welfare, once the Suharto regime 
recognized that Islam was no longer associated with an overt form of political activism 
(Hefner 1997). In the educational sphere, for instance, the government not only 
developed the state religious school system, but also subsidized tens of thousands of 
private Islamic schools. An already existing system of state Islamic teachers' training 
colleges (IAIN) was expanded and granted additional state funding (Feillard 1997). The 
Department of Religious Affairs was assigned the task of assisting and regulating 
religious matters such as religious education. But, the government's 'secular-nationalist' 
principles served to limit its role. In the educational sphere, many private Islamic 
schools were short of financial resources and requested the department's assistance. The 
department, on the other hand, was willing to help because this allowed it to tighten its 
administrative control over such schools (Feillard 1997: especially 141-45). 
'Secular-nationalist' politicians, however, often opposed such aid on 
'secular-nationalist' ideological grounds (Interview with a Department of Religious 
ideology, see (Ramage 1995). 
26 This ideological mechanism, however, was later used by President Suharto as an instrument for 
political control of religious (particularly Islamic) groups. In 1985, the government required all social, 
religious, and political organizations to adopt it as their asas tunggal (sole ideological foundation). See, 
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Affairs official, Jakarta, 26 September 2001). 
The government's approach generally left many of the religious functions including 
education to non-governmental actors, and kept state-sponsored Islamic institutions 
such as Islamic courts on the periphery of the state administrative structure. 27 Although 
their political activities were largely restrained during the Suharto era, religious 
activities of non-governmental religious organizations-including the NU and 
Muhammadiyah-flourished against the backdrop of rising Islamic consciousness in the 
past decades (Hefner 1987; Liddle 1996; Schwarz 1994). These organizations, after all, 
oversee religious educational institutions, and control key channels for the proliferation 
of Islamic teaching and ideas. It was, therefore, not surprising that education was one 
area most emphasized. Importantly, their relative administrative autonomy from the 
state in the educational area meant that there was little pressure to homogenize Islamic 
teaching. Further, these non-governmental organizations were permitted to retain great 
leverage over enforcement of Islamic ruling and interpretation of doctrines. The most 
notable example was their privilege to issue their own fatwa for their respective 
constituencies (Hooker 2003). 
The relative autonomy allowed to private ulama and kiai, however, do~s not mean 
that the Indonesian government had no interest in regulating their religious activities. 
The government was well aware of the immense grass-roots influence of religious 
leaders in the Muslim community. During much of the New Order rule, it devised 
various means to interfere with-and exert control over-the ulama and kiai's 
followings. Yet, it is important to remember, what matters is not so much the size as the 
quality of state intervention to adequately understand the effects of state intervention in 
Islamic affairs. It is precisely in this quality aspect that Indonesia differed from 
Malaysia. The government's intervention in religious institutions, was overwhelmingly 
for instance (Adnan 1990; Hefner 1997). 
27 For more recent developments in this legal sphere, see (Effendy 1994; Hooker 1999). 
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'personalistic' and sometimes aimed at 'divide and rule,' as opposed to Weber's model 
of merit-based legal-rational bureaucratic authority. Recruitment and promotion of 
religious officials, for example, was commonly based on personal connections and 
organizational affiliations. 28 The primary loyalty of officials appointed to 
state-sponsored Islamic organizations remained with their original private organizations. 
Organizational interests of the state religious agency were often identified with those of 
the particular religious group in control at any particular time, leaving it too weak to 
enforce state regulation over non-state actors independently. And, these officials could 
exit from official and semi-official offices relatively easily because the state office was 
not the prime foundation of their religious authority, career and employment. The 
Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) and the Association of Indonesian Muslim 
Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia or ICMI) were such 
organizational devices to co-opt ulama and kiai (Hefner 1993; Liddle 1996; Porter 
2002). 
The incorporation of religious leaders under the New Order was never adequate or 
complete. As a result, much religious authority was left in the societal sphere (Porter 
2002). This particular pattern of state-Islam relations-and the government's 
personalistic intervention in Islamic affairs in particular-remained virtually intact 
under the post-Suharto administrations. One important consequence of this is that ulama 
were generally excluded from the major corridors of state power (except during the 
brief presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid), but retained considerable freedom to express 
their religious views and propagate a range of Islamic teachings-liberal or extremist. 
The government, on the other hand, was left with only limited institutional facility and 
religious authority to regulate Islamic affairs independently and effectively. 
28 Muhammadiyah members, for example, dominated various posts in the Religious Affairs Department 
from the national to the local levels since the 1970s. According to a NU leader, the trend continued at the 
local level, even after the former NU Chairman Wahid came to power (Interview with a NU leader, 
Jakarta, 17 September 2001). 
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CONCLUSION 
In many parts of the Muslim world, governing elites constantly grapple with radical 
religious mobilization and religious-inspired violence at the societal level. After 
September 11 2001, these trends have drawn unprecedented attention among scholars 
and policymakers alike. In the context of the War Against Terror and Western efforts to 
construct democracy in the Muslim world, many fiercely debate how government 
leaders should deal with religious leaders (ulama) and institutions to keep radical 
religious mobilization under control. The key controversy here is the nature of the 
state's relationship to religious authority. Should a state include or exclude religious 
authorities from government decision-making? If exclusion is not the answer, how 
should the state accommodate religious leaders and teachers? 
This study has aimed to contribute to this debate concerning religious mobilization in 
Muslim nations. Contrary to commonly held perceptions of Western observers, not all 
Muslim nations suffer from a proliferation of radical and violent Islamist .movements. 
Malaysia offers a case at the 'tranquil' end of the spectrum. From a comparative 
perspective, peaceful character of political Islam in Malaysia is quite striking. In the 
1970s, the emergence of revivalist Islamic movements was a salient trend-just as was 
the case in many other Muslim societies across the globe. However, radical and violent 
Islamic elements were largely curtailed both ideologically and organizationally. 
Malaysia stands out among other Muslim nations in another respect, namely its 
'quiescence': the lack of vibrant Islamic doctrinal debates and near absence of liberal 
and plural Islamic activism. Recent studies on Islam and politics cherish the 'new 
Islamic intellectual activism' that new media of communication and mass education 
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have promoted (e.g., Eickeleman and Anderson 1999, 2003). Educated individuals who 
are not religious scholars increasingly contribute to the discussion of Islamic values and 
practices, thereby posing challenges to traditional religious authorities over rights to 
interpret religious texts (Eickelman and Anderson 1999). Indonesia, for example, has 
offered a fertile ground for a wide spectrum of Islamic intellectual activities and liberal 
Islamic movements. However, the presence of pluralistic Islam and vibrant intellectual 
culture alone is not sufficient to guarantee a transition from authoritarian rule to 
democratization. For a transition to succeed, state institutions capable of protecting and 
consolidating civil and democratic cultural practices are a prerequisite. Moreover, as the 
Indonesian and other cases suggest, radical Islarnist movements can hijack 
technological and political opportunities to achieve their political goals (Hefner 2004). 
Nonetheless, the emergence of a 'public sphere,' where new Islamic political ideas are 
debated and new interpretational skills are promoted, is an important step forward in the 
development of civil society. 
Not all Muslim societies benefit from such intellectual activism or from pluralistic 
and liberal Islam. Malaysia has lagged behind in this respect-despite its relative 
political openness and high level of socio-economic development (by Muslim 
standards). Only a very few Western-educated Muslim intellectuals or movements have 
aspired to challenge the 'official' positions of the ulama that they consider to be too 
conservative or radical, or to advocate liberal Islamic ideas and interpretations among 
the Muslim public. And, their impact in the domestic religious sphere seems extremely 
limited. They have been considered unqualified to speak authoritatively about Islamic 
questions due to their lack of theological training. Malaysia is far advanced in the IT 
field and its literacy rate is very high so it should reap benefits from this widening 
access to the outside world, even if tight government regulations are taken into account. 
Why, then, is Malaysia seemingly so intolerant in religious terms? 
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This study asserts that the institutionalization of religious bureaucratic authority 
structures strongly correlates with the immobility oflslamic activism in Malaysia-both 
radical and liberal types of activism. The government coercive apparatus-police force 
(especially its Special Branch) and draconian laws (especially the International Security 
Act)-may be effective as a short-term means for suppressing oppositional Islamic 
forces. However, the long-term effect of these measures is less certain. Religious 
movements, after all, are not political organizations as such-although their political 
characteristics and political impact should not be denied. The capacity of religious 
movements to mobilize followers derive from their apolitical activities, such as their 
provision of education or welfare programs, as well as from the appeal of their religious 
ideas. Keeping 'dangerous' radical Islamic elements in detention is not sufficient to 
eradicate movements, as witnessed in the case of Al-Aqam. Moreover, government 
authorities need to establish a legitimate doctrinal case to ban them unless they take up 
obviously violent means. To do so, the co-operation and compliance of religious 
authorities is essential; how to seek this co-operation is the key. 
State Co-optation Strategies of Religious Authorities 
Government campaigns to co-opt religious scholarly communities to propagate 'official' 
Islam are not an unusual phenomenon in the Muslim nations. In Egypt, for example, the 
government sought to co-opt the Al-Azhar institution-the central institution of Islamic 
learning-and ulama who run it to secure religious legitimation for its policies and to 
fight its Islamist opponents, especially the Islamic Brotherhood (Moustafa 2000; Zeghal 
1999). In Pakistan, too, the military regime of General Zia lent lavish material support 
to the development of madrasah schools to secure compliance of the religious scholarly 
communities (Nasr 2000). In both cases, however, the state efforts to co-opt religious 
authorities proved unsuccessful. 
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My study emphasizes that the type of government co-optation strategy-which varies 
across place and time-has a significant effect on the state's capacities to deal with 
Islamist opponents. The Malaysian government's co-optation strategy that incorporates 
institutionalization of the Weberian mode of bureaucracy is strikingly different from 
those strategies adopted by many other Muslim nations. The strength of the Malaysian 
government's co-optation strategy is derived from its relatively high level of 
'Weberian-ness': legal-rational and meritocratic precepts, rather than ascriptive rules 
and values, permeate bureaucratic organizations tasked to run Islamic affairs. It is 
important to emphasize that greater state intervention in Islamic affairs did not simply 
lead to Muslim politicians' personal abuse of religious offices. Nor did it result in 
Islamist groups' hijacking religious offices to advance their private interests. The 
relative neutrality of state religious offices-and clear distinction between public and 
private interests-has assured the credibility and social esteem of religious officialdom, 
although these same religious officials were left vulnerable to intervention by the ruling 
Muslim politicians within the state. 
The distinguishing characteristic of this 'bureaucratic' co-optation-as opposed to 
'patrimonial' co-optation that characterizes strategies of many other Muslim 
governments-is the way in which authority and legitimacy are conferred onto the state 
religious organizations, which themselves are founded on legality and run by qualified 
officials. The Malaysian government substantially invested in the. recruitment and 
training of religious officials qualified to carry out specific duties-Syariah judges or 
religious teachers. It not only developed the system of recruitment, remuneration, and 
training, but also sponsored the expansion of tertiary-level Islamic education that 
accommodated students from traditional religious schools. What is significant about the 
expanding state role in the running of religious functions is that the government created 
career opportunities for traditional religious school students. Without adequate 
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education in non-religious fields, these students could otherwise have been left 
dislocated or unemployed under a modernizing regime, only to feed social unrest, or 
possibly to provide ready recruits for radical religious mobilization. In this respect, too, 
institutionalization has had an effect of 'nipping in the bud' a potential source of radical · 
religious mobilization. 
The bureaucratic mode of co-optation allowed Muslim ruling politicians a sufficient 
authority and legitimacy to define 'official' and 'correct' Islam and to fight Islamist 
opponents both in ideological and organizational terms. This does not mean, of course, 
that Muslims have completely lost their capacity to dispute the official version of Islam. 
Some still question the state's role in dictating 'orthodoxy.' But, the cost of doing so is 
high and the space for dissent is greatly minimized. Under this condition, the prospect 
of extremist Islamist movements for mobilizing a broad spectrum of the Muslim public 
IS gnm. 
Intra-State Tensions and State-Religion Relations 
It is a conventional view that Muslim-majority countries have never had a centralized 
church structure. Similarly, many believe that a centralized clerical order was unusual in 
Islamic doctrine and thinking. Accordingly, it is commonly held that political forces 
have driven the development of a church-like bureaucratic structure that regulates a 
range of Islamic affairs in Malaysia. 
This study illuminates two levels of intra-state tensions that became apparent in the 
process of institutionalization: intense and expensive rivalry in UMNO, the dominant 
party in the governing coalition, and ideological tension between Muslim politicians 
and religious officials. In doing so, the study sought to go beyond conventional views 
about political Islam that tend to focus on tensions between state and societal actors. 
First, the study shows that state intervention and institutionalization of Islamic 
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authority structures are not consistently affecting all policy sectors equally; instead, 
there is striking variation across sectors. 'Islamization of the state due to an Islamic 
political challenge' is an overly simplistic interpretation and this study has tried to use 
analytical tools to understand the political agency driving state intervention in Islam. A 
central claim advanced by this study is that the level, and the type, of state intervention 
differs across sectors as a result of patronage-maximizing incentive structures of 
Muslim politicians in the dominant party. In the context of UMNO's dominance and 
increasingly expensive intra-party competition, the Muslim politicians sought to expand 
their own patronage channels to achieve political ascendancy within the party. 
Importantly, strategies they adopted to achieve this goal differed according to their 
respective positions in the party hierarchy. For federal-level politicians, on the one hand, 
their close ties with wealthy corporate businesses, especially economically powerful 
Chinese business, have become as important as their traditional Muslim constituencies, 
because those businesses finance their costly election campaigns for their political rise 
and survival. Such clientelistic ties left them considerably amenable to the corporate 
business interests and the expectations of the Chinese community. On the other hand, 
for the state-level leaders-particularly those from Muslim-dominated rural 
States-their ties with traditional Muslim constituencies remain very important. Since 
religious leaders are politically very influential in the local Muslim community, the 
State prerogative over religions matters offered them valuable patronage-dispensing 
resources for consolidating their support bases. This intra-party difference had a 
significant effect on the way in which the state institutionalized Islamic affairs, leading 
to variation in outcomes across sectors. 
This claim differs from conventional arguments that primarily emphasize the effect of 
societal pressures-and electoral pressures from the Islamic opposition, in 
particular-to explain state intervention in Islamic affairs. My emphasis on strategic 
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interaction among Muslim politicians within the state, however, does not completely 
ignore the function of societal actors. The study argues that when the Muslim ruling 
politicians can advance their own interests by appealing to a particular social interest, 
they will do so. Yet, it is important to note that the primary cause of this response is 
attributed to the interests of state actors rather than to the interests of societal actors. 
The second level of intra-state tension highlighted in this study is the one between 
Muslim politicians and state religious officials. This tension has grown more 
conspicuous with the intensification of federal intervention in Islamic affairs. For 
religious officials, serving official functions means that they are required to submit 
themselves to state rules and norms as well as to political dictates that may not 
necessarily be consistent with their doctrinal positions. How do religious officials 
reconcile such tensions? Does political calculation always dictate their behavior? Or, do 
their personal views about 'what Islam dictates' play some part? Tensions between 
Muslim politicians and religious officials that flare up from time to time expose this 
tension. In general, in Malaysia, the UMNO sought to advocate a progressive and 
moderate Islam compatible with material development. Religious officials, on the other 
hand, tended to be more conservative and cautious about rapid social change. The most 
controversial issue was the position of women. 
Similar tensions can be witnessed in many other Muslim nations; whose position 
prevails depends on the political and institutional context. The power balance between 
political elites and religious elites may also vary across time, as well as across place. 
When tension surfaced in Malaysia, politicians' positions almost always prevailed and 
the politicians managed to quiet religious officials. This compliance of religious 
officials was primarily attributable to the mode of state co..:optation of religious 
authorities. Malaysia's relatively well-institutionalized state religious apparatus meant 
that religious authorities were made highly dependent upon the state-and the 
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politicians who dominated it-for their authority, material benefits, and career prospects. 
They recognized that they had to follow the logic of obedience and compliance in a 
tightly defined organizational hierarchy once they became a part of the structure. 
Separation between State and Church: Should the State Retreat from Running of 
· Religious Affairs? 
The building of a church-like clerical organization within the state tends to discredit not 
only 'radicals' but also 'liberals.' For advocates of plural and civil Islam, excessive state 
regulation of Islamic activities is only a vice; it does nothing but harm to the 
development of a civil society in Muslim communities. This raises a fundamental 
question concerning state-religion relations in the Muslim nations. Should the state 
refrain from running religious affairs? 
As noted in the previous chapters, the separation between state and religion is not a 
received wisdom in Islamic thinking; separation between the state and church is a 
radical claim in Islamic doctrine. There will be no shortage of religious leaders or 
Islamists who continue to claim political power in the name of Islam. In practice, too, 
secularism-separation between the state and religion-does not seem to be the best 
option. State repression and exclusion of Islamist movements and leaders has had high 
costs; it often compels them to go underground or to take up violence to fight back 
against states, resulting in numerous civilian casualties. These experiences suggest that 
state exclusion of religious leaders from the corridors of state power is not the optimal 
strategy for controlling violent and radical types of Islamic mobilization. If exclusion is 
not the answer, the question is how to incorporate religious scholarly communities into 
state decision-making. 
Allowing Islamist movements the right to participate in elections is said to be one 
way to accommodate them into the formal political system and to keep religious 
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radicalization and religious violence to a minimum. But, this alone does not appear to 
be sufficient in controlling the level of religious radical mobilization. In Indonesia, 
religious radical movements and religious violence became more prominent after the 
fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime and the introduction of free elections in which 
Islamist parties could also participate. 
The Malaysian case proposes another mode of state incorporation of religious 
scholarly communities into the state structure. It shows that when religious authorities 
are incorporated into the state bureaucratic structure in a way to match Weber's 
legal-rational and meritocratic model, radical religious elements tend to be tempered. 
The distinctive feature of this model is that the Weberian-ness of state religious 
apparatus guarantees a particular quality of state intervention in religious matters. 
Unlike a patrimonial mode of state intervention that tends to favor the interests of 
particular private actors, bureaucratic intervention based on rules and qualifications at 
least ensures that the running of religious affairs including Syariah laws and religious 
education should not be skewed overtly to serve particular political interests outside the 
state. 
An intriguing twist here is that the religious authority structures have expanded and 
been institutionalized under tight state supervision. Moreover, this state is dominated by 
a Muslim-based dominant-party regime ruling since independence, and retains some 
authoritarian characteristics. A relatively well-institutionalized religious apparatus was 
tightly placed under state control to provide the ruling politicians with 'infrastructural 
power' to implement their command over potential Islamist opponents. 
This use of well-institutionalized religious organizations helps resolve a paradox 
ansmg out of the Malaysian case; two apparently contradicting forces-patronage 
incentives and institutionalization-come together. Since 'strong' institutionalized 
government organizations equip the ruling politicians with an institutional instrument to 
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fortify their power base against opponents, their personal interests in fact worked to 
reinforce institutionalization of state apparatus. 1 
Now political and religious authorities join forces-both against Islamic opponents 
and to oversee religious and political life of Muslims. If we can draw a lesson from 
other religious traditions, it may be inevitable that the expansion of religious authority 
st~ctures have created a religiously conservative and ideologically narrow culture-an 
institutional and ideological pressure to comply with one 'orthodox' view. 
I have reiterated the ideological and organizational importance of Islamic movements 
in mobilizing the populace against an authoritarian regime or propagating a new vision 
of society. Not all the Islamist movements are harmful. As recent developments in other 
parts of the Muslim world illustrate, Islamist parties tend to be very well organized and 
enjoy broad popular allegiance. Some have added militia wings to their movements 
(such as Hezbollah in Lebanon), but less violent Islamist core groups also exist to 
generally fight for a just cause. Islamist parties have also proved that they can 
peacefully contend for state office (NYT, 21 May 2005). Limiting ideological and 
organizational channels of Islamic activities is to deny Muslims valuable means for 
political expression and civil activism. The relatively smooth and peaceful form of 
religious mobilization observed in Malaysia was achieved at the cost of pluralistic and 
civil Islamic activism in the Muslim community. 
1 Slater offers a solid theoretical answer to this paradox between personalization and institutionalization 
in Malaysia (Slater 2003). 
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